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Technological advancement and globalization have dramatically impacted the business 
models of multinational enterprises (“MNEs’’). This has complicated the taxation of these 
enterprises significantly. It becomes especially complex, when companies belonging to the 
same multinational group collectively develop (intangible) business assets or centralize 
the performance of (supporting) group services. Which group companies should then 
bear the costs and which are entitled to the additional profits generated through these 
activities?
 
MNEs often structure their intragroup collaboration in legal agreements that foresee in 
a joint ownership of results and that allocate the costs in proportion to each participant’s 
anticipated benefits. These agreements are commonly referred to as cost contribution 
arrangements (“CCAs”) or cost sharing arrangements (“CSAs”). This study analyzes the 
most relevant rules and regulations governing their tax and transfer pricing treatment and 
sets out to determine how effective those rules are at facilitating legitimate CCAs while 
countering their use in tax avoidance structures.
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Preface
In my work as an in-house tax lawyer at a multinational company I have expe-
rienced at first-hand how complex it can be to design, implement and main-
tain a system for allocating the costs and benefits associated with more or 
less centralized activities. Generally the purpose of such exercise is to ensure 
tax deductibility in respect of costs and to avoid double taxation in respect of 
profits, while running a process that is practical enough to operate efficiently 
and transparent enough to explain to stakeholders. All of that not only requires 
a thorough understanding of the applicable tax rules and regulations, but also 
a deep insight in the business model of the company. To put it differently: It can 
offer a very interesting challenge!
Cost contribution arrangements or “CCAs” are a specific type of agreements 
that is often used for purposes of the above. They have so far received rela-
tively limited academic attention, despite their apparent importance to every 
day fiscal practice. Over time that made me realize that they presented a great 
opportunity for a research project and I have not regretted selecting them as the 
topic for my PhD thesis ever since. This book is the result of that decision and 
my subsequent in-depth study into the tax treatment of CCAs. It examines how 
those arrangements relate to international transfer pricing standards, considers 
their position under international tax law and ultimately draws conclusions 
about the future for CCAs in a world that is more and more critical about the tax 
strategies of multinational enterprises.
Materials have been included up to 1 May 2018. 
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1.  Justification
1.1. Introduction
Over the last decades technological advancement and progressing globaliza-
tion have (dramatically) changed the world economy. These developments have 
opened up many new markets and at the same time fundamentally changed 
the way in which multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) operate their businesses. 
Nowadays critical activities may take place online and MNEs might employ 
internationally organized, “virtual” teams of specialists, who can work together 
in digitalized environments from different locations across the world. There has 
also been a material impact on value chains, among others increasing the rele-
vant importance of intangible assets like technology, know-how, brand names 
and trademarks. 1 Although these trends have clearly contributed to economic 
growth and global prosperity, they have also posed difficult to answer questions 
in the context of international tax law. It has become significantly more complex 
to determine how costs and business income are to be allocated among group 
companies.  Meanwhile, MNE group companies will more often collaborate to 
jointly develop tangible or intangible assets or obtain services at their common 
expense and risk. As a part of this collaboration more or less centralized depart-
ments perform activities for the benefit of the group. Centers of expertise 
perform marketing and R&D activities that result in the group’s most valuable 
intangible assets, while shared service centers provide relevant support services 
in a wide range of areas, such as general management, accounting, legal, HR, 
IT etc. For tax purposes it will have to be established where the related costs 
are deductible and, perhaps even more importantly, where the additionally 
generated profit is subject to taxation. Much depends on the business model 
operated by the MNEs involved. Where the development of intangible assets is 
concerned, a group company performing most of the centralized marketing or 
R&D activities may for example come to own those assets. It can then license 
1 The value chain is a set of activities that a company performs in order to deliver a valuable product 
or service for the market. The concept comes from business management and was first described 
by Michael Porter in 1985. See: Porter 1985. 
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1.  JUSTIFICATION
them out to affiliates that use them in the course of their business in return for 
an appropriate royalty. When support services are provided, the group company 
providing these services could charge a businesslike service fee to the benefiting 
group companies. These scenarios imply a solution based on the recognition 
of segregated transactions covering individual activities. Alternatively, MNEs 
could choose a more holistic approach. Under certain conditions they could set 
up a framework agreement for any combination of joint activities that provides 
for an allocation of costs and risks among group companies proportionate to 
their relative share in anticipated benefits. Such framework agreements are 
referred to as cost contribution arrangements (“CCAs”) or, in the United States, 
as cost sharing agreements (“CSAs”) and they are the subject of this study.
1.2. Definition of a CCA
The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines define a CCA as follows:
“A CCA is a contractual arrangement among business enterprises to share 
the contributions and risks involved in the joint development, production 
or the obtaining of intangibles, tangible assets or services with the under-
standing that such intangibles, tangible assets or services are expected to 
create benefits for the individual businesses of each of the participants.”2
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines then add to this:
“In accordance with the arm’s length principle, at the time of entering into 
a CCA, each participant’s proportionate share of the overall contributions 
to a CCA must be consistent with its proportionate share of the overall 
expected benefits to be received under the arrangement.”3
The United Nations’ Transfer Pricing Manual on the other hand defines a CCA 
as “an arrangement between enterprises to share the costs and risks of devel-
oping, producing or obtaining assets, services or rights. The arrangement set out 
the responsibilities and risks of the participants and the nature and extent of the 
interest of each participant’s assets, services or rights resulting from the arrange-
ment”.4
2 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.3.
3 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.5.
4 United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (2017), page 636. 
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In my own words a CCA is an arrangement under which the participating compa-
nies, generally members of the same multinational group, agree to jointly 
perform certain predefined activities aimed at collectively obtaining assets or 
services. The arrangement structures the collective ownership of the results of 
those activities and thus allows for the individual exploitation of those results 
by participants. It allocates the costs and risks associated with the activities 
performed among participants in proportion to their expected benefits from 
such exploitation. 
A CCA can be open ended, if cost shared activities are performed continuously, 
or it can have a fixed term, if the activities are performed on a project basis. 
However it generally does not involve an individually defined and ring-fenced 
request by a principal to a service provider. As a consequence the associated 
costs and risks can theoretically be regarded the own costs of the CCA partici-
pants. Similarly the results will be their collective effective ownership right from 
the very moment that they come to exist. That implies that participants have 
unrestricted access to any intangibles that might be developed under the CCA 
and they can exploit them without having to make any further compensation 
payments to other co-developers. In a US context Shea and Lewis have worded 
this fundamental aspect of a CCA follows: 
“The principle US tax feature of such an arrangement is that, once the 
property is developed, its subsequent use by participating group members 
without charge will not result in reallocations of income...”5
This unrestricted, unburdened access to cost shared results guarantees a free-
flow of knowledge and expertise throughout the group and therefore allows for 
a legal structuring of activities that is well aligned with how many MNEs prefer 
to organize their operations.  At the same time it can also reduce administrative 
complexity. These and other legitimate, non-fiscal benefits from operating a 
CCA are further discussed in Paragraph 2.3.1.  
1.3. Example
The difference between an exchange of services, licensing arrangement and a 
CCA can be illustrated by the following example:
The fictitious company X Electronics (“X”) is a multinational group that 
manufactures and sells consumer electronics. Its parent company is located 
5 Shea and Lewis, The Tax Executive 1987, page 357 – 363.
1.2.  DEFINITION OF A CCA
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1.  JUSTIFICATION
in the United States (X US). The group has further established a number of 
manufacturing plants at logistically strategic locations and has local distri-
bution subsidiaries in every country where it sells its products. Manufac-
turing and sales are considered the group’s primary business activities. Next 
to that X US takes care of the group’s executive management. The group’s 
global R&D center is located in Singapore (X Singapore), while X UK coor-
dinates the group’s strategic marketing activities and operates a shared 
service center (SSC) that renders financial, legal and administrative support 
services to the other group companies.
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Figure 1: “X Electronics Business Model”
Each of the group companies employs sufficiently qualified personnel to 
service its own national market and to independently manage its own 
operations. Manufacturers contribute to the group’s joint R&D effort, for 
example by sharing experiences with the implementation of new technology 
or by providing data on process efficiencies. In a comparable way the distrib-
utors facilitate the group’s joint marketing effort, for example by performing 
market analysis and testing the effect of global marketing strategies. 
Under a first possible business model X Electronics would fully segregate all 
individual intercompany transactions. In this scenario X Singapore and X UK 
could be appointed principal companies for R&D and strategic marketing 
respectively. They could coordinate the associated activities and would have 
to appropriately compensate the other group companies for their contribu-
tion to the development and maintenance of intangible assets. In return 
they would become the full effective owners of the R&D and marketing 
intangibles. X Singapore could then provide a royalty bearing license in 
respect of R&D intangibles to the group’s manufacturers, while X UK could 
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provide a royalty bearing license in respect of the marketing intangibles to 
the group’s distributors. Furthermore, X US and X UK would enter into sepa-
rate service level agreements with all group companies and charge them 
a businesslike service fee taking into account their benefit from executive 
management and support services.  
As an alternative the group could opt to structure the global R&D, strategic 
marketing, executive management and support services in a CCA. In that 
case all the group companies performing primary business activities would 
participate in a single, multilateral framework agreement, thus limiting the 
number of intragroup contracts. They would become the collective owners 
of the R&D and marketing intangibles developed as well as the services 
rendered. As a consequence the group companies would have unrestricted 
access to those assets and services and could freely exploit them in the 
course of their own business. They would be allocated a proportionate part 
of the costs and risks associated with all joint activities in proportion to 
their expected benefits. This could be settled through so called balancing 
payments under a netting system that credits or debits group companies 
for the difference between costs incurred and the costs allocated, thus mini-
mizing the number and size of intragroup payments.
It is important to note that in both scenarios the intercompany transac-
tions will determine to a large extent how the group’s overall taxable profit 
is divided up among the different group companies. At the same time the 
qualification of those intercompany transactions for purposes of inter-
national tax law will determine in which country or countries the group 
companies have to pay tax on their part of the profit. Specifically the allo-
cation of ownership of R&D and marketing intangibles can have a material 
impact on the group’s overall tax burden.  If these intangibles are devel-
oped and owned by X Singapore and X UK, a substantial part of the group’s 
profit will be transferred to those companies through royalty payments. If 
on the other hand the intangibles are jointly developed and co-owned under 
a CCA, the profit allocation will depend on the terms and conditions of that 
arrangement.   
1.4. Relevance of Research
1.4.1. Cost deductibility and Effective Ownership of Intangible Assets
International cooperation between group companies offers synergy benefits 
and economies of scale. However, it also results in a fiscal challenge, when it 
1.3.  EXAMPLE
26
1.  JUSTIFICATION
comes to appropriately allocating to those group companies the costs associ-
ated with the jointly performed activities. Benshalom worded this as follows:
“As business structures, MNEs flourish in those industries where the ability 
to operate an integrated business in numerous jurisdictions enables them to 
internalize efficiently a diversity of the group’s (collective) costs – such as 
transaction costs, research and development costs, information obtaining 
costs and management costs. Hence, tax authorities find it difficult to 
directly assign MNEs’ collective costs and profits to any specific corporate 
entity operating in a certain jurisdiction. This difficulty is particularly high 
with regard to horizontally integrated MNEs in which entities operating in 
different jurisdictions simultaneously utilize the same pool of resources to 
generate value.”6 
Tax authorities are not the only ones concerned. For MNEs themselves it is also 
crucial that they are able to share costs in a consistent and defendable manner. 
If cost reallocations are not accepted and the costs are not tax deductible, 
then that obviously affects their net results significantly. On the other hand a 
cumbersome administrative system of internal cost reallocation is inefficient 
and too expensive and would hurt their competitive position. Hoping to strike 
the right balance between these two considerations the MNE might opt for a 
CCA. This can have fiscal consequences beyond the allocation of costs, because 
it also outlines to what extent the participating group companies are entitled 
to the benefits from the joint activities. Quite relevantly the terms and condi-
tions of the CCA will determine which group companies become the effective 
owner of centrally developed tangible and intangible assets. Specifically owner-
ship of intangibles is becoming ever more important, as research has shown 
that in the modern economy the relative contribution of intangibles to business 
profits has increased strongly. Shapiro and Pham for example have compared 
intangible intensive sectors to other industries looking at the value created per 
employee, the wages earned per employee and the development of the number 
of jobs. The results led them to conclude that “IP-intensive areas of manufac-
turing produce relatively much larger benefits, with the most IP-intensive industry, 
pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals, generating the greatest such benefits”.7 
The trend is further confirmed by the results from an annual study performed 
by investment banking firm Ocean Tomo, which considers the market value of 
S&P 500 companies in comparison to the book value of their tangible assets 
6 Benshalom, Virginia Tax Review 2007/3.
7 Shapiro and Pham 2007.
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while attributing the remainder to intangibles. Where intangibles represented 
approximately 17% of the market value of the considered companies in 1975, 
they accounted for approximately 84% of that value in 2015. 8 Accepting the 
increased importance of intangibles for the value chain of multinationals implies 
that their effective ownership becomes a critical element determining in which 
jurisdiction a major part of the business profits is taxable. This makes a good 
understanding of the fiscal merits of the arrangements under which they are 
developed of crucial importance. Those arrangements could very well be CCAs. 
1.4.2. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Further need for research into the tax aspects of CCAs is triggered by the recent 
concerns about their use in tax avoidance structures. Over the last years there 
has been much to do about the tax strategies of MNEs. The key concern is that 
the international orientation of MNEs places them in a position to minimize 
their tax charge at the expense of governments as well as the taxpaying man 
in the street. Stakeholders in this debate include politicians, non-governmental 
organizations, lobby groups, action committees, tax administrations, other 
taxpayers and, of course, MNEs themselves. More and more it has become clear 
to all of them that inadequate tax and transfer pricing rules are a substantial part 
of the problem.  Tax professionals understand that the pricing of intercompany 
transactions is an abstract exercise rather than an exact science and that tax 
administrations will always be faced with a natural information disadvantage. 
Nevertheless, in the main stream media as well as the political arena the under-
standing of the topic is limited.  As a consequence, among journalists and poli-
ticians many oversimplified and populist arguments have been made, without 
the real bottlenecks being identified or practical measures being proposed. Over 
time however more serious international policymakers have also acknowledged 
the problem. This has led to various international initiatives at different levels. 
The European Commission issued an “Action plan to strengthen the fight against 
tax fraud and tax evasion”9 and a “Recommendation regarding measures intended 
to encourage Third Countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in 
tax matters”10. The Commission set up a “Platform for Tax Good Governance” to 
monitor the progress made by Member States in this context, while the Euro-
pean Parliament issued a “Report on the Fight against Tax Fraud, Tax Evasion and 
8 Ocean Tomo 2015.
9 European Commission, Action plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, 
6 December 2012, COM(2012)722.
10 European Commission, Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third coun-
tries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters, 6 December 2012, OJ 338/37.
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Tax Havens” calling on Member States to half the uncollected tax gap calcu-
lated at € 1 trillion by 2020.11 Furthermore, on 20 June 2016 the EU’s Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council adopted an anti-tax avoidance package, the core of 
which consists of a directive requiring EU Member States to implement a wide 
range of anti-avoidance measures in their national law systems.12 
The EU’s actions build on the measures agreed by OECD Member States and a 
number of other countries in the fall of 2015 under the so called BEPS project. 
This project was initiated three years earlier by the G20 Ministers of Finance 
at a 2012 meeting in Mexico with the intention to strengthen the international 
standards for corporate tax regimes. In early 2013 the OECD’s first publication 
under the project was a Base Analysis Report on base erosion and profit shifting, 
which from that point on was also referred to as “BEPS”.13 This Report identi-
fied the key principles underlying taxation of cross-border activities that offer 
tax avoidance opportunities and recognized that under certain circumstances 
CCAs can be part of the problem. The most aggressive taxpayers might use a 
CCA to allocate the effective ownership of newly developed intangibles to so 
called cash box entities located in tax havens. These entities pay part of devel-
opment costs, but do not themselves perform any development activities nor 
house any expertise that would be required to do so. 14  Four detailed exam-
ples of how CCAs may be applied in tax avoidance structures are considered in 
Paragraph 2.3.2. The OECD’s Base Analysis Report continued to conclude that a 
comprehensive Action Plan was needed to provide countries with instruments 
aimed at better aligning taxing rights with real economic activity. This Action 
Plan was presented by the OECD five months later.15 Among others it included 
an action to develop rules that better ensure that profits are taxed where value 
is created.16 Following through on the different action points related to this 
topic the final reports published in September 2015 included an overall revision 
of the relevant parts of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, including Chapter VI on 
intangibles and Chapter VIII on CCAs.17  As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these 
revisions fundamentally impact the position of CCAs in every day fiscal practice. 
11 European Parliament, Report on the Fight against Tax Fraud, Tax Evasion and Tax Havens 
(2013/2060 INI), 21 May 2013, OJ C55/7.
12 European Council, Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 12 July 2016, OJ L193/1.
13 OECD, “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 12 February 2013.
14 Annex C to the OECD’s Base Analysis Report includes two examples of tax planning structures 
involving the transfer of intangibles under a CCA. 
15 OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 19 July 2013.
16 Actions 8 – 10 of the OECD Action Plan.
17 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value 
Creation”, 5 October 2015.
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1.5. Purpose of Research
1.5.1. Research Objectives
Obviously intangibles have specific characteristics that distinguish them from 
other business assets. They are relatively mobile and easy to reallocate. At the 
same time they can be difficult to identify and value. Some MNEs consider 
these characteristics a tax planning opportunity and actively pursue attributing 
substantial profits to intangibles located in low tax jurisdiction. Others will 
regard the complexity and the possible disagreements with tax authorities a 
difficult to manage risk of double taxation. This was confirmed when Walpole 
and Riedel in 2014 conducted 20 interviews with tax professionals at companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange to gain insight into the extent to which 
tax is a motivator for MNEs to decide where to develop and ultimately locate 
valuable intangibles. They reported their findings in a working paper, in which 
they concluded that in some cases “multinational corporations deal with tax at 
the highest levels of management and tax transfer pricing involving IP is a ‘main-
stream’ activity”, while in other cases “the tax group is left to deal with the tax 
implications of commercial decisions that are taken by others”.18 In both instances 
MNEs might use a CCA for the development of intangibles, albeit with different 
intentions. In my opinion this divide should be taken into account, when rules 
determining the tax and transfer pricing treatment of CCAs are designed 
or applied in practice. While the BEPS initiatives have shown that there is a 
common consensus that tax avoidance has to be called to a halt, this should not 
be achieved at the expense of bona fide taxpayers. Taking that into consider-
ation the research objectives of this study are as follows:
(i) To examine the historical background and original purpose of CCAs and to 
establish how the conceptual thinking about these arrangements as a legit-
imate transfer pricing instrument and a tax avoidance tool evolved over the 
years; 
(ii) To identify the legitimate business reasons for the use of CCAs, to deter-
mine the role of these arrangements in tax avoidance structures and to 
propose a categorization model that can facilitate a tax and transfer pricing 
analysis of their application in practice;
18 Walpole and Riedel 2014.
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(iii) To analyze and compare the applicable transfer pricing rules and regula-
tions governing CCAs as well as relevant case law, focusing primarily on the 
US Cost Sharing Regulations and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines;
(iv) To develop a step plan and a model legal contract facilitating the imple-
mentation of an arm’s length CCA;
(v) To examine the position of CCAs under international tax law and to deter-
mine when this may result in a foreign tax liability of the CCA participants 
taking into account the qualification of the arrangement under tax treaties; 
(vi) To consider how anti-abuse rules aimed at including income of controlled 
foreign corporations in the taxable base of their domestic parent (“CFC 
rules”) can be improved so that they more effectively counter the use of 
CCAs in tax avoidance structures;
(vii) To propose improvements to procedures for obtaining upfront certainty as 
well as for dispute resolution aimed at increasing their effectiveness in situ-
ations involving a CCA. 
I will seek to answer these questions from an objective, legal dogmatic perspec-
tive.  This should allow for a critical analysis from inside the juridical system 
itself, of those elements that have proven to cause uncertainty and disputes in 
everyday fiscal practice. Where appropriate, I will accompany my findings by 
concrete recommendations for improvement.
1.5.2. Limitations of Scope
My research is intended as a contribution to the conceptual thinking, both in an 
academic setting and in every day fiscal practice, about a very specific type of 
legal arrangement that is generally concluded by companies that are members 
of the same multinational group. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive anal-
ysis of each and every possible tax and transfer pricing aspect of CCAs. Instead 
I have focused on the most common issues from a transfer pricing and interna-
tional tax law perspective. There are three limitations of the overall scope that 
deserve explicit mention. 
First, my research accepts and stays within the borders of the existing inter-
national framework of transfer pricing and international tax law. Such frame-
work assumes that companies belonging to the same multinational group are 
to be taxed separately and that in determining their individual taxable income 
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intercompany transactions among these companies should take place under 
arm’s length terms and conditions, i.e. under terms and conditions that under 
similar circumstances would also have been agreed among unrelated parties. 
The background and merits of this so called arm’s length standard as well as a 
substantiation of its status as a commonly accepted standard of international 
tax law will be further discussed in Chapter 3. Here it should however already 
be mentioned that, while this study in the context of the foregoing remark will 
include recommendations for improvement of the existing legal framework, 
it will not endeavor to propose radically innovative alternatives. As a conse-
quence, I have for example not investigated the possibility to allocate income 
from intangible assets among group companies using a formula based approach 
or the possibility to completely de-fiscalize such income.     
Second, I will not discuss exhaustively the issues related to valuations of intan-
gible property. Such valuations belong more to the area of expertise of econo-
mists than to that of lawyers. Nevertheless, they can be crucial to determining 
taxable income and, by consequence, they are the frequent subject of disputes 
between taxpayers and tax administrations. As such, also tax lawyers cannot 
disregard the complexities of these valuation exercises altogether. Therefore, I 
will discuss the most relevance guidance provided in the US Cost Sharing Regu-
lations and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and consider its reasonableness 
and effectiveness in the context of CCAs. 
Third, I will not discuss indirect tax aspects in my thesis. The most obvious 
of these is of course the treatment of payments under a CCA for purposes of 
value added tax (“VAT”), or similar indirect taxation. Generally, these payments 
should be considered a consideration for a service and, hence, can be subject 
to such taxation. However, the next question is then what specific rules apply, 
among others in respect of the place of supply of this service. In a European 
context under strict conditions a specific so called cost sharing exemption can 
apply, if an entity that is a member of an independent group of persons renders 
to the other group members services that are directly necessary for carrying out 
an activity that is exempt from VAT or an activity in relation to which the group 
members are not taxable persons.19 This exemption is particularly relevant for 
exempt companies, as they would not be able to claim a deduction for input 
VAT, if that would be imposed. The workings of the exemption are not undis-
puted and have recently been the subject of different cases brought before the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).20 In those cases the Advocate General and 
then the ECJ concluded that the exemption was to be applied only very restric-
19 EU Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system for value added tax, Article 132(1)(f).
20 ECJ C-326/15, “DNB Banka”, 21 September 2017 and ECJ C-605/15 “Aviva”, 21 September 2017.
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tively. These decisions were received critically in fiscal literature.21 However, it 
should be noted that the cost sharing exemption in the VAT Directive is intended 
to accommodate very specific persons (those belonging to a group engaging in 
exempt activities), while it pertains to arrangements that may be similar to the 
CCAs that are the topic of my research, but are not necessarily identical. For 
one, the cost sharing exemption in the VAT Directive also appears to apply to 
designated service providers that do not themselves expect a benefit from the 
services other than a consideration in cash, while under CCAs all participants 
are required to expect a benefit that they will individually exploit (see Paragraph 
5.3.1). In other words the cost sharing exemption in the VAT Directive targets a 
broader group of agreements, but a more specific group of taxpayers. With that 
acknowledged, indirect tax matters are left outside the scope of my research 
and will therefore not be further discussed hereafter.         
1.6. Methods and Materials
1.6.1. Methodology
Any properly designed investigation into the tax treatment of CCAs will be of a 
multidisciplinary nature. Especially in respect of the transfer pricing aspects the 
topic has to be addressed from both the legal and economic perspective to accu-
rately determine its position under both substantive and formal tax law. First an 
insight in the legal consequences of the arrangements will have to be obtained. 
Key questions in this respect are related to the legal allocation of costs, risks 
and ownership of proceeds associated with the joint activities performed under 
the arrangements. Subsequently the economic impact of this allocation has to 
be established. Only after all relevant characteristics of the situation have been 
economically analyzed and the relative value of contributions, risks and benefits 
for each of the participants is reasonably clear, will it be possible to conclude 
whether the CCA has an acceptable outcome from a transfer pricing perspec-
tive. Subsequently the qualification under tax treaties and the treatment from 
an international tax law perspective have to be determined. And in parallel to 
all of this, it can be necessary to consider how procedural fiscal law divides the 
burden of proof between taxpayer and tax authorities and provides means to 
obtain advance certainty or settle disputes. 
Notwithstanding the relevance of the economic analysis, this study primarily 
adopts the traditional legal dogmatic approach. Economic aspects are addressed 
always in the context of their impact on the legal system. It is recognized that 
21 Wolf, International VAT Monitor 2017/3 and Amand, International VAT Monitor 2017/6.
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CCAs are a specific type of arrangements with unique legal and fiscal conse-
quences. The following chapters aim to provide a comprehensive overview and 
analysis of the most important rules and regulations governing these arrange-
ments. It is investigated how these rules and regulations interact and construe a 
system that foresees in a consistent tax and transfer pricing treatment of CCAs. 
This study is performed from an internal legal perspective allowing for firstly a 
normative analysis of the present law system and secondly proposals for clarifi-
cation and improvements thereof.  
1.6.2. Sources of information
Over the years various international organizations have published guidance on 
transfer pricing and the tax treatment of CCAs. Most notably this includes the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).  Estab-
lished in 1961 the Paris based OECD today counts 34 member countries, has a 
budget of approximately € 350 million and employs a secretariat staff of approx-
imately 2,500. It aims to promote policies that improve the economic and social 
well-being of people around the world. Its Committee on Fiscal Affairs provides 
a forum in which government representatives can work together, share expe-
riences and seek solutions to common problems. In 1979 the Committee 
published a report entitled “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises”.22 
This included guidance on the appropriate tax treatment of CCAs. It was supple-
mented in 1984 by a second report entitled “Transfer Pricing and Multinational 
Enterprises – Three Taxation Issues”.23 In 1995 the Committee revised its position 
by publication of the “OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises and Tax Administrations” (hereafter also referred to as “the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines” and “the Transfer Pricing Guidelines”).24 These guidelines were 
later supplemented by separate chapters on intangible property, services, CCAs 
and the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings as well as various 
annexes. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs renders a continuous effort to keep 
the guidelines up to date and improve them where possible. 
Parallel to the OECD’s efforts, the United Nations’ Economic and Social Counsel 
since 1968 has had a group of tax experts working to enhance and promote 
international tax cooperation. This group focuses on developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition. In 2004 ECOSOC renamed the 
group Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. The 
Committee’s “Transfer Pricing Practical Manual for Developing Countries” intends 
22 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises”, 1979.
23 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises – Three Taxation Issues”, 1984.
24 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations”, 1995.
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to provide developing countries with clearer guidance on the interpretation and 
application of transfer pricing standards.  It should assist both tax authorities 
and taxpayers and also specifically addresses the topic of CCAs. 
Meanwhile the European Union has set up the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
(“EUJTPF”) to assist and advise the European Commission in respect of transfer 
pricing tax matters. It operates within the framework of the OECD’s Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and aims to propose to the Commission pragmatic, non-leg-
islative solutions to transfer pricing issues. The EUJTPF consists of represen-
tatives from each EU Member State as well as experts from the private sector 
and an independent chairman. It was set up and first met in 2002, although its 
position was only formally confirmed in 2006.25 The EUJTPF has divided its work 
into activities related to the EU Arbitration Convention and activities related 
to other transfer pricing issues. So far its efforts have among others resulted 
in a Code of Conduct on the Implementation of the Arbitration Convention26, a 
Code of Conduct on Transfer Pricing Documentation27, guidelines on Advanced 
Pricing Agreements28 and guidelines on low-value-adding intragroup services29. 
Furthermore, the 2011-2015 EUJTPF Work Program announced “an intention 
to explore the possible scope and degree to which a common approach to CCAs 
could be developed within the EU”. In order not to duplicate or interfere with the 
ongoing OECD’s work on the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, the EUJTPF 
focused on services not creating intangibles. This resulted in the “Report on 
Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services not creating Intangible Property (IP)” 
published on 7 June 2012. It was adopted by the European Commission in its 
communication of 19 September 2012.30 
In addition to the European efforts the tax authorities of the United States, 
Canada, Japan and Australia united in the Pacific Organization of Tax Adminis-
trators (‘PATA’) published guidelines on bilateral Advanced Pricing Agreements 
25 European Commission, Decision setting up an expert group on transfer pricing, 22 December 2006, 
OJ L32/189.
26 Revised Code of Conduct for the effective implementation of the Arbitration Convention, 30 
December 2009, OJ C322/1.
27 European Council, Resolution on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associ-
ated enterprises in the EU, 28 July 2006, OJ C176/1 (“EUTPD”).
28 European Commission, Report on the work of the JTPF in the field of dispute avoidance and reso-
lution procedures and on APAs in the EU, 26 February 2007, COM(2007)71.
29 European Commission, Communication on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the 
period April 2009 to June 2010 and related proposals 1. Guidelines on low value adding intra-group 
services and 2. Potential approaches to non-EU triangular cases, 25 January 2011, COM(2011)16.
30 European Commission, Communication on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the 
period July 2010 to June 2012 and related proposals 1. Report on Small and Medium Enterprises 
and Transfer Pricing and 2. Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services not creating 
Intangible Property (IP), 19 September 2012, COM(2012)516.
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and Mutual Agreement Procedures. Furthermore the PATA has provided stan-
dards under which taxpayers can create uniform transfer pricing documenta-
tion. Inter alia the “PATA Documentation Package” includes detailed instructions 
on how to document a CCA.31 
Next to the materials from the above mentioned intergovernmental organiza-
tions, there are various other sources of information taken into account in this 
research. This includes the national tax law of many different countries, regula-
tions published by tax administrations, tax treaties, case law and a wide range of 
academic publications.32  Most notably quite detailed guidance is outlined in the 
Cost Sharing Regulations published by the US Treasury and IRS under Section 
482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which regulations were updated several 
times over the years. Furthermore, it also deserves to be explicitly mentioned 
that some interesting considerations can be found in Indian case law, which 
traditionally is very instructive and can provide for an interesting, alternative, 
non-Western view on tax matters.33 
1.7. Contents
This study is made up of four parts: 
• Part 1 is an introduction on the topic of CCAs. It is made up of two chap-
ters. This Chapter 1 provides for a scientific justification for the research. 
It explains the purpose and methodology of the research and outlines its 
structure.  Chapter 2 evidences the concept of a CCA as an established 
instrument for intragroup cooperation. Going back to the origin of this 
concept it can be determined with what purpose tax legislators first intro-
duced these arrangements as a transfer pricing instrument for MNEs. 
Furthermore, this chapter aims to give a better insight in the application 
of CCAs in fiscal practice for both legitimate purposes and in tax avoid-
ance structures. To facilitate distinguishing between both types of use, I 
will present a categorization method that helps to better understand the 
taxpayer’s motives for concluding a CCA. 
• Part 2 examines the transfer pricing aspects of CCAs. Consisting of five 
chapters this part focusses on the relevant OECD guidance and the appli-
cable US rules, laid down in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the US 
31 PATA Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, 12 March 2003, IR-2003-32.
32 For a comprehensive list of all consulted publications see the attached bibliography.
33 A list of official publications and case law is also attached.
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Cost Sharing Regulations. Before those are addressed, Chapter 3 provides 
some relevant general transfer pricing considerations. It discusses the legal 
status and further interpretation of the international standard for setting 
intercompany prices, the so called arm’s length standard, and considers 
some general aspects of its application in general as well as in situations 
involving CCAs specifically. Chapter 4 provides additional historical back-
ground on the US Cost Sharing Regulations and looks at the two most 
disputed cost sharing issues in the United States: buy-in payments and the 
sharing of stock-based compensation expenses. Chapter 5 then discusses 
the guidance from Chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The analysis is structured around five main focus areas to also give the 
reader a better insight in what a CCA is and how it works. Among others the 
substance requirements imposed on participants will be addressed. Those 
requirements are decisive for the access of cash box entities to CCAs and 
therefore determine the effectiveness of use in tax avoidance structures. 
A second crucial aspect to be discussed is the valuation of contributions. 
Should they be valued at cost or at market price and, if the latter is true, 
then how should such market price be determined? Although an exhaustive 
analysis of valuation techniques is not intended, the most relevant valua-
tion issues are addressed. This includes the valuation of contributions that 
consist of making pre-existing intangible assets available, contributions 
that consist of providing cost shared services or development activities and 
contributions that merely encompass the passive funding of cost shared 
activities. Next Chapter 6 discusses the EUJTPF’s fairly modest contribution 
to the debate consisting of its Report on services CCAs not resulting in the 
creation of intangible property. Finally, Chapter 7 completes the transfer 
pricing part of this study by outlining formal aspects. It features general 
remarks about the division of the burden of proof in transfer pricing matters 
and considers the documentation requirements imposed on taxpayers. 
    
•  Part 3 analyzes the treatment of CCAs under international tax law. This 
part is made up of three chapters. First Chapter 8 looks at the tax treaty 
qualification of CCAs and the situations in which a participation in a CCA 
can cause a foreign tax liability. Can it for example cause a participant to 
have a foreign permanent establishment or can balancing payments be 
subject to source state withholding tax? Chapter 9 subsequently discusses 
the potential role of CFC rules in the fight against tax avoidance structures, 
while Chapter 10 critically reviews the existing possibilities to obtain upfront 
certainty from tax administrations about the tax treatment of CCAs as well 
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as the procedures for dispute resolution and suggests some improvements 
to those processes.
• Part 4 summarizes conclusions and recommendations. This part is 
comprised of only one chapter, Chapter 11, which reflects on the most rele-
vant findings of the research. It features a comparison between the US Cost 
Sharing Regulations and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and then 
provides an example of a valid arm’s length CCA contract as well as a step 
plan for its implementation. It also summarizes the recommendations for 
improvements to various rules of international law that are crucial to the 
tax treatment of CCAs and verifies their effectiveness.
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2.1. Introduction
MNEs are continuously trying to realize the most efficient organizational 
structure. There is a constant search for the optimal level of centralization or 
decentralization of various business functions.  How successful the MNE is, will 
determine to what extent it can realize economies of scale and benefits of inte-
gration. For example, a centrally led purchasing function can result in better 
buying power, a reduction of management layers may lead to stronger and more 
cost efficient management, optimally organized financing reduces the group’s 
cost of capital, more or less decentralized marketing can expand the compa-
ny’s advertorial scope and joint R&D could prove the best way to guarantee 
a valuable bundling of know-how and technology. However, it has since long 
been recognized that synergies should not necessarily be considered the Holy 
Grail in the quest for efficiency optimization.34 Instead striking the right balance 
between centralization and local responsibility should be the goal. The efforts 
to achieve this will not stop at country borders. By consequence, there will be 
many differing examples of more or less centralized activities being performed 
for the benefit of multiple group companies in more than one country. This can 
include both open ended joint efforts as well as project-based initiatives. For 
tax purposes the costs, risks and benefits related to these activities should be 
appropriately allocated among the different group companies. As explained in 
the previous chapter, CCAs offer a framework for this allocation, consisting of 
an upfront sharing of costs and risks and a subsequent individual exploitation of 
results by participants. 
Before the rules and regulations governing CCAs are subjected to a looking 
glass examination in the following chapters, this Chapter 2 considers the origin 
of the CCA concept and how it is applied in fiscal practice. It first examines the 
difference between joint development agreements concluded among third 
parties and CCAs concluded among companies belonging to the same multina-
34 See for example Goold and Campbell, Harvard Business Review 1998/5.
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tional group (Paragraph 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Subsequently a historical overview is 
provided of the most relevant regulatory publications that evidence how CCAs 
have over the years been recognized as an established instrument for the fiscal 
structuring of intragroup collaboration. Going back to its origin will make clear 
how the concept of “a bona fide CSA” was first introduced by the US Treasury 
and IRS as a safe haven for taxpayers to avoid complicated valuations of intan-
gible assets. The conceptual analysis is completed by an examination of the 
legal status of these arrangements, addressing whether they can be qualified as 
a joint venture or partnership and what consequences that has for participants 
(Paragraph 2.2.3). Next, four legitimate reasons for using CCAs are identified 
(Paragraph 2.3.1). These more “noble” motives for use are contrasted by four 
examples of application in tax avoidance structures (Paragraph 2.3.2). Insights 
from these discussions are then translated into a proposal for a theoretical 
framework to categorize so called development CCAs, i.e. arrangements that 
lead to the creation of intangible assets, depending on what type of intangible 
assets are developed and the level of centralization of the cost shared activi-
ties (Paragraph 2.3.3). Finally the conclusions that can be drawn from all of the 
above are summarized in a closing paragraph (Paragraph 2.4).  
2.2. The CCA Concept
2.2.1. Uncontrolled Joint Development Arrangements
Before setting out to further examine the concept and use of CCAs as a struc-
ture for cooperation between companies that are members of the same multi-
national group, it has to be established that the terms and conditions of inter-
company CCAs generally differ from those of similar arrangements between 
unrelated parties. This is specifically true in respect of agreements aimed at the 
joint development of valuable intangible property. That has also been confirmed 
by the United States Treasury and IRS, although it did take them some time 
to get there, as their thinking about the issue evolved over the years. In 1988 
they published a so called White Paper on transfer pricing under Section 482 
of the US Revenue Code, in which it was argued that “CSAs have long existed 
at arm’s length conditions between unrelated parties”.35 At the same time both 
government bodies admitted to have little experience with controlled as well 
as uncontrolled CSAs and they therefore welcomed receiving information 
from taxpayers regarding their contractual arrangements and experience with 
35 Treasury and IRS, “A Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code”, 18 October 1988, 
Notice 88-123 (1988-2 C.B. 458) (“White Paper”)
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cost sharing. However, the comment letters and other information received in 
response provided only limited examples of uncontrolled joint development 
arrangements similar to intragroup CSAs. That caused a change in the opinion 
about the existence of CSAs among unrelated parties. In fact, by the time they 
proposed new regulations in 2005 the Treasury and IRS expressed the view that 
there was a fundamental difference between intercompany CSAs and uncon-
trolled joint development arrangements. This was complemented by the obser-
vation that unrelated parties generally agree to jointly exploit the results of their 
cooperation, whereas related parties will allow for individual exploitation by 
each of the CSA participants. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that unrelated 
parties commonly share benefits based on their respective cost contributions, 
while related parties structure this the other way around sharing costs based 
on their anticipated benefits. By consequence, joint development agreements 
between unrelated parties according to the Treasury and IRS typically involve 
“a materially different division of costs, risks and benefits than in CSAs under the 
regulations”.36 However, as will be explained below, that does not mean related 
parties CCAs and CSAs cannot be businesslike and also, as will be explained in 
Paragraph 3.4, that does not mean that they by definition conflict with the arm’s 
length standard.  
When the OECD issued a public discussion draft on the revision of Chapter VIII 
on CCAs of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 2015, the comments received 
again did not provide convincing evidence of joint development arrangements 
between unrelated parties resembling intragroup CCAs. In fact most of the 
respondents did not address the possible existence of third party arrange-
ments at all. An exception to this rule was the letter sent in by the Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), generally considered as the voice of busi-
ness at the OECD.37  This letter discussed a number of examples of uncontrolled 
development arrangements between third parties from among others the oil 
and gas, aerospace, entertainment, biotech and pharmaceutical industries. 
In an appendix there was also a text included from an agreement extracted 
from public filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”). However, most of the examples did not provide insight in the most 
critical elements, i.e. those that determined how participants shared costs, 
risks and benefits. Some seemed to concern a shared service agreement or a 
financing structure rather than a joint development arrangement. The more 
36 Treasury and IRS, 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations, 70 Fed Reg 51116 (2005), preamble. 
37 Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), Commentary to the OECD’s Public Discussion 
Draft “BEPS Action 8: Revisions to Chapter VIII of The Transfer Pricing Guidelines on Cost Contribution 
Arrangements (CCAs)”, 29 May 2015.
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detailed example in the appendix however did indeed have the characteristics 
of the latter type of arrangement. It also involved a certain level of individual 
exploitation of the cost shared results by its participants. Nevertheless, this was 
limited to the operational exploitation of results only. The profit or loss from this 
exploitation was subsequently shared by participants in the same ratio in which 
they had contributed to development costs. The financial exploitation of results 
was therefore still for the joint account and benefit of participants. By conse-
quence, the arrangement still differed from a CCA, at the very least in this one 
critical way.  
The tendency between third parties to choose for joint exploitation of results 
and the sharing of the benefit in proportion to cost contributions instead of 
the other way around is something I also recognize from my own experience in 
practice. It is important to acknowledge that this is not caused by a non-busi-
nesslike nature of intercompany CCAs, but rather by a material difference in the 
position of related and unrelated parties. First of all the latter group will prefer 
a joint exploitation of results, because that limits the risk of ending up in mutual 
competition when individually commercializing those results. Furthermore, it 
has to be considered that unrelated parties will have only limited information 
about each other’s business. That knowledge gap will be further deepened by 
the fact that unrelated parties are likely to look for a partner that operates in 
a different territory or a different industry instead of collaborating with their 
direct competitors in the same market. Once they have found such partner they 
may still not be willing to disclose all details of their business operations to it. By 
consequence, the partners can lack insight in relevant facts and circumstances 
affecting each other’s commercial position. This can make it difficult or even 
impossible for them to determine each other’s potential benefits from a contem-
plated project, something that they would have to do in case they would enter 
into a CCA that provides for the anticipated benefits to serve as a method for 
the allocation of costs. For affiliated companies on the other hand the situation 
is quite different. They will be less concerned about potential competition issues 
and they will be significantly more knowledgeable about each other’s business 
operations. Under these circumstances it can be a rational business decision to 
enter into a cooperative structure based on individual exploitation of results and 
a sharing of costs based on anticipated benefits. As we will see in Paragraph 3.4, 
this is a crucial condition for the recognition of a CCA as an acceptable arrange-
ment for intercompany cooperation from a transfer pricing perspective, even 
when they are not commonly found between unrelated parties.         
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2.2.2.  Controlled Joint Development Agreements 
2.2.2.1. The 1968 US Transfer Pricing Regulations
Acknowledging that the CCAs that are the subject of this study are arrange-
ments found mostly between related parties enables a more focused investi-
gation into the origin of their concept. This logically goes back to 1966, when 
the United States were the first country in the world to propose transfer pricing 
regulations that included specific language and several explanatory examples 
on CSAs, referred to at the time as “bona fide cost sharing arrangements”.38 The 
proposed regulations were replaced by final regulations in 1968 that provided 
for much more condensed guidance, but still addressed the topic and, in 
general, continued the earlier proposed approach.39 These regulations defined 
a bona fide cost sharing arrangement as “an agreement, in writing, between two 
or more members of a group of controlled entities providing for the sharing of the 
costs and risks of developing intangible property in return for a specified interest in 
the intangible property that may be produced”. For such arrangement to qualify 
as bona fide it had to “reflect an effort in good faith by the participating members 
to bear their respective shares of all the costs and risks of development on an arm’s 
length basis”. 40 
The reason for the Treasury to include the concept of a bona fide cost sharing 
arrangement in the regulations was explained by the then acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Stanley S. Surrey, in an article published 
in the Journal of Taxation:
“We recognize that the valuation of intangibles and the determination of 
an appropriate charge for their use present extremely difficult problems. For 
this reason, the proposed Regulations developed a ‘safe haven’ cost sharing 
arrangement in an attempt to eliminate many of the valuations which 
would otherwise be required.”41
This builds on the fact that all group companies participating in a CCA become 
the owner of the cost shared intangibles from the very first moment that they 
come to exist and that they subsequently have access to those intangibles 
free of further charge. That way there does not have to be a taxable transfer 
or licensing of the intangibles to the other group companies and that signifi-
38 Treasury and IRS, Proposed Transfer Pricing Regulations, 1966, 31 Fed Reg 10394 (1966).
39 Treasury and IRS, Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, 1968, 33 Fed Reg 5854 (1968).
40 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-2(d)(4).
41 Surrey, Journal of Taxation 1968, page 75 - 79. 
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cantly reduces the number of valuation issues. This raison d’être of the bona fide 
cost sharing arrangement was also confirmed in a separate publication by the 
Treasury issued contemporaneously to the 1968 Final Regulations. This outlined 
how those regulations first provided a general rule for determining arm’s length 
results and subsequently specified five types of transactions. Under certain 
conditions the Regulations allowed a safe haven or prima facie rule. Cost sharing 
arrangements were considered one such safe haven:
“The regulations provide a means whereby the necessity of determining the 
arm’s length charge may be avoided if the parties using the property enter 
into a bona fide cost sharing arrangement in connection with the develop-
ment of the intangible property.”42 
In other words the US Treasury intended CSAs to offer taxpayers an opportu-
nity to avoid complex valuation issues in respect of intangible property. This 
intention was continued by Congress, when the United States in 1986 included 
a provision in Section 482 of the Revenue Code requiring the income from any 
transaction involving intangible property to be commensurate with the income 
attributable to such property. That will be further discussed in Paragraph 4.2. 
2.2.2.2. The 1979 OECD Transfer Pricing Report
When the OECD published its first Transfer Pricing Report in 197943, the United 
States were still the only country contributing to the preparation of the Report 
to already have issued specific rules on the subject under its national law. At that 
point the OECD made the following noteworthy observation:
“The United States tax authorities were led to adopt these rules mainly 
because various forms of cost sharing arrangements existed in practice and 
because a need was felt to accommodate their existence in the regulations. 
Experience with intra-group cost sharing arrangements is said to be positive 
and they do not appear to have opened up avenues for tax avoidance. No 
greater danger of tax avoidance is seen through cost sharing arrangements 
than through any other type of intra-group transaction. ”44
42 Treasury Department Press Release F-1217, 16 April 1968.
43 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises”, 1979.
44 Idem, Paragraph 109.
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Apparently in the United States cost sharing arrangements were not regarded 
to facilitate tax avoidance any more than other legal arrangements. By not chal-
lenging this, the OECD accepted that presumption.   
Although the leading role of the US undoubtedly further influenced the work 
of the OECD, the 1979 Report adopted its own terminology. It introduced the 
more general concept of cost contribution arrangements (“CCAs”), while the 
US Cost Sharing Regulations exclusively used the more narrowly defined cost 
sharing arrangements (“CSAs”). As the 1979 Report explains, the term CCA 
covers both CSAs and cost funding arrangements (“CFAs”). Under a CSA partic-
ipants would agree to “share the actual costs and risks of R&D undertaken for 
the benefit or expected benefit of each of them”. Today the concept of a CSA is 
still used in the US Cost Sharing Regulations. Under a CFA on the other hand 
participants would be charged a generalized fee for certain centralized activities 
performed for their benefit. A CFA is similar to a CSA when it comes to the joint 
effective ownership of intangibles and the independent exploitation of results 
by participants.  It is different however in how the amount of total charges is 
determined and allocated. While a CSA allocates actual costs, a CFA provides for 
a funding on a budgeted basis without a one-on-one relation to the actual costs 
incurred. It would allocate this among participants on the basis of some broad 
aspect of their business (e.g. gross turnover), which would not necessarily be 
proportionate to their expected benefits. CFAs could generally be regarded as a 
mandate to a designated group company to perform the centralized activities 
to the best of its ability in return for a fixed fee.  In today’s fiscal practice the 
use of CFAs has diminished to the extent that in my experience it has become 
unusual to come across such arrangement. The more recent OECD’s guidance 
no longer includes any specific reference to these arrangements. In this study 
CFAs are not further addressed.
Besides the difference in terminology, there were two other noteworthy differ-
ences between the 1979 OECD Report and the US Cost Sharing Regulations. The 
first difference concerned the scoping of the arrangements at hand. Although 
the OECD included the wording on CCAs in the chapter on the transfer of tech-
nology and the use of patents and know-how, it mentioned explicitly that these 
arrangements could also cover the costs of various services, including non-tech-
nical activities like management and administrative services.45 The US Cost 
Sharing Regulations on the other hand had focused on the use of CSAs for activ-
45 Idem, Paragraph 102. 
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ities aimed at the development of intangible assets.46 The second difference 
was even more fundamental and is still an issue of debate today.  It concerns the 
matter of whether or not contributions of participants should be valued at cost 
or at market price. The latter would assume that a certain profit element needs 
to be included as a consideration for the functions performed by the contrib-
utor. The US traditionally accepted a valuation at cost, i.e. without any profit 
element included.  In the 1979 Report however, the OECD expressed another 
opinion. It considered the following:
”To the extent that the enterprise carrying out the research is relieved of risk 
because it could rely on its costs being met by the participating members of 
the group, then any profit mark-up should not take account of such risk and 
ought to be limited to a reward for its activities in organizing and managing 
the relevant research project or projects. But it seems difficult to accept that 
there would often be genuine cases of cost sharing arrangements in the 
arm’s length situation. Accordingly, it would usually be right to look for a 
profit mark-up in cases of cost contribution arrangements.”47
As the valuation of contributions determines what balancing payments are 
required between participants, it is a key aspect of any CCA. For that reason it 
is also at the core of the OECD’s more recent guidance, as prepared under the 
BEPS project.48   The valuation of contributions at cost or at market price will 
be extensively discussed in Paragraph 5.5.3, where I will also explain why for a 
CCA to comply with the arm’s length standard, there should indeed be a profit 
element included. The calculation of balancing payments will subsequently be 
discussed in Paragraph 5.6.  
2.2.2.3. The 1984 OECD Supplements
In 1984 the OECD published three Supplements to its 1979 Report, the third 
of which dealt with the allocation of central management and services costs.49 
It recognized again that CCAs offer a relatively simple method for recharging 
managerial and coordination costs. Their use for such purpose was clearly sanc-
tioned, even though it may not be common on the open market: 
46 Today’s US Cost Sharing Regulations still define a CSA as “an arrangement by which controlled 
participants share the costs and risks of developing cost shared intangibles in proportion to their 
reasonably anticipated benefit shares” (Treasury and IRS, 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 76 
Fed Reg 80082 (2011), Paragraph 1.482-7(b)).
47 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises”, 1979, Paragraph 119.
48 OECD/G20, “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation”, 5 October 2015.
49 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises – Three Taxation Issues”, 1984.
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“…it may … be questioned whether such arrangements correspond to the 
arrangements which would be made between unrelated parties.  Never-
theless, it would be wrong to completely disregard the special situation of 
MNEs and the fact that these methods are not applied, or are very seldom 
applied between unrelated parties, ought not to lead one to conclude that 
they necessarily produce charges which must be regarded as not at arm’s 
length. In making judgment as to whether any particular instance of the 
use of such methods is acceptable, there should also be taken into consider-
ation such relevant factors as the amount of the charge or the terms of any 
formal contract, and the reason why the method has been used.”50
Next to this, the 1984 Supplements underlined that under circumstances an 
indirect cost allocation would be acceptable and that the appropriate method 
to do so is by using a key that ensured the sharing of actually incurred costs 
in proportion to the benefits or expected benefits of each group company.51 
Furthermore, the OECD repeated yet again that it would normally be appro-
priate to add a profit mark-up to the resulting intercompany charges.52     
2.2.2.4. The 1995 US Cost Sharing Regulations
In 1995 the United States issued a first set of final regulations dealing specifi-
cally with cost sharing arrangements.53 These regulations define a CSA as:
“…an agreement under which the parties agree to share the costs of devel-
opment of one or more intangibles in proportion to their shares of reason-
ably anticipated benefits from their individual exploitation of the interests 
in the intangibles assigned to them under the arrangement.”54
The preamble to these regulations again refers to CSAs as a safe haven. It can 
be concluded that the purpose of the arrangements was still considered to be 
a way for taxpayers to avoid complicated valuation issues. At the same time 
the Treasury and IRS explicated that the taxpayer claiming the benefits of such 
safe haven had to meet certain formal requirements. Besides outlining these 
requirements the regulations also provided detailed guidance on how to apply 
the arm’s length principle to a CSA. It considered it relevant that participants 
50 Idem, Paragraph 63.
51 Idem, Paragraph 65.
52 Idem, Paragraph 76.
53 Treasury and IRS, 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 60 Fed Reg 65557 (1995).
54 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-7(a)(1).
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would share in the costs of all development stages, regardless of whether the 
research was successful or unsuccessful. Contrary to the 1979 OECD Report and 
the 1984 Supplements the 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations, which are further 
discussed in Paragraph 4.2.1, did not require a profit element to be added to 
these costs.       
2.2.2.5. The 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
In April 1993 the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs established a task force 
to revise the 1979 Report. This was intended to amalgamate the Report and 
the 1984 Supplements as well as the additional work of the Committee carried 
out since then, to update the guidance and reflect technological develop-
ments and the increasing globalization, to take away remaining ambiguities on 
the use of profit methods and to respond to revisions of legislation and prac-
tices in a number of countries.55 The efforts resulted in Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines approved by the Committee in June 1995 and published just one month 
later.56 The Guidelines originally consisted of five chapters, but they were 
later expanded, among others with a separate Chapter VIII on CCAs. This was 
approved in June 1997 and then published in September of the same year. 
The new chapter on CCAs provided general guidance on the tax treatment of the 
arrangements and was an addition to the previous chapters of the Guidelines, 
which therefore unrestrictedly remained applicable. It provided yet another 
definition of a CCA:
“A CCA is a framework agreed among business enterprises to share the costs 
and risks of developing, producing or obtaining assets, services or rights, 
and to determine the nature and extent of the interests of each participant 
in those assets, services or rights.”57
Although the 1997 Chapter VIII was significantly more extensive than anything 
the OECD had ever before published on the topic of CCAs, it was never intended 
to resolve all CCA related issues. From the way in which that was made explicit 
one might deduct that the OECD backed away from the position it had taken 
in the 1979 Report and 1984 Supplements on the pricing of contributions at 
market value: 
55 Hay, Horner and Owens, Intertax 1994/10.
56 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations”, 1995.
57 Idem, Paragraph 8.3 (old).
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“This chapter does not resolve all significant issues regarding the adminis-
tration and tax consequences of CCAs. For example, further guidance may 
be needed on measuring the value of contributions to CCAs in particular 
regarding when cost or market prices are appropriate…”58
At the same time it was anticipated that additional work would also have to be 
done to clarify the tax characterization of CCA related payments, which is deci-
sive for their treatment under general tax rules and regulations including those 
laid down in tax treaties. Such treatment for example determines whether or 
not these payments are subject to source state taxation.59
Furthermore, for the first time the OECD seemed to express some doubt about 
whether or not CCAs offered tax planning opportunities. The Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines therefore required taxpayers to substantiate the arm’s length 
outcome of their CCAs:
“The potential exists for contributions to be allocated among CCA partici-
pants so as to result in an overstatement of taxable profits in some coun-
tries and the understatement of taxable profits in others, measured against 
the arm’s length principle. For that reason, taxpayers should be prepared to 
substantiate the basis of their claim with respect to the CCA.”60
In years following the publication of this new guidance these concerns increased. 
In 2010 the US Joint Committee on Taxation submitted a report to the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, which included 6 case studies of aggressive 
tax structures used by US-based MNEs.61 These cases were anonymized, with 
taxpayers being referred to as Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, Echo and Foxtrot 
Company. In three of them a CCA played an important role. These case studies 
will be further discussed in Paragraph 2.3.2. 
2.2.2.6. The 2011 US Cost Sharing Regulations
At the beginning of this century the United States started to become more 
concerned about multinationals using CSAs to locate high value intangibles in 
low tax jurisdiction. This was reason for a full review of the 1995 Cost Sharing 
58 Idem, Paragraph 8.1 (old).
59 This aspect will be further discussed in Chapter 8.
60 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.15 (old).
61 Joint Committee on Taxation, “Present Law and Background Related to Possible Income Shifting and 
Transfer Pricing”, 20 July 2010.
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Regulations, which eventually resulted in new regulations being issued in 2011.62 
These included the following updated definition of a CSA:
“A cost sharing arrangement is an arrangement by which controlled partic-
ipants share the costs and risks of developing cost shared intangibles in 
proportion to their share of reasonably anticipated benefits.”63
Among others the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations opened the door to using 
a more market based approach for valuing certain specific functions performed 
under a CSA. This was explained already in the preamble to the 2008 Temporary 
Cost Sharing Regulations, which worded it as follows:
“… to the extent a controlled participant … contributes the services of its 
research team for purposes of developing cost sharing intangibles pursuant 
to the CSA, the other controlled participant would owe compensation for 
the services of such team …, just as would be the case in a contract research 
arrangement.”
The 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations continued that approach and included 
the example of a pharmaceutical company committing its experienced R&D 
team to the cost shared development of a vaccine.64 In this example the Trea-
sury and IRS consider that in addition to the ongoing costs of the research team 
the company in question should receive a consideration for having this work-
force in place. However, the Cost Sharing Regulations prescribe that it should 
be paid as part of a separate transaction, referred to as a platform contribution 
transaction, which compensates for all resources made available that pre-exist 
externally from the CSA. This approach differs fundamentally from that to 
include a profit element in the valuation of current contributions. That had 
significant consequences when taxpayers challenged the US approach in court, 
as is further explained in Chapter 4.    
2.2.2.7. The 2015 OECD/G20 BEPS Project Final Report
As already mentioned, in 2012 concerns about increasing tax avoidance by 
MNEs inspired the G20 to initiate an OECD driven project against base erosion 
and profit shifting. The Action Plan developed in this context aimed to ensure 
62 Treasury and IRS, 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 76 Fed Reg 80082 (2011).
63 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-7(b).
64 Idem, §1.482-7(c)(5), Example 2.
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that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation.65 However, it was 
made very clear that this would be pursued without abandoning the current 
transfer pricing system based on the arm’s length standard. Alternatives, such 
as formula based systems, were rejected and it was instead decided to build on 
the existing foundations, albeit, where needed, with the help of so called special 
measures, either within or beyond the framework of the arm’s length stan-
dard. Specific actions in this context addressed the position of intangibles, the 
transfer of risk and allocation of excessive capital to group companies and the 
issue of transactions that are uncommon between third parties.66 Ultimately the 
BEPS project resulted in a number of Final Reports published in October 2015, 
one of which addressed the above identified transfer pricing issues.67 A dedi-
cated section of this Report provided for the announced changes to Chapter VIII 
of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. It most notably featured two fundamental 
policy decisions. 
First of all the OECD expressed its opinion that third parties behaving in a 
commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances would not enter 
into a CCA, unless all of the participants would exercise control over the risks 
associated with the cost shared activities.68  That implies that each participant 
should employ personnel that is capable of making decisions, and actually 
makes decisions, about taking on or laying off the risks as well as responding to 
those risks. When this precondition is not met, tax administrations would be in 
their right to disregard the arrangement, assume an alternative transaction, for 
example a royalty bearing license, and adjust the taxable profit of the compa-
nies involved accordingly.  This “control-over-risk requirement” is discussed in 
more detail in Paragraph 5.3.2. 
The second principal choice in the final BEPS report was to reinstall the OECD’s 
positioning in the 1979 Report and the 1984 Supplements that contributions 
have to be valued at market price instead of at cost, i.e. that they have to include 
a profit mark-up:
“Under the arm’s length principle, the value of each participant’s contribu-
tion should be consistent with the value that independent enterprises in 
comparable circumstances would have assigned to that contribution. That 
is, contributions must generally be assessed based on their value at the time 
they are contributed, bearing in mind the mutual sharing of risks, as well as 
65 OECD/G20, “Action plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 19 July 2013.
66 This concerns actions 8, 9 and 10 of the Action Plan respectively.
67 OECD/G20, “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation”, 5 October 2015. 
68 Idem.
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the nature and extent of the associated expected benefits to participants in 
the CCA, in order to be consistent with the arm’s length principle.”69  
The justification and consequences of this second policy decision are further 
outlined in Paragraph 5.5.3.  
2.2.3. Legal Status
2.2.3.1.  Joint Ventures
Now that CCAs have been identified as an established concept in the context 
of transfer pricing and international tax law, it is a logical next step to make 
some general remarks about their legal status. First of all it may be considered 
whether CCAs can qualify as a joint venture. If a joint venture is defined as any 
form of economic cooperation, then almost every commercially driven arrange-
ment qualifies as such and there is no reason why CCAs would be an exception 
to that rule. However, a categorization using this broad definition would not be 
very useful and lack legal relevance. Alternatively a joint venture has been more 
specifically defined as an agreement between two or more related or unrelated 
parties outlining a stable and interactive legal structure aimed at achieving a 
common business objective.70 Under this narrower definition it is the common 
objective that distinguishes joint ventures from other commercial transactions. 
This implies a benefit external to the agreement, whereas with other commer-
cial transactions the benefit for one party would consist more directly out of the 
consideration in cash or kind received from the other party. The narrowly defined 
joint ventures can subsequently be split up into cooperative joint ventures and 
contractual joint ventures. Joint ventures of the first category establish a new 
legal entity, while joint ventures of the second category do not. 
A CCA will feature all elements of the above narrower joint venture definition. 
In fact the benefit external from the agreement, i.e. the fact that participants 
become the collective owner of results and can exploit them individually, is a 
crucial factor distinguishing it from most other intercompany transactions. By 
itself however that will not lead to the establishment of a new legal entity. There-
fore, a CCA generally qualifies as a contractual joint venture. More precisely 
a “development-only joint venture” instead of a joint venture aimed at earning 
income.71 That means that the arrangement is limited to sharing the costs and 
69 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.25.
70 A.J. Belohlavek, “Law Governing Joint Venture Status and Joint Venture Agreements”, in Campbell, 
Netzer et al 2009.
71 Also see Brabenec 2010.
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risks associated with the activities in scope and does not extend to the benefits 
of participants from their subsequent individual exploitation of results. 
Qualification as a contractual joint venture offers an MNE the freedom of choice 
as to what law governs the agreement.72 It also has certain public law implica-
tions. However, this relates foremost to competition law, the rules of which 
are generally already applicable to the participants in a CCA because of their 
affiliation as members of the same multinational group. Finally, and perhaps 
more relevantly for the purpose of this study, it should be acknowledge that as 
a contractual joint venture a CCA does not by itself constitute a taxable entity.      
2.2.3.2. Partnerships
The specific conditions for an agreement to qualify as a partnership differ per 
jurisdiction. However, in most countries a CCA will not be regarded as such.73 
The reason for this is that the characteristics of a CCA differ from those ordi-
narily required by private law for the recognition of a partnership. The most 
notable differences are as follows:
(i) As an internal agreement between group members there is no external 
trade in the name of the CCA, whereas partnerships will often act on the 
market in their own name.
(ii) A CCA itself does not hold any property. Instead property related to or 
resulting from cost shared activities is held by individual participants. Part-
nerships on the other hand may under certain conditions hold property in 
their own name.
(iii) Under a CCA participants share costs and risks and subsequently exploit 
the resulting assets, services or rights for their own use. They are all individ-
ually entitled to proceeds of that exploitation. In contrast, under a partner-
ship the services, assets and rights are exploited by the partnership itself.
Not qualifying as a partnership has both legal and tax implications. It limits 
liability of participants towards creditors. While often all partners are collec-
tively liable for debts of a partnership, participants in a CCA will only be liable for 
debt following from the third party transactions that they entered into in their 
own name (although that does not limit an internal right of recourse against the 
72 See Article 3 of Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I).
73 Also see J. Malherbe, “Cost Contribution and Cost Sharing Arrangements”, in Jochum et al 2016. 
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other participants for their pro rata share, if there is a relation to cost shared 
activities). Furthermore, not incorporating a legal entity and not qualifying as a 
partnership confirms yet again that the CCA itself is not a taxable entity. Instead 
the participants are taxable individually. Closely related to this matter, albeit a 
fundamentally different issue, is whether or not a CCA can lead to a tax liability 
of a participant in another country by constituting a permanent establishment. 
This question will be answered in Paragraph 8.2. 
2.3. Application in Fiscal Practice
2.3.1. Legitimate Use
The foregoing addressed the original purpose for the introduction of the CCA 
concept, the developed thinking by tax authorities about their application in 
practice and the legal status of the arrangements. Before looking at tax and 
transfer pricing technical aspects in more detail, it is good to determine why 
MNEs would choose a CCA to structure their intragroup development activities 
or services. The legitimate reasons for doing so can be divided up into five cate-
gories: 
(i) A Free Flow of Expertise and Knowledge
 A strong knowledge base is considered to offer a key competitive advan-
tage to MNEs. In fact, it has been argued by scholars in the field of strategic 
management research that the primary reason why multinationals exist is 
their ability to transfer and exploit knowledge more efficiently and more 
effectively in the intra-corporate context than through external market 
mechanisms.74 If group members have continuous unlimited access to the 
group’s collective know-how, this will increase the chances of achieving 
economies of scale.  A CCA can constitute a legal framework for the flow of 
knowledge within the group. By providing for collective ownership of cost 
shared results it allows participants a legal title to make use of the services 
performed by experts located elsewhere within the group and access to 
jointly developped intangibles.  
(ii) Risk Sharing  across the Group
 CCAs allow for a division of costs and risks associated with the cost shared 
activities among the participants. If a project performed under a CCA does 
not pay off or results in a lower return than expected, the costs and disap-
74 Gupta and Govidarajan, Strategic Management Journal 2000/4.
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pointment about proceeds are shared by all participants.  This encourages 
activities that might be too costly or too risky for one enterprise to initiate 
by itself. At the same time it is a mechanism to allocate costs appropriately 
among benefiting group members. That facilitates the tax deductibility of 
the costs, which brings down the group’s current tax charge in a way that is 
coherent with the arm’s length standard.  Provided that the cost allocations 
are reported “above the line” for management reporting purposes, they 
can at the same time enable management to more accurately measure 
the business performance of the individual enterprises and base manage-
ment decisions as well as its employees remuneration plan on the resulting 
insights.           
(iii) Avoidance of an Intercompany Transfer of Intangibles
 As already mentioned in Paragraph 2.2.2.1 the original reason for the intro-
duction of CSAs in the 1968 US Transfer Pricing Regulations was to offer 
MNEs an option to allow their group companies access to jointly devel-
oped intangibles, without having to separately transfer those intangi-
bles to those group companies or to grant them a right of use. This offers 
MNEs two critical benefits. First of all, it prevents recognition of taxable 
income on the separate transfer of the intangibles. Such front loading of 
profit could otherwise be regarded quite unfair by the MNE, as it will from 
a group perspective often not yet have realized any (external) profit at the 
time of the intercompany transaction. Secondly, avoiding an intercom-
pany transfer of intangibles also avoids an often complex valuation exer-
cise. This prevents a cumbersome and to some extent arbitrary exercise to 
determine the fair market value of the intangibles on the basis of difficult 
to verify financial projections. By consequence, it also reduces uncertainty 
and potential disputes. 
(iv) Administrative Simplicity
 Activities are often physically centralized in the group’s parent company, 
regional and divisional headquarter companies or so called shared service 
centers. Alternatively an MNE may functionally centralize activities in staff 
departments, while the employees belonging to that department are divided 
over multiple group companies and can be physically located in different 
places. When services are only functionally and not physically centralized, 
this can cause transfer pricing complications. There are not only multiple 
service recipients, there are also multiple service providers. Formalizing 
these relationships in unilateral agreements would require a complex web 
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of intra-group contracts. It would have to be defended on a contract-by-
contract basis that service providers receive a fiscally acceptable remu-
neration.  A CCA on the other hand offers the advantage of contractual 
simplicity. It guarantees a consistent transfer pricing approach throughout 
the group, allowing the MNE to defend the single framework agreement 
instead of multiple SLAs. On the other hand not all related companies are 
necessarily in a comparable position.  Especially in a larger multinational 
group, circumstances of group members can be quite different. Within 
different geographical regions or divisions the market circumstances, the 
organizational set-up, legal structure and assumed transfer pricing policies 
may differ. A one-size-fits-all CCA is then not possible. Furthermore, just 
like administrating multiple unilateral service agreements, operating a CCA 
can also be a cumbersome exercise. It will have to be tested on an ad hoc 
basis what type of arrangement best fits the MNE’s organization.  
(v) Upfront Clarity about Cost Reallocations
 Last but not least a CCA offers an opportunity to establish upfront clarity 
and consistency in respect of cost reallocations within the group. This 
avoids managerial and budget discussions in respect of individual service 
and license agreements. It also has the benefit of certainty on the tax treat-
ment once a CCA has been approved by local tax administrations either in 
an upfront tax ruling or after a tax audit. Especially if a multilateral advance 
pricing agreement could be obtained to which the most relevant tax admin-
istrations involved sign up, that significantly reduces the risk of double taxa-
tion, interest charges and penalties. The procedures for obtaining advance 
certainty are further discussed in Paragraph 9.2. 
2.3.2. Tax Avoidance
2.3.2.1. Introduction
The advantages outlined in the previous paragraph provide legitimate busi-
ness reasons for MNEs to enter into a CCA. Unfortunately, as already acknowl-
edged, CCAs are also used in structures aimed at eroding the tax base in high 
tax jurisdictions by shifting profit into low tax jurisdictions. Although there can 
be discussions about the transfer pricing outcomes of these structures or their 
qualification under international tax law, by themselves they do not qualify a 
fraud or abuse of law. As such, the only way to limit their effectiveness without 
disproportionally restricting the bona fide use of CCAs is through enhanced 
guidance on their appropriate tax and transfer pricing treatment or targetted 
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anti-abuse rules. The recent efforts made by the OECD under the BEPS project 
can be considered an attempt to provide such guidance. To further place that 
in perspective, this Paragraph 2.3.2 illustrates how CCAs have been used in tax 
avoidance structures. In that context it examines the case studies included in 
the Report that the US Joint Committee on Taxation submitted to the House 
Committee on Ways and Means in 201075 to facilitate the identification and 
discussion of business structures that may affect a taxpayer’s US and worldwide 
tax liability. These case studies were anonymized, with taxpayers being referred 
to as the Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, Echo and Foxtrot company. In three out of 
the six case studies a CCA played a crucial role. Furthermore, Paragraph 2.3.2.5 
considers an example from the OECD’s Base Analysis Report on Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting that also prominently featured a CCA.
2.3.2.2. US Case Study 1: Bravo Company
2.3.2.2.1. Group Structure and Business Model
Bravo Company is a major US-based publicly listed MNE involved in the sale 
of industrial technology products and services. It has sizeable sales around the 
world and a multibillion dollar annual global profit. Bravo has a substantial R&D 
spend and performs its R&D activities almost exclusively in the US. Bravo US 
holds its foreign subsidiaries via a Bermuda intermediate holding company. 
Key roles in the tax structure are for a Swiss and Dutch group company. Other 
subsidiaries are located worldwide. In the 1990’s Bravo decided that Bravo US 
would continue to be responsible for manufacturing and selling existing prod-
ucts, but that going forward the intangible assets related to newly developed 
product lines would be centralized in Bravo Switzerland while the primary 
responsibility for manufacturing and selling new products would come to rest 
with  Bravo Netherlands. In this context Bravo US entered into a cost sharing 
arrangement with Bravo Switzerland, so that the effective ownership of newly 
developed intangibles was from then on split between Bravo US and Bravo 
Switzerland. To also allow Bravo Switzerland access to all pre-existing intangi-
bles a buy-in payment was agreed in the form of a royalty declining on the basis 
of an assumed four years useful lifetime of the intangibles. Once the structure 
was up and running Bravo Switzerland fully recovered the total buy-in royalty 
within three years.  Over the years Bravo also acquired several companies with 
US owned intangible property. To the extent Bravo Switzerland was considered 
75 Joint Committee on Taxation, “Present Law and Background Related to Possible Income Shifting and 
Transfer Pricing”, 20 July 2010.
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to make use of such intangibles, the CSA was amended and an appropriate addi-
tional buy-in payment was agreed. The CSA further provided for total R&D costs 
to be split between Bravo US and Bravo Switzerland on the basis of the sales 
of old and new products. As the sales of new products initially accounted for 
approximately 25% of total sales, Bravo Switzerland started off to pay 25% of 
the total R&D spend. When over time the sales of new products as a percentage 
of total sales increased, the cost sharing payments were adjusted accordingly 
and Bravo Switzerland paid a larger part of the total R&D costs.
Bravo Switzerland, which employed no personnel of its own, licensed out the 
right to use intangibles developed under the cost sharing to Bravo Netherlands. 
The latter company was responsible for manufacturing and distributing new 
products and bore all significant risks in that relation. Among others this included 
the manufacturing risk (including risk of obsolete stock), the product and quality 
risk and the bad debt risk. However, Bravo Netherlands also employed only 
a limited workforce. It outsourced all the actual manufacturing to unrelated 
contract manufacturers and most of the actual distribution to related limited 
risk distributors. Bravo US acted as the limited risk distributor for all sales of new 
products in the US. In a number of other jurisdictions Bravo Netherlands sold 
directly to customers. In those instances it received sales support from related 
party commission agents. Contract manufacturers, limited risk distributors and 
commission agents all received a fixed remuneration determined on a cost-
plus or resale-minus basis. Furthermore, various types of support services were 
performed by Bravo US. This included procurement services, general marketing 
and sales support services, factoring services, administrative services as well as 
tax, legal and treasury services. All these services were compensated on a cost-
plus basis.  The business model in respect of new products can be summarized 
as follows:
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Figure 2: “Bravo Case Study”
2.3.2.2.2. Tax Treatment
In respect of manufacturing and selling of new products Bravo US earned a profit 
mark-up on the limited risk distribution activities and support services that it 
performed, which was included in its US taxable base. Next to this the royal-
ties received from Bravo Switzerland as cost sharing buy-in payments were also 
taxable in the US. The same applies for the cost sharing payments, but those 
were offset against tax deductible R&D expenses and thus effectively did not 
result in US taxable profit. Meanwhile, Bravo US was entitled to an R&D credit 
for all R&D costs, even those reimbursed by Bravo Switzerland. 
US law includes an extensive set of rules under which certain types of income of 
controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) is included in the taxable base of a US 
parent company. However, various exceptions to these rules can apply. In this 
case none of the foreign profit was included in the US taxable base under the 
US CFC legislation. The royalty income of Bravo Switzerland was disregarded, 
because the royalty payer (Bravo Netherlands) and the royalty recipient (Bravo 
Switzerland) both elected the status of disregarded entity for US tax purposes 
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under the so called check-the-box regime. Furthermore, the profit of Bravo 
Netherlands, including the profit of the disregarded commission agents, as well 
as the profit of the opaque limited risk distributors qualified for the manufac-
turing exception, because the US CFC rules attributed the manufacturing activ-
ities of the contract manufacturers to Bravo Netherlands.
Bravo Switzerland earned a spread from developing and licensing out new 
intangibles. Initially the Swiss profit was reduced substantially by the deduct-
ible buy-in royalties. However, this royalty decreased to nil over the assumed 
relatively short useful lifetime of the pre-existing intangibles, causing the part 
of profits that was taxable at a favorable rate in Switzerland to increase quite 
rapidly. Another substantial share of the profits from the sale of new prod-
ucts ended up with Bravo Netherlands. Generally, it would have been taxable 
at the normal Dutch statutory rate (25.5% in 2010). However, it is implied that 
Bravo Netherlands concluded a tax ruling with the Dutch tax authorities that 
significantly reduced the Dutch tax burden. Unfortunately the content of the 
ruling is not discussed in the Report. It should be noted here that the Dutch 
tax authorities do not agree rulings simply foreseeing in a lower tax rate. More 
likely the Dutch tax authorities allowed for a generous deduction of royalties 
paid to Bravo Switzerland. Now that no further details are available it is uncer-
tain what the effective tax rate on the remaining Dutch taxable income was. 
Nevertheless, even at the normal Dutch rate of 25.5% it would have been signif-
icantly below the US combined federal and state tax rate of almost 40% at the 
time. Bermuda, for completeness sake, did not impose a material tax on any 
of the group’s profit either. As a consequence, the structure allowed for Bravo 
Company to keep the majority of its profit outside the US. The Report indicates 
that one third of the total profit was taxable in the US at approximately 40%, 
while the rest was taxed abroad at a mixed rate of approximately 4%.  Mean-
while more than 97% of Bravo’s workforce was employed in the US and all its 
R&D activities were performed there.   
2.3.2.2.3. Author’s Analysis
Bravo Company’s tax structure was aimed at allocating profits from new prod-
ucts to two jurisdictions with favorable tax regimes. These are the Netherlands 
and Switzerland.  Bravo Netherlands was attributed a substantial share of the 
total profits, in part because it coordinated manufacturing and distribution. 
This will have involved some relevant functions being performed by the limited 
number of employees in the Dutch company. It appears that another relevant 
factor for attributing profits to Bravo Netherlands was the risks that it assumed. 
Bravo Switzerland on the other hand was entitled to significant profits, because 
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it had become the owner of the group’s intangibles related to new product lines 
under the CSA from the moment those had come to exist. It had borne the costs 
and the risks in respect of the intangibles’ development. The buy-in payments 
for pre-existing intangibles were a part of that. However, the buy-in royalty 
was recouped in as little as three years. Furthermore, its overall substance was 
minimal and it had not performed any development activities itself. In fact it had 
performed no material functions besides holding intangibles. Bravo Company 
tried to leverage the argument that its Swiss subsidiary had borne the finan-
cial risk of the development of new activities and was therefore entitled to the 
results of the cost shared marketing and R&D activities. In testing the validity 
of this position the US rules disregarded that Bravo Switzerland did not have 
actual substance. It did not employ personnel capable of making relevant busi-
ness decisions and control the risks associated with the cost shared activities. 
As a consequence, the US rules effectively offered Bravo Company the oppor-
tunity to allocate its intangibles to Switzerland under favorable conditions and 
shift profits from manufacturing and selling new products to jurisdictions with 
a significantly lower effective tax rate than the United States. In my opinion the 
main CCA related issue that comes to the surface in this case study is the lack 
of substance requirements imposed on CCA participants.  As a consequence, 
the applicable rules and regulations offered the opportunity for a low taxed 
foreign group company with minimal substance, in this case Bravo Switzerland, 
to assume effective ownership of the group’s intangibles at a limited cost (not in 
the least because of the rapid decline of the buy-in royalty) without performing 
any of the underlying development activities. This resulted in a tax structure 
that was significantly disconnected from the group’s actual business opera-
tions, while it resulted in the majority of profits being taxed at rates far below 
the rate applied in the United States. 
2.3.2.3. US Case Study 2: Echo Company
2.3.2.3.1. Group Structure and Business Model
Echo Company is a US based publicly listed MNE in the business of manufac-
turing and selling technology-based consumer products. It has significant R&D 
activities that are almost exclusively performed in the US. For many of its prod-
ucts Echo has registered a patent. Echo’s legal structure includes a Swiss subsid-
iary held via a Dutch entity that was disregarded for US tax purposes. The Swiss 
sub in its turn holds two other Swiss companies, both of which were also disre-
garded from a US perspective. 
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During the study period most of the group’s products were manufactured in 
Puerto Rico. However, for a key product line Echo structured the manufacturing 
and non-US sales differently. These products were manufactured by one of the 
disregarded Swiss entities, Echo Europe, that had entered into a cost sharing 
agreement with Echo US. As a buy-in payment for pre-existing intangibles 
Echo Europe paid Echo US a declining royalty. The time-period of the royalty 
was product dependent, but never exceeded 10 years. Ongoing R&D costs were 
shared using a sales key. Furthermore, Echo Europe also purchased component 
parts from Echo US. Echo Europe sold finished products to the other disre-
garded Swiss entity, Echo Europe Trading. The transfer price was set so that the 
latter company earned a fixed 2% return on sales. Echo Europe Trading then 
sold the products to non-US customers either directly or via related limited risk 
distributors. This led to the following business model in respect of non-US sales:
Figure 3: “Echo Case Study”
2.3.2.3.2. Tax Treatment
The buy-in royalty and cost sharing payments received by Echo US were included 
in the US taxable income. However, they were for a substantial part offset by tax 
deductible R&D costs, in respect of which Echo might also have been eligible 
63
for a US tax credit. Furthermore, there was the purchase price received by Echo 
US for the components it supplied to Echo Europe, but this appears to have 
included only a minimal part of the profit margin earned. Most of the profit from 
the sale of the products outside the US ended up in Switzerland, where it was 
taxed at a relatively favorable rate. Echo Europe Trading earned a modest return 
on sales, while residual profit flowed to Echo Europe. From a US perspective 
these companies were disregarded, just like Echo Switzerland’s Dutch parent 
company, and the income was attributed to Echo Switzerland. However, for 
purposes of US CFC legislation practically none of Echo Switzerland’s income 
was included in the US taxable base. 
2.3.2.3.3. Author’s Analysis  
This case study again offers an example of a multinational that had centralized 
its R&D activities in the US, but structured its business model so that most of 
the profits were taxed elsewhere. Here Echo Company was able to keep the 
profits from the sale of a key product in Switzerland. Crucially there was no 
royalty payment to Echo US required for the use of manufacturing intangibles, 
because Echo Europe was a co-developer and co-owner of the relevant intan-
gibles under the CSA. The Swiss organization shared in costs of R&D activities, 
manufactured the products and was responsible for sales. It also bore all signifi-
cant risks in respect of these activities and potentially employed personnel that 
was capable of taking relevant business decisions in this respect and thereby 
control these risks. Echo clearly had significantly more substance than the Swiss 
IP subsidiary of Bravo Company. However, its active involvement in the actual 
development of intangibles was still limited. In fact all development activities 
were in the US, while under the CSA Echo US received compensation on a cost 
basis. As a consequence, also in this structure the CSA enabled a certain shift of 
profits to a jurisdiction that applied a more favorable tax rate. This effect was 
made possible by an under-appreciation of the R&D functions performed in the 
US. In my opinion the key CCA related issue to be identified in this case study 
therefore is the unsatisfying outcome from valuing Echo US’ contributions 
under the CSA at cost instead of at market price. 
2.3.2.4. US Case Study 3: Foxtrot Company
2.3.2.4.1. Group Structure and Business Model
The third case study from the US Report involving a cost sharing agreement 
features a global multinational that manufactures, markets, and sells a broad 
variety of consumer goods. This company is referred to as Foxtrot. The group’s 
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legal structure included a Bermuda intermediate holding company as well as a 
Dutch and a Hong Kong subsidiary. The latter two entities were disregarded for 
US tax purposes. During the study period approximately 50% of its revenues 
came from sales in the United States. The company’s R&D spend was near to 3% 
of sales, with all R&D activities being performed in the US. 
In the mid-1990’s Foxtrot decided to make its foreign subsidiaries responsible 
for non-US activities. For this purpose Foxtrot US and Foxtrot Bermuda entered 
into a CSA. This arrangement made Foxtrot Bermuda the effective owner of 
intangibles related to products sold outside of the US and entitled it to the 
profits from their trade. In return Foxtrot Bermuda paid a buy-in payment for 
pre-existing intangibles and a relative share of total R&D costs. The buy-in was 
structured as a declining royalty over a 10-year period. Shared R&D costs were 
split on the basis of each participant’s sales compared to total sales.  With almost 
90% of R&D costs covered by the cost sharing agreement and around 50% of 
sales outside the US, Foxtrot Bermuda paid for approximately 45% of the total 
R&D spend. Within the group Foxtrot Netherlands took on key responsibilities 
coordinating the manufacturing, marketing and sale of all Foxtrot products. 
It engaged a number of toll manufacturers, out of which Foxtrot Hong Kong 
was the greatest by volume. Raw materials were bought in the name of Foxtrot 
Netherlands and Foxtrot Netherlands held ownership of stock at all times. The 
toll manufacturers received a service fee set equal to their own costs increased 
by a profit mark-up of 5%.  Finished products were sold by Foxtrot Netherlands 
to associated distributors, who on-sold to third party customers in their own 
territories. Transfer prices were generally set so that the local distributors only 
earned a limited return on sales. The only exception to this rule was Foxtrot US, 
that was allowed to buy products at a lower price reflecting its ownership of 
intangibles related to US sales. For the use of the intangibles related to non-US 
sales Foxtrot Netherlands paid a royalty to Foxtrot Bermuda.
The new business model can be summarized as follows:
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Figure 4: “Foxtrot Case Study”
2.3.2.4.2. Tax Treatment
The revenue from the sale of products to US customers, the buy-in royalties and 
cost sharing payments were all included in the US taxable base. The US taxable 
profit was decreased by the purchase price for finished products paid to Foxtrot 
Netherlands, the R&D costs incurred in the US and the own operating costs of 
Foxtrot US. Although on balance the R&D activities paid for by Foxtrot Bermuda 
did not generate any future US taxable income, Foxtrot US was eligible for a 
tax credit in their respect. Toll manufacturers like Foxtrot Hong Kong and local 
associated distributors earned a limited fixed profit. Residual profit ended up 
with Foxtrot Netherlands. Its Dutch taxable profit was however eroded by the 
royalty payment to Foxtrot Bermuda, where there was no pick-up due to a lack 
of any corporate income taxation in Bermuda. The size of the royalty was agreed 
in an advance pricing agreement with the Dutch tax authorities. Although the 
Netherlands tax authorities consistently apply OECD transfer pricing guidance, 
the report of the Committee suggests that the royalty for which they allowed a 
deduction in this case was relatively high.
2.3.2.4.3. Author’s Analysis
The Foxtrot case study shows a strong similarity to that of Bravo explained 
before. In both cases the tax structure relied on a CSA to place the effective 
ownership of intangibles with cash box companies located in a low tax jurisdic-
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tion outside the US. The involvement of these cash box entities in R&D activities 
was limited to paying their share and bearing the associated financial risk. Active 
involvement was non-existent and in fact their overall substance was extremely 
small. They did not employ any personnel nor did they perform valid business 
functions. To the contrary, their inclusion in the structure appears to have been 
predominantly, if not exclusively, tax driven. However, Foxtrot Bermuda paid 
a more generous buy-in royalty (10 years) than Bravo Switzerland (4 years). 
Furthermore, Foxtrot’s CSA only transferred intangibles related to sales outside 
the US to its low taxed subsidiary and the purchase price for finished products 
paid by Foxtrot US to Foxtrot Netherlands was discounted accordingly. It can 
therefore be argued that in respect of certain elements Foxtrot’s approach is 
somewhat less aggressive than that of Bravo. Nevertheless, according to the 
Report by the Committee on Ways and Means, the structure allowed for Foxtrot 
to assert reinvestments abroad and thereby defer US taxation on earnings of 
more than US$ 50 billion! Like in the Bravo case, this was facilitated by the US 
tax and transfer pricing rules that allowed a low substance tax haven entity, in 
this case Foxtrot Bermuda, to participate in the CSA.  As such, this case study 
is again a good illustration of why substance requirements should be imposed 
on CCA and CSA participants. This will be further discussed in Paragraph 5.3.2.
2.3.2.5. OECD Example 
2.3.2.5.1. Group Structure and Business Model
In annex C to the Base Analysis Report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting the 
OECD also published three examples of aggressive tax planning structures. In 
two of these a CCA was used to allocate the effective ownership of intangibles 
to a group company in a low tax jurisdiction. One example was clearly inspired 
by the Foxtrot case study discussed above. The other concerned a set-up with 
legal entities in countries referred to as countries A, B, C and D.76 This could very 
well have concerned an MNE from the US (country A) that routes its investment 
in for example Italy (country D) via Bermuda (country B) and the Netherlands 
(country C). The structure would work as follows:
Assume a US company intends to start manufacturing and selling products on 
the southern European market through its Italian subsidiary. In order to limit its 
overall tax burden it first incorporates a Bermuda intermediate holding company 
with which it concludes a CCA. Under the agreement the Bermuda company 
pays a buy-in for pre-existing intangibles and pays a pro rata share of future 
76 OECD, “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 12 February 2013, page 76 – 79.
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R&D expenses. As such it becomes the effective owner of a significant part of 
the group’s intangibles and is entitled to profits stemming from these intangi-
bles. When the cost sharing arrangement is entered into at an early stage, at 
least before the group developed a track record of sales in southern Europe, 
the buy-in payment can be kept relatively small.  The Bermuda company holds 
two subsidiaries. These are the Italian operating company and a Dutch special 
purpose vehicle (“SPV”). The Bermuda holding company licenses out the right 
to use the intangibles to the Dutch SPV, which in turn sub-licenses that right 
to the Italian operating company. In return the Dutch SPV pays a royalty to the 
Bermuda holding and the Italian operating company pays a royalty to the SPV.
Figure 5: “OECD BEPS Example”
2.3.2.5.2. Tax Treatment
In Italy the tax deductible royalty erodes the taxable base, leaving only a small 
part of the profit from operational activities subject to Italian taxation. Under 
the EU Interest and Royalty Directive there is also no Italian withholding tax 
payable on the royalty payment to the associated Dutch group company. The 
Dutch company meanwhile reports the royalty received as taxable income, but 
at the same time treats the royalty paid to Bermuda as a deductible expense. On 
balance only a limit spread is subject to Dutch corporate income tax, while the 
Netherlands under national law does not impose a withholding tax on outbound 
royalties. To further facilitate the taxpayer, the size of the Dutch taxable income 
might be confirmed in a tax ruling from the Dutch tax authorities providing 
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upfront certainty that the structure will work. In Bermuda there is no corporate 
income tax imposed on the royalty receipts.  By having the Dutch and Italian 
company elect a disregarded status for US tax purposes, the royalty payments 
are not recognized under the US CFC legislation. In fact for those purposes the 
active business operations in Italy would be attributed to the Bermuda company, 
leaving none or almost no CFC income taxable with the parent company in the 
US.
2.3.2.5.3. Author’s Analysis
Like the US case studies the OECD’s example illustrates how a CCA can be used 
to shift future profits to a low tax jurisdiction like Bermuda. The group company 
located there has limited substance and its only contribution to the develop-
ment of the intangible assets consists of funding a proportionate share of the 
development costs. Again two critical elements of the traditional tax treatment 
of CCAs are in play: the access of low substance group companies to participate 
in the CCA and the undervaluation of contributions in kind by valuing develop-
ment activities at cost instead of at market price. The structure would not have 
the desired effect, if the corporate income tax in the country where intangibles 
are developed, in this case the US, is replaced by a withholding tax in the country 
where they are exploited, in this case Italy. The OECD’s example shows how 
this last hurdle can easily be taken by means of so called treaty shopping.  The 
taxpayer simply inserts into the structure a flow-through company located in a 
country that is satisfied to tax only a small spread on in- and outbound royalties 
and has a good treaty network, in this case the Netherlands. When the Italian 
operating company now pays the royalty to the Netherlands, this is exempt 
from withholding tax under the EU Interest and Royalty Directive. When on its 
turn the Dutch SPV forwards most of the royalty to Bermuda, the Netherlands 
under its national law does not impose any additional withholding tax either. 
2.3.3. Demarcation Lines
2.3.3.1. Distinguishing between Legitimate Business Practices and Tax Avoidance
After investigating the non-fiscal business rational for implementing CCAs in 
Paragraph 2.3.1 and considering some examples of their more tax driven appli-
cation in aggressive tax structures in Paragraph 2.3.2, the question arises how 
acceptable legitimate and non-acceptable abusive applications can be effec-
tively distinguished. In that context it should be observed that all tax related 
behavior can generally be qualified along a gradual scale. On the one far end of 
the spectrum there is tax evasion. This type of behavior conflicts with tax legisla-
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tion, it is illegal and it can be challenged in front of a court of law potentially with 
punitive action as a consequence. On the other far end of the spectrum there 
is behavior that is undisputedly accepted as legitimate business practice. That 
type of behavior clearly complies with both the letter and the objectives of tax 
law. It is commonly regarded as prudent and responsible behavior. In between 
these two outer limits of the scale is a grey area with a wide range of behaviors 
that reduce a taxpayer’s tax bill and that clearly stay within the boundaries set 
by the letter of the law, but that at the same time can be argued to conflict with 
the objectives of the law. If the latter is indeed the case, this type of behavior 
can be qualified as tax avoidance. As such, tax avoidance has been defined by 
Prebble and Prebble as “contriving transactions and structures that reduce tax in 
ways that are contrary to the policy or spirit of the legislation”77. Since the OECD’s 
BEPS project tax avoidance is more or less synonymous to base erosion and 
profit shifting. 
The identification of a conflict with the spirit of the law and the consequential 
qualification of certain behavior as tax avoidance has a subjective element to it. 
It is also a matter of morality and to some extent it is an arbitrary call. To be clear 
about that: An analysis of these complex and abstract aspects goes beyond the 
scope of my research and will not be performed in the remainder of this thesis. 
Alternatively I refer the reader to the many different publications on the topic in 
both fiscal and non-fiscal literature. However, a practical distinction found there 
that I would still like to point out, is that between exogenous and endogenous tax 
avoidance.78 Exogenous tax avoidance refers to “avoidance of tax by resorting to 
transactions or structures for their own sake, that is, to transactions and structures 
that are independent of other economic activity of the taxpayer”. Endogenous tax 
avoidance concerns “avoidance that is affected by adjusting transactions and 
structures that the taxpayer was proposing to enter, or has already entered, in any 
event”. I would argue that in a transfer pricing context exogenous tax avoidance 
should in principle be countered by the underlying principles of the arm’s length 
standard, as set out in Chapter 3. These make the pricing and even the recog-
nition of intercompany transaction dependent on their economic substance. 
Similarly tax avoidance through transfer pricing manipulation should be battled 
by enhanced international consensus and clearer guidance on the application 
of the principle based arm’s length standard. In case of CCAs two very concrete 
examples of such measures would be the inclusion in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines of the requirement for participants to control the risk associated with 
the cost shared activities (Paragraph 5.3.2) and the more extensive wording on 
77 Prebble and Prebble, Creighton Law Review 2010/3.
78 Idem.
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the valuation of contributions at market price (Paragraph 5.5.3). The problem 
with endogenous tax avoidance on the other hand is that it does not per se 
conflict with rules and regulations or the economic substance requirements 
of the arm’s length standard. The appropriate measure against this type of tax 
avoidance would be an anti-abuse rule, either targeted or general, depending 
on the type of tax avoidance at hand. A traditional example could be so called 
controlled foreign company rules aimed at keeping MNEs from parking profit-
able mobile assets such as high value intangibles in low tax foreign subsidiaries. 
These rules are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.           
2.3.3.2. Categorization Model
Coming back to the application of CCAs, it should be mentioned that their 
justification as a safe haven to avoid valuation issues has been challenged by 
scholars. Brauner for example has argued:
“Cost sharing, a technique exclusive for the development of intangibles, 
has strangely evolved, with little evidence of educated policy justifications, 
within our transfer pricing regime functioning as a safe harbor regime, yet 
supposedly fully subjected to the discipline of the dominant arm’s length 
standard. “79
However, as explained in Paragraph 2.3.1 more legitimate reasons may still exist 
for the use of CCAs. At the same time it cannot be denied that the arrangements 
also facilitate aggressive tax planning and even tax avoidance. Establishing the 
motives for the choice of MNEs to implement a CCA in practice can be difficult 
and, as explained above, qualifying the use of the CCA as legitimate or abusive 
is an arbitrary call. Without trying to draw a hard line, I would like to propose a 
categorization model that in my opinion can facilitate an analysis of the appli-
cation of CCAs in practice and can help to identify situations where there is an 
increased risk of base erosion and profit shifting. The proposed categorization 
model is based on the assumption that there are two aspects that have been 
particularly decisive for how MNEs have used CCAs to structure the intragroup 
development of intangibles: the role of intangibles in the value chain and the 
company’s organizational structure. 
In relation to the role of intangibles in the value chain Keates, Muylle, Reichert 
and Wright have already argued that CCAs are traditionally applied in two 
different ways:
79 Brauner, Intertax 2010/11.
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1. They have been used by mostly innovative, high-tech companies to 
develop high value intangibles and make those available to their foreign 
subsidiaries, and
2. They have also been used by mostly old-line, low-tech manufacturing 
companies to develop incremental improvements to existing technologies 
and share the costs of doing so among their manufacturing sites.80
The distinguishing factor here is the relative importance of R&D and marketing 
for an MNE’s operations. That importance is high, if technology, brands or 
similar intangibles are the fundament of a company’s entire enterprise to the 
point that they offer the company its right to operate. These industries gener-
ally revolve around new, original intangibles, hereafter referred to as “innova-
tive intangibles”. In contrast, the role of intangibles in the company’s value chain 
is less crucial, if those intangibles only marginally improve an existing product, 
production process or brand image. These intangibles are less the core of the 
MNE’s business, but rather an efficiency factor. They are hereafter referred to as 
“incremental intangibles”. Stereotype examples of MNEs using innovative intan-
gibles would be found in among others the pharmaceutical industry and the 
software and internet industry. It concerns companies that produce specialty 
products or services, for which customer demand exists because of specific 
functionalities of the products that outperform available alternatives. The R&D 
efforts of these companies will often involve “greenfield” research aimed at 
the development of completely new products. As an example of an MNE using 
incremental intangibles one could think of a bulk chemicals manufacturer. Its 
products are more a commodity instead of a specialty product and its customers 
select suppliers on the basis of price instead of functional performance. Its R&D 
effort will often target cost savings through process improvements. However, it 
80 Reichert and Wright, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2006/1 and Keates, Muylle and Wright, 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 2009/3. 
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should be kept in mind that this observation cannot be turned around to assume 
that all process intangibles are merely incremental intangibles.81
The second aspect to take into account when categorizing the use of CCAs then 
is the organizational structure of the MNE at hand.  As already acknowledged in 
the introductory paragraph of this chapter, centralization of activities, including 
intangible development activities, can offer synergy benefits and economies 
of scales. At the same time there will inevitably be a certain distance between 
the central teams and the business units that have to apply the results of the 
centralized activities in daily practice. This can create a tension and raise the 
question what level of centralization leads to optimal performance.  In today’s 
globalized world it is in my opinion very unlikely that an MNE would be at one 
of the outsides of this spectrum by either completely centralizing or decentral-
izing its development activities. Instead, in most cases there will be some, but 
not complete, centralization. Its level can differ significantly from time to time 
and case by case. 
The proposed categorization model divides up the application of CCAs into four 
categories based on the two aspects referenced above; the innovative nature 
of the developed intangibles and the level of centralization of the development 
activities. The model is depicted in the following categorization chart:
81 Already in the 1970s Abernathy and Utterback described how common patterns can be recog-
nized in how companies and industries move from radical, innovation to evolutionary incremental 
improvements (see: Abernathy and Utterback, Technology Review 1978/7). They acknowledged 
that, although there is often emphasis on product innovations, radical process and productivity 
improvements may have equal or even greater commercial importance. The most famous example 
illustrating this is the Ford Motor Company, established in 1903. During its first years it developed, 
produced and sold different model cars with engines ranging from two to six cylinders. In 1908 the 
experience gathered resulted in a single dominant design, the Model T Ford.  Although this unde-
niably was a technologically advanced automobile for its time, it was only made into an unprec-
edented commercial success after the factory in which it was produced was reorganized along 
a single assembly line. The cost savings in which this innovative manufacturing process resulted 
made the Model T Ford affordable to the larger public. Without any fundamental technical innova-
tions being applied to the design during the next 19 years Henry Ford sold more than 15 million of 
these cars.
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Figure 6: “CCA Categorization Model”
In the north-western quartile “A” one would find the CCAs of companies that 
predominantly use incremental intangibles developed by centralized R&D or 
marketing teams. This could concern for example the old-line, low-tech manu-
facturing companies referenced by Keates, Muylle, Reichert and Wright. Their 
centralized R&D team may focus on debottlenecking and efficiency improve-
ment of existing production processes. It might regularly visit local manu-
facturing sites, but generally works at a central location and then makes the 
know-how and technology developed available to all group members. Alterna-
tively the work could very well be performed in parallel by engineers on various 
manufacturing sites sharing experience and best practices among themselves. 
In this case, the CCA would end up in the south-western quartile “C”. The north-
eastern quartile “B” includes CCAs aimed at the development of innovative 
intangibles by centralized organizations. Occasions to implement such CCAs 
are not uncommon, as the development of innovative intangibles generally 
involves highly specialized R&D work, which is most effectively performed 
by uniquely experienced teams centralized in only one or a limited number of 
locations. When accurately delineating the intercompany transactions under 
these CCAs (also see Paragraph 3.3.1), it is important to note that only one or 
a limited number of participating group companies are uniquely positioned to 
perform the functions that result in the development of high value intangibles. 
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This is less the case, if the performance of development activities is more evenly 
shared between participating group companies. In that situation the CCA moves 
into the south-eastern quartile “D”. This could for example occur in case of ring-
fenced research projects with a limited number of participants, each of which 
performs a reasonable amount of R&D activities. In such case the contributions 
in kind of different participants would be more equally balanced out.
If the CCA is aimed at developing innovative, high value intangibles the valua-
tion of contributions consisting of pre-existing intangibles or the performance 
of development activities will become more relevant (see Paragraph 5.5.3). If 
development activities are strongly centralized, it would be less likely that a low 
substance participant exercises sufficient control over the risks associated with 
the cost shared activities to participate in the CCA (see Paragraph 5.3.2). Most 
notably CCAs allocated to the north-eastern quartile “B” of the categorization 
chart would therefore be in the danger zone. Not surprisingly the CCAs used 
by the Bravo, Echo and Foxtrot Company from the 2010 Report by the US Joint 
Committee on Taxation all appear to fit into this category. With those CCAs 
there should thus be careful consideration of which group companies partici-
pate in the arrangement, what the terms and conditions of their collaboration 
are and what therefore should be the appropriate tax and transfer pricing treat-
ment of their transactions. However, the purpose of the categorization exercise 
under the model presented above is not to label the transfer pricing outcome 
of certain CCAs as per se conflicting with the arm’s length standard. It is also 
explicitly not intended to rule out CCAs as a possible arrangement for the collec-
tive performance of R&D or marketing activities by innovative and centralized 
groups in the far north-eastern quartile “B”. Therefore, if all further require-
ments for implementation of a CCA are met but the outcome is not at arm’s 
length, tax authorities should not disregard the legal agreement, but should 
seek to correct the outcome through pricing adjustments, i.e. through reval-
uation of the various contributions by participants under the CCA. They might 
start by assessing whether the contributions of participants housing the R&D 
and marketing centers, both their pre-existing intangibles and the ongoing 
functions performed by these participants, are appropriately compensated. 
Testing this may logically involve a comparison of the outcome with that of the 
taxpayer’s best realistically available alternative to cost sharing, as also advo-
cated in the US Cost Sharing Regulations.82 For a company with a uniquely expe-
rienced and skilled R&D or marketing team such alternative would be to develop 
its knowhow, technology, brand and trademarks or other intangibles at its own 
82 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(A) – Also see Paragraph 4.3.3.2.
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account and for its own risk and then license them out in return for an appro-
priate royalty. Obviously there should not be a material deviation in the net 
present value of the outcome of the CCA structure and the realistically available 
alternative. If there is, then a pricing adjustment seems in order. However, as 
long as other requirements for concluding the CCA are met (including those that 
all participants expect a mutual benefit from the cost shared activities and each 
of them control the risk associated with those activities), the legal arrangement 
should be respected. At the same time taxpayers that have strongly centralized 
development activities , after  taking the commercial and financial relation-
ship between the group companies involved into account, may also recognize 
upfront that a licensing model  offers a better fitting, easier to benchmark and 
more transparent solution. Such taxpayers might then opt for that alternative 
from the beginning and not use a CCA at all.       
Having noted the above, the categorization model is intended to facilitate a full 
transfer pricing analysis of transactions under a CCA, including their accurate 
delineation, a comparability analysis and eventually their pricing. It can also 
help to identify those situations where there is an increased risk of tax avoid-
ance and in respect of which additional attention should be paid to the terms 
and conditions of the arrangement as well as its tax treatment. When in the 
following chapters the tax aspects of CCAs are further discussed, I will on occa-
sion reference how this categorization model could in my opinion accommo-
date a structured analysis.   
2.4. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 2 are as follows,
In respect of CCAs as a concept:
(i) The arrangements that are the subject of this research are generally 
concluded between companies belonging to the same multinational 
group, but they are not commonly agreed between unrelated enterprises. 
This reality is caused by fundamental differences in the factual position 
of related and unrelated companies, most notably a lack of conflicting 
competitive interests among the former. As that explains why it can still 
be a rational business decision for related companies to enter into those 
arrangements, CCAs should nonetheless be considered an acceptable 
instrument for structuring the joint development of tangible or intangible 
assets or for obtaining intercompany services. In fact, they have been 
recognized as such for more than half a century. 
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(ii) The most relevant publications since the nineteen sixties can be set out 
along a timeline as follows:
Figure 7: “Timeline of Most Relevant Rules and Regulations”
(iii) The United States Treasury introduced bona fide cost sharing arrengements 
in 1966 as a safe haven for taxpayers to avoid valuation issues in respect of 
intangible proporty. The reasoning behind this is that by foreseeing in the 
collective ownership of intangibles CCAs offer group companies free acces 
to those intangibles and thereby limit the necessity to transfer or license 
them out, avoiding the valuation issues inherent to the latter type of trans-
actions. 
(iv) Following the US lead, the OECD adopted the concept of cost contribution 
arrangements in 1979 and since then provided updated guidance on several 
occassions. However, from the very start it used its own terminology and 
took a position that materially deviated from the US approach in respect of 
some aspects. Most critically this included the matter of whether or not a 
profit mark-up should be included in the value of CCA contributions.  While 
the US Cost Sharing Regulations have continuosly allowed for a valuation 
at cost of most contributions, the OECD prefers such valuation to include a 
profit element. It quite explicitly reinstated its position on this in the 2015 
Final BEPS Report. 
(v) Traditionally both the US Cost Sharing Regulations and the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines displayed little concern about the use of CCAs in tax 
avoidance structures. The first sign of a shift in thinking can be found in the 
1997 version of Chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which 
acknowledge that the arrangements could potentially result in an over-
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statement of income in some countries and therefore require taxpayers to 
be prepared to substantiate their claim with respect to CCAs. By 2013 the 
impression that CCAs were being used as a tax avoidance tool had clearly 
grown, when the OECD considered it necessary to include a revision of 
Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines in its Action Plan to tackle 
base erosion and profit shifting.
In respect of the legal status of CCAs:
(i) CCAs can be defined as contractual joint ventures that are not regarded 
partnerships. This status has certain legal implications: Participants have 
the freedom to choose the law of which jurisdiction governs the agreement, 
while their liability to third parties is limited. At the same time CCAs do not 
constitute separately taxable entities. Instead participants are taxable indi-
vidually in respect of their profits from cost shared activities.
In respect of the application of CCAs in fiscal practice:  
(i) When considering the application of CCAs in fiscal practice it should first 
be noted that there are at least five type of legitimate business reasons for 
MNEs to implement CCAs. The arrangements facilitate a free flow of exper-
tise and knowledge, allow for cross company risk sharing, help to avoid the 
complexity associated with separate intercompany transfer of intangibles, 
bring administrative simplicity and offer upfront certainty and consistency 
in respect of the group’s transfer pricing approach. 
(ii) At the same time CCAs are also known to facilitate tax avoidance struc-
tures. The examples included in the Report by the US Joint Committee on 
Taxation and the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs show that there are 
two specifically problematic issues in respect of the traditional tax treat-
ment of CCAs. The first is that it allows for group companies with limited 
substance to participate in the arrangements (identified as the main issue 
in the Bravo and Foxtrot case studies in Paragraph 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.3 ). The 
second is the underappreciation of contributions in kind by valuing these at 
cost price instead of market price (identified as the main issue in the Echo 
case study in Paragraph 2.3.2.2). 
(iii) The aforementioned examples further illustrate that the use of CCAs in tax 
avoidance structures is not effectively restricted by traditional anti-abuse 
rules. In the US for example, the freedom for taxpayers to opt for tax trans-
parant treatment of subsidiaries at their own discretion and the wide range 
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of exceptions offer taxpayers ample opportunity to avoid the application of 
CFC legislation.  Furthermore, there can be concerns about the possibility 
for taxpayers to avoid source state taxation on royalty payments to a low 
substance group company by routing such payments via a pass-through 
subsidiary in a tax jurisdiction with the right tax treaty network and a coop-
erative tax administration.
(iv) When performing a tax and transfer pricing analysis of a CCA in practice 
it can be helpful to categorize such application depending on the innova-
tive nature of the intangibles developped under the arrangements and the 
level of centralization of development activities (see the categorization 
chart included in Paragraph 2.3.3.2). The profit shifting potential of CCAs 
becomes specifically apparent, when CCAs are used to place the owner-
ship of centrally developed, innovative intangibles with foreign affiliates of 
minimal substance that are located in a low tax jurisdiction. In other words, 
there is an increased risk of tax avoidance when it concerns CCAs in the 
north-eastern quartile “B” of the categorization chart.
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3.  General Transfer Pricing Considerations
3.1. Introduction
Transfer pricing is about the pricing of transactions between associated enter-
prises. It can concern the supply of goods or provision of services as well as 
transactions involving intangible assets. Transfer pricing is relevant from a 
tax perspective, because it determines how profits are split between group 
members of an MNE in different tax jurisdictions. Thus it determines which 
group company has to pay tax on those profits.  If an MNE uses inappropriate 
transfer prices, sometimes also referred to as transfer mispricing, this is gener-
ally considered a justification for tax administrations to make profit adjust-
ments, for example by disallowing a deduction for certain costs or by imputing 
additional income. Without a corresponding adjustment of the taxable income 
of the other party to the intercompany transaction, that would result in two 
different group companies paying tax on the same profit. This is referred to 
as economic double taxation.83 In order to effectively avoid economic double 
taxation an international consensus on how to establish transfer prices in cross-
border transactions is required.84
This Chapter 3 includes some introductory considerations about those current 
transfer pricing practices that are relevant for a further in-depth analysis of the 
position of CCAs. First Paragraph 3.2 discusses the legal basis for the so called 
arm’s length standard and considers the status of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines as a means to its interpretation. It references the long ongoing 
discussion about the impact of changes in the Commentary to the OECD Model 
Tax Convention and establishes how that plays a role when qualifying the recent 
amendment to the guidance on CCAs under the OECD’s BEPS-project. Next 
Paragraph 3.3 looks in more detail at the so called comparability analysis, which 
is to be performed when pricing intercompany transactions. It also considers 
the relevance of risk assumption in that context, specifically risk assumption by 
83 Economic double taxation is different from juridical double taxation, which is further elaborated on 
in Paragraph 8.1.
84 Compare also Paragraph 12 of the Preface of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
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cash box entities participating in a CCA, and addresses the general complexity 
of pricing transactions governed by a CCA.  Paragraph 3.4 then considers the 
possibility for tax administration to disregard the legal arrangements between 
associated enterprises and to make so called transactional adjustments. It also 
further explains why CCA contracts between group companies should princi-
pally be respected, even though materially similar arrangements are not found 
frequently between unrelated parties.
3.2. The Arm’s Length Standard
3.2.1. Legal Basis
The global standard for setting prices of intragroup transactions, including 
transactions under a CCA, is the so called arm’s length standard (“ALS”), often 
referred to as the arm’s length principle. This is based on the fundamental 
assumption that transfer prices should be determined by comparing intercom-
pany transactions with transactions between unrelated enterprises. An arm’s 
length transfer price is the price that third parties would be prepared to pay on 
the open market for a comparable transaction under similar circumstances or, 
as Wittendorff worded it: 
“The arm’s length principle involves a valuation of controlled transactions 
where the yardstick is market transactions.”85 
Over the years the United States has been an advocate of the use of the ALS as a 
global transfer pricing standard. Under US tax law its legal basis originates from 
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which states the following:
“In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether 
or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and 
whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the 
same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross 
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organ-
izations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, 
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of 
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, 
or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property 
(within the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to 
85 Wittendorff 2010, page 7.
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such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable 
to the intangible.”
Notably the Internal Revenue Code does not define an allocation norm. However, 
under the mandate provided by the Code to the US tax administration, the US 
Transfer Pricing Regulations adopt the ALS: 
“In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the stan-
dard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length 
with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”86  
The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further confirmed that the ALS was 
the readily understandable international measure for profit allocation among 
affiliated enterprises in the Xilinx case. This case will be discussed in detail in 
Paragraph 4.4.2.
Backed by the United States the ALS has become the most commonly accepted 
profit allocation standard of international tax law. As such it is applied in the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, which includes the authoritative statement of the 
ALS in Article 9:
“Where … conditions are made or imposed between … two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits 
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enter-
prises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.”87
This restricts contracting states, so that they cannot include any profits in the 
taxable income of a resident enterprise in excess of the profits that would have 
been allocated to his enterprise in third party situations.  If on the other hand 
a contracting state appropriately includes profits in the taxable income of a 
resident under this provision, the article requires the other contracting state 
86 US Transfer Pricing Regulations, §1.482-1(b)(1).
87 OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 9, Paragraph 1.
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to make a corresponding adjustment to the tax that it charged from the other 
party to the intercompany transaction.88 
The ALS is also adopted as an allocation standard in other model tax conven-
tions, including the model tax convention of the United Nations as well as most 
of the bilateral tax treaties currently in force. Furthermore, it is mandatorily 
applied by the contracting states of the EU Arbitration Convention.89 Taken all 
this into account it seems justified from an objective perspective to regard the 
ALS as the customarily accepted allocation standard. However, that does not 
mean that application of the ALS is a legal requirement under international 
customary rule (“opinio juris”). For it to qualify as such, a subjective condition 
would also still have to be fulfilled. That means that there would have to be 
a certain belief among states that they are bound by international law to use 
the ALS in all allocation matters. However, this belief does not appear to exist. 
To the contrary, every so often a debate about alternative allocation norms is 
re-activated. Specifically so called formula based apportionment has frequently 
been suggested as an alternative norm. This would involve an indirect allocation 
of taxable income on the basis of a specific allocation key or multiple specific 
allocation keys, for example turnover, number of employees or balance sheet 
value. It has also been argued that in fact the ALS and formula based apportion-
ment are not two distinct and unrelated concepts, but that instead they repre-
sent the extreme ends of a transfer pricing continuum. In that view the only true 
arm’s length pricing is achieved by applying the comparable uncontrolled price 
method, followed at close distance by the cost plus or resale minus methods. 
Via the various profit split methods one eventually gets to the allocation of 
consolidated group profits according to a prefixed allocation key referred to as 
formula based apportionment.90 
According to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines however, the OECD Member States 
reject formula based apportionment.91 Nevertheless, in the United States and 
Canada the method is applied to allocate corporate profits among states, while 
88 Both these adjustments are referred to as primary transfer pricing adjustments. They correct the 
taxable income of taxpayers to reflect arm’s length pricing. They do not however address the 
issue of remittance of the difference between the applied incorrect transfer price and the arm’s 
length transfer price. Although that is not arranged for in the OECD’s Model Tax Convention, some 
countries will therefore supplement primary adjustments with so called secondary adjustments. 
The latter adjustments seek to effectuate the cash impact of amending the transfer pricing. For 
example, when a transfer price was too high the state of the paying entity might, as a primary 
adjustment, impute additional taxable income and then, as a secondary adjustment, recognize a 
dividend distribution to the shareholder.
89 Convention 90/436/EEC on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of 
transfers of profits between associated undertakings (EU Arbitration Convention), Article 4.
90 Avi-Yonah 2007. 
91 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 1.32.
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the European Union has been investigating for several years whether it would 
be possible to apply an indirect allocation norm under a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) among its Member States.92  True, the European 
Commission has also argued in several recent state aid cases that EU Member 
States are bound to apply the arm’s length standard, as they would otherwise be 
in breach of Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
granting state aid to the benefitting taxpayers. However, as explained in the 
Commission’s decisions, that would only be the case because these countries 
use the corporate accounting profit as a starting point to calculate a taxpay-
er’s tax base.93 If under those circumstances they allow taxpayers that are part 
of a multinational group to deviate from commercial prices in intercompany 
transactions, those taxpayers would be able to erode that tax base and that 
would provide them with an unacceptable selective advantage.94 Neverthe-
less, EU Member States can, at least theoretically, still deviate from the arm’s 
length standard, as long as they then somehow ensure that the tax base for all 
taxpayers (controlled and uncontrolled) is established in a consistent manner. 
In light of the foregoing, formula based apportionment should at the very least 
be considered a legitimate alternative to the ALS. Wittendorff has made a 
similar analysis and concluded:
“… the arm’s length principle cannot be assumed to qualify as customary 
international law. This means that Article 9(1) does not have a special status 
in international law, since the OECD Model and Commentary in general are 
not regarded as being customary international law.”95
While Wittendorff subsequently continues to refer to the “arm’s length prin-
ciple”, it is in my opinion more accurate to consequently use the term “arm’s 
length standard” instead and I have therefore chosen to do so throughout the 
rest of this study.96 
92 Press release of the European Commission, 16 March 2011, IP/11/319.
93 See for example: European Commission, Decision (EU) 2017/1283 on state aid implemented by the 
Netherlands to Starbucks, 21 October 2015, OJ L83/38 and European Commission, Decision (EU) 
2017/502 on state aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, 30 August 2016, OJ L187/1.
94 That leaves open the question whether the disputed rulings in the state aid cases did or did not 
comply with the arm’s length standard. With Member States currently disagreeing about this with 
the Commission, that will have to be determined by the European Court of Justice.
95 Wittendorff 2010, page 290.
96 It should be noted that other scholars have reached different assertions about the legal status of 
the arm’s length concept. Dwarkasing, for example, after an extensive examination of its history 
concludes that it is in fact “a general principle of international taxation” (Dwarkasing 2011). 
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3.2.2. Interpretation
In the Commentary to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention the conditions 
that would have been made between independent enterprises are referred to as 
“arm’s length terms”. The Commentary further claims that the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines represent internationally agreed principles for determining 
arm’s length terms and indicates that those Guidelines, including Chapter VIII on 
CCAs, provide additional guidance on the application of the ALS.97 This makes 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines an integral part of the Commentary. As such, 
they have an important role to play in the interpretation of tax treaties and the 
application of the ALS in practice. However, the legal status of the Commentary 
is disputed and the uncertainty in which that results automatically also affects 
the legal status of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The interpretation of tax treaties is governed by the rules set out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).  Article 31 of the VCLT provides for 
the primary means of interpretation. It prescribes that treaties should be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose (Paragraph 1). 
For interpretation purposes the context of the treaty is subsequently defined as 
any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty or any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
then accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty (Para-
graph 2). As an alternative to an interpretation based on context or object and 
purpose, a special or technical meaning can be given to a term, but only if that is 
what the parties have intended (Paragraph 4). Article 32 subsequently provides 
for so called supplementary means of interpretation. These have a more limited 
role, as they can only confirm the meaning as interpreted under Article 31 or 
help determine that meaning, if the primary means of interpretation leave the 
meaning of a term “ambiguous or obscure” or lead to a result that is “manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable”. 
There appears to be consensus among scholars that the OECD Commentary is 
not a binding legal agreement under international law.98 This is also confirmed 
by the introduction to the Commentary itself, which states:
97 Commentary to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, under 1.
98 Vogel, Bulletin for International Taxation 2000/10, Engelen 2004, page 459 and Wittendorff 2010, 
page 123.
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“The Commentaries are not designed to be annexed in any manner to the 
conventions signed by Member countries, which unlike the Model are legally 
binding international instruments.”99
As such the Commentary is not part of the context of the treaty as defined 
in Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the VCLT. It has been argued however that the 
Commentary, as it existed at the time the treaty was concluded, reflects a 
common international tax language that provides for the ordinary meaning 
of the terms of the treaty under Paragraph 1 of Article 31100 or for a special or 
technical meaning of a term under Paragraph 4 of Article 31101. Others consider 
the OECD Commentary a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 
32.102 The High Court of Australia came to the latter conclusion in the Thiel case: 
“Whilst the Model Convention and Commentaries may not strictly amount 
to work preparatory to the double taxation agreement between Australia 
and Switzerland, they are documents which form the basis for the conclu-
sion of bilateral double taxation agreements of the kind in question and, as 
with treaties in pari materia, provide a guide to the current usage of terms 
by the parties. They are, therefore, a supplementary means of interpretation 
to which recourse may be had under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.”103
The various views outlined above have in common that they all consider the 
Commentary, as it existed at the time the treaty was concluded, an authori-
tative means of interpretation. The next question that comes up is what the 
impact is of additions or changes to the Commentary introduced subsequent 
to the conclusion of the treaty.  Ward answers this question by distinguishing 
different types of additions and changes to the Commentary.104 The first type 
only amplifies the existing Commentary by adding examples or supplementary 
arguments. These explicatory additions are given similar weight as the existing 
Commentary. They differ from a second type of additions, which  provides guid-
ance that was not previously included without contradicting with the existing 
Commentary. According to Ward “such gap-filling Commentary should be viewed 
with great care by treaty interpreters, particularly domestic courts, to determine 
whether it has any legitimate role in the interpretative process”. Finally, there may 
99 Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention, Introduction Paragraph 29.
100 Wittendorff 2010, page 124.
101 Ward, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2006/3.
102 Engelen 2004, page 460 and Lang and Brugger, Australian Tax Forum 2008/2. 
103 Thiel v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, (1990) 171 CLR 338, 22 August 1990.
104 Ward, Bulletin for International Taxation 2006/3.
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be outright changes made to the Commentary that reverse the Commentary as 
it existed at the time a treaty was concluded. It appears logical that this third 
type of changes can never play a legitimate role in the interpretation of pre-ex-
isting tax treaties. 
The foregoing imposes a certain restriction on the effectiveness of any change 
to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. If such change conflicts with the previous 
version of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, then it would only take effect after 
the pre-existing tax treaties have also been amended. This was however not 
explicitly acknowledged by the OECD, when it announced that there might 
be so called special measures deviating from the ALS included in the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines as a key part of its 2015 anti-BEPS proposals.105 In this context 
it should also be pointed out that, after the BEPS project’s Final Reports were 
issued, more than 100 countries entered into a multilateral instrument to 
modify over 2,000 existing bilateral tax treaties.106 This instrument implements 
a number of the agreed measures, predominantly targeting tax treaty abuse. 
However, it does not in any away address the position of Article 9 of existing 
tax treaties or the impact of changes in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines on the 
interpretation of the ALS. Perhaps it was a deliberate decision of the OECD’s 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs to limit the scope of the multilateral instrument 
to increase chances of reaching a political agreement about it. Although that 
would be very understandable, it means that the earlier referenced uncertainty 
about the legal status of changes to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines remains.
When it comes to the transfer pricing treatment of CCAs, there are at least two 
relevant changes to Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines in respect of 
which the foregoing justifies a further analysis. The first is the introduction of 
the control-over-risk requirement, under which all participants of a CCA need 
to exercise control over the risks associated with the business opportunity 
presented by that arrangement. The second is the new wording that requires 
all contributions under a CCA to be valued at market price. Both these require-
ments were not explicitly mentioned in the previous version of Chapter VIII of 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines nor were they routinely applied in practice by all 
OECD Member States. In fact, a very important Member State, the US, tradi-
tionally accepted cash box entities with insufficient substance to control risks 
as a participant and allowed for current contributions to be valued at cost. As 
such, the two new requirements could be viewed upon as what Ward would 
call “gap-fillers”, making their role in the interpretation of existing tax trea-
105 OECD/G20, “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation”, 5 October 2015. 
106 OECD/G20, “Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 24 November 2016.
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ties debatable. However, as will be explained in Paragraph 3.3.1.2, 5.3.2.2 and 
5.5.3.5, both requirements are the logical consequence of the more general aim 
of the ALS to apply open market conditions in controlled situations. They should 
in my opinion therefore not be regarded “gapfillers” but instead be considered 
mere clarifications of the ALS. As such, they have the same legal status as any 
other requirement following from earlier versions of the Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines and they should also apply under Article 9 of pre-existing tax treaties based 
on the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
3.3. Comparability Analysis
3.3.1. Delineating Transactions
3.3.1.1. Commercial and Financial Relations
The merits of the ALS require a comparison of the conditions of controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions.  Under the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines this 
comparability analysis consists of two steps. The first is to accurately delin-
eate intercompany transactions, while the second is to compare them with 
similar transactions between unrelated parties and price them accordingly.107 
The delineation involves the identification of economically relevant character-
istics of the commercial and financial relations between the transacting group 
companies. The contractual terms of the transaction will be a starting point.108 
However, as there is no or only limited divergence of interests between the 
parties to intercompany transactions, it is very well possible that their actual 
conduct is inconsistent with the contractual arrangements. Testing whether 
that is the case involves a so called functional analysis, which examines the 
functions performed by each of the parties taking into account the assets 
used and the risks assumed. This is not so much a quantitative test, but rather 
a qualitative test. The economic significance of the functions that the parties 
perform in terms of their frequency, nature and value is more important than 
the number of those functions.109 As outlined in Paragraph 2.3.3 I believe that 
when delineating the transactions under a CCA it is helpful to categorize the 
arrangement based on the type of intangibles developed and the level at which 
development activities are centralized. Especially when innovative intangibles 
are developed by centralized teams, it would be quite relevant to determine 
107 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 1.33.
108 Idem, Paragraph 1.42.
109 Idem, Paragraph 1.51.
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whether all participants actually assume sufficient risk to justify that they are 
considered full-fledged participants in the intercompany collaboration with a 
corresponding entitlement to share in future profits and to establish whether 
their contributions are valued appropriately.110
3.3.1.2. Risk Assumption
The impact of risk assumption on the outcome of the functional analysis was 
a major focus point of the revision of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines under 
the BEPS project. Risk is highly mobile, as it can easily be legally transferred 
between entities. As the assumption of risk may justify a party to a controlled 
transaction to receive a higher compensation, a legal transfer of risk could facil-
itate profit shifting. For that reason the OECD has traditionally been concerned 
about “contractual allocations of risk to low-tax environments in transactions that 
would be unlikely to occur between unrelated parties”.111  To better address this 
issue, a new section on the analysis of risks in commercial or financial relations 
was included in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines.112 This defines risk as “the effects 
of uncertainty on the objectives of the business”.113 Risk is assumed by a party 
that bears the up- and downside consequences of the risk and feels the impact, 
when it materializes. A risk is controlled by the party or parties that make deci-
sions about taking on, laying-off or declining a risk bearing opportunity and 
that make decisions about how to respond to risk. The controlling party does 
not necessarily also perform the day-to-day risk management. Alternatively it 
might outsource such risk mitigation activities to others.114 The OECD explains 
that unrelated parties would only assume risk, if they exercise control over the 
risk and have the financial capacity to bear it. It therefore follows from the ALS 
that, if in a controlled transaction risk is contractually assumed by a party that 
does not exercise control over that risk or does not have the necessary financial 
resources to bear it, the risk should be allocated to the associated enterprise 
or group of associated enterprises that does exercise this control and has such 
resources.115   
In the more aggressive pre-BEPS transfer pricing structures MNEs would take 
the position that risk had been allocated to a low substance cash box entity in 
a low tax jurisdiction. The only activity performed by the cash box entity would 
110 See the categorization model proposed in Paragraph 2.3.3.2.
111 OECD, “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 12 February 2013, page 45 and OECD, “Action 
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 19 July 2013, page 19 and 20. 
112 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Section D.1.2.1.
113 Idem, Paragraph 1.71.
114 Idem, Paragraph 1.65.
115 Idem, Paragraph 1.98.
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consist of providing financial funding for certain business activities. The Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines provide an example of such a situation in Paragraph 1.85 and, 
further on, effectively define a cash box entity as “[a company] that does not 
perform functions to evaluate the financing opportunity, does not consider the 
appropriate risk premium and other issues to determine the appropriate pricing of 
the financing opportunity, and does not evaluate the appropriate protection of its 
financial investment”.116  I would agree with the OECD that a cash box entity 
cannot exercise control over financial risks. If it contractually assumes such 
risks, this conflicts with the factual substance of the relations between the 
parties. That justifies deviating from the contractual arrangements when deter-
mining taxable income (also see Paragraph 3.4). For transfer pricing purposes 
the risks would then be allocated to the other party or parties to the transaction 
and no risk is left with the cash box entity. By consequence, that entity would 
be rewarded with nothing more than a risk free return. It is also this inability to 
control risk that would block a cash box entity’s access to a CCA. 
3.3.1.3. Other Elements
Besides the contractual arrangements and the actual conduct of the associated 
parties there are three other elements to observe when delineating associated 
transactions. The first of these elements concerns the characteristics of the 
property involved or the nature and extent of services provided. When intangible 
assets are involved, as will often be the case with CCAs, the type of intangible 
(patent, trademark or know-how), the duration and degree of its protection 
and the anticipated benefits from this use would also be relevant.117 However, 
as will be discussed in more detail in Paragraph 3.3.2.1, determining the antici-
pated benefits can be a difficult and sometimes arbitrary exercise. The second 
element consists of the economic circumstances under which the transactions 
take place. This includes the geographic location of the associated enterprises 
and related aspects such as size of the local market, the purchasing power of 
its consumers and its labor costs. These local market features will also play an 
important role, when in the second step of the comparability analysis the inter-
company transactions are to be priced or, in case of a CCA, contributions are to 
be valued.118 The third and final element relevant for the delineation of inter-
company transactions is the business strategy adopted by the associated enter-
prises.  This refers to the strategic choices impacting their day-to-day opera-
tions. That can be related to innovation and product development, risk appetite 
116 Idem, Paragraph 1.103
117 Idem, Paragraph 1.107.
118 See Paragraph 3.3.2 and 5.5.3.
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or market penetration schemes. These aspects may distinguish the nature of a 
transaction from otherwise comparable transactions. For example a company 
trying to get foothold in a new market might be prepared to temporarily accept 
more costs. Under a CCA there would be a case to make that this should then be 
reflected in the allocation key used to split costs and risks among participants.119 
3.3.2. Pricing
3.3.2.1. Transfer Pricing Methods
The second step of the comparability analysis is to select a method for setting 
an appropriate transfer price for the controlled transactions. If data are available 
on comparable uncontrolled prices used in transactions under similar circum-
stances these can be used for reference (the “CUP-method”). It is also possible 
to base the pricing on the resale price of a product minus a fixed percentage 
as compensation for the reseller (the “resale minus method”) or the costs of a 
supplier plus a fixed percentage as compensation for the supplier (the “cost plus 
method”). The CUP, cost plus and resale minus method are so called transac-
tional methods. Alternatively a profit split method may be used.  Under a so 
called one-side profit split method the net margin on an intercompany transac-
tion of one party is determined on an appropriate basis, for example the tested 
party’s costs, sales or assets (the “transactional net margin method”). In contrast, 
under a so called two-sided profit split method the overall profit from an inter-
company transaction is allocated between the two parties to the transaction 
considering both parties’ relative position in respect of a certain splitting factor 
(the “transactional profit split method”).    
As there are generally limited or no comparables available for CCAs (also 
see Paragraph 2.2.1), tax administrations have to determine the underlying 
economic reality behind the arrangement and thus try to establish whether it is 
likely that the agreed terms would have been acceptable to third parties, should 
they have concluded the same arrangement under similar circumstances. When 
testing this, it has to be kept in mind that a CCA is often a package deal covering 
more than one transaction. It may include the contribution of multiple pre-ex-
isting intangibles and the performance of various types of development activi-
ties and services. Application of the ALS will further be complicated by the fact 
that part of the compensation for participants consists of the expected benefits 
from their individual exploitation of the results from the pooling of resources 
and skills. All this distinguishes CCAs from an ordinary transfer of property or 
119 See Paragraph 5.6.2.
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rendering of services and makes it impossible to price the aggregate of transac-
tions under the arrangement using a single traditional transfer pricing method. 
Instead it will be required to price the different contributions of participants 
separately and then even these out by means of so called balancing payments, 
in order to establish a situation under which it can be said that the net contri-
bution after such balancing payments of each participant is proportionate to its 
expected benefit for the collaboration. 
To illustrate how complex this can be, the example can be given of two asso-
ciated companies that enter into a CCA with one of them contributing pre-ex-
isting intangibles that will be used to develop a new product line and both of 
them performing part of the future R&D work. It is very well possible that the 
tax administration in the country of residence of the participant contributing 
the pre-existing intangibles argues that the best way to test the arm’s length 
nature of the compensation for such contribution is to compare it with the net 
present value of royalties that the pre-existing intangibles could generate under 
a licensing agreement between unrelated parties.  This would, at least theoreti-
cally, require the following subsequent steps to be taken:
1. The net present value of the overall compensation of the participant contrib-
uting the pre-existing intangibles has to be established using an appro-
priate discount rate. This compensation can consist of multiple elements: a 
buy-in payment, balancing payments paid in the course of the CCA and the 
benefit from the participant’s individual exploitation of results.
2. It has to be acknowledged what part of the overall compensation is 
intended to compensate for the contribution of the pre-existing intangi-
bles and what part is intended to compensate for other contributions by 
the same participant, like performing R&D activities and assuming devel-
opment risks.  
3. An arm’s length royalty for a license to use the pre-existing intangibles has 
to be determined using one of the traditional transfer pricing methods, for 
example the CUP method, involving a comparability analysis of its own.
4. The net present value of the hypothetical royalty during the remaining 
lifespan of the pre-existing intangible has to be calculated using an appro-
priate discount rate, which should differ from the discount rate used in step 
1 in such a way that it appropriately reflects the difference in risk profile 
between a licensor and a cost sharing participant.
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5. The outcomes of steps 2 and 4 have to be compared. A pricing adjustment 
should only be considered, if the value arrived at under both steps differs 
materially.
The pricing of contributions under a CCA are discussed in more detail in Para-
graph 4.3.3 and 5.5.3.
3.3.2.2. Comparability Factors
It should further be acknowledged that there may be certain external elements 
that impact the conditions that third parties would agree upon for transactions, 
including those under a CCA. These elements are referred to as comparability 
factors. They should be taken into account when performing the comparability 
analysis and they should subsequently be reflected in the applied transfer pric-
ing.120  It may concern local market features, assembled workforce and group 
synergies. Local market features can involve low labor costs, availability of 
highly skilled personnel, strong purchasing power of potential customers, 
an above average demand for specific products, favorable weather etcetera. 
The existence of an assembled workforce has to be reflected in arm’s length 
pricing, if a company has successfully concluded mid or long term employ-
ment contracts with a uniquely qualified or experienced group of employees, 
while group synergies may concern benefits from among others streamlined 
management, the elimination of duplicated processes, integration of systems 
or stronger purchasing and borrowing power. 
Countries with developing economies are generally focused on whether transfer 
prices sufficiently  compensate for comparability factors. This is caused by a 
concern that group companies in their jurisdiction may be cut short, especially 
in respect of local market features. These countries therefore often argue that 
transfer prices should include a so called market premium. China for example 
included extensive wording on this issue in the section on its country practice of 
the UN Transfer Pricing Manual.121
3.4. Transactional Adjustments
A sound comparability analysis followed by an accurate application of an appro-
priate transfer pricing method should normally lead to an arm’s length outcome. 
If this is not the case, then the preferred solution is a pricing adjustment. It is 
120 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Section D.6. – D.8.
121 United Nations, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (2017), Section 
D.2.4.4.
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explicitly confirmed in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines that every effort should 
be made to price the actual intercompany transaction before it is disregarded.122 
The OECD however also adopts a substance over form approach as a measure 
of last resort. This would be applied, when it has to be assumed the unrelated 
parties would under similar circumstances not have chosen to enter into the 
arrangement and it is therefore simply not possible to determine an appropriate 
pricing or, as it is worded in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines:
“The transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appro-
priate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements 
made in relation to the transaction viewed in their totality, differ from those 
which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in 
a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby 
preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the 
parties taking into account their respective perspectives and the options 
realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the trans-
action.”123 
If the transaction in itself does not make business sense so that it cannot be 
corrected through a price adjustment, it is alternatively possible to make a 
so called transactional adjustment. This could consist of non-recognition or 
re-qualification of the transaction.  
Wittendorff has argued that Article 9 of the Model Tax Convention cannot be 
interpreted to sanction a substance over form approach and that transactional 
adjustments are therefore not governed by this article.124 Alternatively, the legal 
basis for transactional adjustments should then be found in domestic anti-abuse 
rules. This position is based on a reading of Article 9 that recognizes the transac-
tions as an undisputed, fixed point and the conditions of those transactions as 
the tested element. It is assumed that consequently only these conditions can 
be adjusted. I disagree with this interpretation. In my opinion it appears more 
likely that the term “commercial or financial relations” used in Article 9 should be 
broadly interpreted to mean the factual economic reality between the parties 
and not restrictively read as to refer only to the contractual arrangements 
between them. An adjustment of the conditions made or imposed in these 
commercial or financial relations could then in extremis include disregarding 
122 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 1.121
123 Idem, Paragraph 1.122
124 Wittendorff 2010, page 152 and further.
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the contractual arrangement all together resulting in the non-recognition or 
re-qualification of transactions.         
However, any transaction that is also concluded between unrelated parties 
should by definition be respected. Furthermore, a transaction that is uncommon 
between third parties or has simply not been proven to exist between third 
parties can only be disregarded, if it lacks commercial rational. Determining 
whether this “condition sine qua non” is met in my opinion involves the cumu-
lative testing of two elements: (i) whether there are inherent differences in 
commercial and economic circumstances between related and unrelated 
parties justifying a lack of comparables, and (ii) whether the economic outcome 
of the existing contractual arrangements is or via price adjustments can be influ-
enced such that profits arise where value is created. In other words, the mere 
fact that a transaction is not found between unrelated parties by itself is insuffi-
cient reason to automatically disregard it. This is crucial for the position of CCAs, 
which would typically be observed more often between associated parties and 
far less between unrelated parties. Or, as the preamble to the 2005 US Cost 
Sharing Regulations put it: 
“Comment letters and other information available to the Treasury Depart-
ment and IRS have provided limited information on third-party arrange-
ments that are asserted to be similar to cost sharing arrangements.”125
Nevertheless, as already contested in Paragraph 2.2.1, material differences 
exist between the commercial and competitive positions of related and unre-
lated entities, which offer an acceptable explanation for the fact that the overall 
number of comparable uncontrolled transactions is, at best, very limited. This 
difference in position makes that for companies belonging to the same multi-
national group there can be convincing commercial rational to conclude a 
CCA, while third parties would choose to enter into a joint development agree-
ment with different terms and conditions. Furthermore, it will be argued in the 
following chapters that the overall outcome of a CCA is by definition such that 
profits are taxed where value is created, if all contributions by participants in 
the arrangement are valued at an arm’s length price appropriately taking into 
account assets used, functions performed and risks assumed by those partic-
ipant for making these contributions.  Presuming for the moment that this 
coherence will be adequately demonstrated hereafter, it should be possible for 
any tax auditor coming across a specific CCA with a non-arm’s length outcome 
125 Treasury and IRS, 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 60 Fed Reg 65557 (1995), preamble. 
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to restore the balance by adjusting the valuation of one or more contributions, 
while it should not be necessary to resort to the nuclear option of disregarding 
the underlying contractual arrangement. 
It can be said that the second tested element determining whether or not there 
is a commercial rational (i.e. whether or not an arm’s length outcome can be 
created through a pricing adjustment) in fact reverses the arm’s length analysis: 
It does not look for the correct pricing of an existing contractual arrangement 
but instead starts at the pricing to decide whether the underlying contractual 
arrangement should be respected. Be that how it may, this approach upholds 
the ultimate goal of the arm’s length principle to ensure that companies 
belonging to the same multinational group transact under conditions that 
third parties would also have accepted under similar circumstances. As such, 
tax administrations should in principle respect CCA contracts and only contem-
plate a transactional adjustment in the exceptional situation that the accurate 
delineation of the transactions evidences that the factual relationship and 
actual dealings between the parties differ fundamentally from their contractual 
arrangement. The most likely reason to disregard a CCA then appears to be that 
one or more of the participants do not have the capacity and resources required 
to exercise control over the risks associated with the cost shared activities and 
therefore cannot assume those risks. In other words: A CCA contract could be 
disregarded, if an empty shell cash box company signs up as a participant and 
the arrangement should then be replaced by an alternative transaction or set of 
transactions that results in the income of participants to be adjusted, so that the 
empty shell cash box company makes no more than a risk-free return.  
3.5. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 3 are as follows,
In respect of the legal status of the ALS and the role of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines as a means of its interpretation:
(i) The ALS is the most commonly accepted standard for profit allocation in 
international tax law and therefore generally also governs controlled trans-
actions under a CCA.
(ii) The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are an integral part of the Commen-
tary to the OECD Model Tax Convention and, as such, qualify as an authori-
tative means of interpretation of the ALS. 
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(iii) The most relevant additions to Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines, the control over risk requirement and the instruction that all contri-
butions should be valued at market price, follow from the fundamental 
starting point of the ALS that intercompany transactions should be priced 
according to open market standards. As such, they can be considered mere 
clarifications of the earlier version of Chapter VIII and therefore will also be 
relevant in situations governed by tax treaties that were concluded before 
these changes were implemented. 
In respect of the application of the ALS to transactions under a CCA:
(i) Determining arm’s length transfer prices involves a comparability analysis 
that takes into account the functions performed, risks assumed and assets 
used by the parties to the transactions at hand. In respect of CCAs espe-
cially the assumption of risks associated with the cost shared activities is 
quite relevant, as that determines whether cash box entities in tax haven 
jurisdictions can participate. 
(ii) The application of traditional transfer pricing methods is complicated 
by the specific characteristics of a CCA, most notably the nature of the 
arrangement as a package deal and the fact that at least part of the benefit 
for participants is expected to come from their own, individual exploitation 
of results.
(iii) If the outcome of a controlled transaction is not in line with the ALS, tax 
administrations should first seek to make a transfer pricing adjustment. 
Only when that is not possible, they may consider deviating from the 
contractual arrangements between parties through a transactional adjust-
ment. However, that CCAs are not frequently found between unrelated 
parties does not necessarily mean that their outcome conflicts with the 
ALS and also the lack of comparables most certainly does not by itself 
justify a transactional adjustment. Instead tax practitioners should first 
attempt to align the outcome of the arrangement with the ALS by reval-
uing the contributions under the CCA at hand and adjusting the balancing 
payments between the participants accordingly.
99
4.  United States
4.1. Introduction
The United States has a longstanding tradition of rulemaking in respect of 
transfer pricing in general and cost sharing arrangements (“CSAs”) in specific.126 
The IRS and Treasury first proposed regulations including rules for CSAs in the 
nineteen sixties. As such, it was the only country contributing to the OECD’s 
1979 “Report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” that had issued 
rules pertaining to cost contribution arrangements. Most likely, at that time the 
US was the only country in the world to have introduced such rules. Over the 
years the US regulations governing CSAs evolved significantly. The main driver 
behind this was the concern of the Treasury and IRS that these arrangements 
made it too easy for taxpayers to allocate the effective ownership of intangi-
bles to group companies located abroad. The rulemaking that followed was 
intended to safeguard US tax revenues, but taxpayers did not always agree 
with the outcome. This led to disputes, litigation and, by consequence, relevant 
case law, most notably about (i) the compensation payable for making available 
pre-existing intangibles when entering into a CSA, also referred to as buy-in 
payments, and (ii) the sharing, or non-sharing, of costs for stock-based compen-
sation of employees. Both issues are still the subject of discussion today, as is 
illustrated by a recent case brought to court by e-commerce company Amazon.
com concerning more than US$ 1 billion of transfer pricing adjustments over the 
years 2005 and 2006. 127 The disagreement with the IRS in that case concerned 
precisely these two topics.
This Chapter 4 focusses on the both aforementioned bottleneck issues compli-
cating the tax treatment of cost contribution arrangements from a US perspec-
tive. I will however first provide some further background to the legislative and 
regulatory history ultimately resulting in the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regula-
126 In the United States cost contribution arrangements are generally referred to as cost sharing 
arrangements. There might be marginal differences. For further details see Paragraph 2.2.2.2. For 
purposes of this chapter both phrases are regarded interchangeable. 
127 Amazon.com Inc. and subsidiaries v. Commission, 23 March 2017, 148 TC 8.
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tions (Paragraph 4.2). Subsequently the rules for calculating a buy-in payment 
for pre-existing intangibles under a CSA are considered. In that context the 
prescribed valuation approach under the 2011 Cost Sharing Regulations is 
discussed as well as its appreciation by the United States Tax Court in the Veritas 
case and Amazon case (Paragraph 4.3). Furthermore, the validity of the so 
called all-costs-requirement as the standard for determining whether stock-
based compensation expenses should be shared under a CSA is examined. This 
includes a discussion of the Xilinx case, the Altera case and, again, the Amazon 
case (Paragraph 4.4). Eventually, conclusions are drawn about today’s US tax 
treatment of cost contribution arrangements and its future direction (Para-
graph 4.5).          
4.2. Regulatory History
4.2.1. Early Regulatory History (Pre-2005)
Cornerstone of all the United States’ transfer pricing rules is Section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code by which Congress authorizes the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to reallocate profit among affiliated taxpayers, if this is required to prevent 
tax evasion or to clearly reflect the taxpayer’s income. The IRS and Treasury 
proposed regulations under this Section 482 in 1966.128 Those proposed regula-
tions were replaced in 1968 by simpler, more general regulations containing a 
single condensed provision on “bona fide cost sharing arrangements”.129 As already 
explained in Paragraph 2.2.2 these arrangements were intended as a safe haven to 
avoid complex valuation issues in respect of intangibles by an upfront agreement 
on collective ownership. It is noteworthy that already at this early time Surrey, 
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in charge of the drafting of 
the regulations, recognized that the valuation of pre-existing intangibles was a 
complicating aspect that would require more attention in the future:
“One of the principal problems remaining is the requirement that the use 
of previously developed intangibles be valued. We have discussed various 
alternatives to this extremely difficult task with industry representa-
tives and members of the legal and accounting professions. We hope that 
together we can develop a satisfactory alternative which will eliminate this 
valuation problem.”130 
128 Treasury and IRS, Proposed Transfer Pricing Regulations, 1966, 31 Fed Reg 10394 (1966).
129 Treasury and IRS, Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, 1968, 33 Fed Reg 5854 (1968).
130 Surrey, Journal of Taxation 1968, page 75 – 79.
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The later developments discussed in Paragraph 4.3 will evidence how the issue 
has remained at the center of debate ever since. For now it is important to note 
that through the early transfer pricing regulations the Secretary authorized the 
Commissioner to allocate income and deductions among related parties, if that 
was necessary to produce arm’s length outcomes. At this stage the regulations 
provided methods for setting intercompany prices on a transaction basis. They 
did not take profitability into consideration directly and did not include any 
profit split methods.
In the nineteen eighties it was felt that more detailed guidance was required, 
specifically in respect of transactions involving high value intangibles such as 
those structured as license and cost sharing agreements.  Congress addressed 
this issue, when it added the so called commensurate-with-income standard as 
a second sentence to Section 482 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This 
enunciated that the income related to any transaction involving intangible 
property should be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangi-
ble.131 Quite controversially the commensurate-with-income standard required 
a periodic adjustment of the compensation received by a licensor or transferor 
of intangible property, which in case of licensing arrangements resulted in a 
so called super royalty. Although the commensurate-with-income standard 
and especially its potential sanctioning of the use of hindsight has been chal-
lenged by both taxpayers and foreign tax administrations, the IRS has to date 
continued to defend that the standard is in line with the ALS.  
Whereas Congress clearly had a concern about the compensation received by 
US multinationals for making available or transferring their intangible property 
to foreign affiliates, the Conference Report accompanying the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 stated explicitly that Congress did not intend to preclude the use of 
bona fide R&D cost sharing agreements: 
“In revising Section 482, the conferees do not intend to preclude the use 
of certain bona fide cost-sharing arrangements as an appropriate method 
of allocating income attributable to intangibles among related parties, if 
and to the extent such agreements are consistent with the purposes of this 
provision that the income allocated among the parties reasonably reflects 
the actual economic activity undertaken by each. Under such a bona fide 
cost –sharing arrangement, the cost-sharer would be expected to bear its 
portion of all research and development costs, on successful as well as 
unsuccessful products within an appropriate product area, and the cost of 
131 HR, Conference Report to accompany HR 3838, No. 99-841 (1986).
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research and development at all relevant developmental stages would be 
included.”
Congress in other words continued to allow the use of cost sharing arrange-
ments as an opportunity to agree collective ownership before the intangible 
property was developed and thus avoid a taxable transfer of such property as 
well as the accompanying valuation issues later. At the same time however, the 
Conference Committee deciding on the 1986 tax reform also suggested that the 
IRS conduct a comprehensive study reviewing the existing transfer pricing rules 
and regulations in general. The IRS followed up on this and in 1988 published 
a document entitled “A Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the 
Code”.132 This document is also referred to as “the White Paper”. It included two 
separate chapters on cost sharing, one on the history of CSAs and one on their 
use after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The first chapter started off by stating that 
“CSAs have long existed at arm’s length conditions between unrelated parties”. 
However, as the IRS and Treasury admitted to have little experience with 
both related and unrelated CSAs, they welcomed receiving information from 
taxpayers regarding their contractual arrangements and experience with cost 
sharing. 
Based on the information already available, the White Paper went on to analyze 
the status of the regulatory framework for cost sharing at the time. This resulted 
in a recommendation to introduce a more narrow definition of a bona fide 
CSA under which taxpayers would be required to include standard provisions 
in the underlying agreements. It would become mandatory to assign partici-
pants exclusive geographic rights in the developed intangibles. Furthermore, 
arrangements for developing marketing intangibles as well as manufacturing 
intangibles were to be excluded from qualifying. Eventually much more relaxed 
regulations were proposed in 1992133 and then finalized in 1995134. In fact the 
1995 Final Regulations provided the first set of final regulations dealing specifi-
cally with cost sharing agreements.  The preamble explained that they allowed 
for more flexibility, because comments to the White Paper had indicated “that 
there was a great deal of variety in the terms of bona fide cost sharing arrange-
ments and that if the White Paper’s suggestions were incorporated in regulations, 
the regulations would unduly restrict the availability of cost sharing”. In the 1995 
Final Regulations the Treasury and IRS therefore relied only on anti-abuse tests 
132 Treasury and IRS, “A Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code”, 18 October 1988, 
Notice 88-123 (1988-2 C.B. 458) (“White Paper”).
133 Treasury and IRS, 1992 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations, 57 Fed Reg 3571 (1992).
134 Treasury and IRS, 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 60 Fed Reg 65557 (1995).
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rather than that they prescribed standard contractual provisions or limited the 
type of intangibles that could be developed under the agreements. Another key 
element of these regulations was the requirement of a compensation payment 
for the contribution of pre-existing intangibles, referred to in these regulations 
as a “buy-in payment”.135 Such payments were already considered to be required 
under the ALS and applied by many taxpayers in practice. There had however 
not been any explicit reference made to them in earlier regulations. 
Over the following years the 1995 Final Regulations were revised and updated 
on several occasions.136 Most notably explicit wording was added in 2003 on 
the requirement to include the expenses for stock-based compensation in the 
shared costs.137 This later became the subject of litigation in the Xilinx case, the 
Altera case and the Amazon case. The 2003 changes to the Cost Sharing Regula-
tion and the related case law are further discussed in Paragraph 4.4.3.
4.2.2. Recent Regulatory History (2005 Onwards)
4.2.2.1. The 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations
Before the 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations, the so called buy-in payment for the 
use of pre-existing intangibles was commonly structured as a declining royalty 
paid to the contributor based on the limited economic lifetime of such intangi-
bles. This approach had also been accepted by the United States Tax Court.138 
The IRS and Treasury however were not always satisfied with the outcome. They 
had grown a justifiable concern that CSAs were being used to transfer intangi-
bles developed in the US to affiliates in low tax jurisdiction at prices below their 
fair market value. Eventually the acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Tax Policy, Pamela F. Olson, in June 2002 announced a full revision of the Cost 
Sharing Regulations. She stated that such revision was required to avoid that 
CSAs were used to “facilitate a disguised transfer of intangible assets outside the 
United States in a manner inconsistent with the arm’s length standard”.139 The 
work was to focus specifically on the effectiveness of rules intended to apply the 
ALS to taxpayers that contributed pre-existing intangibles, which often were 
considered to be the most valuable assets of the company.  Three years later, in 
2005, the revision efforts resulted in new regulations being proposed.140
135 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(1). 
136 61 Fed Reg 33656 (1996); 66 Fed Reg 295 (2001); 68 Fed Reg 51177 (2003); 69 Fed Reg 13473 (2004).
137 Treasury and IRS, Update of the 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 68 Fed Reg 51177 (2003).
138 See the 1994 court case of Seagate v. Commissioner, which is discussed in detail in Paragraph 6.3.2. 
139 Testimony of Pamela F. Olson, Department of the Treasury acting assistant secretary for tax policy, 
before the House Ways and Means Committee on Corporate Inversion Transactions, 6 June 2002.
140 Treasury and IRS, 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations, 70 Fed Reg 51116 (2005).
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Although the IRS and Treasury had claimed in the 1988 White Paper that cost 
sharing was common among third parties, they acknowledged in the preamble 
to the 2005 Proposed Regulations that in reality the existing arrangements 
between third parties are generally not analogous to CSAs between affili-
ates. Third party agreements would typically involve “a materially different 
division of costs, risks and benefits than in CSAs under the regulations”.141 The 
2005 Proposed Regulations went on to reverse some of the flexibility offered 
by the 1992 Proposed Regulations and 1995 Final Regulations.  For example 
the recommendation from the White Paper to require CSAs to assign partici-
pants exclusive geographical rights in the developed intangibles was recon-
sidered and adopted. At the same time detailed formal rules were introduced 
consisting of specified contractual, documentation, accounting and reporting 
requirements. Furthermore, as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax 
Policy had predicted, the guidance in respect of the contribution of pre-existing 
intangibles became the core of the Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations. These 
were referred to as “external contributions” to be compensated in a “preliminary 
or contemporaneous transaction”.142  The 2005 Regulations assumed that the 
arm’s length character of all transactions under a CSA was best evaluated on 
an aggregated basis. To facilitate this, the so called investor model was intro-
duced.  As explained in the preamble of the Proposed Regulations this model 
assumes that the aggregate contributions made by a participant constitute an 
investment that should earn an appropriate expected return taking into account 
the risks borne by participants during the development and exploitation of the 
cost shared intangibles. In explanation of their choice for the investor model 
the Treasury and IRS referred to a quote from Congress in the context of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986:
“…it is envisioned that the allocation of R&D cost-sharing arrangements 
generally should be proportionate to profit as determined before deduction 
for research and development. In addition, to the extent, if any, that one 
party is actually contributing funds towards research and development 
at a significantly earlier point in time than the other, or is otherwise effec-
tively putting its funds at risk to a greater extent than the other, it would 
be expected that an appropriate return would be required to such party to 
reflect its investment.”143 
141 See also Paragraph 2.2.1.
142 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(b)(3).
143 HR, Conference Report to accompany HR 3838, No. 99-841 (1986), at II-638.
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The rules presented in the 2005 Proposed Regulations on the valuation of 
preliminary and contemporaneous transactions were interpreted by some tax 
practitioners to disallow the use of a higher discount rate for determining the 
net present value of returns of participants assuming more financial risk. That 
would have required cash box participants to pay higher buy-in payments and 
thus it would have significantly limited their entitlement to residual profits. 
4.2.2.2. The 2008 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations 
The 2005 Proposed Regulations were already quite comprehensive and 
extremely detailed. Including the preamble they consisted of 184 pages. After 
they were published the IRS and Treasury received extensive comments on many 
of the issues that they addressed in the Proposed Regulations. Not surprisingly 
many of the commentators criticized the restrictions in respect of the qualifying 
types of agreements and the presumed inflexibility of the investor model. To 
some extent they were accommodated when the 2005 Proposed Regulations 
were replaced by the 2008 Temporary Regulations.144 By now the document had 
grown to 195 pages. As an alternative for the assignment of geographical rights 
in developed intangibles a division of interests based on the “field of use” was 
introduced. Other means of dividing interests were also allowed, provided they 
met specific conditions in respect of their practical applicability. However, the 
suggestion by some commentators to apply the tax treatment of CSAs to any 
arrangement between affiliates aimed at creating intangibles was a bridge too 
far. As the IRS and Treasury explained in the preamble to the 2008 Temporary 
Regulations:
“Because the cost sharing rules are designed to provide guidance for specific 
types of transactions and arrangements, the Treasury Department and the 
IRS continue to believe that the new rules set forth for CSAs should apply 
only to the transactions intended. From the standpoint of the purpose of the 
cost sharing rules and their administrability, it is important that the rules 
be applicable only to the defined scope of intangible development arrange-
ments and apply no more broadly or narrowly than intended.” 
The 2008 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations also introduced a whole new 
set of terminology in respect of compensation payments for the contribution 
of pre-existing intangibles (discussed in Paragraph 4.3.3.1). Furthermore, the 
preamble was used to clarify the position on risk assumption and the use of 
144 Treasury and IRS, 2008 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations, 74 FR 9570 (2009).
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discount rates. The interpretation as if the Proposed Regulations prescribed the 
use of a single discount rate for all calculations under a cost sharing analysis 
was rejected. Instead the 2008 Temporary Regulations explicitly allowed for 
discount rates to vary when determining the net present value of the expected 
returns of individual participants. By consequence, a participant assuming more 
financial risk can use a higher discount rate than a participant assuming less 
financial risk and would therefore pay a lower buy-in payment. It was also explic-
itly mentioned that discount rates could vary when comparing the outcome of 
CSAs to that under realistic alternatives. For example, a participant under a CSA 
generally assumes more risk than a licensee under a license arrangement and 
therefore a higher discount rate should be used for calculating the net present 
value of the anticipated benefits of the CSA scenario, when comparing both 
options. 
4.2.2.3. The 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations
The 2008 Temporary Regulations were replaced by the issuance of the Final 
Regulations on 16 December 2011.145 By now the issued document covered 202 
pages. The Final Regulations follow the main principles from the 2008 Temporary 
Regulations.  This includes the less prominent role of the investor model than 
under the 2005 Proposed Regulations. The preamble to the latter included an 
extensive explanation of its meaning and purpose as “a fundamental concept” of 
cost sharing, but this language was not repeated in later regulations. Neverthe-
less, the investor model is still the theoretical basis for the specified methods for 
pricing platform contribution transactions. The implications of this are discussed 
in detail in Paragraph 4.3.3 below. The 2011 Final Regulations also adopted the 
effective date and transition rules of the 2008 Temporary Regulations letting 
them apply to all CSAs entered into from 5 January 2009 onwards. Pre-existing 
arrangements are required to have been compliant with the 1995 Regulations, 
while the activities of the participants needed to substantially comply with the 
rules of the Final Regulations and the underlying written agreement had to be 
updated accordingly by 6 July 2009 at the latest.146          
145 Treasury and IRS, 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, 76 Fed Reg 80082 (2011).
146 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-7(m)(1).
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4.3. Buy-in Payments
4.3.1. Introduction
As already explained above, the Treasury and IRS have for some time been 
concerned that CSAs are used to allocate intangibles to group companies 
abroad without the US taxpayer receiving sufficient compensation. This has 
caused quite some discussions about the consideration that participants 
should receive for the contribution of pre-existing intangibles under a CSA. The 
thinking around this topic evolved over the years and drastically changed direc-
tion with the publication of the 2005 Proposed Regulations. This Paragraph 4.3 
first illustrates the pre-2005 practice in respect of buy-in payment by looking at 
the 1994 Seagate case and then examines the concept of “platform contribution 
transactions” under later regulations. Subsequently, it discusses how the valua-
tion approach advocated by the IRS has been rejected by the US Tax Court in the 
Veritas and Amazon case.  
4.3.2. Buy-in Royalties under Earlier Cost Sharing Regulations
After the addition of the commensurate-with-income standard to Section 482 
in 1986 compensation payments for the contribution of pre-existing intangibles 
were generally structured as declining royalty payments. These royalties would 
ramp down over the limited economic lifetime of the intangibles developed 
under a CSA. In 1994 this so called ramp down approach was accepted by the 
United States Tax Court in Seagate Technology v. Commissioner.147 This would 
later be considered “a foundational cost sharing case”.148 
Seagate Technology Inc. was, and today still is, a major manufacturer of 
computer hard disk drives. It was established in 1979 and is based in Scotts 
Valley California (United States).  After a flying start the company faced serious 
economic challenges in the early eighties. Market prices fell, while competition 
intensified. In reaction Seagate sought to reduce costs by using an offshore 
manufacturing and distribution subsidiary in Singapore. That could have been 
inspired by opportunities of labor arbitration or the 10-year tax holiday offered 
to the company in Singapore. However that may be, Seagate Singapore was 
established in July 1982 to manufacture hard disk drives and hard drive compo-
nents. It sold these products back into the US via Seagate Scotts Valley as well 
as to third parties directly. The company was quite successful. Starting with 
147 Seagate Technology v. Commissioner, 8 February 1994, 102 TC 149.
148 Heriford, Keates, Lamoureuw and Wright, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2013/4.
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approximately 50 employees, it grew into the second largest employer in Singa-
pore, employing more than 8,000 people by 1987. 
Within the group most R&D activities were performed by Seagate Scotts Valley. 
In the spring of 1985 Seagate Scots Valley and Seagate Singapore entered into a 
cost sharing agreement. R&D costs were shared equally, while both participants 
were appointed the right to use, within limited geographical areas, the intan-
gible property developed under this agreement.  Seagate Scott Valley’s exclu-
sive territory was the Americas, while Seagate Singapore’s exclusive territory 
consisted of South-East Asia, India and China. The CSA was supplemented by 
a license agreement for the use of Seagate Scotts Valley’s pre-cost sharing disc 
drive technology and know-how as well as the exploitation of products obtained 
through the use of that technology and know-how. The royalty payable for the 
license was set at 1 percent of sales. 
Unfortunately for Seagate the IRS challenged the group’s transfer pricing set-up. 
The subject of discussion included the intercompany sales price of hard drives 
and hard drive components manufactured in Singapore and sold to Seagate 
Scotts Valley, the split of costs under the CSA, the size of the royalty payable 
under the license agreement as well as several other intercompany transac-
tions. Over the years 1983 to 1987 the IRS reallocated more than US$ 285 million 
of profit from Singapore to the US. Seagate petitioned against the deficiencies 
at the United States Tax Court, where both parties brought in several experts to 
substantiate their positions.  At the end of the day the Tax Court was convinced 
that Seagate Scotts Valley’s management expected Seagate Singapore to 
benefit most from the R&D conducted in the US after the manufacturing capa-
bility was transferred to Singapore. As neither party presented third party cost 
sharing agreements that could serve as guidance for its decision, the Tax Court 
used its best judgment to conclude that 75 percent of the R&D expenses should 
be allocated to Seagate Singapore and 25 percent to Seagate Scotts Valley. 
Furthermore, the Tax Court concluded that third party agreements presented 
as comparables for the license agreement did not concern the same or similar 
intangibles and contained different conditions. The Court however did accept 
the conclusion by one of Seagate’s experts that royalty rates for disk drive tech-
nology generally ranged from 1 to 5 percent. At the same time it established 
that Seagate Scott Valley’s management anticipated Seagate Singapore to 
become the sole manufacturer of certain types of disk drive models that were 
at the early stages of their economic lifecycle. As such the Court did not approve 
of Seagate setting the royalty at the low-end of the range and decided that it 
had to be increased from 1 to 3 percent. 
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Although the adjustment of the royalty rate was not in favor of the taxpayer, 
the important aspect to note is that the Tax Court did accept Seagate’s prin-
ciple choice to structure the compensation for the pre-existing intangibles as a 
royalty payment based on the economic lifetime of the intangibles. As such, the 
ruling in the Seagate case confirmed the standard operating practice under the 
commensurate-with-income standard. The Treasury and IRS however remained 
dissatisfied with that approach, which ultimately resulted in stricter guidance 
and more specified valuation methods being included in the Cost Sharing Regu-
lations as from 2005 (see Paragraph 4.2.2).
4.3.3. Platform Contributions under Recent Cost Sharing Regulations
4.3.3.1. Terminology
The US Cost Sharing Regulations have always used an extensive set of special-
ized terms. New relevant terminology categorizing the different types of 
contributions under CSAs was introduced in the 2008 Temporary Regulations 
and continued in the 2011 Final Regulations. Most notably these Regulations 
replaced the concept of external contributions used in the 2005 Proposed Regu-
lations149 by that of “platform contributions”, which are made available and 
should be compensated for in “platform contribution transactions” or “PCTs”. A 
platform contribution is defined as:
“…any resource, capability, or right that a controlled participant has devel-
oped, maintained, or acquired externally to the intangible development 
activity (whether prior to or during the course of the CSA) that is reasonably 
anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles.” 150
149 Paragraph 4.482-7(b)(3)(iii) of the 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations explained that an 
external contribution was a contribution consisting of “the rights […] in any resource or capability 
that is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles and that [the 
contributing participant] has developed, maintained, or acquired externally to (whether prior to or 
during the course of) the CSA.”
150 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 4.482-7(c)(1).
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Under this definition platform contributions are not limited to the stricter defi-
nition of intangibles as provided elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code.151 
Instead various other resources also qualify as a platform contribution, such as 
making available a workforce in place (e.g. a uniquely skilled and experienced 
research team), goodwill or going-concern value. This is a crucial consideration, 
because it expands the buy-in payment to the sale of a business opportunity 
rather than “only” a transfer or license of narrowly defined pre-existing intangi-
bles. As such according to the Treasury and IRS the buy-in consideration should 
not just reflect the fair market value of the pre-existing intangibles included 
in the PCT, but it should also be increased depending on the further profits 
expected from new intangibles developed under the CSA. Such PCT can take 
the form of a lump sum payment as well as a multiyear royalty.152 
Platform contributions have to be distinguished from “cost contributions”. 
The latter concerns payments to fund ongoing intangible development costs 
under the CSA.153 Cost contributions can consist of internal costs related to the 
ongoing performance of cost shared activities or third party costs, such as costs 
for materials or costs for services provided by third parties. Cost contributions 
are leveled out in accordance with each participant’s reasonably anticipated 
benefits from the cost shared intangibles through so called Cost Sharing Trans-
actions or “CSTs”. They are generally settled at cost, i.e. without a profit mark-
up. 
In addition to platform contributions and cost contributions a participant can 
also make “operating contributions” and “operating cost contributions”. oper-
ating contributions are contributions of pre-existing resources, capabilities or 
rights related to the exploitation of cost shared intangibles. As the preamble to 
the 2011 Final Regulations puts it:
“The concepts of platform and operating contributions are intended to 
encompass any existing inputs that are reasonable anticipated to facili-
tate developing or exploiting cost share intangibles at any time, including 
151 Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code defines intangibles as any: 
(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how; 
(ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition; 
(iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name; 
(iv) franchise, license, or contract; 
(v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate, customer 
list, or technical data; or 
(vi) any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual.
 This definition of intangibles is also copied in Paragraph 1.482-4(b) of the Section 482 Regulations.
152 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(h)(2).
153 Idem, Paragraph 4.482-7(d)(4).
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resources, capabilities, or rights, such as expertise in decision-making 
concerning research and product development, manufacturing or marketing 
intangibles or services, and management oversight and direction.”
Operating cost contributions on the other hand are contributions to cover costs 
related to the development of resources, capabilities, or rights related to the 
exploitation of cost shared intangibles. 
4.3.3.2. Pricing Methods
Covering over 50 pages the guidance on the pricing of platform contribution 
transactions is a major part of the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations. Para-
graph 1.482-7(g)(1) includes five specified methods that might be used for that 
purpose:
(i) the comparable uncontrolled transaction (“CUT”) method and the compa-
rable uncontrolled service price (“CUSP”) method;
(ii) the income method;
(iii) the acquisition price method;
(iv) the market capitalization method; and
(v) the residual profit split method.
Taxpayers are also allowed to use an unspecified method, but only to the extent 
it produces a more reliable result.154 Such an unspecified method should at least 
provide information on the prices or profits that the participant could have real-
ized by choosing a realistic alternative to cost sharing.
Ad (i): The CUT Method and CUSP Method
In a cost sharing context the CUT method is used to evaluate the amount 
charged for the transfer of intangible property, while the CUSP method is used 
to evaluate the amount charged for a services transaction. Both methods deter-
mine the appropriate arm’s length amount by reference to comparable uncon-
trolled transactions. This requires reference to transactions involving compa-
rable intangible property or services, under comparable conditions and in 
154 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(8).
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comparable circumstances. The Treasury and IRS regard the comparability and 
reliability to depend specifically on similarity in the way risks have been split up 
between parties.  
Ad (ii): The Income Method
The income method appears to be the preferred method of the Treasury and 
IRS. It calculates the appropriate arm’s length PCT payment as the difference 
between the present value of a participant’s expected results under the CSA and 
the present value of that participant’s expected results under the so called best 
realistic alternative to cost sharing.155 For a PCT payer the best realistic alterna-
tive to cost sharing is assumed to be the licensing of the new to be developed 
intangibles from an uncontrolled licensor. For a PCT payee the best realistic 
alternative is the exact opposite, namely to perform the cost shared activities 
itself and then license out the intangibles to an uncontrolled licensee. As under 
the best realistic alternative to cost sharing the licensor bears all the risk of the 
development of the intangibles and the licensee does not share in such risk, the 
discount rate used to calculate the present value of their expected results in that 
scenario has to be adjusted accordingly.  
The income method can be illustrated by the following stylized example inspired 
by the facts and circumstances of the Seagate case: 
A US resident company manufactures computer hard disks. In anticipation 
of market developments the company is looking to develop a new genera-
tion hard disks based on a pre-existing model. For that purpose it concludes 
a cost sharing agreement with its recently established, fully owned Singa-
pore subsidiary. Under this agreement the US parent has the right to sell the 
new hard disks in the US, while the Singapore subsidiary has the right to sell 
them in South-East Asia, India and China. The pre-existing know-how and 
technology related to manufacturing the new hard disks and the availa-
bility of an experienced R&D team employed by the US parent are expected 
to contribute significantly to the development of the new hard disks and 
therefore constitute platform contributions for which the Singapore subsid-
iary should pay an arm’s length compensation in a PCT. For the purpose of 
the example it is assumed that the reasonably anticipated revenues of the 
Singapore subsidiary from future sales of the new hard disks are as shown 
in the table below. These are reduced by the operating costs of the Singa-
pore subsidiary and the cost contributions it pays to its US affiliate under 
155 Idem, Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(A).
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the CSA. This then leaves the Singapore entity’s operating income (A). After 
year 10 there are no more sales expected. The company has an ambition to 
realize an internal rate of return on risk bearing R&D activities of 16% and 
therefore the operating income is discounted using a similar discount rate. 
As shown below, this implies a net present value of the Singapore entity’s 
overall forecasted results under the CSA of US$ 1,600M.
Amounts in US$ * 1 million
Year
Sales of new 
hard disks
Operating 
costs
Cost 
contributions
Singapore 
subsidiary’s 
operating 
income (A)
Discount 
factor using a 
discount rate 
of 16% (B)
Net present value of the 
Singapore subsidiary’s 
operating income at the 
outset of the CSA (A x B) 
1 0 0 60 -60 0.8621 -52
2 200 40 80 80 0.7432 59
3 500 80 100 320 0.6407 205
4 800 120 90 590 0.5523 326
5 940 160 80 700 0.4761 333
6 1000 160 60 780 0.4104 320
7 800 110 40 650 0.3538 230
8 540 80 40 420 0.3050 128
9 300 80 30 190 0.2630 50
10 80 50 30 0 0.2267 0
Total Net Present Value of Cost Sharing Scenario                1,600
It is further assumed for the purpose of the example that it can be evidenced 
that in an uncontrolled transaction a licensee would, instead of the cost 
contributions, pay a royalty equal to 30% of sales for the use of the tech-
nology and know-how to manufacture comparable hard drives.156 This would 
leave the Singapore entity with a lower operating income (A). However, as 
an uncontrolled licensee it would not bear any risks related to the develop-
ment of the new versions and it would therefore be satisfied with an internal 
rate of return of just 14%. At this discount rate the net present value of the 
results in the best realistic alternative scenario is US$ 1,350M. 
156 As an alternative to the CUT method the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations also allow for the 
so called comparable profits method (“CPM”) for determining the royalty that an uncontrolled 
company would have paid for such rights. Under the CPM the royalty is based on the excess of the 
PCT payer’s expected operating income above a fixed routine profit.
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Amounts in US$ * 1 million
Year Sales of new 
hard disks
Operating 
cost
License 
fee
Uncontrolled 
licensee’s 
operating 
income (A)
Discount 
factor using a 
discount rate 
of 14% (B)
Net present value of the 
uncontrolled licensee’s operating 
income at the outset of the 
license arrangement (A x B) 
1 0 0 0 0 0.8772 0
2 200 40 60 100 0.7695 77
3 500 80 150 270 0.6750 182
4 800 120 240 440 0.5921 261
5 940 160 282 498 0.5194 259
6 1000 160 300 540 0.4556 246
7 800 110 240 450 0.3996 180
8 540 80 162 298 0.3506 104
9 300 80 90 130 0.3075 40
10 80 50 24 6 0.2697 2
Total Net Present Value of Licensing Alternative                1,350
The income method specified in the Cost Sharing regulations is based on 
the principle that the risk adjusted return of a PCT payer in a CSA scenario 
should not be different from its risk adjusted return in the best realistic alter-
native scenario. This implies that any excess profit represents the value of 
the platform contributions and should therefore be paid over to the partic-
ipant making those platform contributions. In this case that means that 
the Singapore subsidiary would have to pay an amount of US$ 250 million 
to the US parent, being the difference between US$ 1,600 million and US$ 
1,350 million. 
Ad (iii): The Acquisition Price Method
The acquisition price method is specifically appropriate, if a newly acquired 
subsidiary enters into the group’s CSA shortly after its acquisition. This method 
uses the purchase price paid in an uncontrolled transaction for shares in a subsid-
iary or all the assets of a business as reference for determining the arm’s length 
PCT payment. The PCT payment should equal the so called adjusted acquisition 
price, consisting of the purchase price plus the liabilities of the target on the 
date of acquisition minus the value of the target’s assets that are not part of its 
platform contributions. The acquisition price method can be very suitable when 
a special purpose vehicle holding only intangible property is acquired and a CSA 
is set up to further develop these intangibles. It is regarded to become less reli-
able however, if a longer period of time passes between the acquisition and the 
moment of entering into the CSA. Furthermore, the adjusted acquisition price 
is probably more difficult to calculate accurately, if the target owns significant 
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difficult to value (intangible) assets that are not contributed to the CSA. It is not 
difficult to imagine that this can specifically cause complications, if the target 
has pre-acquisition operational activities of its own that are not covered by the 
CSA, while the purchase price included a compensation for the going concern 
value and goodwill in relation to those activities. In that case, it would after all 
be necessary to accurately determine what part of the purchase price can be 
attributed to such going concern value and goodwill and exclude that value 
from the PCT payment, as these assets are not contributed under the CSA.        
Ad (iv): The Market Capitalization Method
The market capitalization method is suggested for evaluating PCTs, if the shares 
in the contributing entity are regularly traded on a public stock exchange. An 
arm’s length PCT should equal the so called adjusted average market capitali-
zation. This is made up of the average of the daily market capitalizations in the 
last 60 days preceding the PCT plus the value of the PCT payee’s liabilities on 
the date of the PCT minus the value of the payee’s assets that are not part of 
its platform contribution. Just like with the acquisition price method, it would 
appear to be difficult determining the PCT on the basis of the market capital-
ization method, if the PCT payee has significant difficult to value (intangible) 
assets and operational activities that are not covered by the CSA. Most likely 
the market capitalization method is only useful in very specific situations, for 
example if a highly specialized publicly traded US company starts to expand 
internationally.     
Ad (v): The Residual Profit Split Method
Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(7) includes a version of the so called residual profit split 
method to value platform contributions and operating contributions. This 
method is allowed only, if two or more participants to a CSA make platform 
contributions or operating contributions. It prescribes that the PCTs allocate 
the net present value of the residual divisional profits on the basis of the rela-
tive value of these platform and operating contributions. For these purposes 
this relative value can be measured using either external market benchmarks 
that reflect the fair market value of the non-routine contributions or the capital-
ized costs of developing the platform or operating contributions, appropriately 
grown or discounted so they provide a comparable dollar comparison on the 
date of the PCT payment.157 If for example the relative value of the platform 
contributions by participants A and B are 50 and 100 respectively, then the rela-
157 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(7)(2).
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tive size of the net present value of anticipated residual profit of both partic-
ipants should be similar, e.g. 500 and 1,000. If however the net present value 
of participant A’s anticipated residual profit is 300 and that of participant B is 
1,200, then B should make a PCT payment of 200 to A to restore the balance. 
Such a stylized numeric example may give the unjustified impression that appli-
cation of the residual profit split method is simple. In fact however, applying the 
profit split method can in practice be quite problematic. First of all, it requires 
an appropriate allocation of profit to routine cost sharing contributions in order 
to determine the residual divisional profits. Secondly, it can be up for debate 
whether the capitalized development costs are a suitable basis for determining 
the relative value of non-routine contributions. It could be argued that non-rou-
tine contributions with different risk profiles require different returns and, 
therefore, a different calculation of PCT payments.          
4.3.3.3. Periodic Adjustments
4.3.3.3.1. The Actually Experienced Return Ratio
The Cost Sharing Regulations allow the Commissioner to make periodic adjust-
ments to PCT payments, if the returns of individual participants are not in line 
with the ALS. Before any adjustment is made all relevant facts and circum-
stances will have to be considered. Extraordinary events that are beyond the 
control of the cost sharing participants and could not reasonably have been 
anticipated can offer a legitimate explanation for unexpected outcomes. Such 
events are likely to have occurred, if the return ratios of all participants show a 
similar deviation from forecasts. However, there can also be unforeseen condi-
tions impacting the results of only one or a limited number of individual partic-
ipants. Those may be more difficult to evidence. The Regulations also contain a 
safe haven rule, under which no adjustments are made if a participant’s so called 
actually experienced return ratio stays within a predefined range. To qualify for 
this rule the Cost Sharing Regulations require a participant’s overall return from 
cost shared activities to not be less than 66% or more than 150% of its overall 
contributions under the CSA. If the cost sharing participant has not complied 
with the documentation requirements included in the regulations, the range 
is narrowed to 80% at the low end and 125% at the top end. The safe haven 
rule is further nuanced by the assumption that adjustments because of a return 
ratio below the lower limit of the range will not be made in the first five years 
subsequent to the first substantial exploitation of the cost shared intangibles. 
Furthermore, if the return ratio has fallen within the range for the first ten years 
subsequent to the first substantial exploitation of the cost shared intangibles, 
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the regulations also deem adjustments not to occur in later years.  Finally, there 
would normally not be any adjustments made, if the same PCT payment is 
also furnished to an unrelated third party under substantially the same circum-
stances or if the PCT is covered by an advanced pricing agreement.
4.3.3.3.2. Use of Hindsight
There are principle arguments to be made against periodic adjustments as set 
out in the regulations, because they appear to provide the IRS with the benefit 
of hindsight. A PCT payer might argue that the IRS is retroactively denying a 
rightful return for a bona fide assumption of risk. The use of hindsight in transfer 
pricing is controversial. It is something the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
traditionally oppose158, although they do not include a clear definition of the 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the OECD has recently sanctioned the use under 
certain conditions of so called ex post results to determine whether a retroactive 
adjustment to the pricing of hard to value intangibles is justified (see Paragraph 
5.5.3.2.4). Meanwhile the Treasury and IRS argue that the wording on periodic 
adjustments in the cost sharing regulations is simply a further specification of 
the commensurate-with-income standard. In the preamble to the 2008 Tempo-
rary Cost Sharing Regulations they again refer to the legislative history of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, pointing out that Congress intended for taxpayers to 
be able to use CSAs only “if and to the extent such agreements are consistent 
with the purposes of this provision that the income allocated among the parties 
reasonably reflect the actual economic activity undertaken by each”. In light of 
the information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities, they appar-
ently consider periodic adjustments both necessary and reasonable.                             
4.3.3.4. The 2007 Coordinated Issue Paper
As long as the 2005 Proposed Regulations were not finalized, the 1995 Final 
Regulations stayed in force. Nevertheless the IRS published a Coordinated Issue 
Paper (“CIP”) in September 2007 that basically instructed its field agents to 
already start using the income method as set out in the 2005 Proposed Regu-
lations for valuing pre-existing intangibles and calculating buy-in payments.159 
The CIP recognized two typical buy-in scenarios.  The “initial buy-in scenario” 
concerned a new CSA between a US participant with an existing R&D capability 
and a foreign affiliate. For that scenario the CIP considers the income method, 
also referred to as the foregone profits method, the most reliable method for 
158 OECD 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 3.74.
159 Treasury and IRS, Coordinated Issue Paper – Sec. 482 CSA Buy-in Adjustments, 27 September 2007, 
LMSB-04-0907-62.
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measuring an initial buy-in. The “subsequent acquisition buy-in scenario” involved 
the acquisition of intangibles by the cost sharing participants from a third party 
in an asset or stock acquisition. Not surprisingly, in this scenario the value of 
intangibles is determined by the acquisition price method. 
The CIP challenged the appropriateness of the CUT method for determining a 
buy-in payment. It basically claimed that uncontrolled transactions referenced 
by taxpayers to apply the CUT method would generally lack similar profit poten-
tial or would not feature similar contractual terms and economic conditions. 
Furthermore, the CIP disapproved of an alternative version of the residual profit 
split method (“RPSM”) to compensate for pre-existing intangibles. This method 
involved splitting the aggregate residual profit from cost shared activities, i.e. 
the total profit after routine contributions are appropriately compensated, 
among participants based on their respective share in capitalized and amor-
tized past and current development costs. I understand this to work as follows: 
Assume a US parent has incurred US$ 1.5 million for the development of a plat-
form intangible. These costs are capitalized and amortized over a 5 year period. 
It subsequently enters into a CSA with a foreign subsidiary to on-develop the 
platform intangible into new commercially exploitable intangibles. The ongoing 
development costs are approximately US$ 500k per annum, which under the 
CSA are shared between the US parent, US$ 100k, and the foreign subsidiary, 
US$ 400k, based on their anticipated benefit from exploitation of the cost 
shared results in their own territories. Under these circumstances the alterna-
tive RPSM would during the first five years take into account the amortization 
of the pre-existing development costs and allocate 40% of residual profit to the 
US parent; (US$ 300k + US$ 100) / US$ 800k. In later years it would allocate 
only 20% of the residual profits to the US parent; US$ 100 / US$ 500. The IRS 
contested that by doing so, it would be insufficiently recognized that the pre-ex-
isting development activities could have presented a very different risk profile. 
The IRS was concerned that the US parent would be under compensated for 
taking on all the risk during the most uncertain initial phase of a development 
project. It also felt that there could be a potential distortion of results by difficult 
to verify assumptions regarding useful life of the platform intangibles.
Having rejected these alternatives, the CIP came back to the income method as 
it would offer the more appropriate solution: 
“This CIP concludes that in the typical initial buy-in scenario an unspecified 
method known as the income or foregone profits method will generally 
constitute the most reliable method for measuring an initial buy-in (in the 
aggregate with the tandem license of make-sell rights). This method deter-
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mines the value of the buy-in intangible (along with the licensed make-sell 
rights) as the present discounted value of the stream of projected operating 
profits of the CFC (or affiliated CFCs), after project under the CSA.” 
It recognized that there had been disputed about how to account for the value 
of an experienced US research team being made available and it argued that, 
even if such workforce in place would not be considered an intangible asset, it 
would at least entail a certain “synergy value” with an increasing effect on the 
buy-in payment. Taxpayers were allowed the freedom to structure the buy-in as 
a lump-sum or a periodic royalty payment and in applying the income method 
the taxpayer’s own financial projects were to be accepted as a starting point. 
However, it was also acknowledged that in some cases IRS personnel would 
need to develop own projections. The instruction in the CIP were to be used 
as a blueprint in respect of all outstanding CSA valuation issues without taking 
into account specific fact and circumstances of an individual case at hand. It was 
also disregarded that the audited CSAs were still governed by the 1995 Cost 
Sharing Regulations, which did not specify the income method. In practically 
all instances the IRS now required buy-in payments to be calculated using the 
income method. This rigorous approach led to many conflicts with taxpayers. 
It was unavoidable that the matter eventually ended up in court and so it did. 
That resulted in the Veritas case160 and Amazon case161, both of which are further 
discussed below.
4.3.4. The Veritas Case
4.3.4.1. Facts of the Case
Veritas Software Corporation (Veritas) manufactures and sells so called 
advanced storage management software products. These products facilitate 
making a back-up of systems without user interruption and the recovery of 
data in case of disk or system failure. They protect against data loss and file 
corruption and, by doing so, provide performance improvement and relia-
bility enhancement, which is critical for many commercial applications. Veritas 
historically had only limited presence outside of the US. Nevertheless, at the 
end of the nineteen nineties it recognized that geographic expansion presented 
an opportunity to increase sales and profits. In 1999 it set up a legal structure 
with an Irish subsidiary, Veritas Software International Ltd. That company was 
160 Veritas Software Corporation and subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 10 December 2009, 133 TC 14.
161 Amazon.com Inc. and subsidiaries v. Commission, 23 March 2017, 148 TC 8.
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held via a Bermuda based intermediate holding company.  Veritas Ireland was 
assigned all the existing sales agreements with European based sales subsid-
iaries. Furthermore, Veritas US and Veritas Ireland entered into a CSA and a 
license agreement. Under the CSA the participants pooled their respective R&D 
resources as well as agreed to share R&D costs and risks going forward. The 
CSA provided Veritas Ireland with the exclusive and perpetual right to manufac-
ture, market, license and sell products using the cost shared intangibles. Under 
the agreement Veritas US provided Veritas Ireland the right to use its pre-ex-
isting know-how, trademarks and trade names and comparable intangible 
assets. In return Veritas Ireland paid Veritas US a royalty to be adjusted prospec-
tively as well as retroactively in order for the rate to remain at arm’s length. 
Payments consisted of US$ 6 million, paid in 1999, and US$ 166 million paid in 
2000. The latter payment was adjusted to US$ 118 million in 2002, so that on 
balance Veritas US received US$ 124 million. Veritas Ireland went on to grow 
in the EMEA, Asia Pacific and Japanese markets without significant assistance 
from Veritas US. It was able to increase sales by continually upgrading sales 
resources, providing sales incentives to distributors and finding new customers. 
The IRS however did not agree with the way in which the license agreement 
structured the buy-in payment. It recalculated the appropriate buy-in payment 
using the income method as outlined in the 2007 Coordinated Issue Paper. By 
doing so it arrived at a buy-in payment of US$ 2.5 billion and the IRS allocated 
profit to Veritas US accordingly. The IRS later changed its valuation expert and 
decreased the allocation from US$ 2.5 billion to US$ 1.675 billion. Veritas peti-
tioned against the notice of deficiency with the United States Tax Court.
4.3.4.2. The United States Tax Court Decision
The IRS’s position in this case was based primarily on the assumption that 
Veritas US did not just provide Veritas Ireland with the right to use its individual 
pre-existing know how, trademarks, trade names and comparable intangibles. 
It also recognized workforce in place, goodwill, going-concern value as well as 
access to Veritas US’ R&D and marketing teams as transferred intangibles. In 
the IRS’s view these intangibles were expected to contribute not only to income 
anticipated from the sale of existing products, but also to income from sales of 
future products developed under the CSA. In fact, the valuation expert for the 
IRS argued that the collective effect of the CSA and the license agreement was 
“akin” to a sale of business. In his eyes this justified an aggregated valuation of 
the intangibles transferred taking into account future income from newly devel-
oped cost shared intangibles in determining the arm’s length buy-in payment. 
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The US Tax Court did not agree with the IRS on the most principle aspects of the 
case. On behalf of the Tax Court Judge Foley used harsh language to underline 
this, when he referred to “the implausibility of respondent’s flimsy determination”. 
He considered that the 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations, in force for the years at 
hand, unequivocally required buy-in payments to be made for certain pre-ex-
isting intangibles, but offered no support for the “akin” to sale theory or the 
inclusion of a consideration for workforce in place, going-concern value, good-
will or access to an R&D and marketing team. As such in the Judge’s opinion 
there was also no room for an aggregated valuation:
“Transactions may be aggregated if an aggregated approach produces the 
‘most reliable means of determining the arm’s length consideration for the 
controlled transactions’. Respondent’s ‘akin’ to sale theory (i.e., a theory 
which encompasses short-lived intangibles value as if they have a perpetual 
life and takes into account intangibles that were subsequently developed 
rather than pre-existing) certainly does not produce the most reliable 
result.” 
Judge Foley further did not accept that future income from newly developed 
intangibles could be taken into account for calculating the appropriate buy-in 
payment. He emphasized that the Cost Sharing Regulations required buy-in 
payment to be made with respect to transfer of pre-existing intangible prop-
erty only. In the Judge’s view, attributing income from next generation intan-
gibles to the pre-existing intangibles implies that the latter have a perpetual 
useful life. The Judge was prepared to accept that the useful life of pre-existing 
intangibles was four years, but certainly not perpetual. In reaching its conclu-
sion the Judge explicitly took into account that Veritas was “in a perpetual mode 
of innovation” and that its products had “finite lifecycles”. In fact, by the time 
a new product became available, the next generation was already in develop-
ment. Furthermore, after a remarkable detailed discussion of relevant corpo-
rate finance literature  the Judge determined that the valuation expert for the 
IRS used the wrong discount rate to calculate the net present value of future 
income. The Judge also considered that the expert incorrectly used large and 
unrealistic growth rates into perpetuity, while the expert did not fully appreciate 
that Veritas Ireland grew its own markets. This led the Judge to conclude:
“… Veritas Ireland prospered, not because Veritas US simply spun off a 
portion of an established business and transferred valuable intangibles, 
but because Veritas Ireland employed aggressive salesmanship and savvy 
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marketing, successfully developed the EMEA and APJ markets, and co-de-
veloped new products that performed well in those markets. For the fore-
going reasons, we conclude that respondent’s allocations set forth in the 
amendment to amended answer and at trial are arbitrary, capricious, and 
unreasonable.”                     
In his decision Judge Foley then went on to consider Veritas’ determination of the 
buy-in payment using the CUT method. For this Veritas had referred to several 
license agreements that it had concluded with third party original equipment 
manufacturers (“OEMs”). Veritas had provided these with their products and 
the OEMs sold the products either bundled with their own operating systems or 
unbundled as an option.  Veritas’ valuation expert had used a number of these 
arrangements, mostly with OEMs selling bundled products, to determine what 
he felt was an at arm’s length buy-in payment. The Judge pointed out that by 
bundling the products with their own operating systems OEMs added credibility 
to Veritas’ products, improved brand identity and therefore generally paid lower 
royalty rates. By consequence these arrangements were not regarded suffi-
ciently similar to the arrangement with Veritas Ireland. In respect of the arrange-
ments with OEMs selling unbundled products, the Judge arrived at an opposite 
conclusion, i.e. those were regarded comparable to the controlled transaction. 
This was substantiated by a thorough analysis of the functions performed, the 
contractual terms agreed, the risks assumed, the significant economic circum-
stances applying and the property or services provided.  In respect of all these 
elements the Judge regarded the transactions to be quite similar and to offer a 
good comparable for applying the CUT method:
“Although Veritas US’ unbundled OEM agreements are certainly not iden-
tical to the controlled transaction, an analysis of the comparability factors 
establishes that the unbundled OEM agreements are sufficiently compa-
rable to the controlled transaction and that the CUT method is the best 
method to determine the requisite buy-in payment.”
The Tax Court’s decision further acknowledged that there was additional value 
in the rights to use the Veritas trademark as well as the sales agreements trans-
ferred to Veritas Ireland. Nevertheless, it principally agreed to a buy-in struc-
ture applied by Veritas, making only a minimal adjustment to amounts paid by 
Veritas Ireland.
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4.3.4.3. Action on Decision
In fiscal literature the Tax Court’s decision was considered a painful blow to the 
IRS’s position on buy-in payments.162 Shortly after the decision came out Lin and 
Wright worded that as follows:
“…this decision seems to be consistent with buy-in analyses that were 
employed some 25 years ago, before cost sharing arrangements became 
the subject of highly focused and debated analyses. If one accepts the IRS’ 
statement that its current temporary cost sharing regulations are merely 
a clarification of existing law, then the Court seems to be sending a strong 
message that it does not agree with those regulations.”163
As such, it might have been expected that the IRS would appeal the decision 
with the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit. However, it did 
not do so. Instead it issued a notice of non-acquiescence.164 In this action on 
decision (‘AOD’) the IRS explained this strategy by pointing out that it lost the 
case because of the factual findings by the Tax Court. It still disagreed with these 
facts, but more principally was disturbed by the additional comments made by 
the Judge Foley about the general working of the law. Those comments the IRS 
felt needed to be contradicted in the AOD:
“Because the Court’s factual findings eliminated the basis for the Service’s 
valuation, and correspondingly supported the Court’s valuation, it was 
unnecessary for the Court to make the broad assertions it made about the 
governing law. As those assertions are erroneous and could be inappropri-
ately relied upon by taxpayers in planning future transactions...”
The IRS continued to uphold its view that Veritas US did not only transfer make-
and-sell rights, but also the right to further develop existing products and that 
the combined effect of these interrelated transaction were most reliably valued 
on an aggregated basis. In a footnote the IRS corrected the Tax Court’s inter-
pretation as if the intangibles were assumed to have a perpetual useful lifetime. 
Instead the IRS indicated to believe that the availability of pre-existing intangi-
bles in addition to make-and-sell rights provided a head start for further R&D 
that lifted the results from newly developed products during a longer period 
162 See for example: Oates and O’Brien, International Tax Journal 2010/1 and Dau and Ryan, Interna-
tional Tax Journal 2010/2.   
163 Lin and Wright, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2010/2.
164 IRS, Action on Decision (Veritas), 6 December 2010, IRB No. 2010-49.
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of time then the useful life of the individual pre-existing intangibles. The IRS 
further objected to Judge Foley’s interpretation of the 1995 Cost Sharing Regu-
lations. The relevant Paragraph 1.482-7(g)(2) of those regulations states:
“If a controlled participant makes pre-existing intangible property in which 
it owns an interest available to other controlled participants for purposes 
of research in the intangible development area under a qualified CSA, then 
each such other controlled participant must make a buy-in payment to the 
owner.”
The IRS argued that the Tax Court’s decision incorrectly focused on the words 
“pre-existing intangibles” to conclude that subsequently developed intangibles 
are to be disregarded in determining the appropriate buy-in payment. The IRS 
argued that the words “for purposes of research in the intangible development 
area” are equally important and that these words intent to include income from 
newly developed intangibles in the calculation of the buy-in payment. In addi-
tion the IRS disagreed with the Tax Court’s crucial factual finding that Veritas 
Ireland grew its markets by itself with Veritas US’ marketing contributions 
having no or little value. It also challenged that the access to the marketing and 
R&D team would have no substantial value. 
Nonetheless, the Tax Court decision presented quite an impediment for the IRS. 
This was strikingly worded by Oates and O’Brien:
“In VERITAS, the CIP, the temporary regulations and the AOD, the IRS 
takes the position that the buy-in payment under the cost sharing regu-
lations should value the buy-in aggregate, which in turn gives rise to the 
IRS view that the buy-in should be valued as a geographic sale of part of 
the US participant’s business. The critical distinction here is that acquisition 
of a business (including acquisition of the stock of a corporation) by defini-
tion takes into account all future cash flows from the enterprise, including 
cash flows into perpetuity from new products. Here in lies the rub for the 
IRS: as Judge Foley necessarily and correctly concluded, participants to a 
cost sharing agreement do not have to pay royalties for intangible property 
developed under a cost sharing agreement as they are considered co-devel-
opers. That, in fact, is the purpose of the cost sharing rules.”165
165 Oates and O’Brien, International Tax Journal 2011/1.
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Perhaps because it also realized the vulnerability of its own position the IRS 
recalled the 2007 Coordinated Issue Paper on 26 June 2012 (see Paragraph 
4.3.3.4). At the same time however it continued to apply an aggregate valua-
tion for buy-in payments. The arguments for this remained the same and that 
position was later backed-up by the Obama Administration’s proposal in the 
US budgets for fiscal years 2010 through to 2017 to change the law and expand 
the Section 482 definition of intangibles to include workforce in place, goodwill 
and going-concern value.166 Furthermore, the Treasury and IRS also maintained 
the income method as the preferred method in the 2011 Final Cost Sharing 
Regulations and that was not completely without success. Turley, Chamberlain 
and Petriccione even believe that it caused the income method to replace the 
declining royalty as the most frequently used standard for calculating buy-in 
payments:
“Despite the win for the ramp-down methodology in Veritas, it appears that 
common practice among US taxpayers has shifted to use of the income 
method after the release of the 2011 regulations. Whether the shift will 
prove to be the victory for the IRS remains to be seen: the large number 
of variables involved in the income method and the high sensitivity of the 
method to many of the variables (especially discount rates) suggest that 
buy-in disputes will be as common and as contentious as ever.”167 
Be that how it may, not all taxpayers have accepted the income method. Specif-
ically not those governed by theh 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations. One of those 
was internet retailer Amazon that entered into a CSA with its Luxembourg 
subsidiary in 2005.
4.3.5. The Amazon Case 
Up to 2005 internet retailer Amazon had grown its European businesses as inde-
pendent silos. Each of the European subsidiaries had their own website in their 
own national language. They operated separate fulfillment centers, often kept 
their own inventory and predominantly serviced their own local customers. This 
operating model led to inefficiencies and limited further expansion. As such 
there was a legitimate business case for establishing a European headquarters 
to coordinate future regional activities. It was envisaged that a substantial part 
of Amazon’s future income would be attributable to the intangible property 
166 Budget of the US government for fiscal year 2017, “Analytical Perspectives”, Office of Management 
and Budget, 9 February 2016, page 169.
167 Turley, Chamberlain and Petriccione 2017, Paragraph 7.2.3.
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owned in the European HQ and the  coordinating functions performed by the 
European HQ. Therefore Amazon’s tax department was requested to determine 
a location for the company, where that income would be taxed at a low rate. They 
considered several countries, including Ireland and Luxembourg. According to 
the Tax Court’s decision Amazon decided to opt for the latter only after meeting 
with representatives of the Luxembourg authorities, including Mr. Jean-Claude 
Juncker, Luxembourg’s then prime minister. Apparently in Luxembourg they 
were able to strike a good deal. 
The Luxembourg ruling was later found to grant unlawful state aid to Amazon 
in an investigation by the European Commission, which remarkably enough was 
at that time chaired by the same Mr. Juncker. From the Commissions letter to 
Luxembourg in this case it becomes clear that Amazon’s Luxembourg structure 
included several legal entities. At the top of that structure was a limited partner-
ship, Amazon Europe Technology Holdings SCS (“AETH”), which held the intan-
gible property rights associated with the European business as well as all the 
shares in the second entity, an operating company called Amazon EU Sarl. The 
employees of the latter entity actually performed activities that resulted in the 
launch of various new products, a roll-out of advanced new technology and the 
extension of Amazon’s business operations elsewhere in Europe. Luxembourg 
considered AETH a transparent non-taxable entity, whilst the US considered it a 
foreign subsidiary of Amazon US. By consequence, the royalty income received 
by AETH from licensing out its intangible property to Amazon EU Sarl remained 
untaxed in both countries.   
On both sides of the Atlantic the tax authorities chose not to challenge the 
untaxed position of AETH, but Amazon’s transfer pricing arrangements. In the 
US the IRS focused on the cost sharing agreement, which Amazon US and AETH 
entered into as of 1 January 2005. Under this agreement a set of intangibles 
was transferred to AETH, including the software and technology required to 
operate the European websites, marketing intangibles, website domain names 
and customer lists. In return AETH made a onetime buy-in payment as well as 
annual cost sharing payments to cover ongoing development costs. The buy-in 
payment was determined using the CUT method. Uncontrolled transactions 
available included those as part of which Amazon provided tailor made e-com-
merce platforms, services and tools to third party customers that wished to sell 
their own products online under their own brand names. Using these transac-
tions as well as other comparable open market licensing transactions identified 
by valuation experts, the buy-in payment was calculated at US$ 245.5 million. 
Upon audit the IRS concluded that this outcome was not at arm’s length and 
it recalculated the buy-in payment using the income method. Discounting 
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future cash flows of AETH over a 20 year period and adding to that a discounted 
terminal value, the IRS calculated the buy-in payment at US$ 3.6 billion. Amazon 
petitioned against the corresponding adjustment of its taxable US income at 
the United States Tax Court. 
Writing for the Tax Court Judge Lauber on 23 March 2017 produced a lengthy and 
detailed decision covering 207 pages. He did not regard AETH a shell company, 
probably because for US tax purposes Amazon EU Sarl was a disregarded entity 
of which the activities were attributed to AETH. The Judge further compared 
the valuation technique applied by the IRS in Amazon and Veritas in a manner 
already indicating that his decision would not be favorable for the IRS:
“One does not need a Ph.D. in economics to appreciate the essential simi-
larity between the DCF methodology that Dr. Hatch [valuation expert for 
the IRS] employed in Veritas and the DCF methodology that Dr. Frisch 
[valuation expert for the IRS] employed here. Both assumed that the 
pre-existing intangibles transferred had a perpetual useful life; both deter-
mined the buy-in payment by valuing into perpetuity the cash flow suppos-
edly attributable to these pre-existing intangibles; and both in effect treated 
the transfer of pre-existing intangibles as economically equivalent to the 
sale of an entire business.”
On the useful life of Amazon’s intangibles the Judge found that Amazon was 
forced to “leverage the future”, in order to deliver the high level of continuous 
innovation required to keep up with the competition and increase scale quickly. 
Its engineers for example built new pieces of software at a high pace, but at 
the risk that it would not be adaptable to future needs. This resulted in soft-
ware that became outdated relatively quickly and that had a useful life that was 
limited, certainly not perpetual. The judge rejected the IRS’s arguments that it’s 
valuation expert did not assume a perpetual useful life, after pointing out that 
the expert’s valuation discounted 20 years’ worth of cash flows and then added 
a “terminal value”. It did not help the IRS that the valuation expert admitted 
on cross-examination that his methodology produced, in mathematical terms, 
precisely the outcome that would occur if one assumed a perpetual life.  
On the assumption that the buy-in transaction was economically equivalent to 
the sale of an entire business opportunity the Judge further commented when 
he discussed the appropriateness of an aggregated valuation. The IRS had 
argued that this was justified, as the “akin” to a sale theory required an enter-
prise valuation to be performed rather than “only” a valuation of pre-existing 
intangibles. The Judge disagreed:
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“For at least two reasons, the type of ‘aggregation’ proposed by respondent 
does not yield a reasonable means, much less the most reliable means, of 
determining an arm’s length buy-in payment… First, Dr. Fitch’s business-en-
terprise approach improperly aggregates pre-existing intangibles (which 
are subject to the buy-in payment) and subsequently developed intangi-
bles (which are not). Second, his business-enterprise approach improperly 
aggregates compensable ‘intangibles’ (such as software programs and 
trademarks) and residual business assets (such as workforce in place and 
growth options) that do not constitute ‘pre-existing intangible property’ 
under these regulations in effect during 2005-2006.” 
Furthermore, the Judge in his decision addressed the argument made by the 
IRS that in determining the buy-in payment the best realistic alternative to cost 
sharing had to be taken into account. Such alternative would be the possibility 
to license out the intangibles to AETH instead of entering into the CSA. The 
IRS positioned that, if dealing with a third party, Amazon would have clearly 
preferred this alternative to a cost sharing arrangement that allowed a compet-
itor access to its “crown jewels”. Again the Judge disagreed with the IRS. He 
pointed out: 
“The transaction actually structured by Amazon US was a cost sharing 
arrangement, and [the IRS] does not contend that this structure lacked 
economic substance. The regulations in effect during 2005-2006 unam-
biguously entitled Amazon US to enter into a qualifying CSA; it cannot be 
deprived of this entitlement on the theory that it had the alternative of 
doing something else.”          
Finally the IRS had requested that, if Veritas could not be distinguished on the 
facts, it would be overruled. It also contested that Veritas was dictated solely 
by fact findings and that “any assertions made by the Court about governing law 
are dicta and not controlling”. However, in line with his further decision Judge 
Lauber did not overrule the decision in Veritas, nor did he characterize the asser-
tions in that case as non-controlling dicta. To the contrary: He concluded that 
the primary valuation of the IRS was arbitrary and capricious and then went on 
to state that, if an uncontrolled transaction involving transfer of the same or 
comparable intangibles under similar or substantially similar circumstances can 
be identified, the CUT method generally provides the most reliable measure of 
an arm’s length consideration and it was therefore held that Amazon’s method 
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with some appropriate upward adjustments was the best method to determine 
the requisite buy-in payment.168
4.3.6. Author’s Analysis
In both the Veritas and Amazon case a US parent company employing a 
uniquely experienced, centralized R&D entered into a CSA with a foreign 
subsidiary located in a low tax jurisdiction to jointly create valuable innovative 
intangibles. In other words, both cases concerned taxpayers that would be in 
the north-eastern quartile “B” of the categorization model presented in Para-
graph 2.3.3.2. However, it is quite critical to note that the foreign subsidiaries 
at hand could, at least from a US tax perspective, not be qualified as a cash box 
entity. Instead these subsidiaries were attributed skilled personnel that played 
a crucial part in coordinating and growing their regional businesses. Under the 
CSA they paid a consideration for the pre-existing intangibles made available by 
the US parent company. The value of these intangibles was determined by the 
taxpayers using comparable uncontrolled transactions as a reference, while the 
IRS advocated a valuation using the income method. That the latter valuation 
method involved making difficult to test assumptions about the useful lifetime 
of intangibles, forecasted financial results and the appropriateness of discount 
rates are all understandable reasons for the Tax Court to prefer the taxpayers’ 
approach better. It seems very reasonable to assume that this will not provide 
for the most reliable means to value pre-existing intangibles transferred under 
a CSA, specifically not if there are also appropriate comparables available that 
could be used for a valuation on the basis of the CUT method. 
Be that how it may, Veritas Ireland and Amazon Luxembourg got a very good 
deal, so good even that I strongly believe that the audited transactions would 
not have occurred between unrelated parties and that their overall outcome 
conflicts with the ALS. By entering into the CSA under the terms and conditions 
outlined above the Irish and Luxembourg subsidiaries received something of 
value in excess of the access to pre-existing intangibles; a contract under which 
the US parent commits to making available its resources to on-develop those 
intangibles into new intangibles co-owned by the subsidiaries in return for a 
consideration at cost price, i.e. without any profit mark-up. Veritas and Amazon 
would of course never have committed the same to an unrelated party. The 
IRS shares this insight, but then quickly takes a wrong turn by seeking to trans-
late the long term commitment in respect of the future development activities 
168 On 29 September 2017 the IRS announced that it would appeal against the Tax Court’s decision at 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where at the time of writing this procedure 
is still pending.
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into items such as workforce in place, going concern value and goodwill that it 
would like to have compensated as part of the buy-in payment. It subsequently 
muddles up its position by suggesting an aggregated valuation of those “soft” 
intangibles and the “hard” pre-existing intangibles such as know-how and tech-
nology. One of the reasons why such an aggregated valuation is doomed to 
fail, is that the commitment in respect of development activities is for a much 
longer period than the useful lifetime of the pre-existing know-how and tech-
nology. This discrepancy is especially amplified, if the taxpayer operates in a 
very innovative business environment where access to an experienced R&D 
team is extremely valuable but intangibles have a short lifetime. In other words, 
the approach chosen by the IRS is specifically ineffective in those situations that 
under my categorization model can be considered the most likely to cause tax 
and transfer pricing concerns.    
There is another noteworthy angle to the above observation. If Veritas or 
Amazon had decentralized their development activities and the Irish or Luxem-
bourg subsidiary would have performed a proportional part of such activities, 
the contributions made under the CSA would have averaged out. However, now 
that this is not the case the US parent will make overly generous contributions 
during the whole course of the CSA without receiving an appropriate consider-
ation in return. In my opinion this should be solved by valuing the future cost 
contributions at market price instead of at cost. The 2008 Temporary and 2011 
Final Cost Sharing Regulations on the other hand try to include the value of this 
commitment in the buy-in payment. That requires complex valuations. As such, 
it defeats the original purpose of the introduction of the CSA concept, which 
was to offer taxpayers a safe haven to avoid valuation issues. It also results in 
disputes that are extremely difficult to litigate. Judges after all are not econ-
omists and therefore have a natural tendency to solve transfer pricing issues 
by allocating the burden of proof among the litigating parties (also see Para-
graph 7.2). That involves an increased reliance on the input of valuation experts. 
The credibility of those experts then becomes crucial. This was lively illustrated 
by the Veritas case, in which the IRS recalled its first expert’s valuation without 
clear motivation and then effectively lost the case because of Tax Court’s assess-
ment about the quality of the replacement. As the Tax Court quite relentlessly 
put it: 
“After an extensive stipulation process, a lengthy trial, the receipt of more 
than 1,400 exhibits, and the testimony of a myriad of witnesses, our anal-
ysis of whether respondent’s $1.675 billion allocation is arbitrary, capricious, 
or unreasonable hinges primarily on the testimony of Hatch. Put bluntly, 
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his testimony was unsupported, unreliable and thoroughly unconvincing. 
Indeed, the credible elements of his testimony were the numerous conces-
sions and capitulations.” 
In the end the Tax Court rejected the use of the income method in respect of CSAs 
governed by the pre-2008 Cost Sharing Regulations in both Veritas and Amazon. 
By doing so it undeniably rebutted the claim made by the Treasury and IRS that 
the guidance in the later Cost Sharing Regulations concerning the valuation of 
platform contributions and the prescription of the income method as a speci-
fied method is merely a clarification of existing practice. The Tax Court clearly 
regarded these aspects to introduce a new approach and decided in favor of the 
taxpayer, who in the words of the Tax Court in Veritas was “merely required to be 
compliant, not prescient”. By consequence, it is still unclear whether valuation of 
platform contributions using the income method could be in line with the ALS 
under the post 2008 Regulations. Even if the Courts would adopt this approach, 
performing a reliable upfront valuation of the commitment to provide develop-
ment activities at cost price will remain a practical challenge.
4.4. Stock-based Compensation Expenses
4.4.1. Introduction
In 2000 Seagate was again involved in a cost sharing related tax dispute (the 
first Seagate case was discussed in Paragraph 4.3.2). It now concerned the quite 
fundamental question of whether expenses related to stock-based compensa-
tion of R&D employees had to be shared under a CSA. This second time around, 
the Tax Court ruled in favor of the IRS169. Seagate’s request for a summary judg-
ment was rejected and at trial issues of fact remained. Among others evidence 
was lacking on the factual matter of whether or not third parties would have 
shared the expenses related to a stock option plan for R&D employees in a 
similar CSA. As such, the case did not provide for a conclusive decision, leaving 
the issue open for further discussions. 
The amounts involved in stock-based compensation are very significant, espe-
cially in the United States where these types of employee incentive programs 
are quite common.170 The IRS and Treasury were, and still are, concerned that 
169 Seagate v Commissioner, 22 December 2000, TC Memo 2000-388. 
170 The US National Center of Employee Ownership estimates the value of stock-based compensation 
plans per end of 2016 at approximately US$ 1.4 trillion (see http://www.nceo.org/articles/statisti-
cal-profile-employee-ownership).
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US companies will grant their R&D employees share based compensation 
and claim a deduction against their US taxable profit, while the benefit of the 
R&D activities lands with (low taxed) foreign affiliated enterprises that have 
concluded a cost sharing agreement with the taxpayer. Their concern was 
serious enough to amend the 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations in respect of this 
point in 2003. Although at that time the 1995 Regulations did in principle require 
all intangible development costs to be shared unless a specific exception was 
made (the all-costs-requirement), they did not explicitly address expenses for 
stock-based compensation. New and extensive wording was added specifically 
requiring costs attributable to stock-based compensation to be included in the 
operating expenses shared with other cost sharing participants. Stock-based 
compensation was defined widely, while detailed rules were provided on how 
to identify and measure the related costs. In the preamble to the 2003 Regu-
lations the IRS and Treasury took the position that the amendments were only 
intended to clarify the existing practice. By consequence, even though the new 
rules only took effect as of 26 August 2003, the IRS also expected taxpayers to 
include expenses related to stock-based compensation in the shared costs of 
earlier taxable years. Taxpayers did not agree with this approach and in the 2005 
case of Xilinx v Commissioner it was tested in court.
4.4.2. The Xilinx Case
4.4.2.1. Facts of the Case
Xilinx Inc. (Xilinx) researches, develops, manufactures and markets integrated 
circuit devices and related development software systems, so called all program-
mable devices technology. It was established in 1982 and today positions itself 
as a leading competitor in the semi-conductor industry.171 In 1994 Xilinx estab-
lished an Irish subsidiary (Xilinx Ireland) to sell programmable logic devices on 
the European market as well as to perform research and development activi-
ties. In 1995 Xilinx US and Xilinx Ireland entered into a cost sharing agreement 
under which they each paid a part of their collective research and development 
expenses in proportion to the anticipated benefits from the newly developed 
technology. It was stated in the agreement that among others salaries, bonuses 
and other payroll costs and benefits for R&D personnel would be shared. The 
agreement however did not specifically address whether expenses related to 
employee stock options were also covered.
171 www.xilinx.com.
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Over the taxable years 1996 up to and including 1999 Xilinx offered its R&D 
employees two different stock option plans. The related costs were not included 
in the group’s cost sharing. Instead Xilinx claimed a tax deduction for busi-
ness expenses in its US tax return under Sections 83(h) and 162 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 172 The IRS challenged Xilinx position and issued notices of tax 
deficiency for all four years. In respect of the taxable year 1996 Xilinx and the 
IRS were later able to resolve the issues among themselves, but for the years 
1997 through 1999 their disagreement remained. The tax at stake increased by 
accuracy related penalties amounted to a very sizable US$ 97,243,618. This was 
reason enough for Xilinx to petition the case with the United States Tax Court.173
4.4.2.2. The United States Tax Court Decision
Before the Tax Court the IRS was not able to provide examples of a similar CSA 
between third parties under which stock-based compensation expenses were 
shared. Nor did the IRS dispute the fact that third parties would not “explicitly” 
share such costs. It did contest that third parties would “implicitly” share the 
costs, but in the Tax Court’s opinion the IRS failed to explain what it meant by 
this or present creditable evidence that this was actually the case. However that 
might be, the Tax Court found that there were no suitable comparables. In that 
context the IRS suggested that the ALS as set out in Section 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code did not necessarily require comparing the transaction at hand 
with transactions between third parties. It argued that an arm’s length result 
would automatically be reached by applying the 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations, 
which required that all costs related to the collective development of intangi-
bles were to be shared. The IRS believed that this was confirmed by the legisla-
tive and regulatory history of the 1986 amendments to Section 482, from which 
it deducted that Congress had intended to replace the use of comparable trans-
actions with internal measures of cost and profit. The Tax Court did not agree. It 
made a thorough analysis of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the 1988 White Paper as 
well as the 1992 and 1995 Regulations taking into consideration the legislative 
and regulatory history. It concluded that the rules were unambiguous, that the 
ALS applied to all transactions and that CSAs were not exempt. Furthermore, 
it did not find any reason to eliminate the use of comparable transactions in 
determining Xilinx’s taxable income.  As such the Tax Court held that the profit 
allocations proposed by the IRS were arbitrary and capricious, that the alloca-
172 These sections allow for an employer to deduct value of property transferred to an employee 
connected to employment performance (Section 83(h)) and ordinary and necessary business 
expenses for compensation for services (Section 162).
173 Xilinx v Commissioner, 30 August 2005, 125 TC 37.
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tions proposed by Xilinx satisfied the ALS and that Xilinx was not liable for defi-
ciencies or accuracy related penalties.
4.4.2.3. The First Ninth Circuit Decision
The Commissioner appealed the Tax Court’s decision with the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 174  The Court of Appeals made its own 
analysis of the applicable Treasury Regulations. It considered that the general 
Section 482 Regulations prescribed that in determining the true taxable income 
of controlled taxpayers the ALS was to be applied in every case. 175 At the same 
time it recognized that the 1995 Cost Sharing Regulations defined the costs to 
be shared under a bona fide CSA as all of the costs incurred by a participant 
related to the collective development of intangibles.176 Taking into account the 
Tax Court’s factual finding that unrelated parties would not share the costs for 
stock-based compensation, the Court of Appeals found these two regulations 
to establish “distinct and irreconcilable standards”. The conclusion of the Tax 
Court that the rules were unambiguous was not followed and attempts by both 
parties to harmonize the regulations were regarded unpersuasive. Left with the 
question which of the two regulations prevailed, the Court of Appeals applied 
“the elementary tenet of statutory construction that where there is no clear indi-
cation otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general 
one”. As the Cost Sharing Regulations in this case provided the more specific 
rule, the Court of Appeals held that the IRS did not take an unreasonable posi-
tion by requiring Xilinx to share its expenses for stock-based compensation of 
R&D employees. By doing so the Tax Court appeared to accept that the Cost 
Sharing Regulations effectively prevailed over the ALS. Along the way the Court 
of Appeals rejected Xilinx’s claim that it did not actually incur costs in relation 
to its R&D employees’ stock-based remuneration. Xilinx pointed out that there 
was no cash outflow and argued that the costs were in fact for the account of 
other shareholders, who were confronted with dilution of their equity stake in 
the company. The Court of Appeals felt that Xilinx’s argument was undermined 
by regulatory language and its own tax returns. It considered that Xilinx could 
not have claimed a deduction for business expense under Sections 83 and 162 
of the Internal Revenue Code, unless it had incurred an expense , which in the 
opinion of the court is the key term in the definition of costs under Paragraph 
1.482-7(d)(1) of the Cost Sharing Regulations.  Finally, the Court of Appeals 
174 Xilinx v. Commissioner, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 27 May 2009, Tax Ct. 
No. 702-03 and 4142-01. 
175 Treasury Regulations Paragraph 1.482-1(b)(1).
176 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(a) and 1.482-7(d)(1). 
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decided that the IRS’s position did not violate the United States – Ireland tax 
treaty. The Treaty allows for a reallocation of profits from controlled transac-
tions to the extent that “conditions are made or imposed between the two enter-
prises in their commercial or financial relations that differ from those that would 
be made between independent parties”.177 However, under Article 1, Paragraph 4, 
of the treaty a contracting state may tax its own residents as if the treaty had 
not come into effect. As in this case Xilinx was a US resident, the IRS could in the 
Court’s opinion refuse a tax deduction for certain costs under the Cost Sharing 
Regulations without violating the treaty. 
The appeal was heard by a three-Judge panel. Following the trail of thought 
set out above a two-Judge majority consisting of Judges Fisher and Reinhardt 
reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case. Judge Noonan 
in his dissent explained that in his view the majority overvalued the-specif-
ic-above-the-general canon of construction.  Furthermore, he felt that by 
by-passing the ALS, the court ignored the international context, the Treasury’s 
own practice and the purpose of the United States – Ireland tax treaty to avoid 
double taxation.
4.4.2.4. The Revised Ninth Circuit Decision
The first decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not satisfy the 
taxpayer and received quite some criticism in fiscal literature. As one scholar 
contested:
“The Ninth Circuit arrived at a legal and economic conclusion that contra-
dicts the ‘spirit’ of Section 482, disregards tax and international law princi-
ples, violates the principle of certainty of law, and punishes a company for 
acting as uncontrolled parties would.”178 
On 12 August 2009 Xilinx filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for rehearing 
or a rehearing en banc. Following this petition the Court on 13 January 2010 
withdrew its prior decision without further comment. Subsequently, on 22 
March 2010 the original three-Judge panel reissued its decision.179 It was again 
based on a two to one majority. Writing for the majority this time Judge Noonan 
made a similar analysis of Paragraph 1.482-1(b)(1) and Paragraph 1.482-7(d)(1) 
of the Cost Sharing Regulations as had been done in the withdrawn decision. 
177 1997 United States – Ireland Tax Treaty, Article 9.
178 Fontiveros, Journal of International Taxation 2010/1.
179 Xilinx v. Commissioner, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 13 January 2010, Tax 
Ct. No. 702-03 and 4142-01.
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This time the rules were found “ambiguous” rather than “irreconcilable”. Judge 
Noonan acknowledged that the Court of Appeals could resolve the ambiguity 
by applying a rule of thumb that the specific controls the general. However, he 
pointed out that this solution would be based on a single canon of construction 
designed to help Judges determine the Legislature’s intent. The Judge preferred 
to look at the dominant purpose of the regulations instead:
“Purpose is paramount. The purpose of the regulations is parity between 
taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions and taxpayers in controlled transac-
tions. The regulations are not to be construed to stultify that purpose. If the 
standard of arm’s length is trumped by [Paragraph] 7(d)(1) [of the Section 
482 Regulations], the purpose of the statue is frustrated. If Xilinx cannot 
deduct all its stock option costs, Xilinx does not have tax parity with an 
independent taxpayer.”
In other words the required parity between taxpayers in controlled transactions 
and taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions could only be achieved, if Xilinx US 
and Xilinx Ireland could choose to conclude a CSA without sharing its costs for 
stock-based remuneration of R&D employees in the same way as uncontrolled 
taxpayers. Furthermore, Judge Noonan took the United States – Ireland tax 
treaty and Treasury’s Technical Explanation thereof into consideration from a 
different perspective than was done in the earlier Court of Appeals decision. 
He considered that “the arm’s length standard used in the treaty aids in under-
standing the mind and practice of the Treasury”. While in this case the treaty 
might not constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts, it 
was in the Judge’s opinion clearly concluded under the bilateral assumption that 
the ALS was the “readily understandable international measure” used to allocate 
profit among controlled taxpayers. The Judge went on to write:
“There is good reason for the standard the Treasury chose: It is an inter-
nationally comprehensible standard. It does not require the treaty partner 
to recognize costs that may have no recognition in its law. If double taxa-
tion of the income of parent and subsidiary is to be avoided, a clear, simple, 
comprehensive standard is needed.”  
These quite fundamental statements have been broadly interpreted to rein-
force the ALS as the commonly accepted standard of international tax law to 
be applied consistently and unrestrictedly in all transfer pricing cases. They thus 
increased the importance of the decision to beyond that of one that merely 
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provides guidance on the treatment of stock-based compensation under 
CSAs.180 
Of the three-Judge panel Judge Fisher was the one to change his mind in 
between the first and the second decision by the Court of Appeals. Concurring 
with Judge Noonan in the new opinion he especially showed concern about the 
Commissioners attempt to reconcile the applicable regulations. The Commis-
sioner had argued that unrelated parties concluding a joint development agree-
ment would not expose themselves to an obligation that is dependent on the 
price of the stock of their unrelated counter parts, while related parties do not 
have the same problem. As such the Commissioner was of the opinion that there 
were no appropriate comparables available and that the arm’s length result had 
to be determined by another method than the CUT method. The Commissioner 
felt that in this case the all-costs-requirement included in Paragraph 1.482-7(d)
(1) provided the appropriate guidance. Judge Fisher regarded the Commis-
sioner’s reasoning “complex” and “theoretical”. At the same time various Amici 
Curiae briefs convinced him that Xilinx’s alternative interpretation of the regu-
lations was widely shared in the business community and tax profession. This, 
according to the Judge, showed that taxpayers had not been given clear and fair 
notice of how the regulations would affect them. At the same time he explicitly 
mentioned in a footnote that it is still an open question whether this situation 
changed after the 2003 amendments to the regulations. For now however Judge 
Fischer agreed with Judge Noonan that the case was to be decided in favor of 
Xilinx and the judgment of the tax court was to be affirmed.  
Judge Reinhardt dissented. He remained convinced that the all-costs-require-
ment as the more specific rule should prevail over the general rule that the 
ALS was to be applied in every case. He doubted whether not sharing the costs 
for stock-based employee remunerations would create more parity between 
controlled and uncontrolled taxpayers, he objected to the idea that the tech-
nical explanation to a tax treaty could trump duly enacted regulations and he 
questioned whether there was any legal authority for taking into consideration 
the understanding of the business community and tax profession in the way 
Judge Fischer did.
180 In my opinion that however does not mean that the ALS is more than a standard and should be 
recognized as a principle of international tax law (also see Paragraph 3.2.1).
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4.4.3. The 2003 Additions to the Cost Sharing Regulations and the Altera 
Case
The Xilinx case dealt with taxable years 1997, 1998 and 1999. As stated above, 
the IRS and Treasury revised the 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations on 26 
August 2003 to include specifically that expenses for the stock-based remunera-
tion of employees were to be shared among participants.181  In the preamble to 
the adjustment they argued that this would be consistent with what unrelated 
parties would agree:
“The regulations relating to QCSAs [qualifying cost sharing agreements] 
have as their focus reaching results consistent with what parties at arm’s 
length generally would do if they entered into cost sharing arrangements 
for the development of high-profit intangibles. These final regulations 
reflect that at arm’s length the parties to an arrangement that is based on 
the sharing of costs to develop intangibles in order to obtain the benefit 
of an independent right to exploit such intangibles would ensure through 
bargaining that the arrangement reflected all relevant costs, including 
all costs of compensating employees for providing services related to the 
arrangement. Parties dealing at arm’s length in such an arrangement 
based on the sharing of costs and benefits generally would not distinguish 
between stock-based compensation and other forms of compensation.”
The chosen wording of the new to be included paragraphs of the regulations 
was quite detailed. It provided a wide definition of what qualifies as stock-based 
compensation and when it was regarded to be related to intangible develop-
ment. In principle the measurement and timing of the stock-based compensa-
tion expenses had to be consistent with the amounts included as a tax deduct-
ible expense in the participants United States income tax return. However, 
for options on publicly traded stock taxpayers were also allowed to follow the 
expenses reflected as a charge against income in audited financial statements. If 
a foreign controlled entity wanted to share stock-based compensation expenses 
under a CSA with its United States affiliate, this was only allowed for as far the 
expenses would have been tax deductible to a United States taxpayer. Finally 
the new regulations provided guidance on how to deal with the re-pricing and 
other modifications of stock options as well as the expiration or termination of 
the CSA. These new regulations were later maintained in the 2005 Proposed 
Regulations, the 2008 Temporary Regulations and the 2011 Final Regulations. 
181 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(d)(2).
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After the second decision of the Court of Appeals the IRS could have taken 
several next steps. It could have asked for a rehearing en banc (i.e. for the full 
panel), it could have appealed to the Supreme Court or it could have asked 
Congress to change the law. It could also have issued an Action on Decision of 
non-acquiescence. It did none of this. Instead on 28 July 2010 the IRS issued an 
Action on Decision in which it acquiesced in the result, but not the reasoning, of 
the second Ninth Circuit Decision for taxable years beginning prior to 26 August 
2003.182 The Action on Decision specifically states that the IRS still believes the 
second Ninth Circuit decision is erroneous. Furthermore, it reaffirms the IRS’s 
opinion that the requirement of Paragraph 1.482-7(d)(1) to share all costs related 
to the development of intangibles, including expenses for stock-based compen-
sation, does not contradict with the ALS, even if third parties in practice do not 
share such costs. Nevertheless, the IRS acquiesced, because it believes that the 
relevance of the second Ninth Circuit decision is mooted by the later amend-
ments to the regulations. This positioning led to new disputes and resulted in 
the Altera case serving before the Tax Court in 2015.183  
Altera Corporation is a California based manufacturer of computer chips. Its 
US parent company, Altera US, entered into a cost sharing agreement with 
its Cayman Islands affiliate, Altera International. Altera US did not share its 
expenses for stock-based compensation for R&D employees over the years 
2004 through 2007. The IRS disagreed with this approach and adjusted the 
taxable income of Altera US over these years with more than US$ 80 million. 
Altera appealed with the Tax Court arguing that the 2003 additions to the Cost 
Sharing Regulations do not meet the standard of reasoned decision-making, 
because they fail to consider that uncontrolled taxpayers do not share these 
costs. The IRS countered that it  is not obliged to determine the taxable profit 
of controlled taxpayers by reference to third party transactions. In his decision 
on behalf of the Tax Court Judge Marvel first reviewed the rulemaking process. 
The IRS had contested that in matters concerning federal tax law the Tax Court 
should apply different standards when performing such a review. However, the 
Judge relied on the 2011 decision in Mayo184, in which the Supreme Court stated:
“…we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review 
good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have expressly recognized the 
182 IRS, Action on Decision (Xilinx), 16 August 2010, IRB No. 2010-03.
183 Altera Corporation v. Commissioner, 30 August 2015, 145 TC 3.
184 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research et al v. United States, 11 January 2011, 562 US 
44 (2011).
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importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of admin-
istrative action.”185
Interpreting this to allow for an extensive review, Judge Marvel found that Trea-
sury failed to rationally connect its choice to require the sharing of stock-based 
compensation expenses with the fact that third parties do not share these costs. 
He also considered that Treasury failed to respond to significant comments 
when it issued the new rule. Finally the Judge established that the Treasury’s 
conclusion that this rule is consistent with the ALS is contrary to all of the 
evidence before it. Therefore, the Judge concluded that the rule fails to satisfy 
the reasoned decision-making standard as established in earlier non-tax case 
law186, declared that the rule is invalid and ruled in favor of the taxpayer. Under-
standable this was a hard to swallow defeat for the IRS and it therefore appealed 
the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On 24 July 2018 the Court of Appeals’ three judge panel in a two to one vote 
issued an opinion reversing the Tax Court’s decision, only to spontaneously with-
draw that opinion again on 7 August 2018. 187 The withdrawal means that the 
opinion holds no authority and that the status on sharing stock-based compen-
sation costs under CSAs is as if the opinion never existed. It should be mentioned 
that one of the majority judges died before the later withdrawn opinion was 
published. Although Judge Reinhardt had formally consented with the opinion 
prior to his death, the withdrawal was explained to “allow time for the reconsti-
tuted panel to confer”.  At the time of writing this the timeline for such conferral 
is still completely unclear. Be that how it may, it can be mentioned that the 
withdrawn opinion was at publication considered a major win for the IRS. The 
Court of Appeals founded it on the assumption that with the 1986 introduction 
of the commensurate with income standard Congress intended to “displace 
a comparability analysis where comparable transactions cannot be found”. The 
Court of Appeals further argued that third parties may not require each other to 
recognize stock-based compensation cost, but would at least assure “through 
bargaining” that they would be reflected in an arrangement that is in their best 
interest. Interestingly enough, the dissenting Judge O’Malley not only disagreed 
with the majority on the appreciation of how Treasury had formalized the 2003 
adjustments to the Cost Sharing Regulations, but she also agreed with amicus 
curiae Cisco Systems Inc. that under the best reading of Paragraph 482 the 
185 For a further discussion of the Mayo case also see: Starkey and Cullinan, Journal of Tax Practice & 
Procedure 2012/4.
186 Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 24 June 1983, 436 US 29 (1983).
187 Altera Corporation v. Commissioner, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 24 July 
2018 and 7 August 2018, Tax Ct. No. 6253-12 and 9963-12.
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commensurate with income standard applies only to the transfer or licensing 
out of intangibles. The sharing of development costs under a qualifying CSA is 
neither such transaction and therefore, at least according to Cisco and Judge 
O’Malley, the commensurate with income standard would potentially not apply 
to CSAs at all. 
4.4.4. Stock-based Compensation Expenses in the Amazon Case
Stock-based compensation expenses were also subject of discussion in the 
Amazon case, which was already discussed in Paragraph 4.3.5. Amazon’s CSA 
provided for the sharing of these costs  in line with Paragraph 1.482-7(d)(2) of 
the Cost Sharing Regulations, but like many other US taxpayers Amazon had 
included a claw-back clause in the arrangement that reversed such a sharing of 
costs, if Paragraph 1.482-7(d)(2) of the Cost Sharing Regulations would be held 
to be an invalid regulation in a final decision by a court of law. The claw-back 
would be offset against the cost share of Amazon US in the year in which the trig-
gering event occurs and following years until the claw-back is fully exhausted. 
However, as the proceedings in Altera were not yet concluded when Amazon 
was ruled upon, the claw-back clause was not yet operative by its own terms 
and Amazon US was rejected a downwards adjustment of its taxable income for 
the time being.     
4.4.5. Author’s Analysis
The case law concerning the treatment of stock-based compensation expenses 
touches on a fundamental aspect of the US Cost Sharing Regulations, i.e. 
whether or not they can autonomously prescribe under what conditions a CSA 
complies with the ALS. Blair and Fischer worded this as follows:
“The IRS needs to decide what it is doing when it is prescriptive in its regula-
tions. Is it granting a safe harbor, for which it can set the rules? Or is it trying 
to tell taxpayers and the courts what is ‘arm’s length’?”188
The 2003 additions to the regulations are most certainly prescriptive in nature. 
However, they were subsequently overruled by the Tax Court in Altera, because 
they would conflict with the assumed fact that non-controlled parties in cost 
sharing arrangements do not share stock-based compensation expenses. In 
his decision Judge Marvel discussed in detail the comments submitted by 
taxpayers in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public 
188 Blair and Fisher, Bloomberg BNA 2016.
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hearing precedent to the 2003 additions to the regulations. Those explained 
how unrelated third parties would not share these type of costs because the 
value is speculative, potentially large and completely outside the control of 
parties. Some commentators had identified uncontrolled agreements in which 
stock-based compensation expenses were not shared. Judge Marvel then went 
on to establish that the Treasury and IRS had not presented any real evidence of 
the contrary. They had for example not attempted to provide any examples of 
non-controlled transactions that did include a sharing of such costs.
In my opinion the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was right to hold in its 
revised Xilinx decision that the ALS prevails over Treasury and IRS regulations. 
I would also regard it consistent with this decision for the Tax Court in Altera to 
reject such regulations, to the extent that they impose conditions that uncon-
trolled parties would not have agreed upon in similar transactions under similar 
circumstances. In applying this test it should be recognized that uncontrolled 
parties generally do not enter into the type of CSAs that are found between 
related parties (also see Paragraph 2.2.1). The Treasury and IRS tried to leverage 
this point in the preamble to the 2003 adjustment of the Cost Sharing Regula-
tions (see the quote in Paragraph 4.4.3). However, that did not convince Judge 
Marvel, who was especially dissatisfied with the lack of factual substantiation of 
this position: 
“We conclude that (1) by failing to engage in any fact finding, Treasury failed 
to ‘examine the relevant data’,… and (2) Treasury failed to support its belief 
that unrelated parties would share stock-based compensation costs in the 
context of a QCSA [qualifying cost sharing agreement] with any evidence in 
the record. Accordingly, the final rule lacks a basis in fact.”
As such, the whole matter can be reduced to the following question: Would 
uncontrolled third parties share stock-based compensation expenses, if they 
did not have conflicting competitive interests and entered into an agreement 
similar to a CSA? In my opinion it is very well defendable that the Tax Court 
found that they would not, given that there was empirical data presented to 
the Court evidencing that third parties did not require any compensation for 
share based costs in uncontrolled joint development agreements and there is 
no evident reason why the difference between such uncontrolled agreements 
and the CSAs commonly found between related parties would justify a different 
approach. This is of course very factual and one would expect that does not 
improve the IRS’s chances of a successful appeal. Nevertheless, the later with-
drawn opinion issued by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on 24 July 
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2018 was very much in the IRS’s favor. It was based on a controversial inter-
pretation of the commensurate with income standard, under which Treasury 
would under circumstances be allowed to determine transfer prices without 
using comparables. Needless to say, the further Altera proceedings will be quite 
critical, not only for the future tax treatment of CSAs, but also for the evolution 
of the ALS and transfer pricing in general.  
In light of this finding it is worth noticing that the whole discussion about stock-
based compensation expenses would become far less relevant, if the US would 
adopt rules that require current contributions to be valued at market price 
instead of at cost. In that case it would no longer be critical to accurately identify 
the cost basis, while the profit element included in the value of the contributions 
could be regarded to offer a certain compensation also for stock-based employ-
ment costs.189 That would then also do right to the observation by the Court of 
Appeals in its later withdrawn opinion that third parties would compensate for 
stock-based employment costs “through bargaining”. In my opinion this further 
adds to the argument made in Paragraph 4.3.6 in favor of such an approach.          
4.5. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 4 are as follows,
In respect of US debate about buy-in payments:
(i) The US undeniably has a very sophisticated set of rules governing cost 
sharing arrangements. Despite concerns about cost sharing being applied 
as a tax planning tool Congress approved the use of “bona fide CSAs” in 
1986. This has been respected ever since, even if the foreign counterpart 
under a CSA was a cash box entity located in a low tax jurisdiction. 
(ii) Over the years the use of CSAs was ring-fenced however, specifically by the 
commensurate-with-income standard and the investor model. These quite 
fundamental concepts intend to ensure that US cost sharing participants 
are appropriately rewarded for the contributions they make and the risks 
they assume under the CSA. In this respect the Treasury and IRS focused 
primarily on buy-in payments in return for making available pre-existing 
intangibles. 
(iii) The attempt by the IRS to limit the erosion of the US tax base by requiring 
higher buy-in payments for pre-existing intangibles fails to recognize the 
189 Also see: Joseph, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2010/4. 
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true bottleneck of CSA related transfer pricing issues, which is that the US 
cost sharing rules accept a valuation of current contributions at cost and 
therefore allow for an under appreciation of valuable functions performed 
in the course of the arrangement. 
(iv) The IRS advocates a valuation of pre-existing intangibles on an aggregated 
basis using the so called income method. Such valuation would rely on diffi-
cult to verify assumptions about future financial results and useful life of 
the intangibles at hand. It also would take into account “soft” intangibles, 
like workforce in place, goodwill and going concern value as compensable 
assets. All this has been quite explicitly rejected by the Tax Court for years 
governed by the 1995 Final Cost Sharing Regulations In Veritas and Amazon. 
That has significantly limited the effectiveness of the IRS’s approach, specif-
ically in respect of taxpayers with centralized R&D activities that applied a 
CSA to develop high value innovative intangibles, i.e. those taxpayers that 
are allocated to the north-eastern quartile “B” of the categorization model 
presented in Paragraph 2.3.3.2 and that actually are most likely to cause tax 
and transfer pricing concerns.
In respect of the allocation of stock-based compensation expenses under CSAs:
(i) The revised decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the 
Xilinx case and the decision of the Tax Court in the Altera case have shown 
that the Treasury and IRS are bound by the fundamental standard of the 
ALS when governing CSAs in regulations. Nonetheless, is should remain 
possible that the commonly held understanding of the meaning and 
purpose of the standard is further explicated in the Cost Sharing Regula-
tions. It should then also be taken into account that the position of related 
parties entering into a CSA can differ materially from that of unrelated 
parties concluding a non-controlled joint development agreement under 
different terms and conditions.
(ii) The disputes about the treatment of stock-based compensation expenses 
are the result of the US practice to value current contributions under a CSA 
at cost and the focus on cost basis in which that results. It would in principle 
not be necessary to determine whether uncontrolled participants would 
share those expenses, if current contributions are valued at market price.
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5.1. Introduction
As concluded in the Chapter 3 it can be difficult to apply traditional transfer 
pricing methods to CCAs. This effect is caused by two specific characteristics of 
those arrangements. First of all, CCAs generally concern a package deal covering 
a broad scope of activities performed by multiple participants. This implies a 
variety of contributions that have to be identified and valued. Obviously this 
is more complex than a straight forward bilateral transaction covering a single 
transfer of a property or service. The second fundamentally complicating char-
acteristic is that the allocation of costs and risks under CCAs is based on the 
anticipated benefits of the individual participants. As most of these benefits 
will materialize in future years, this requires reliance on financial projections. By 
definition, that involves a degree of uncertainty and has a subjective element to 
it. This can be a source of dispute between taxpayers and tax administrations. 
Taking note of the foregoing this Chapter 5 looks at the OECD guidance on 
how to apply the ALS in respect of CCAs. While doing so, it also aims to give the 
reader a better insight into what a CCA is and how it works. For this purpose the 
analysis  is structured around five main focus areas, which in my opinion should 
be covered by any transfer pricing analysis of a CCA.  These are the following:
(i) the scoping of activities;
(ii) the selection of participants;
(iii) the assignment of benefits; 
(iv) the valuation of contributions;
(v) the calculation of balancing payments.190
190 Similar, but slightly different categorizations can be found in fiscal literature. Van Egdom for 
example identifies (i) the scope of the CCA, (ii) its participants, (iii) the extent in which the value 
of functions performed is decisive for the share in benefits and (iv) the way in which entry of new 
participants and exit of existing participants is arranged (Van Egdom 2011, page 168). 
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The writings below categorize and examine the OECD guidance on CCAs per 
focus area, while occasionally comparing the guidance to that provided by 
the United States Treasury and IRS in the Cost Sharing Regulations. Obviously 
Chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is designated to CCAs and it 
is therefore at the core of this examination. At the same time however, it should 
be noted that this Chapter VIII is intended to provide supplementary guidance 
only and that all relevant other chapters of the Guidelines also continue to 
apply. Most relevantly this concerns the provisions of Chapter VI on transactions 
involving intangibles and Chapter VII on intra-group services.  
5.2. Activities
5.2.1. Development Activities and Services
A CCA can cover many types of activities. That includes marketing and R&D 
activities that may result in innovative intangible assets and can potentially be 
regarded key value drivers of the group’s business. At the same time however 
the scope of a CCA can also be limited to auxiliary activities like administrative, 
technical, financial, commercial, legal and accounting services. The broadness 
of the scope was already recognized by the OECD in the 1979 Report on Transfer 
Pricing and Multinational Enterprises.191 Ever since, it has consistently consid-
ered activities aimed at the development of intangibles as well as intercompany 
services as part of the potential coverage. This was further emphasized in the 
revision of Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines under the BEPS project 
by introducing an explicit distinction between “development CCAs”, aimed at 
the development, production or obtaining of intangible or tangible assets, and 
“services CCAs”, aimed at obtaining services.192 
For completeness sake it can be pointed out that a development CCA requires 
the actual performance of new development activities. If the purpose of a trans-
action is only to allow affiliated companies access to another group company’s 
existing intangibles, such transaction is more likely to constitute a transfer 
or license arrangement rather than a CCA. It would further appear that those 
new development activities have to be material. For incidental maintenance 
of existing intangibles or only marginal improvements to existing intangibles 
a CCA would not appear to be the most logical solution.  Furthermore, devel-
opment CCAs are generally considered more troublesome, because it can be 
complicated to value contributions and determine the anticipated benefits 
191 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprise”’, 1979, Paragraph 102.
192 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.10.
147
under these arrangements. Applying the ALS to development CCAs normally 
requires close observance of the specific guidance on transactions involving 
intangibles provided in Chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In respect 
of services CCAs on the other hand the specific guidance on low value adding 
intra-group services provided in Chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines is 
more relevant. 
When the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum set out to publish an instruction on 
CCAs in 2012, it also considered the split between development and services 
CCAs. 193 As it did not want to interfere with the OECD’s ongoing work on intan-
gibles, it consequentially limited the Report to the latter type of CCAs. That 
Report is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
5.2.2. Benefit Test
Tax authorities will generally not allow a deduction of costs for intra-group 
services, if the benefit from the activities to which the costs are related will 
not end up in the taxable base of companies located in their jurisdiction. This is 
commonly referred to as the benefit test. In its 1979 Report the OECD worded 
it as follows:
“Any payment for services rendered between associated enterprises would 
be required or allowed for tax purposes only if a real benefit has accrued to 
the enterprise that has been charged for such services.”194
This wording requires MNE’s to evidence that a service has indeed been provided, 
that costs are incurred in relation to it and that a real benefit is conferred on to 
another group company.  Such benefit has to be reasonably expected, but does 
not necessarily have to be realized in practice. For the benefit to be sufficiently 
real, it should not be only indirect or remote. Neither should the services merely 
duplicate a service already being performed by the recipient itself or on behalf 
of the recipient by a third party. Furthermore, the 1979 Report recognized that 
it might be relevant whether the recipient would have bought the service had it 
been on offer from an independent third party. The benefit test was continued 
in the 1984 Transfer Pricing Report and then reworded in chapter VII of the 1995 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines as follows:
193 European Commission, Communication on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the 
period July 2010 to June 2012 and related proposals 1. Report on Small and Medium Enterprises 
and Transfer Pricing and 2. Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services not creating 
Intangible Property (IP), 19 September 2012, COM(2012)516.
194 OECD, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises”, 1979, Paragraph 151.
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“ Under the arm’s length principle, the question whether an intra-group 
service has been rendered when an activity is performed for one or more 
group members by another group member should depend on whether the 
activity provides a respective group member with economic or commercial 
value to enhance its commercial position.” 195
This wording was maintained when the provisions of Chapter VII were replaced 
in their entirety under the BEPS project.196 The guidance proceeds to indicate 
that whether economic or commercial value is provided depends on whether 
an independent enterprise under similar circumstances would be willing to pay 
for the activity if performed for it by an independent enterprise or would have 
performed the activity in-house for itself. As such, the criterion whether or not 
the receiving entity would search for an alternative had the intra-group service 
not been provided is a key aspect to take into consideration.
That the benefit test correspondingly applies to CCAs does not only follow 
from the reference to the guidance on intragroup services in Paragraph 8.9 
of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, it is also a direct consequence of 
the general principle that a CCA is aimed at sharing costs and risks in accor-
dance with the reasonably expected benefits of participants. By definition this 
requires all participants to expect a benefit from the cost shared activities. That 
this is the case should be appropriately documented by the taxpayer. A high 
level contract outlining only the most important terms and conditions under 
which the services are provided is generally not sufficient. Instead a reasonably 
detailed description of all departments involved and their activities will have 
to be available.197 This of course entails a significant administrative burden on 
the taxpayer. That same obligation will apply in respect of all intercompany 
services, irrespective of whether they are performed under a traditional service 
level agreement or under a CCA. However, it can be less cumbersome to fulfill, if 
the intragroup transactions are centrally managed and administrated. This can 
make it easier to keep a central set of documentation evidencing the nature of 
services performed and, as such, that can be considered an important benefit 
of a CCA. At the same time, application of the benefit test can be complicated 
by the often indirect method of allocating costs and risks under a CCA. The indi-
rect method does not provide for a one-on-one connection between the charge 
and the underlying services. Instead the services benefit multiple group compa-
195 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 7.6.
196 OECD/G20, “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation”, 5 October 2015. 
197 The burden of proof and the nature and extent of documentation requirements are further 
discussed in Chapter 7.
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nies that are charged a proportionate share of costs on the basis of what is 
considered to be an appropriate allocation key.198 This can make it significantly 
more difficult to prove the benefit conveyed to the service recipient. The OECD 
acknowledges that this implies a risk of double taxation and apparently accepts 
this risk.199 However, it is of course highly unlikely that an MNE would unneces-
sarily incur external costs. Instead it will expect a real benefit somewhere within 
the group or avoid the costs. Hence, it should in theory always be possible to 
identify this benefit and the group company that enjoys it. In my opinion the tax 
administrations should therefore show restraint, when they consider disallowing 
indirectly allocated charges because of insufficient benefit. If the taxpayer can 
evidence that it has actually incurred external costs, a tax deduction should only 
be denied in clearly abusive situations.200 
For completeness sake it can be added that the foregoing does not mean that 
tax deductibility should be a given in all situations where it is concluded that a 
benefit is enjoyed. Domestic law in the country of the recipient might still deny 
a deduction for different reasons than a lack of benefit. An example could be 
the costs for a stock option plan of R&D employees. If this personnel works on 
development projects under a CCA concluded between multiple group compa-
nies, including the group’s Netherlands subsidiary,  it might be considered arm’s 
length to share stock based compensation expenses (also see Paragraph 4.4). 
However, Netherlands tax law includes a general non-deductibility clause in 
respect of these costs. The Netherlands participant in such a CCA would there-
fore be denied a tax deduction for its share in the costs for the stock-based 
compensation plan regardless of the benefit conveyed onto it by the underlying 
R&D activities.
5.2.3. Excluded Activities
5.2.3.1. Shareholder Activities
While the benefit test has to be passed in respect of every internal cost realloca-
tion, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines identify certain activities that per se 
do not qualify as an intragroup service and therefore should not be recharged, 
or cost shared for that matter. The first category of activities to which this 
applies are the so called shareholder activities. This is based on the assumption 
198 The allocation of costs via balancing payments under CCAs is discussed in more detail in paragraph 
5.6.
199 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 7.26.
200 For an early critical review of the benefit test see Helderman, Bulletin for International Fiscal Docu-
mentation 1995/10. 
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that there is no benefit recognized for subsidiaries from the activities performed 
by the parent company in its capacity of shareholder. A study book example 
of this type of costs is the costs incurred by the legal department for drafting 
the articles of incorporation for the parent company. Such costs should not be 
recharged to or cost shared with subsidiaries. At the same time there can very 
well also be support activities performed by the legal department that undoubt-
edly do benefit other group companies and for which those group companies 
would have been prepared to pay a fee to a third party service provider. This 
could for example concern the drafting of standard sales contracts or the design 
of general sales conditions. The costs for these activities should indeed be 
recharged to or cost shared with the benefitting group companies. The Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines define shareholders activities as activities performed “solely 
because of its ownership interest in one or more other group members, i.e. in its 
capacity as shareholder”.201 The term “shareholders activities” is distinguished 
from the broader term “stewardship activities”. The latter was already used in 
the 1979 OECD Transfer Pricing Report, but received much less attention there. 
It covers both non-rechargeable costs of activities for the management and 
protection of the parent’s investments and rechargeable costs of activities to 
improve the operation of subsidiaries. 
The current guidelines list as prima facie shareholders costs:
(i) costs relating to the juridical structure of the parent company itself, such as 
costs for meetings of shareholders of the parent, costs for the issuance of 
shares in the parent, costs for listing on the stock exchange and costs of the 
supervisory board;
(ii) costs relating to the reporting requirements of the parent company, 
including costs for the consolidation of financial reports, costs for the 
audit of the parent company’s accounts as well as the audit of subsidiary’s 
accounts to the extent carried out in the interest of the parent company 
and costs for the preparation of consolidated financial statements of the 
group;
(iii) costs of raising of funds for the acquisition of participations and costs for 
the parent company’s investor relations such as communication strategy 
with shareholder of the parent company, financial analysts, funds and 
other stakeholders in the parent company;
201 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 7.9.
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(iv) costs which are ancillary to the corporate governance of the group as a 
whole.202
The 1984 OECD Supplements also included managerial and control activities 
related to the management and protection of the investment in participations. 
However, these activities now no longer qualify as prima facie shareholder 
costs. Instead the related costs should be recharged to a subsidiary (potentially 
under a CCA), unless it can be assumed that an independent entity in the place 
of the subsidiary would not be willing to pay for the activities nor would have 
performed them for itself. Another category of costs concerns those incurred 
when performing so called mixed activities, combining elements of both share-
holders activities and intra-group services. An example would be the work 
performed by the accounting department. Their efforts result in annual accounts 
of the parent, but also enable better operational management decisions at the 
level of individual group companies.
Shareholders activities are by definition not suitable for cost sharing. Instead it 
should become clear from the CCA documentation that they are out of scope. 
For that purpose they are to be left out from the summary of activities covered 
by the arrangement. For the avoidance of doubt they can also be explicitly 
excluded.  Subsequently this has to be lived up to when operating the CCA. If 
the arrangement has a broad scope and also covers general support and admin-
istrative activities, the taxpayer has to be able to show how it has ring-fenced 
shareholders costs and excluded them from the identification of contributions 
as well as the subsequent calculation of balancing payments. That will generally 
require a transfer pricing report with an analysis of the nature of the different 
activities performed at headquarters level. To the extent that costs facilitate 
both shareholder activities and other activities they would either have to be 
allocated directly or on the basis of an appropriate allocation key. The part that 
is not related to shareholder activities, should then be recharged to the bene-
fiting group companies. This could be structured as multiple direct charges to 
those group companies or by means of a CCA.  
5.2.3.2. Duplication
A second category of activities that the OECD also does not regard to consti-
tute intra-group services consists of those that merely duplicate a service that 
is already provided by other group companies themselves or on their behalf.203 
They simply do not provide those other group companies with a real benefit and 
202 Idem, Paragraph 7.10.
203 Idem, Paragraph 7.11.
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therefore should not be recharged  to them or cost shared with them. Exceptions 
can apply when the duplication is temporary (e.g. in case of a business reorga-
nization) or when the purpose of the activity performed is to reduce the risk 
of wrong management decisions (e.g. a second opinion on a legal issue). When 
the  Transfer Pricing Guidelines were revised under the BEPS project the OECD 
added wording that requires tax administrations to explain why the company 
would duplicate costs contrary to efficient practices. This also acknowledges 
that activities performed at different levels within the group can be different, 
additional or complementary and therefore can still provide a benefit in addi-
tion to activities in the same field performed in-house. Obviously, this is closely 
related to the point made in Paragraph 5.2.2 that a taxpayer cannot be assumed 
to accept costs unnecessarily.
5.2.3.3. Incidental Benefits
The third and final category of activities that the OECD does not recognize as an 
intra-group service is those activities that provide an incidental benefit to certain 
group members.204 An example is the costs involved in analyzing the potential 
acquisition of a new company. The acquisition might lead to synergy benefits 
for the existing group companies. However, that does not cause the perfor-
mance of the analysis to qualify as an intra-group service.  This is a fair outcome. 
However, I tend to question whether the incidental nature of the benefit is the 
decisive element. Instead it appears to be the indirectness of the benefit that is 
the distinctive characteristic causing the absence of an intra-group service and, 
by consequence, excluding the underlying activities from being recharged or 
cost shared. Similarly, benefits arising from only being part of a larger group 
are often indirect and in that case also do not by themselves cause an intra-
group service to be performed.205  A good example is the higher credit rating 
given to group members by financial institutions, because an implicit guarantee 
from the parent company is assumed. Such implicit guarantee is not regarded 
an intra-group service. As such it is not something for which compensation is 
payable and it should not be cost shared. Explicit guarantees are different. They 
are regarded a financial service, that should be appropriately compensated for. 
However, an explicit guarantee is a quite specific type of service. The benefit to 
group companies will depend on credit ratings of the guarantor and the bene-
ficiary. Calculating it is a specialized financial exercise. It is quite unsuitable 
for cost sharing. Instead guarantees are more commonly structured as tradi-
tional service agreements. Another example of a function where the difference 
204 Idem, Paragraph 7.12.
205 Idem, Paragraph 7.13.
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between passive and active association can be relevant is sourcing. It is reason-
able to expect that a group as a whole will have better buying power than its 
individual members. By itself that is not a service provided among the group 
members. Nevertheless, if a more or less centralized sourcing department 
actively takes over the control of the group’s purchasing activities and decides 
what contracts are concluded with which suppliers, the picture changes and 
an intra-group service becomes more than likely. In that case it may well be 
possible to alternatively structure the sourcing activities under a CCA.
5.2.4. Centralized Services
In addition to explicitly pointing out which activities do not convey a benefit 
onto other group companies and are therefore excluded from being recharged 
or cost shared, the current OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines also include exam-
ples of activities that in fact do constitute an intra-group service. These were 
added as part of the revisions under the BEPS project. It concerns: 
“… administrative services such as planning, coordination, budgetary 
control, financial advice, accounting, auditing, legal, factoring, computer 
services; financial services such as supervision of cash flows and solvency, 
capital increases, loan contracts, management of interest and exchange 
rate risks, and refinancing; assistance in the fields of production, buying, 
distribution and marketing; and services in staff matters such as recruit-
ment and training …”206
The Guidelines go on to explain that group service centers also often carry out 
order management, customer service and call centers, research and develop-
ment or the administration and protection of intangible property for all or part 
of the group. By consequence, all these activities should be regarded suitable 
for cost sharing under services CCAs.                
5.3. Participants
5.3.1. Mutual Benefit
In parallel to selecting the appropriate activities it is to be determined which 
group companies should participate in the CCA. The first requirement of the 
206 Idem, Paragraph 7.14.
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OECD is that each participant should at least expect a real benefit from the CCA 
activities:
“Because the concept of mutual benefit is fundamental to a CCA, it follows 
that a party may not be considered a participant if the party does not have 
a reasonable expectation that it will benefit from the CCA activity itself (and 
not just from performing part or all of that activity).”207 
This requirement is closely related to the benefit test described in Paragraph 
5.2.2, but it goes a step further. It requires all participants to obtain a benefit 
from exploiting cost shared results, which means that such benefit cannot be 
limited to receiving a balancing payment under the CCA. If a group company 
performs development activities without itself exploiting the resulting intan-
gibles, it would not be exposed to any real risk of the activities being unsuc-
cessful. As such, commercial and financial relations between the group compa-
nies would not be in line with the CCA definition requiring a sharing of costs and 
risks. Instead an accurate delineation of the intercompany transactions would 
identify the group company performing the activities as a service provider 
and the other group companies involved as the service recipients. The mutual 
benefit requirement also implies that if a group has centralized its primary busi-
ness activities in relation to which the exploitation of cost shared results takes 
place (for example manufacturing or sales) in a limited number of group compa-
nies, then it could be expected that those  group companies are identified as 
cost sharing participants and, by consequence, become the owners of the cost 
shared results. After all, it would be those group companies that are the key 
users of those results.   
The mutual benefit requirement further entails that the results from the cost 
shared activities should consist of assets or services that add value to the busi-
ness operations of all participants. Those participants should have been prepared 
to solicit a third party to perform the cost shared activities or perform these 
themselves, had they not been performed under the CCA. It further implies that 
participants should obtain an interest in the assets or services resulting from 
the cost shared activities. They should be able to exploit such results without 
any charges in addition to balancing payments under the CCA. This also applies 
in respect of newly developed intangibles, which participants should be able to 
use and exploit free of additional royalty charges. The requirement of a mutual 
benefit was also adopted by the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in its report on 
207 Idem, Paragraph 8.14.
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CCA’s on services not creating intangible property, while the US Cost Sharing 
Regulations explicitly state that each participant should “receive a non-overlap-
ping interest in the cost shared intangibles without further obligation to compen-
sate another controlled participant for such interest”.208 
For completeness sake it should be noted that all these institutions, the OECD, 
the EU JTPF and the US Treasury, only require participants to expect a benefit. 
They do not impose a condition that the cost shared activities in reality have to 
be successful. To the contrary, the participants should share the risk of under-
performance. Therefore, if the actual results are less than reasonably expected, 
for example because the market demand in a certain group company’s region 
disappoints, that does not mean that such group company was unrightfully 
qualified as a participant. However, if the situation does not improve over a 
longer period of time, it may of course be questioned whether there is still a 
reasonable expectation of a benefit and whether a third party would not have 
discontinued its participation in the CCA.      
5.3.2. Substance
5.3.2.1. Low Substance Participants
As discussed in paragraph 2.4 allowing low substance group companies to 
participate in a CCA without further restrictions potentially opens up the door 
to undesired tax planning opportunities. It enables MNEs with facilities in high 
taxed countries to incorporate a so called cash box subsidiary in a tax haven 
jurisdiction, which can then participate in a CCA covering the group’s future 
R&D and marketing projects. That way the tax haven subsidiary quite easily 
obtains an interest in new intangibles and becomes entitled to the income from 
their exploitation. As such, the subsidiary’s participation in the CCA can result 
in a significant shift of profit from the high tax countries to the tax haven juris-
diction. MNEs using these structures may argue that this is justified by the risk 
that the cost shared activities are unsuccessful.  The potential upside for the 
cash box subsidiary would be regarded a compensation for its assumption of 
such risk.  Even if it could be assessed that the risk is sufficiently real and at par 
with the potential benefits of the cash box subsidiary, it still has to be acknowl-
edged that considering low substance entities are able to assume such risk and 
allowing them to participate in a CCA enables profit shifting by only moving 
around highly mobile items like cash and risk. By consequence, it would effec-
tively offer MNEs an “opting out” opportunity from the domestic tax system. 
208 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(b)(1)(iii).
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This can distort the competitive position of smaller business or less aggressive 
MNEs and undermine the solidarity and the payment moral of other taxpayers. 
The problem becomes especially apparent in case of organizations that have 
centralized the development activities of innovative intangibles. They would be 
concluding CCAs belonging in the northern-eastern quartile “B” of the categori-
zation chart presented in paragraph 2.3.3.2. A participant in such a CCA could be 
performing all of the development activities, while it would be entitled to only 
a limited share of the future profits from the resulting high value intangibles.     
It is questionable if and how international tax law can resolve the issue. Obvi-
ously, it would be shear protectionism and probably not even practically 
possible to simply prohibit and thereby completely block the establishment of 
new business activities abroad to those situations that profits are subject to a 
minimal level of taxation. It could also be a material overkill expected from such 
undesirable measure, because it would also impact taxpayers that have valid 
business reasons to set-up real activities abroad.  It is evident that this would 
hurt economic growth and global prosperity. Furthermore, within a European 
context it would be in clear breach of the fundamental freedoms as laid down in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. That is not to say that states 
might not try to discourage MNEs from transferring business to low tax jurisdic-
tion for fiscal reasons only by topping up the tax charge to a certain minimal rate, 
for example by means of so called CFC legislation.  Under such rules income of 
controlled foreign corporations (‘CFCs’) is conditionally included in the taxable 
base of the parent company. If a tax credit is granted for the minimal corporate 
income tax levied abroad, this effectively results in an additional top-up of the 
tax burden to the level of the statutory tax rate of the country of residence of 
the parent company. However, in practice many exceptions to CFC rules have 
been allowed. As becomes clear from the US case studies included in the 2010 
Report of the US Joint Committee on Taxation, creative MNEs will exploit these 
exceptions and plan around the CFC legislation.209 Nevertheless, there may be 
opportunities to improve CFC legislation or supplement it by modern day alter-
natives and make it more suitable for addressing base erosion and profit shifting 
through CCA structures. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
Meanwhile legislators and policymakers have also identified potential transfer 
pricing solutions to the problem of tax avoidance through CCA structures. The 
OECD’s 2015 adjustments to Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
as part of the BEPS project pursue two such transfer pricing measures. The 
first measure aims at reversing the profit shift by focusing on the valuation of 
209 See Paragraph 2.4.
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contributions under the CCA. It tries to increase the compensation payable to 
the participants that make certain resources available. If contributions consist 
of performing development activities, their value will generally be higher as 
the intangibles that are developed are more innovative. By consequence, the 
measure becomes more effective as the CCA moves to the right on the hori-
zontal axis into the eastern quartiles “B” and “D” of the categorization chart 
presented in Paragraph 2.3.3.2. Such approach is further discussed in Paragraph 
5.5.3. 
The second measure does not aim to reverse the profit shift, but instead to 
avoid it. This measure assumes that the nature of the arm’s length standard 
sets a minimum requirement for the functions performed and risks assumed by 
group companies in respect of the cost shared activities in order for those group 
companies to be allowed access to a CCA. The measure entails a first high-level 
functional analysis to establish which group companies perform critical manage-
ment and control functions and actually control the risk associated with the cost 
shared activities.  It therefore sets a minimum substance threshold. Less group 
companies will meet this threshold, as more relevant functions are central-
ized. In any case centralization would not be allowed to the extent that local 
participants lack all management and control functions. As such, this measure 
targets CCAs that are high up on the vertical axis in the northern quartiles “A” 
and “B” of the categorization chart. This measure, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the following paragraphs, is hereafter referred to as the control-
over-risk requirement. It effectively denies cash box companies access to CCAs. 
The concept of control-over-risk was introduced by the OECD in 2009. As we 
will see, similar tests aimed at verifying the economic reality of commercial 
and financial relations between CCA participants have also found their way into 
regulations governing CCAs in countries like Australia and The Netherlands.210  
5.3.2.2. The OECD’s Control-over-risk Requirement
It has taken quite some time for the OECD to clearly express itself about the 
amount of functional involvement required from participants to a CCA. There 
was no explicit guidance included on this in the 1979 Transfer Pricing Report, the 
1984 Supplements or the original Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The requirement for parties to intercompany transactions to exercise control 
over the associated risks was first more generally explicated with the intro-
duction of Chapter IX on business restructurings. This addition to the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines was adopted by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 22 June 
210 For a pre-BEPS comparative law analysis also see Okten, International Transfer Pricing Journal 
2013/1.
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2009 and approved by the Council on 22 July 2009. It defines the concept of 
control as follows: 
“…’control’ should be understood as the capacity to make decisions to take 
on the risk (decision to put the capital at risk) and decisions on whether and 
how to manage the risk, internally or using an external provider. This would 
require the company to have people – employees or directors – who have 
the authority to, and effectively do, perform these control functions…”211  
Day-to-day monitoring and administration functions can be outsourced, but the 
risk controlling entity should at least be able to assess the outcome of activities 
performed. The OECD further illustrates this by examples concerning principals 
that hire a fund manager, a contract researcher or a contract manufacturer. 
In all these cases the principal is regarded to have control over the main risks, 
because he decides on entering into or terminating the agreement, the scoping 
and objectives of the outsourced activities and the available budget.212 
For the assessment of whether sufficient control is exercised all risks that poten-
tially affect the transactions under the arrangement are relevant. This includes 
funding risk, which is recognized as being “integrally related” to risk-taking.213 
After all the funding entity is exposed to the risk that it loses its funds. Further-
more, the OECD describes the risks related to transactions involving intangibles 
in detail in Paragraph 6.65 of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines:
“Particular types of risk that may have importance in a functional anal-
ysis relating to transactions involving intangibles include (i) risks related 
to development of intangibles, including the risk that costly research and 
development or marketing activities will prove to be unsuccessful, and 
taking into account the timing of the investment (for example, whether the 
investment is made at an early stage, mid-way through the development 
process, or at a late stage will impact the level of the underlying invest-
ment risk); (ii) the risk of product obsolescence, including the possibility that 
technological advances of competitors will adversely affect the value of the 
intangibles; (iii) infringement risks, including the risk that defence of intan-
gible rights or defence against other persons’ claims of infringement may 
prove to be time consuming, costly and/or unavailing; (iv) product liability 
and similar risks related to products and services based on the intangibles; 
211 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 9.23.
212 Idem, Paragraph 9.24 - 9.26.  
213 Idem, Paragraph 6.60.
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and (v) exploitation risks, uncertainties in relation to the returns to be gener-
ated by the intangible.”   
These risks similarly apply to CCAs aimed at the development of intangibles. 
Noting this, it should be remembered that a CCA has been defined as a frame-
work agreement aimed at cumulatively sharing costs and risks. It is clear that 
cash box entities can share costs, but it is up for debate to what extent they 
can also share any risk, let alone those risks described in the quote above. In 
this context the OECD assumes the position that under arm’s length conditions, 
parties should be allocated a greater share of risks, if they have more control 
over such risks.214 This should be taken into consideration when trying to answer 
the question what level of active involvement is required from participants in a 
CCA. A cash box entity will by definition not have directors or employees that 
are sufficiently skilled to make any of the decisions necessary to have control 
over the main risks associated with the cost shared activities. The entity there-
fore realistically speaking does not assume these risks. By consequence it 
simply cannot participate in a CCA. The OECD finally included specific guidance 
confirming this, when it revised the Transfer Pricing Guidelines under the BEPS-
project:
“A party would also not be a participant in a CCA if it does not exercise 
control over the specific risks it assumes under the CCA and does not have 
the financial capacity to assume these risks, as this party would not be enti-
tled to a share in the output that is the objective of the CCA based on the 
functions it actually performs … In particular this implies that a CCA partic-
ipant must have (i) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or 
decline the risk-bearing opportunity presented by participating in the CCA, 
and must actually perform that decision-making function and (ii) the capa-
bility to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associ-
ated with the opportunity, and must actually perform that decision-making 
function.”215
At this stage it is important to acknowledge that the OECD does not rule out that 
an entity assuming only a funding risk, could still participate in a CCA. There-
fore, effectively a distinction is made between cash box entities without any 
substance and funding entities with sufficient substance to bear a funding risk. 
Cash box entities are not able to control any risk associated with cost shared 
214 See Paragraph 3.3.1.2.
215 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.15.
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activities. Funding entities on the other hand would have employees that are 
capable of making, and actually do make, three relevant types of decisions: 
(i) decisions on entering into or terminating the participation in the CCA; 
(ii) decisions on the type of activities and objectives of the CCA; and 
(iii) budget decisions.216
So, while cash box entities are denied all access to CCAs, entities controlling 
funding risks can still participate, provided they can control the financial risks 
associated with the cost shared activities. To avoid leaving open a door to profit 
shifting opportunities, the OECD has however tried to ensure that their poten-
tial benefit from the arrangement is limited. This is part of the second transfer 
pricing measure against the use of CCAs in tax avoidance structures, as is further 
discussed in Paragraph 5.5.3.4.   
5.3.2.3. The Australian Substance Requirements
The Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’) addressed the issue of cash box partic-
ipants explicitly in the Taxation Ruling on CCAs that it published in 2004.217 
Following Chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines the ruling recog-
nizes that the consideration for sharing resources and skills, in part or in whole, 
comes from the individual exploitation of the cost shared results. It goes on to 
acknowledge that a CCA avoids the difficulties involved in requiring the separate 
determination of arm’s length prices for the two-way flow of contributions and 
benefits among the participants. This is illustrated by the case of a CCA between 
a participant that performs research activities and another that provides funds. 
In this context the Ruling remarks:
“Instead of the first participant being rewarded at a market price of cost plus 
a margin for the research services it has performed for the benefit of the 
second, and that participant being rewarded by a margin on the funds it has 
supplied to the benefit of the first, the costs of both might simply be shared 
and rewarded not through any margins but through commensurate sharing 
in the expected benefits from use of the results of the CCA activity.”218     
216 Compare the examples provided in Paragraph 9.25 and 9.26 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines.
217 Australian Tax office, Taxation Ruling on Cost Contribution Arrangements, ATO TR 2004/1.
218 Idem, Paragraph 72.
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By consequence the ruling in principle accepts the possibility of a participant 
funding cost shared activities without actively performing them itself. However, 
the ATO does make a crucial reservation in this respect. It refers to another ruling 
in which it has laid down its fundamental approach of transfer pricing matters. 
That ruling states clearly that at the end of the day, the outcome of any analysis 
must make business sense in the context of the particular case.219 This means 
that, also when it concerns participation in a CCA, it should be considered that 
independent parties would protect their own economic interest. They would 
compare the options realistically available and seek to maximize the overall 
value derived from their resources. One of the options then taken into account 
should be not to enter into the CCA. 
This is further explained in several examples annexed to the ruling. Perhaps by 
coincidence or perhaps to illustrate the fundamental relevance of the matter, 
the first of these examples addresses cash box participants. In that Example 1 
an Australian company (‘AusCo’) has developed a successful product, which it 
sells itself. It also licenses out the technology to manufacture the product. The 
company now intends to start up an R&D project to develop the next generation 
of the product. AusCo is financially strong and has skills and resources avail-
able to perform the necessary R&D activities itself. Nevertheless, it is consid-
ering to enter into a CCA with a new foreign group company (‘ForCo’), possibly 
established in a low tax jurisdiction. Under the arrangement AusCo would make 
available the existing technology and perform the R&D, while ForCo would only 
contribute cash. In return for sharing in the costs the foreign company would 
be entitled to license the cost shared technology to other group members for 
manufacturing and selling the product in their local markets. The ATO considers 
that under these circumstances it is questionable whether a third party in 
AusCo’s position would enter into the CCA at all:
“Even if AusCo’s contribution of pre-existing technology is valued so as to 
take account of its future earning potential, there is a question as to why 
AusCo as an independent party would agree to share the future earning 
potential of the new technology. If it were concluded that independent 
parties in the positions of AusCo and ForCo might be expected not to enter 
into the CCA, we may disregard the arrangement and take the action neces-
sary to produce an arm’s length outcome for AusCo.”220
219 Australian Tax office, Taxation Ruling on Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing Methodologies for Interna-
tional Dealings, ATO TR 97/20, Paragraph 1.1.
220 Australian Tax office, Taxation Ruling on Cost Contribution Arrangements, ATO TR 2004/1, Para-
graph 195.
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As the example makes apparent, a CCA would not pass the Australian test of 
making business sense and would therefore be disregarded by the ATO, to the 
extent it includes participants that lack the necessary substance to control the 
risks associated with the cost shared activities.        
5.3.2.4. The Netherlands Substance Requirements
The Netherlands Ministry of Finance issued a decree outlining the Dutch inter-
pretation of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 2001. This was subsequently 
updated a number of times, most recently in 2018.221 It includes a section on 
CCAs with five stylized examples. Two of them illustrate how the Dutch author-
ities require participants to exercise control over risks along the lines of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The first of these examples is lettered M and 
concerns three associated companies A, B and C that are all involved in the 
development, manufacturing and selling on their local markets of consumer 
products. They enter into a CCA to develop a new product. They contribute 
equally to the structuring of the research program and the decision taking per 
identified research phase, including the strategic project planning and coordi-
nation. Furthermore, Company A contributes existing technology, company 
B contributes resources (personnel and fixed assets) and company C contrib-
utes cash to cover expected third party costs. Each participant’s contribution is 
valued equally at approximately € 2 million. Companies A, B and C each become 
legal and effective owner of the results for as far as they pertains to their own 
markets. They are expected to benefit equally from the individual exploitation 
of the new products. Under these circumstances the decree regards the CCA 
to lead to an arm’s length result. This shows that the Ministry of Finance does 
not upfront exclude group members like Company C, who’s involvement in the 
actual performance of research activities is limited to a funding contribution, 
from sharing in residual profits.
The other example in the Dutch decree that is relevant in this context is lettered 
O.  It features two associated companies A and B. Company A is involved in 
the development, manufacturing and selling of consumer products. Company 
B employs only two people with a financial and administrative background. 
Company A has performed initial research into the development of a new 
product. This is potentially suitable for exploitation on the local markets of both 
companies A and B.  They enter into a CCA under which Company A contributes 
the results of the initial research. In addition to the contractual agreement it is 
determined that Company A also coordinates and controls all further develop-
221 Decree of the Netherlands State Secretary of Finance, 22 April 2018, no. 2018-6865.
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ment activities, which includes taking all key R&D related management deci-
sions as well as actually performing the day-to-day R&D activities. Company B 
contributes 50% of the fair market value of the initial development results and 
50% of the actual further development costs. Under the CCA both companies 
would share the effective ownership of the resulting intangibles to the extent 
these pertain to their own markets, while company A would become the sole 
legal owner of such intangibles.  According to the Dutch decree the outcome 
of the CCA in this example is not at arm’s length. The Dutch decree reaches 
this conclusion by acknowledging that Companies A and B have contractu-
ally agreed to share all risks associated with the cost shared activities,  while 
Company B lacks the functional capacity to control those risks associated with 
the management of R&D activities. According to the Dutch Ministry of Finance 
the latter risks should therefore be allocated exclusively to Company A and the 
compensation of both companies should be adjusted accordingly. That does not 
mean that Company B is excluded as a participant. It does after all control the 
funding risks associated with its participation in the CCA. However, the profit of 
Company A would be increased to include all benefits from the sale of the new 
products with the exception of a risk adjusted return compensating Company 
B for the funding it provided (also see Paragraph 5.5.3.4). As such, the Neth-
erlands tax administration explicitly requires participants in a CCA to have the 
expertise and resources to control the risks they contractually assume and, by 
doing so, follows the OECD’s guidance in this context. 
5.3.2.5. Author’s Analysis
The use of low substance entities in tax structures was undoubtedly one of the 
major concerns when the OECD started its BEPS-project in 2012. To combat this, 
risk assumption was made a focus point of the revision of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. Rather surprisingly the only place where the revised OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines explicitly address cash box entities is in an example.222 Never-
theless, a new section on risk assumption included in the revised guidance on 
the delineation of transactions provides relevant insights, specifically on the 
control of funding risks.223 The amendments to Chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines on CCAs build on this to exclude group companies from 
participation, if they do not have the capacity to control the risks associated 
with cost shared activities or they do not regularly exercise such control. This 
control-over-risk requirement has a logic to it. In fact, as explained in Paragraph 
4.3.2.2, it is the natural consequence of the intention under the ALS to have 
222 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 1.103.
223 See Paragraph 3.3.1. 
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controlled transactions take place under circumstances that are consistent with 
those of the open market.  It should be noted however that under the revised 
OECD guidance a group company whose only contribution consists of passively 
funding cost shared activities can still qualify for participation, provided it 
employs sufficiently experienced personnel that make the critical funding deci-
sions. The benefit of these group companies from their participation in the CCA 
should however be limited to a risk adjusted return. In my opinion the prac-
tical consequence of drawing such a thin line, is that only the most marginally 
furnished entities are excluded from participation. Any company with a minimal 
level of active business operations and a corresponding amount of substance 
can participate (under the Dutch decree two employees with a financial back-
ground would suffice). The tax administrations of Australia and the Netherlands 
have adopted rules with similar consequences in their national regulations. The 
ATO and the Dutch Ministry of Finance both allow for participants to make only 
cash contributions, but are restrictive when it comes to low substance partici-
pants. Under circumstances, they will disregard their participation in a CCA. For 
this purpose, Australia considers whether the CCA at the end of the day makes 
business sense, while the Netherlands requires all participants to control the 
risks associated with their contributions. In contrast, the United States has 
traditionally not imposed any substance requirements on participants. Alterna-
tively, the Treasury and IRS have tried to limit the return of cash box participants 
by making pricing adjustments under the existing arrangement, specifically by 
claiming higher buy-in payments from the low substance participants. Perhaps 
the US approach is more aligned with the principle that a pricing adjustment 
should always be considered first and that non-recognition of an arrangement 
can only be a measure of last resort. Furthermore, from a US internal perspec-
tive it can perhaps be argued that not positioning substance requirements 
corresponds best with the intention of congress to limit the curtailing of CCAs 
as much as possible.  However, the approach unavoidably leads to additional 
discussions about the appropriate size of a buy-in payment. This has forced 
the Treasury and IRS to publish extensive regulations. As a result the taxpayers 
that Congress wanted to accommodate, those using bona fide CCAs, are faced 
with the complex valuation issues on pre-existing intangibles. This is remark-
able, given that CCAs were initially intended to reduce the number of valua-
tion disputes. Meanwhile, aggressive MNEs still appear prepared to take on the 
challenge of a valuation conflict and up to now they have been successful when 
advocating these in front of the courts.224 I therefore, as stated already several 
224 For a discussion of the Veritas and Amazon case see Paragraphs 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 respectively. 
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times in Chapter 4, much prefer the application of a control-over-risk require-
ment to an approach aimed at imposing high platform contributions on cash 
box entities.  
5.3.3. Controlled Non-Participants
5.3.3.1. Free Riding
As discussed in the previous paragraphs an overly broad scope of participants 
including group companies with insufficient mutual benefit or substance will 
cause an outcome that is not in line with the ALS. There can also be situa-
tions in which the same effect occurs because of the opposite reason, i.e. the 
number of participants is too limited. This can be the case if non-participating 
group companies benefit from the cost shared activities, while they do not pay 
compensation to the participants community for assuming the costs and risks 
related to those activities. These controlled non-participants would in fact be 
free riding. For completeness sake it can be pointed out that free riding does 
not per se infringe directly upon the interest of an individual participant. It can 
also consist of the exploitation of cost shared results in a way that does not 
harm any of the parties to the CCA directly. The obvious example would be if 
a controlled non-participant would use cost shared know-how for the manu-
facturing and selling of products on a territorial market in which none of the 
participants is active. Obviously a third party would not be granted the right to 
use the know-how without paying an appropriate compensation.   
The free rider problem is eliminated, if controlled non-participants benefiting 
from the cost shared results pay a royalty, service fee or other form of compen-
sation to the participants community. If this is effectively shared among the 
appropriate participants on the basis of the same allocation key as development 
or services costs under the CCA, the outcome should be acceptable again. Natu-
rally the size of the compensation paid as an alternative to participating in the 
CCA would have to be  at arm’s length, i.e. equal to what a third party would 
have been prepared to pay for a license under similar circumstances. This means 
that the specific situation of the controlled non-participants has to be consid-
ered.  That might well differ from that of participants. By consequence, the size 
of an appropriate royalty or service fee is not necessarily equal to the amount 
that the outsider would have been charged had it been a full-fledged participant 
in the CCA.  For example a controlled non-participant can have the same access 
to cost shared intangibles and make similar use of them as participants. As such 
it equally benefits from results. However, the controlled non-participant will 
generally enter into the license agreement once the development of the intan-
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gibles has been completed. By consequence it generally does not share in the 
risk of failed projects. This places the outsider in a favorable position, for which 
a third party might well have been prepared to compensate the participants 
community by paying a royalty that exceeds the contributions that it would 
have paid as a participant. The opposite can also occur. A licensee might only 
have limited access to cost shared intangibles, it may make limited use of the 
intangibles or it may be required to further develop them before they are suit-
able for exploitation on its own market. A service recipient might have a more 
limited need for services, because it obtains them elsewhere or it performs the 
activities itself. In these cases the controlled non-participant is in a less favorable 
position than participants and it can be appropriate for the royalty or service fee 
paid to be less than the contributions that would have been payable by a full-
fledged CCA participant.
5.3.3.2. Author’s Analysis
It should be noted that under certain circumstances MNEs can have an incen-
tive to allow controlled companies to exploit cost shared results without paying 
an appropriate royalty or services fee. This may have a fiscal background. For 
example it might be difficult to claim a tax deduction for CCA charges, royalties 
and service fees under local law in the country of residence of the controlled 
non-participant or such charges might be subject to a withholding tax. Alterna-
tively an MNE might allow free riding because the associated company is not 
100% owned by the group. In that case the MNE might not want to share results 
in the same way as it does with fully owned subsidiaries or the joint venture 
partner might not accept the cost sharing charge. By not adequately addressing 
the free riders issue the OECD omits to provide guidance on the appropriateness 
of conditions under which the participants community transacts with controlled 
non-participants. However, it is evident that the tax treatment of intragroup 
charges in the non-participant’s country of residence cannot offer a valid reason 
for exempting the non-participant from paying an appropriate consideration for 
the activities from which it (co-)benefits.  If the MNE in such a case does allow 
for free riding because of tax reasons, then tax administrations can be expected 
to adjust taxable profits to reflect the free riders’ share in costs and risk. 
If the reason for a group company not to participate in the CCA originates from 
the relationship with a joint venture partner, better arguments may exist for a 
differing size of the royalties and service fee or even the absence thereof.  The 
terms and conditions of this relationship are after all the outcome of negotia-
tions between two unrelated parties. The MNE might not want to grant effective 
ownership to joint ventures in the same way as it does to fully owned subsidiaries 
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and the joint venture partner might not want to share in the costs of the MNE’s 
centralized activities. Whatever the situation, it should be kept in mind that 
under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention the joint venture company 
is still an associated enterprise, as long as the MNE directly or indirectly partic-
ipates in its management, control or capital. As such all circumstances relevant 
in respect of the relationship with the joint venture partner will have to be taken 
into consideration, when determining whether there is any free riding going on. 
If such an analysis leads to the conclusion that conditions have been imposed 
that differ from those that would have been agreed between unrelated parties, 
there will still be a risk of (or indeed a need for) profit adjustments. 
5.4. Benefits
5.4.1. Identifying Benefits
Just like with any other commercial transaction parties enter into a CCA, because 
they expect it will render them certain benefits. In fact, under the distinguishing 
characteristic of a CCA, those anticipated benefits are the basis for partic-
ipants to be allocated costs and risks.  Determining whether the outcome of 
the arrangement is at arm’s length requires turning this around to determine 
whether the size of the benefit of each individual participant justifies the costs 
it incurred and the risks it assumed. Be that how it may, the anticipated bene-
fits are a crucial element and they need to be properly identified. Nevertheless, 
the guidance by the OECD on the matter does not go any further than remark 
that “some benefits can be determined in advance, whereas others will be uncer-
tain”.225 This is very short and therefore leaves quite some room for uncertainty 
and disputes. 
Among others the existing OECD guidance does not provide any insight on how 
to deal with benefits that are completely unforeseen. That this might pose a 
problem is illustrated by the example of an MNE from the semiconductor industry 
that cost shares a project to develop a next generation computer chip. The group 
companies of this MNE decide that the expensive, high-tech equipment used 
in the R&D process is to be legally owned by the individual group companies. 
However, the maintenance and depreciation costs related to the equipment are 
proportionally allocated among participants. When more advanced equipment 
becomes available, it is agreed to replace the models currently in use. They are 
sold off on the second hand market at a price exceeding book value. The ques-
225 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.6.
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tion then comes up to what extent that gain should be identified as a benefit 
from cost shared activities and how it is to be divided between the participants. 
The agreement underlying the CCA may provide for an allocation of the benefit. 
On the other hand it might not do so explicitly, if the benefit from selling off 
the old equipment is unforeseen. Nevertheless, there might in that case still be 
indirect guidance deducted from the way in which specific risks related to the 
equipment are shared under the arrangement. If the legal owners exclusively 
bear the risk that the equipment should perish, it could make sense for them 
to also have the full entitlement to any upward potential. If that risk is shared 
among participants it could be more reasonable to also share the benefit. Alter-
natively, it could be argued that apparently the cost shared depreciation was 
determined at a too high amount and should be reversed resulting in a repay-
ment of balancing payments by the participant that legally owned the equip-
ment. Another factor to take into account is whether the equipment was used 
exclusively for cost shared activities or also for other activities. A pro rata split of 
the gain on sale could be required. With detailed guidance missing, it will be up 
to tax practitioners themselves to come to a reasonable analysis that takes into 
account all relevant facts or circumstances. 
5.4.2. Assigning Benefits
The OECD guidance is not only very limited when it comes to identifying CCA 
benefits. In respect of the assignment of those benefits there is also very little 
to go by. Paragraph 8.6 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recognizes 
that “each participant’s interest in the results of the CCA activity should be estab-
lished at the outset”, but says nothing about how to do so. There is only a lone 
example indicating that in case of a development CCA  a perpetual, royalty-free 
license for the territory in which participants operate would be an option. The 
US Cost Sharing Regulations offer some more direction. They suggest a division 
of benefits based on territories or field of use.226 In case of a division on a terri-
torial basis the entire world has to be split up in territories, which subsequently 
all have to be assigned to participants. They should be entitled to the perpetual, 
non-overlapping and exclusive right to exploit the cost shared results through 
the use, consumption, or disposition of property or services in their territories. 
Obviously there is some overkill in the requirement to cover the entire world, 
if it is clear from the start that none of the participants will be active in certain 
territories. The refrigerator company will after all not be selling to the Eskimos. 
226 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(b)(4)(ii) and (iii).
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For a division on the basis of field of use under the US Cost Sharing Regulations, 
all possible uses of cost sharing results have to be identified. Subsequently they 
should all be assigned to individual participants, who each should be granted 
the perpetual, non-overlapping and exclusive rights to exploit the cost sharing 
results through at least one of those uses. Furthermore, any unanticipated uses 
should be assigned to a single participant. An example of a field of use assign-
ment is offered by the MNE selling consumer electronics that cost shares its 
marketing effort to develop a new brand and then assigns the use of the brand 
for the sale of desk- and laptops to one participant, the use of the brand for 
the sale of tablet computers to a second and the use of the brand for the sale 
of mobile phones to a third. It is however unclear to me why the Cost Sharing 
Regulations prescribe that benefits are assigned to just one participant, to the 
extent that they result from the use of such brand in ways that were not antic-
ipated at the time of entering into the CCA, for example its use for the sale of 
“smart” watches or glasses. In my opinion there is no principle objection against 
taxpayers assigning those benefits proportionally to multiple or even to all 
participants.  
Although a division on a territorial or field of use basis is considered most 
common, the Cost Sharing Regulations also allow for alternative divisions 
provided that:
(i) the interest in cost shared results is clearly and unambiguously divided 
among the participants;
(ii) recordkeeping by the MNE enables the checking of a consistent applica-
tion;
(iii) the participants’ exploitation rights are perpetual, non-overlapping and 
exclusive;
(iv) it should be possible to predict with a reasonable reliability, the resulting 
benefits per participant.227        
As an alternative assignment method participants may for example be allowed 
the rights to use cost shared results at their own manufacturing sites. However, 
what method is most appropriate will always depend on the nature of the activ-
ities performed under the CCA. I believe that specific assignment methods may 
227 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(b)(4)(iv).
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be easier to identify, if the cost shared activities result directly or indirectly in 
new products or services which the participants can exploit. They are there-
fore more likely to be available, when the cost shared activities are aimed at 
generating additional profit. If on the other hand the cost shared activities are 
aimed at realizing a cost saving, a more general description of how benefits are 
assigned may have to be used. Provided this results in a sufficiently unambig-
uous assignment, participants can in my opinion simply be assigned benefits 
from the cost shared results “to the extent it pertains to their business”.                
5.5. Contributions
5.5.1. Introduction
As the OECD points out in paragraph 8.3 of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines the 
transfer pricing issues in respect of CCAs relate to “the commercial or financial 
relations between the participants and the contributions made by the partici-
pants that create the opportunities to achieve those outcomes”. Those contribu-
tions can come in different shapes and sizes and they can be made at different 
moments in time during the course of the CCA. In order for the arrangement to 
comply with the arm’s length standard each participant’s proportionate share 
of contributions should be consistent with its proportionate share of expected 
benefits. If necessary, participants should pay each other balancing payments 
to reach a situation in which this is the case (see Paragraph 5.6). In order to 
test the proportionality it is crucial to establish the overall contributions of the 
combined participants. These will first have to be identified and subsequently 
valued. The valuation of contributions, specifically the valuation of contributed 
pre-existing intangible assets, has been one of the focus point of the OECD’s 
recent work on CCAs.
5.5.2. Identifying Contributions
5.5.2.1. Terminology
The OECD recognizes that certain contributions have a so called pre-existing 
value. They involve assets obtained or developed by the contributing partici-
pant or participants externally from the CCA and are referred to as pre-existing 
contributions. Although this choice of words can be confusing, I believe these 
contributions do not necessarily have to exist already at the time the CCA is 
concluded nor is it required that they are contributed at the outset of the arrange-
ment. It can also involve assets that were obtained or developed by the contrib-
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uting participant externally from the cost shared activities, but contempora-
neously to those activities and then contributed under the CCA.  The textbook 
example of a pre-existing contribution is manufacturing technology owned by 
one of the participants that is contributed for further development so that the 
participants can manufacture a next generation of products. Such pre-existing 
technology is owned exclusively by the respective contributing participant. It is 
something different from the more advanced technology that is created by the 
performance of the cost shared activities. The latter technology is a separate 
intangible, which is co-owned by all of the participants community. Pre-existing 
contributions are to be distinguished from current contributions. The latter type 
of contributions consists of the performance of cost shared activities. They are 
by definition made in the course of the CCA. While pre-existing contributions 
are comparable to the transfer or licensing of assets, current contributions are 
more alike to the performance of services. 
5.5.2.2. Salaries, Tangible Assets and Third Party Costs
Obvious contributions are the salaries of personnel that performs the cost 
shared activities and the costs for tangible assets that are used in the process. 
This can involve both internal and external costs. It may concern employees on 
the ground involved in day-to-day operations as well as higher management 
taking key decisions at a certain distance. The tangible assets that are used 
could among others consist of materials, equipment, software and laboratory 
or office space. Participants can also decide to outsource all or part of the cost 
shared activities to a non-participating outsider. In that case the payment of 
the outsourcing fee qualifies as a contribution. The outsourcing partner could 
be an unrelated third party or a group company that does not expect to exploit 
the results itself and therefore cannot participate in the CCA. This would for 
example be the case, if the group has centralized activities in a special purpose 
entity that is not involved in operational activities.  
The outer limits of what does and does not qualify as a contribution are not 
undisputed. A good example are expenses for the stock-based compensa-
tion of employees. If these employees work on cost shared activities, it would 
under the benefit test prima facie seem appropriate to share those costs with 
the entire participants community. However, there are two arguments to be 
made against this. The first argument assumes that expenses for stock-based 
compensation actually do not constitute a cost for the employer.  The issuance 
of new shares to employees does not imply a cash out nor does it negatively 
impact the financial position of the employer. Instead the cost is effectively for 
the account of the employer’s shareholders, who are faced with a certain dilu-
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tion of their equity stake in the company. The second argument assumes that 
third parties would not share these costs as they would be reluctant to expose 
themselves to an obligation that is dependent on the price of the stock in an 
unrelated counterpart. This led to issues in the United States, where taxpayers 
were not only granted a deduction but also an R&D related tax credit in respect 
of these costs. Obviously this provided a strong incentive for the Treasury and 
IRS to argue that the costs were to be recharged. They tried to achieve this by 
including a requirement for sharing these costs in the US Cost Sharing Regula-
tions. However, the revised regulations were subsequently overruled by the US 
Tax Court (Paragraph 4.4.2 and 4.4.3).
5.5.2.3. Intangible Assets
5.5.2.3.1. Platform Intangibles and Make-Sell Rights
The contribution of salaries and tangible assets can be distinguished from 
making available intangible assets. As already addressed earlier, the OECD 
qualifies such intangibles as pre-existing contributions. They may be used 
to perform the cost shared activities or they might be further developed into 
new intangibles. The difference can be illustrated by comparing two different 
CCAs of taxpayers from the computer gaming industry. The first arrangement is 
aimed at developing a completely new computer game with one or more partic-
ipants making available their pre-existing programming know-how. The second 
CCA intends to develop the sequel to a popular existing so called shooter game, 
which was originally designed by one of the participants.  In the first instance the 
programming know-how is used instrumentally to produce a new stand-alone 
intangible asset. In the second situation the contributed pre-existing intangible 
serves as the basis for developing the next generation of an existing product. 
The latter type of pre-existing intangibles is also referred to as “platform intan-
gibles”. 
It should be acknowledged at this stage that any contribution of intangibles 
under a CCA differs materially from granting so called make-sell rights. The 
latter would involve limited rights to use intangibles for the manufacture or sale 
of a product, without the intention to further develop those intangibles or to use 
them for developing new intangibles. Transactions involving make-sell rights 
are generally structured as a license arrangement under which the licensee pays 
a periodic royalty to the licensor in return for access to the intangibles. In these 
situations there is no transfer of the effective ownership of the intangibles to 
the licensee. By consequence the licensee is not entitled to the proceeds from 
the intangibles other than those generated by its own use of the intangibles 
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within the scope of the license arrangement. In my opinion make-sell rights are 
fundamentally different from a contribution under a CCA and should generally 
be evaluated and priced on a separate basis.228
5.5.2.3.2. The OECD Definition of Intangibles
To properly identify all contributions under a CCA consisting of intangible 
assets, a good understanding of the definition of “intangibles” is required. A 
revised definition was introduced in a discussion draft published by the OECD 
in June of 2012, which was followed by a revised version only a year later.229 The 
project was subsequently incorporated into the more comprehensive work on 
base erosion and profit shifting, which eventually resulted in the current Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines defining intangibles as: 
“…something which is not a physical asset or a financial asset, which is 
capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities, and 
whose use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred in a transac-
tion between independent parties in comparable circumstances”.230  
This is an autonomous definition, independent of the qualification for accounting 
and legal purposes. It is therefore not required that these intangibles are capi-
talized on the balance sheet. Neither do they per se have to be suitable for legal 
or contractual protection. Furthermore, intangibles under the OECD’s definition 
do not necessarily have to be individually transferable and hence may be insep-
arable from other business assets.  
 The Transfer Pricing Guidelines list patents, know-how, trade secrets, trade-
marks, trade names, brands, contractual rights and government licenses as 
examples of intangibles.231 They also point out that licenses and similar agree-
ments offering the right to use intangibles can themselves qualify as an intan-
gible asset. The same applies for other rights from contractual arrangements, 
such as agreements to make available the services of one or more employees.232 
Other assets not explicitly mentioned in the report that may be regarded intan-
gibles are for example copyrights, formulas, data and customer lists. 
The OECD further addresses the position of goodwill and ongoing concern 
value.  Various definitions of goodwill are possible, all of which recognize good-
228 This is also confirmed in Paragraph 1.482-(c)(4) of the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations.
229 OECD, “Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles”, 30 July 2013.
230 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 6.6.
231 Idem, Section A.4.
232 Idem, Paragraph 6.25.
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will as the excess value in a combination of business assets compared to their 
stand-alone worth. This is elaborated upon in Chapter XI of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, where an ongoing concern is described as a functioning, 
economically integrated business unit.233 Transferring such ongoing concern 
implies not only the transferring of assets but also the ability to perform certain 
functions and bear certain risks. In that case it may, according to the OECD, be 
most reliably to measure the value of the multiple contemporaneous trans-
actions involved on an aggregated basis. This valuation should then reflect 
all valuable elements that would also be compensated for in uncontrolled 
situations.  However, goodwill or ongoing concern value are not qualified as 
intangible assets. Instead their exact legal status is considered irrelevant for 
transfer pricing purposes. They are simply considered an element to be taken 
into account when valuing transactions involving the interrelated assets that 
together constitute an operating business.      
Concepts that the OECD explicitly excludes from the definition of intangibles 
are group synergies, an assembled workforce and market specific characteris-
tics. As is also discussed in paragraph 3.3.2.2, these are so called comparability 
factors that impact the price at which controlled transactions should take place, 
but they cannot be qualified as intangibles for the purpose of Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.    
5.5.2.3.3. The US Definition of Intangibles
As already acknowledged in paragraph 5.3.2.5, the United States has been 
trying to counter the use of CCAs for off-shoring profits by requiring higher 
compensation under the investor model for non-cash contributions, specifically 
contributed platform intangibles. In this context the Treasury Department and 
IRS introduced the concept of platform contribution transactions (‘PCTs’) in the 
2008 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations and continued to use this in the 2011 
Final Cost Sharing Regulations.234 Assets that would potentially constitute a 
platform contributions are not limited to only “intangibles” as defined in section 
936(h)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. The latter intangibles are limited to 
any:
(i) Patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how;
(ii) Copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition;
233 Idem, Paragraph 9.93.
234 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations Paragraph 4.482-7(c)(1).
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(iii) Trademark, trade name, or brand name;
(iv) Franchise, license, or contract;
(v) Method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, 
estimate, customer list or technical data; or
(vi) Any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the services 
of any individual.
Platform contributions on the other hand would also include an assembled 
workforce, goodwill and ongoing concern value. Especially in respect of assem-
bled workforce the preamble to the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations includes 
very explicit wording. First an example is provided of a participant contributing 
the commitment of an experienced research team to the development of new 
intangibles under a CCA. The preamble states:
“To limit the arm’s length charge in these circumstances to sharing the 
ongoing salary costs would ignore the value of having the particular 
research team already in place to undertake the intangible development 
with the benefit of its particular knowhow.”
To emphasize that the same can also apply for services outside the field of R&D, 
it then continues: 
“As another example, the contribution of core entrepreneurial functions 
such as a product selection, market positioning, research strategy, and 
risk determinations and management requires an arm’s length charge 
under these regulations. To omit charges for these or any other significant 
economic contributions one controlled taxpayer makes for another’s benefit 
would fail to clearly reflect the incomes of such controlled taxpayers.” 235 
It is not questioned that the salary costs of the assembled workforce are qual-
ified as cost contributions and shared among the participants community. 
However, the unique experience of the employees involved is considered to 
have an extra value, which justifies that the participant that assembled the work-
force externally from the CCA receives an additional compensation through a 
235 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, preamble.
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PCT. By consequence, an assembled workforce, goodwill and ongoing concern 
value are under the Cost Sharing Regulations qualified as items that them-
selves are capable of being owned, controlled and transferred in a PCT, i.e. as 
intangible assets. The Cost Sharing Regulations do not take them into account 
as a comparability factor when valuing the performance of R&D activities, but 
instead regard these elements to be part of a platform contribution consisting 
of an intangibles and services package. In the eyes of the Treasury and IRS this 
package constitutes a business opportunity that has to be valued on an aggre-
gated basis taking into account the income from new intangibles developed 
under the CCA.  
In the 2007 Coordinated Issue Paper discussed in Paragraph 4.3.3.4, the IRS 
field agents were instructed to already apply the above approach to CCAs that 
existed prior to the 2008 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations entering into force 
on 5 January 2009. This led to disputes with taxpayers and eventually resulted 
in litigation. In the Veritas case, which can be considered a landmark case in the 
history of transfer pricing disputes, the United States Tax Court quite bluntly 
rejected the inclusion of assembled workforce, goodwill and going concern 
value as transferred intangibles.  In respect of the assembled workforce Judge 
Foley explicitly referred to the definition of section 936(h)(3)(B). He pointed 
out that in his view it was not an item “which has substantial value independent 
of the services of any individual”. 236  Apparently the Judge was of the opinion 
that the value of an assembled workforce comes from the services of individual 
employees and therefore does not qualify as an intangible under the definition 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Although the Veritas decision was very clearly in 
favor of the taxpayer, it did not end the debate. The IRS rejected the decision in 
a notice of non-acquiescence.237 It disagreed with both the factual findings and 
the legal reasoning of the Tax Court. At the same time the IRS acknowledged 
that it was highly unlikely to be successful in applying its extended intangibles 
definition in fiscal years that ended before the 2008 Temporary Cost Sharing 
Regulations were even published. Therefore, the coordinated issue paper was 
recalled on 26 June 2012.  However, the cost sharing regulations were not 
amended and the IRS has continued to advocate a broad intangibles definition 
ever since. This then led to further discussions and a second unfavorable ruling 
for the IRS in the Amazon case. 
Meanwhile the Obama administration in its 2010 budget proposal tried to 
improve the position of the Treasury Department and IRS by amending the 
236 Veritas Software Corporation & Subsidiaries, et al. v. Commissioner, United States Tax Court, 12 
October 2009 – see Paragraph 4.3.4 for more details.
237 IRS, Action on Decision (Veritas), 6 December 2010, IRB No. 2010-49.
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intangible definition in the Internal Revenue Code to include workforce in place, 
goodwill and going concern value.238 This proposal has been repeatedly posi-
tioned in slightly amended form up to the 2017, after which it was not continued 
by the Trump administration. 
5.5.2.3.4. Authors Analysis
By labeling “soft” intangibles like workforce in place, goodwill and going 
concern value platform contributions, the Treasury and IRS try to create a basis 
for increasing buy-in payments to be paid as a consideration for the contribu-
tion of pre-existing intangibles by US based CCA participants. I have repeat-
edly indicated that I am not in favor of such an approach. It leads to difficult 
to resolve  valuation issues, as encountered in Veritas and Amazon (see Para-
graph 4.3). Furthermore, it results in complex discussions about the cost base 
and what part of it should be shared, as seen in Xilinx and Altera (see Paragraph 
4.4). After the analysis in this Paragraph 5.5.2.3 two additional arguments can 
now be brought forward as to why the referenced soft intangibles should not 
be compensated for in platform contribution transactions. First of all, it would 
be inaccurate and inconsistent from a theoretical perspective to not qualify 
concepts like workforce in place, goodwill and going concern value as what they 
actually are: comparability factors determining the value of resources made 
available in the course of the CCA. Secondly, doing so nonetheless has an unjus-
tifiable timing disadvantage for the taxpayer, because it frontloads taxable 
income to the moment of the platform contribution, which is very often at the 
outset of the CCA. That would disregard that from a group perspective income 
is only realized when the results from cost shared activities are exploited. It can 
be argued that this is compensated by discounting the income stream in the 
valuation of the platform contribution, but that still leaves a severe cash flow 
constraint. This is also not completely taken away by structuring the platform 
contribution transaction as a royalty instead of a lump sum, as such royalty 
would logically decline (or “ramp-down”) over the useful life time of the pre-ex-
isting intangibles and therefore still would not match cash inflows. Those, after 
all, can come from the exploitation of newly developed intangibles, which might 
continue even after the CCA is terminated. 
All the foregoing issues are avoided, if workforce in place, goodwill and going 
concern value are excluded from the platform contribution transaction and 
instead taken into account as a comparability factor when valuing current 
238 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, Office of Management and Budget, 
www.budget.gov.
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contributions at market price. I therefore appreciate that this is exactly what the 
revisions of the OECD guidance under the BEPS-project propose as a main rule. 
5.5.3. Valuing Contributions
5.5.3.1. Cost vs. Market Price
The OECD considered already in the 1979 Report and its 1984 Supplements that 
it would be appropriate to include a profit-mark up in the valuation of contribu-
tions under a CCA. The OECD then distanced itself from that initial positioning 
by stating in the 1997 version of Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
that the valuation issue was not decisively addressed and would require addi-
tional guidance, specifically in respect of whether contributions should be 
valued at cost (excluding a profit mark-up) or at market price (including a profit 
mark-up).239 Subsequently, the US Treasury and IRS introduced the concept of 
platform contributions in the 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations. Not 
only did the new regulations require the buy-in payment to offer market price 
compensation for pre-existing intangibles, it also had to include a consider-
ation for the ex-ante commitment to make later contributions available at cost. 
Finally, the OECD in the revision of Chapter VIII under the BEPS project firmly 
restored the valuation at market price as the main rule for all contributions. 
However, taking note of the new US approach, the revised guidance foresees in 
two possible exceptions. 
The first exception allows for a valuation of current contributions at cost, if 
these contributions are preceded by an appropriately higher valued pre-existing 
contribution:
“While all contributions should be measured at value…, it may be more 
administrable for taxpayers to pay current contributions at cost… If this 
approach is adopted, the pre-existing contributions should recover the 
opportunity cost of the ex-ante commitment to contribute resources to the 
CCA.”240   
To the extent there was any doubt about whether this exception was included 
to accommodate the US tax administration, the OECD adds the illustrative 
example of a participant making available the services of its pre-assembled 
group of R&D experts. These would normally be priced taking into account the 
239 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.1 (old).
240 Idem, Paragraph 8.27.
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unique computation of the team. Nevertheless, the OECD allows for a valua-
tion at cost, provided that the added value of this specific workforce in place is 
taken into account when determining the value of a pre-existing contribution. 
The example appears to be a one-on-one copy of that included in the preamble 
to the 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations (see Paragraph 5.5.2.3.3).
The second exception to the rule of a valuation at market price is of a very prac-
tical nature. The OECD recognizes that in certain cases cost would be a practical 
means to determine the relative value of current contributions.241 That could be 
the case, if the difference between cost and market value is limited. However, 
this is considered unlikely to apply to development CCAs and, instead, the excep-
tion is intended to primarily be applied in respect of services CCAs. Most notably 
this exception would be an appropriate solution for CCAs that aim to allocate 
costs related to low value adding services. If these services are predominantly 
provided by one of the participants, it would appear reasonable to include a 
fixed profit mark-up. However, that would still offer taxpayers a relatively easy 
to administrate arrangement. It also aligns the Transfer Pricing Guidelines with 
the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum’s report on CCAs not creating intangibles 
discussed in Chapter 6.
5.5.3.2. Valuing Pre-existing Contributions
5.5.3.2.1. Introduction
As already mentioned in paragraph 1.7 above, it is not the intention of this study 
to provide a detailed examination of various specific valuation techniques. 
Nevertheless there are some general remarks to be made about the valuation 
of pre-existing contributions, most relevantly those pre-existing contributions 
that consist of intangibles. When determining such value the guidance from 
previous chapters of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is to be taken into 
account, specifically that included in Chapter VI. This provides an overview of 
the most critical aspects to observe when determining an arm’s length price for 
transactions involving intangibles (Paragraph 5.5.3.2.2). It outlines the OECD’s 
view on the application of valuation techniques (Paragraph 5.5.3.2.3) and poten-
tial issues concerning so called hard to value intangibles (Paragraph 5.5.3.2.4).
241 Idem, Paragraph 8.28.
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5.5.3.2.2. Critical Elements of Transactions Involving Intangibles 
The fundamental elements of a transfer pricing analysis of transactions involving 
intangibles can be found in Paragraph 6.139 of the Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines. When in absence of appropriate comparables a transfer pricing method 
other than the CUP method is used to determine the value of intangibles in a 
controlled transaction, the OECD requires attention to be paid to the following:
• the functions, assets and risks of the respective parties to the transaction;
• the business reasons for engaging in the transaction;
• the perspectives of and options realistically available to each of the parties 
to the transaction;
• the competitive advantages conferred by the intangibles including espe-
cially the relative profitability of products and services or potential prod-
ucts and services related to the intangibles;
• the expected future economic benefits from the transaction; and
• other comparability factors such as features of local markets, location 
savings, assembled workforce and MNE group synergies.
An illustrative example of how these elements can impact a transfer pricing 
analysis of transactions involving intangibles is offered by the decision of the US 
Tax Court in Bausch & Lomb. The case concerned the pricing of a classic license 
agreement between a US company and its Irish affiliate. Considering elements 
that in effect are similar to those listed above, the Tax Court came to the deci-
sion that the US company was sold short:
“In the normal licensing situation, each party possesses something unique 
which is necessary for exploitation of a particular project. For example, one 
party may possess the production technology and the other possesses the 
capital and marketing expertise. A license agreement is negotiated since 
neither party possesses all of the attributes needed to exploit the product on 
its own. Here in contrast, B&L possessed both the productions technology 
and the marketing network necessary to produce and sell soft contact 
lenses. B&L Ireland merely had the capital, a nonproprietary asset which 
theoretically could have been supplied by any number of entities. Thus, B&L 
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Ireland would have found itself in a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis 
B&L.”242 
There appears to be no reason why this reasoning should not also apply to trans-
actions under a CCA. In other words: A transfer pricing analysis of a transaction 
involving intangibles, including a valuation of pre-existing contributions under 
a CCA, should, like any other transfer pricing analysis, be based on the value 
in use of the intangible for each of the parties to the transaction. The eventual 
arm’s length price is then to be determined somewhere in between the range 
set by these different values, depending on the relative bargaining power of the 
parties involved determined by considering the above listed elements.
5.5.3.2.3. Valuation Techniques
Valuation standards for transfer pricing differ from those for other purposes, 
such as corporate finance and financial reporting.  While the OECD has adopted 
the ALS for transfer pricing valuations, the International Valuation Standards 
Council (IVSC)243 uses the so called market value standard.  Market value is 
defined as: 
“…the estimated amount for which a property should exchange on the date 
of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length 
transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties had each acted 
knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion.”244
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on the other hand uses 
the so called fair value standard. Fair value is defined as: 
“…the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer 
a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date.”245
The OECD acknowledges that a valuation under the market value or fair value 
standard differs from a valuation under the ALS and may not be appropriate for 
transfer pricing purposes. It specifically recognizes an “inherent conservatism” 
242 Bausch & Lomb Inc v. Commissioner, United States Tax Court, 14 May 1991.
243 The IVSC is an independent not-for-profit institution from the private sector that produces and 
implements universally accepted standards for the valuation of assets across the world in the 
public interest.
244 International Valuation Standards Council, IVS 104: Bases of Value, 7 April 2016.
245 International Accounting Standards Board, IFRS 13: Fair Value Measurement, 12 May 2011.
5.5.  CONTRIBUTIONS
182
5.  OECD
in valuation assumptions made for accounting purposes, which could lead to 
“valuation approaches that are not necessarily consistent with the arm’s length 
principle”.246 However, it is not only potential conservatism that plays a role 
here. As Wittendorf has also written, there are more fundamental differences 
between the arm’s length standard and the other two valuation standards.247 
The ALS focusses on an actual transaction between specific associated parties. 
It considers the subjective, entity-specific value of the asset involved for each 
of those parties taking into account their specific situation (also compare the 
critical elements listed in Paragraph 5.5.3.2.2). Furthermore, the ALS looks 
at the relative bargaining position of parties. It then seeks to determine the 
transfer price that would have been used in the same transaction by unrelated 
parties under similar circumstances. The market value and fair value standards 
on the other hand assume a hypothetical transaction on a hypothetical market. 
In other words these standards consider at what price the owner could sell its 
asset to a random buyer. This is a one-sided approach aimed at determining an 
objective, market-based value. 
Proper recognition of the differences between valuation standards described 
above leads to the conclusion that valuation for investment or accounting 
purposes cannot necessarily be relied upon for transfer pricing purposes. Never-
theless, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not upfront endorse or reject any 
valuation standard, nor do they give a mandatory prescription of a specific valu-
ation technique.248 They do however strongly discourage the use of a valuation 
on a cost basis, because there is considered to be little correlation between the 
costs of intangibles and their value.249 With the CUP method often ruled out due 
to a lack of comparables, it may be necessary to resort to valuation techniques 
that estimate the discounted value of projected cash flows, even if that requires 
relying on difficult to verify financial projections. The OECD, like the US Treasury 
and IRS before it, specifically embraces the income method:
“… application of income based valuations techniques, especially valu-
ation techniques premised on the calculation of the discounted value of 
projected future income streams or cash flows derived from the exploitation 
of the intangible being valued, may be particularly useful when properly 
applied.”250 
246 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, paragraph 6.155.
247 Wittendorf, Tax Notes International 2011/3. 
248 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 6.156.
249 Idem, Paragraph 6.142.
250 Idem, Paragraph 6.153.
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It subsequently however provides only general guidance on the application of 
income based techniques.251 These considerations include the following:
• Financial projections are regarded more reliable when they are not 
prepared exclusively for tax purposes but also for non-tax business plan-
ning purposes.
• Growth assumptions should reflect a likely pattern of revenue and expense 
development, this is unlikely to result in simple linear growth rates.
• Discount rates should be based on the specific conditions and risks 
impacting the anticipated cash flows. This means that discount rates are 
not necessarily equal to the taxpayer’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC).
• The useful life of an intangible can depend on the term of legal protection 
as well as the rate of technological development in the industry. Platform 
intangibles however may also result in cash flows from the exploitation of 
next generation intangibles beyond their own expiration.
• Valuations are performed on an after tax basis, considering tax on projected 
cash flows, tax amortization benefits and taxation as a consequence of the 
transfer. 
The income based valuation technique that in my own experience is most 
frequently used in practice is the so called relief-from-royalty method. This 
makes use of benchmark reports indicating a reasonable royalty for the type 
of intangible that is being valued. Such royalty would commonly be expressed 
as a percentage of sales. Under the relief-from-royalty method a hypothet-
ical royalty stream would then be determined considering forecasted sales 
during the expected useful life of the intangible. This royalty stream would be 
discounted to reach a net present value that should equal the value of the intan-
gible.252 
251 This guidance is much more high level than the very detailed instructions on the use of specific 
valuation methods found in the US Cost Sharing Regulations (see Paragraph 4.3.3.3).  
252 For a detailed analysis of income-based valuation techniques also see Wittendorf, International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 2010/5 and 6.
5.5.  CONTRIBUTIONS
184
5.  OECD
5.5.3.2.4. Hard to Value Intangibles
Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines further includes guidance on 
the transfer pricing treatment of so called hard to value intangibles (“HTVIs”). 
These are defined as:
“…intangibles or rights in intangibles for which, at the time of their transfer 
between associated enterprises, (i) no reliable comparabale exists, and (ii) 
at the time the transaction was entered into, the projections of future cash 
flows or income expected to be derived from the transferred intangible, or 
the assumptions used in valuing the intangible are highly uncertain, making 
it difficult to predict the level of ultimate success of the intangible at the 
time of the transfer.”253
Subsequently possible features of transactions involving the transfer or use 
of HTVIs are listed. For the purposes of this study it is quite relevant that the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines explicitly recognize that HTVIs are sometimes used 
in connection with or developed under a CCA or similar arrangement.254 Obvi-
ously that should not be interpreted to mean that every intangible used or 
developed under a CCA is per definition a HTVI. A cost shared intangible should 
only be regarded as such, if there is a lack of comparables and the future profits 
related to the intangible are uncertain. However, it will not be uncommon for 
both of these conditions to be met and then the further guidance on HTVIs 
becomes critically important.
Understandably the OECD argues the information asymmetry between 
taxpayers and tax administrations poses a serious challenge in respect of the 
transfer pricing treatment of HTVIs. It makes it difficult for tax administrations 
to determine the arm’s length nature of transfer pricing arrangements involving 
these type of assets. The possibility that this is exploited by taxpayers to transfer 
high value intangibles to low tax jurisdictions at prices below market value was 
one of the main concerns that the OECD intended to address with the revision 
of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines under the BEPS-project. To counter this form 
of profit shifting, different measures were introduced that offer tax administra-
tions more room to make transfer pricing adjustments, when the actual results 
from the exploitation of HTVIs deviate substantially from the forecasted results 
on which the originally agreed compensation for such intangibles was based. 
First of all, it is considered that third parties might include price adjustment 
253 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 6.189.
254 Idem, Paragraph 6.190.
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clauses in the terms of agreements involving HTVIs to cover these situations.255 
In absence of such clause unexpected deviation in results might inspire third 
parties to set out to prospectively renegotiate their agreements.256 If either of 
the two is the case, the tax administration would be permitted to adjust transfer 
prices accordingly. It should be noted here that, contrary to the US Cost Sharing 
Regulations257 the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not foresee in a strict 
numeric test determining when a retroactive adjustment is to be made.   
Furthermore, the new wording somewhat controversially sanctions the use of 
ex post outcomes as presumptive evidence about the appropriateness of ex 
ante pricing arrangements, provided it is given sufficient consideration whether 
“the information on which the ex post results are based could or should reasonably 
have been known and considered by the associated enterprises at the time the 
transaction was entered into”.258 In other words the OECD excludes the use of 
ex post information, if the taxpayer could reasonably not be expected to have 
foreseen the facts and circumstances that resulted in the difference between 
forecasted and actual results. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines list the 
following situations, in which the foreseeability condition is not met and there-
fore tax administrations should refrain from making a transfer pricing adjust-
ment on the basis of ex post results:
(i) The taxpayer provides evidence that (i) the applied transfer pricing was 
based on financial projections that took into account all reasonably fore-
seeable events and risks and (ii) the difference between forecasted and 
actual results is due to unforeseen facts and circumstances.
(ii) The transfer pricing is covered by a bilateral or multilateral APA.
(iii) Considering actual results instead of forecasted results would not lead to 
an adjustment of more than 20% of the compensation for the HTVI.
(iv) More than five years have passed since the HTVI first generated unrelated 
party revenues and in each of these years the ex post results were within 
the 20% safe haven mentioned under (iii) above. 259
255 Idem, Paragraph 6.183.
256 Idem, Paragraph 6.184.
257 See Paragraph 4.3.3.3.1.
258 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 6.188 and 6.192.
259 Idem, Paragraph 6.193.
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The new HTVI approach has attracted criticism in fiscal literature.260 The OECD 
tried to rebut that by pointing out that use of ex post results cannot be considered 
the same as the use of hindsight, if the foreseeability analysis is properly applied. 
I believe that the before mentioned information gap between taxpayers and tax 
administration justifies a sanity check based on ex post results and agree with 
the OECD that a foreseeability analysis is the right backstop to keep it reason-
able. At the same time, opening the door to ex post results will undoubtedly 
inspire tax authorities to more frequently initiate transfer pricing adjustments. 
The OECD also acknowledges this and suggests that more generous access to 
mutual agreement procedures offers a solution.261 That is good and well, but, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 10, there are reasons to be concerned about 
whether such procedures are effective enough to serve that purpose, especially 
when it comes to CCAs between participants from more than two countries.
5.5.3.3. Valuing Current Contributions
According to the OECD the value of current contributions is not based on the 
value of the cost shared results. Instead the latter value should be reflected 
in the valuation of pre-existing intangibles and the sharing of risks in propor-
tion to expected benefits.262 Consequently, the value of the current contribu-
tion is determined exclusively by the value of the functions performed by the 
contributing participant. In combination with the requirement that all partic-
ipants themselves control the risks associated with the cost shared activities 
to the extent that it pertains to their business, I believe this places the partici-
pants performing such activities in a position comparable to that of a contract 
researcher or a similar limited risk service provider. As such, those participants 
should receive a similar compensation. If a comparable uncontrolled price is 
available, that could be used for price setting purposes. Under conditions it 
could also be appropriate to value functions performed at cost plus a profit 
mark-up. The OECD however rightfully does not consider a cost-plus valuation 
appropriate in all cases. Instead Paragraph 8.26 refers to Paragraph 6.79 of 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines which explains that the value of, for example, 
research activities depends on “all the facts and circumstances, such as whether 
the research team possesses unique skills and experience relevant to the research, 
assumes risks (e.g. where ‘blue sky’ research is undertaken), uses its own intan-
gibles, or is controlled and managed by another party”. It may be argued that in 
respect of CCAs the skills and experience are the more relevant aspects to take 
260 Fedusiv, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2016/6.
261 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 6.195.
262 Idem, Paragraph 8.26.
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into account. After all, the assumed risks are proportionally shared, the more 
material use of own intangibles qualifies as an individually valued pre-existing 
contribution and the control and management by another party constitutes a 
separate current contribution of its own. However, if these skills and experience 
in fact make the contribution unique and valuable, the transactional profit split 
method could also be considered as a means to determine an arm’s length price. 
As also explained in Paragraph 3.3.2.1, such a method would involve deter-
mining the revenue of all CCA participants stemming from the current contri-
bution at hand, the costs associated with the contribution and an appropriate 
profit splitting factor.
5.5.3.4. Valuing Funding Contributions
As already pointed out in Paragraph 5.3.2.2 above, a group company can be 
allowed access to a CCA, even if its only contribution consists of providing 
the necessary funding for cost shared activities.  A hard condition however 
is that the funding entity effectively controls the associated funding risk. At 
the same time, that does not necessarily mean that the OECD considers the 
group company entitled to share in the excess returns from cost shared results. 
Instead, according to Paragraph 6.62 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
the benefit of a group company passively funding activities should generally not 
exceed an appropriate risk adjusted return. This limitation on funding returns is 
also a key assumption made in example 4 of Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, which involves a CCA between two group companies. One of these, 
company A, provides funding, while the other, company B, provides pre-existing 
intangibles and performs further development activities. The realistic funding 
alternatives should then be taken into account and that then leads to a valua-
tion of Company A’s funding contribution at an amount equivalent to its funding 
commitment plus a risk adjusted return. In other words, a fixed risk adjusted 
return for passive funding only is the standard. That implies that the funding 
entity would have to transfer any income from its own exploitation of the cost 
shared result in excess of such return to the other CCA participants as balancing 
payments. This seems very reasonable, given that it can be assumed that third 
parties would not allow for a provider of funds to share in excess returns, if they 
could also borrow elsewhere against a limited fixed interest rate. That does not 
mean that determining the risk adjusted return is always a simple exercise, as is 
also evidenced by Polonska after an analysis of funder’s remuneration in private 
equity examples.263
263 Polonska, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2018/2. 
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5.5.3.5. Author’s Analysis
I agree with the OECD that for a CCA to have an arm’s length outcome contri-
butions should principally be measured at market value. After all, under the 
ALS each participant should be appropriately rewarded for the functions it has 
performed, the assets it has used and the risks it has assumed for the purpose 
of making contributions under the arrangement. If pre-existing contributions 
would be valued at cost, then the participant making those contributions 
would not be rewarded for developing or obtaining those contributions for its 
own account and at its own risk, to the extent that the cost shared results are 
exploited by other participants. If current contributions would be valued at cost, 
than the value added by the functions performed in order to make these contri-
butions would go under rewarded. At the same time it should be acknowledged 
that, although theoretically correct, a rule to value contributions at market 
value implies a large number of valuation issues, administrative complexity and, 
by consequence, a serious risk of disputes and double taxation. 
When it comes to the valuation of contributions, it is clear that the US has had 
a strong influence on the content of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. With 
the amendments made to Chapter VIII, the OECD follows the US approach to 
place most emphasis on the valuation of pre-existing contributions (referred to 
in the US as platform contribution transactions). Often such contributions will 
consist of HTVIs, of which the value depends on the further application of new 
developed intangibles. From a US perspective that value should also be included 
in the compensation for the ex-ante commitment to contribute certain specific 
resources (e.g. the services of a uniquely qualified R&D team). In line with the 
Cost Sharing Regulations, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines suggest a valuation 
technique based on a discounted value of future cash flows. Economists have 
pointed out that by doing so the OECD sets a very complex and highly conten-
tious approach to achieving an arm’s length result.264 Obviously major chal-
lenges are posed by the inherent uncertainty about financial forecasts, growth 
assumptions, discount rates and the life expectancy of the intangibles at hand. 
This appears to be in direct conflict with the original purpose of the CCA concept 
to avoid valuation disputes.
Furthermore, the OECD places taxpayers under more pressure to get their valu-
ations right by allowing tax administrations to take into account ex post results 
when retroactively testing the outcome. As said, the OECD takes the posi-
tion that this is not the same as using hindsight, because tax administrations 
should refrain from transfer pricing adjustments, if taxpayers can proof that 
264 Wright, Keates, Lewis and Auten, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2016/2.
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results were impacted by unforeseeable facts and circumstances. The Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines however leave ample room for dispute about what qualifies 
as evidence and how much of that is needed. As such, the hindsight discussion is 
not completely neutralized. It also surfaced in the United States, when the Trea-
sury and IRS included detailed rules on periodic adjustments to platform contri-
bution transactions in the Cost Sharing Regulations.265 Commentators criticized 
these rules as inconsistent with the arm’s length standard, because they would 
strip away returns from legally assumed risk retrospectively.266 To the extent 
that the US Cost Sharing Regulations automatically adjust any return outside 
of the predefined range, they do indeed disregard that, as Wright, Keates, 
Lewis and Auten put it, third parties could just have entered into a bad deal.267 
The Treasury and IRS counter this argument by claiming that “in determining 
whether to make any periodic adjustments, the Commissioner considers whether 
the outcome as adjusted more reliably reflects an arm’s length result under all the 
relevant facts and circumstances”. However, without explicit instructions for the 
Commissioner to focus on the appropriateness of the arrangement at the time 
the arrangement was entered into, I seriously doubt whether any post ex result 
outside of the prefixed range will ever be accepted in practice. 
Be the foregoing how it may, I do not find the measure to consider ex post 
results incomprehensible or unreasonable, especially as there is a safe harbor 
proposed for deviations of less than 20% (see Paragraph 5.5.3.2.4). To the 
contrary, I believe it would be sensible for taxpayers to include an adjustment 
clause incorporating the HTVI approach into their CCA contracts at their own 
initiative. That way there is a legal basis for adjustments on the basis of ex post 
results, which should offer better chances of a corresponding adjustment in the 
country of residence of the other participants. 
The valuation of current contributions appears to be slightly less complex than 
the valuation of pre-existing contributions. This is because the value of current 
contributions depends only on the functions performed by the contributing 
participant and not on the intangible assets made available by those partici-
pants. The valuation exercise even becomes quite straight forward, if it can take 
place at cost under one of the two exceptions described in Paragraph 5.5.3.1. 
However, the first exception, which allows the value of the ex-ante commitment 
of resources to be shifted to the value of a pre-existing contribution, in principle 
265 These US rules allow for the IRS to adjust a taxpayer’s income in any open taxable year and for 
all subsequent taxable years for the duration of the CCA activity, if the return on investment (the 
so-called actually experienced return ratio or AERR) is outside a prefixed range. For more details 
see Paragraph 4.3.3.3.
266 2008 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations, preamble. 
267 Wright, Keates, Lewis and Auten, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2016/2. 
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only defers the complexity to the valuation of the pre-existing contribution. It 
might offer some actual simplification in case of CCAs that are project based or 
CCAs that are concluded for a limited period of time. In case of open ended CCAs 
on the other hand, it can actually be counterproductive, as it can be extremely 
difficult to determine the lump sum value of such ex ante commitment and then 
attribute that value to the pre-existing contribution (see Paragraph 4.3.6). The 
second exception allows for a valuation at cost, if contributions are of a similar 
nature and the difference between their value and cost is immaterial. However, 
as already established in Paragraph 5.5.3.1, the application of this exception is 
effectively restricted to services CCAs. When it comes to current contributions 
not qualifying for either of the exceptions, a comparable uncontrolled price 
would have to be sought, a more substantial profit mark-up on costs would have 
to be applied or a transactional profit split has to be determined. 
Finally, in respect of funding contributions, I agree with the OECD that these 
represent a limited value.  After all, if the other participants take care of all other 
contributions, including the contribution of pre-existing intangibles and the 
performance of development activities, it is quite unlikely that they would enter 
into a funding arrangement with a third party allowing that third party to reap 
returns in excess of a risk adjusted return, especially if they could obtain funding 
at a fixed interest rate elsewhere.
5.6. Balancing Payments
5.6.1. Introduction
After the contributions are identified and appropriately valued, the next step 
is to allocate the costs involved among the participants in proportion to their 
share in the anticipated benefits from the CCA. If it turns out that the contri-
butions of one or more participants are insufficient, then the contributions of 
one or more other participants will have been excessive. This is to be adjusted 
through appropriate balancing payments between these participants. It should 
be noted that the valuation of contributions at market price has the conse-
quence that balancing payments will in most cases come to include a profit 
element. By consequence, the amount settled can exceed the costs incurred by 
the participants receiving such payments. The OECD considers these payments 
to increase the value of the contributions of the payer and decrease that of the 
payee.268 Although this is not stated in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, I believe 
that balancing payments can be spread out over the course of the CCA, but 
268 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.34.
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could also take the form of a lump sum. For purpose of calculating the amount 
of the payments an appropriate cost allocation method has to be selected 
(see Paragraph 5.6.2). If the expectations about future benefits of participants 
change, this could be a reason to prospectively make adjustments to such allo-
cation method (see Paragraph 5.6.3). 
5.6.2. Allocation Methods
In order to allocate costs in a way that is consistent with the division of expected 
benefits, it is necessary to establish the relative value of the interest assigned to 
each participant. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not prescribe a fixed 
way in which to do this. An obvious approach would be to prepare an upfront 
estimate of additional income or cost savings per participant as a result of the 
activities performed under the CCA (a “direct” allocation method). However, 
financial projections may be unreliably. This is generally more likely with benefits 
that are realized in the further future. As projections themselves become uncer-
tain, it may be practically preferred to instead apply an allocation key based on 
an objectively verifiable measure that can reasonably be assumed to indicate 
a participant’s future benefit (an “indirect” allocation method). However, such 
indirect allocations on the basis of a general key can make it more difficult to 
then evidence such benefit (see Paragraph 5.2.2). Nevertheless, they are explic-
itly sanctioned by the OECD in Paragraph 8.21 of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
Possible objectively verifiable measures to use as an allocation key include 
assets, capital invested, number of employees, production, sales and earnings. 
If a CCA covers multiple activities, it could also be considered to use more than 
one allocation key. Allocation keys can be selected because they are closely 
related to the cost shared activities (I refer to those keys as “activities-based” 
keys) or because they can reasonably be considered indicative for expected 
benefits (I refer to those keys as “benefits-based” keys). For example the number 
of computer workstations might be an appropriate activities-based allocation 
key for the costs and risks involved in the development and roll-out of an inter-
nally employed software product. On the other hand in strongly trademark 
driven businesses sales could be expected to be a realistic benefits-based indi-
cator of the expected future benefits per participant from the cost shared devel-
opment of a new brand name. 
Whether an activities-based key or a benefits-based key is more appropriate in 
my view depends on the scope of the activities covered by the CCA. An activi-
ties-based key is more likely to be suitable, if the scope of activities is narrow and 
the main purpose is to realize a cost saving or develop an asset or service that is 
intended only for internal use. In that case there will often be a relatively direct 
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relationship between the activities and the expected benefits and a correspond-
ingly higher reliability of the selected allocation key. If the scope of activities is 
wide and the main purpose is to create additional income, it may be better to 
use a benefits-based key.  In that case the relationship between the activities 
and the expected benefits will be more indirect. This can influence the reliability 
of the allocation key and that makes it even more important to consider all rele-
vant facts and circumstances. For example, units produced or sold is only an 
appropriate key, when the cost shared activities relate to the production or sale 
of uniform items under comparable circumstances. If the participants produce 
or sell different products with variable profit margins, units produced or sold 
can be a less suitable measure to determine their share in expected benefits. In 
the same way third party sales will only be a reliably profit indicator, if partic-
ipants operate at the same level in the value chain, for example if they are all 
manufacturers and/or they are all distributors. If third party sales are used as an 
allocation key for participants that operate at different levels in the value chain, 
manufacturers are likely to be allocated too little and distributors are likely to be 
allocated too many costs.         
5.6.3. Adjustments
If the actual benefits of participants differ substantially from their anticipated 
results or relevant circumstances change in such a way that the expectations 
about future benefits are altered, it may be necessary to adjust the cost alloca-
tion method. In fact, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines require all CCAs to 
foresee in a periodic reassessment of contributions vis-à-vis the revised share 
of benefits.269 The US Cost Sharing Regulations provide for a similar require-
ment.270 Adjustments to cost allocation methods should be distinguished from 
adjustments to the value of (pre-existing) contributions. The latter adjust-
ments were discussed in Paragraph 4.3.3.3 and Paragraph 5.5.3.2.4. They may 
under circumstances have a retroactive effect. Adjustments to cost allocation 
methods on the other hand are intended to be of a prospective nature only. I 
believe that adjustments of the allocation method are more likely to occur when 
a direct allocation method is used, for example when the cost allocation is for a 
longer period of time based on anticipated results as determined at the outset 
of the CCA. Contrary to such a fixed direct cost allocation, a variable indirect 
allocation based on a general allocation key has the advantage that it automat-
ically corrects the cost allocation to better reflect actual results. If for example a 
sales key is used, this means that balancing payments in the course of the CCA 
269 Idem, Paragraph 8.22.
270 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations, Paragraph 1.482-7(e)(1)(i).
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will be adjusted to actual sales of the participants in the fiscal year to which the 
balancing payment relates.   
5.6.4. Buy-in, Buy-out and Termination Payments
A change in the constellation of participants in an existing CCA occurs when 
a new participant joins the arrangement, an existing participant leaves the 
arrangement or the CCA is terminated. This can effectively result in a transfer 
among the participants of the effective ownership of the results from the cost 
shared activities already performed. Such a transfer will require an appropriate 
arm’s length compensation. The OECD recognizes this in section D of Chapter 
VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, where it refers to these payments as 
buy-in and buy-out payments.271 That section however does not provide for any 
specific guidance on how these payments are to be calculated. It only mentions 
that they should be determined in accordance with the other chapters of the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, most notably Chapter I – III and Chapter VI. Further-
more, it indicates that the tax treatment of buy-in and buy-out payments should 
be the same as when the payments were made to acquire the interest in the 
results of the cost shared activities outside of the CCA.  
 In my opinion when a new participant joins an existing CCA, the relationship 
between the existing participants and the new participants is similar to that 
of participants that conclude a completely new CCA. The existing cost shared 
results constitute assets of a pre-existing value developed externally from that 
new CCA. They are in other words pre-existing contributions of the original 
participants, for which the new participant should pay an appropriate balancing 
payment as outlined in the preceding paragraphs above. When on the other 
hand a participant leaves the CCA and abandons its interest in the cost shared 
results in favor of the remaining participants, it in fact transfers such interest to 
the other participants. In my opinion this logically triggers balancing payments 
from the remaining participants to the departing participant. As such, Section D 
of Chapter VIII does not provide completely original guidance, but instead only 
clarifies how the mechanics of a CCA outlined elsewhere in Chapter VIII work out 
in case of newly entering or exiting participants.
271 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.44 and 8.46.
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5.7. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 5 are as follows,
In respect of scoping of activities:
(i) Both development activities and services are suitable for cost sharing, 
provided they benefit multiple participants. Shareholder activities, duplica-
tive activities and activities resulting only in incidental benefits by defini-
tion have to be excluded. The existence of a benefit can be more difficult 
to evidence when an indirect cost allocation method is used. However, tax 
administrations should only disallow balancing payments because of dupli-
cation in case of clearly abusive situations, because it is highly unlikely that 
an MNE would otherwise knowingly allow for an inefficient structuring of 
its operations.
In respect of selection of participants:
(i) Only group companies that expect a real benefit from their own indi-
vidual exploitation of the cost shared results can participate in a CCA, i.e. 
only those group companies that are entitled to some part of the residual 
profit from the exploitation of those results. Low risk service providers 
merely expecting a cash compensation for the activities they perform are 
excluded. As such, participants are those group companies that perform 
primary activities, generally manufacturing or sales, and the level at which 
those activities are integrated within the group defines them.
(ii) Group companies can only participate in a CCA, if they can assume the risks 
associated with the cost shared activities. It is a logical consequence of the 
ALS that a party to a transaction cannot assume risks, if it does not have a 
minimal level of substance. It should employ relevantly skilled personnel 
and have at its disposal the further necessary resources to control such 
risks. 
(iii) The control-over-risk requirement limits the level of centralization allowed 
under a CCA. It therefore targets CCAs that are on the top end of the 
vertical axis of the categorization model of Paragraph 2.3.3.2. If centrali-
zation reaps a group company from the capacity to control any of the risk 
associated with the cost shared activities, i.e. in the case of a true cash 
box entity, then such company is disallowed access to the CCA altogether. 
However, the control-over-risk requirement has not been consistently 
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applied in international tax law.  The US Treasury and IRS for example have 
traditionally allowed US taxpayers to enter into CSAs with low substance 
affiliates located in tax havens. 
(iv) If a non-participating group company benefits from the activities performed 
under a CCA, they should pay an appropriate compensation that should 
be shared proportionally among the participating group companies. As 
the non-participant does not become a co-owner of the results from the 
CCA, such compensation is not necessarily equal to the amount that the 
non-participant would have been charged had it in fact participated in the 
CCA.
In respect of assignment of benefits:
(i) To avoid uncertainty and disputes, the CCA contract should identify 
benefits and assign them to individual participants as unambiguously as 
possible. Most commonly benefits are divided up on a territorial or field 
of use basis. This should be done in such a way that future benefits of each 
participant can be estimated with reasonable reliability and can be properly 
administrated when they materialize.
In respect of valuation of contributions:
(i) Contributions of participants can consist of assets, including intangible 
assets, obtained or developed externally from the CCA (so called pre-ex-
isting contributions) as well as the performance or funding of cost shared 
activities (so called current contributions).
(ii) “Soft” intangibles like local market features, a work force in place, good-
will and going concern value are not contributions themselves. They can 
however qualify as comparability factors that impact the valuation of 
contributions.
(iii) It follows from the ALS that contributions under a CCA should be valued at 
market price and not at cost. More strictly testing this will ensure that all 
resources made available under CCAs aimed at developing high value, inno-
vative intangibles are appropriately rewarded. As such, that targets CCAs 
that are at the right end of the horizontal axis of the categorization chart 
of Paragraph 2.3.3.2. The valuation of contributions under these arrange-
ments should reflect the arm’s length value of all functions performed, 
assets used and risks assumed.   
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(iv) The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines allows for two exceptions to the main 
rule that current contributions should be valued at market price. As the 
value of the contributions of a participant should be tested against market 
price on an accumulated basis, current contributions may be valued at cost, 
if the effect of comparability factors is already reflected in the valuation of 
earlier pre-existing contributions. Furthermore, a valuation at cost can be 
an appropriate way to determine the relative value of current contributions 
under low value added services CCAs.
(v) The first exception, leaving room to reflect the effect of comparability 
factors related to later current contribution in the valuation of earlier pre-ex-
isting contributions, was undoubtedly instigated by the United States. 
The US Treasury and IRS have since long been seeking to increase buy-in 
payments to US based group companies. There are clear downsides to this 
approach, specifically when it comes to open-ended CCAs. These down-
sides are caused by an irregularity, which consists of taking into account 
comparability factors for purposes of a valuation exercise that are inher-
ently related to contributions that are the subject of another, completely 
separate valuation exercise. Firstly, this significantly overcomplicates the 
valuation of the pre-existing contributions.  Secondly, it shifts the focus 
of discussion about current contributions to the cost basis, which leads to 
difficult to answer questions about which costs have to be shared. Thirdly, 
it implies a timing mismatch as it involves a front loading of taxable income 
to a time at which the pre-existing contribution is compensated, while the 
value is created only when the later cost shared activities are performed.      
(vi) By their nature, transfer pricing analysis of CCAs will frequently involve 
the valuation of intangible assets. There is not a single valuation technique 
that mandatorily has to be applied for all these valuations, nor is there 
any valuation standard or method that should be rejected upfront. It will 
often be most appropriate to value an intangible at the discounted value of 
projected future income or cash flows. 
(vii) If there is no reliable comparable and future income from the exploitation 
of intangibles is difficult to predict, the OECD under certain conditions 
sanctions the use of ex post results for purposes of testing the arm’s length 
nature of a valuation. I believe that taxpayers should consider adopting a 
price adjustment clause in their CCA contracts in anticipation of this.
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In respect of the calculation of balancing payments:
(i) Disproportionality of contributions is to be restored through so called 
balancing payments. As a consequence of the valuation of contributions 
at market price these payments will in most cases include a profit element. 
The amounts that are to be settled can be determined using either a direct 
or an indirect cost allocation method. An indirect cost allocation method 
can feature an activities-based or a benefits-based key. The former is more 
suitable in case of a narrowly scoped CCA aimed at realizing a cost saving, 
while the latter is more suitable in case of a broadly scoped CCA aimed at 
generating additional income. 
(ii) The allocation methods may require prospective adjustments, if they no 
longer reflect the participants’ proportionate share of anticipated benefits.
(iii) If new participants enter or existing participant leave a CCA, that will often 
lead to a transfer of the intangibles already developed under the CCA prior 
to such event. Those intangibles should then be regarded a pre-existing 
contribution of the existing participants or the departing participant. In 
either case, after a market price valuation of the intangibles such contribu-
tion should be appropriately compensated for by the incoming or departing 
participants. 
5.7.  CONCLUSIONS
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6.1. Introduction
While the OECD and US have clearly dominated the debate about transfer 
pricing aspects of CCAs, the arrangements have also for several years been 
on the work program of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (“EUJTPF”). As a 
concrete result from that a Report on services CCAs not creating intangible 
property was published on 7 June 2012.272 This Report was intended to supple-
ment the EUJTPF’s guidance on low value adding intra-group services and to 
complete its work on intra-group services in general. In order not to interfere 
with the ongoing OECD project on the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 
the scope of the Report was deliberately limited to those CCAs that do not 
create intangible property. The conclusions in the Report received full support 
from the European Commission in its “Communication on the Work of the EUJTPF 
in the period July 2010 to June 2012”.273 That Communication was adopted by the 
Commission on 19 September 2012 and subsequently welcomed by the Euro-
pean Council on 4 December 2012.274 This Chapter 6 analyzes that Report and 
puts it in a critical perspective. It is an adjusted version of an article, which I 
published in the International Transfer Pricing Journal in April 2013.275
6.2. Legal Status of the EUJTPF Report
First of all it is important to note that binding European harmonization in 
respect of direct taxes is generally only possible through Council directives. 
These require unanimous consent of all Member States. For situations in which 
unanimity is not achieved but at least nine Member States do want to proceed, 
272 European Commission, Communication on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the 
period July 2010 to June 2012 and related proposals 1. Report on Small and Medium Enterprises 
and Transfer Pricing and 2. Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services not creating 
Intangible Property (IP), 19 September 2012, COM(2012)516.
273 Idem. 
274 European Council, Press Release 17131/1/12 REV 1, 4 December 2012.
275 Nijssen, International Transfer Pricing Journal, 2013/3.
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the Treaty of Nice introduced the possibility of “enhanced cooperation”. This 
allows for increased integration in an area within EU structures, without all 
Member States being involved. However, it is still a cumbersome and politically 
complicated process. As an alternative the European Commission often takes 
the initiative itself to position harmonization measures as mere recommenda-
tions. That is also the case in respect of the proposals included in the EUJTPF 
Report, which the Commission has invited Member States to implement in their 
national legislation or administrative rules.276 Although such invitation might 
put some pressure on Member States to adopt the recommendations, it still 
does not cause the EUJTPF Report to exceed the status of “soft law”. 
6.3. Contents of the EUJTPF Report
6.3.1. Activities and Participants
After an introductory section the Report starts off to clarify the difference 
between the definition of intra-group services (“IGS”) on the one hand and 
CCAs on the other. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines make the same 
distinction, addressing IGS in chapter VII and CCAs in chapter VIII. At the time 
the EUJTPF wrote its Report, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines defined a 
CCA as “a framework agreed among business enterprises to share the costs and 
risks of developing, producing or obtaining assets, services or rights, and to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the interests of each participant in those assets, 
services or rights”.277 The Report duplicated this definition278 and continued to list 
the distinctive elements of CCAs as compared to IGS279. Among others it is stip-
ulated that CCAs are aimed at not only sharing costs, but also risks and benefits 
of the activities covered. As such, the EUJTPF recognizes that under a CCA all 
participants also share in the costs of unsuccessfully or inefficiently provided 
services, whereas under IGS the service provider generally bears the risk of 
failed or over expensive projects. 
Furthermore, like the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the US Cost Sharing 
Regulations before it, the EUJTPF Report confirms that a CCA allocates costs 
and risks based on the expected benefits of participants, while in case of IGS 
the allocation is determined by the extent to which service recipients request 
services to be rendered. As a result a company cannot be a participant in a CCA, 
276 COM/2012/516, section 3: Commission Conclusions.
277 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, paragraph 8.3 (old).
278 EUJTPF, “Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services Not Creating Intangible Property 
(IP)”, Paragraph 7.
279 Idem, Paragraph 12.
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if the only benefit it expects consists of receiving a payment for the CCA activi-
ties it performs. Instead such company would be regarded an IGS provider, that 
should include a profit element in its service fee.280 While the EUJTP’s position 
on the requirement of an expected benefit for each participant is very clear, its 
position is more ambiguous where it concerns the minimum level of influence 
on decision making required per participant in respect of the services covered 
by a CCA. Under the Report participants can contribute either in cash or in kind 
and it is therefore not necessary for them to actively participate in the actual 
performance of these services. In respect of substance requirements applying 
to participants, the Report goes no further than to state that their involvement 
in cost shared activities can vary depending on the type of CCA, the expertise 
of the participants and the amount of costs being allocated to the respective 
participants.281 Initially it was considered to include that each participant has 
to be involved in strategic decision making, but not necessarily in the day to 
day management. However, that wording was left out on request of the Dutch 
representatives at the EUJTPF and private sector members, because it was 
not regarded relevant in respect of the services covered by the Report.282 As a 
consequence the minimum influence on decision making depends on facts and 
circumstances, which have to be assessed on a case by case basis. The EUJTPF 
Report therefore leaves open the possibility that CCAs may exist under which 
certain participants with limited substance have no such influence at all. In my 
opinion this overly careful approach hollows out the Report and thereby further 
reduces its added value. Be that how it may, since the OECD’s renewed guid-
ance has meanwhile introduced a requirement for participants to control the 
risks associated with the cost shared activities283, it should be assumed that also 
in respect of services CCAs concluded in the EU minimum standards apply for 
the substance of participating group companies.   
6.3.2. Benefits and Contributions
As the EUJTPF operates within the framework of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, it makes sense that the Report requires the outcome of CCAs to be 
in line with the ALS. This implies that third parties should under similar circum-
stances also have been prepared to enter into the CCA. As such each partici-
pant’s expected benefit should be consistent with the value of its overall contri-
280 Idem, Paragraph 43.
281 Idem, Paragraph 16, sub (viii).
282 Revised Secretariat working document, March 8th 2012, JTPF/020/REV2/2011.
283 See Paragraph 5.3.2.2.
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bution. The EUJTPF Report provides some guidance in respect of both these 
elements.
In respect of expected benefits, the Report points out that those can consist of an 
increase of income, a saving in expenses, the possibility to maintain profit or the 
avoidance of losses.284 As already stated in the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines a key element is that the participants should have been prepared to pay for 
the services or otherwise would have performed the services themselves. For 
activities not creating intangible property it is often possible to determine the 
benefit of individual participants by applying an appropriate allocation key to 
the group’s overall benefit. The EUJTPF’s earlier Guidelines on low value adding 
intra-group services already provided allocation keys of common usage.285 All in 
all the Report does not seem to add much to the existing guidance from other 
sources in respect of the benefit test. On the contrary, it could create some 
confusion by what appears to be a circulus in probando where it is included in 
Paragraph 30 that the allocation key chosen should reflect the expected benefit 
per participant, while Paragraph 31 states that it should be able to derive the 
benefit per participant from applying an appropriate allocation key.
When it comes to contributions the Report, like the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines before it, explains how these can be valued at market price or at 
cost. At the time the EUJTPF Report was written, the OECD did not manda-
torily prescribe either method. Instead it only recognized that in this respect 
further guidance in addition to Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
might still be required.286 Limiting the Report to CCAs not creating intangible 
property offered the EUJTPF the opportunity to take an additional step and 
recommend contributions generally to be valued at cost.287 This is a practical 
approach, following the assumption that for the type of activities covered by 
these CCAs there is in most cases only a small difference between the pricing at 
cost and at market value. That also fits in with the later guidance of the OECD 
under the BEPS-project, which conditionally allows for a valuation of contribu-
tions at cost:
“Whereas it cannot be assumed that the value of pre-existing contributions 
corresponds to costs, it is sometimes the case that cost could be used as a 
284 EUJTPF, “Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services Not Creating Intangible Property 
(IP)”, Paragraph 29.
285 EUJTPF, “Guidelines on low value adding Intra-group Services” as adopted by the European Commis-
sion on January 25th 2011, Paragraph 53.
286 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.1.
287 EUJTPF, “Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services Not Creating Intangible Property 
(IP)”, Paragraph 34.
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practical means to measure relative value of current contributions. Where 
the difference between the value and costs is relatively insignificant, for 
practical reasons, current contributions of a similar nature may be measured 
at cost in such cases for services CCAs.”288 
The next question is of course what costs should be taken into account. Since 
the Xilinx and Altera case the relevance of that matter has been well recognized 
in the United States.289 The US 2011 Final Cost Sharing Regulations include more 
detailed wording on the topic. The EUJTPF’s Report on the other hand addresses 
it in generic terms only: 
“Contributions should include all relevant costs for the acquisition, mainte-
nance or for securing the benefits derived from the arrangement”.290
6.3.3. Balancing Payments and Adjustments
Like the US Cost Sharing Regulations and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines, the Report generally assumes that any inequality of contributions will be 
compensated through balancing payments. After these payments, the results 
from the cost shared activities should be commonly available to all participants 
free of any further charge. As a consequence it makes sense that when a new 
participant joins, it has to pay an arm’s length buy-in premium for IP previously 
developed under the CCA. Similarly, a buy-out premium can become payable 
when a participant exits the CCA. By limiting the scope of the Report to CCAs on 
services not creating IP, the EUJTPF was able to minimize the section on partici-
pants joining and leaving a CCA. It does state that an adjustment of the propor-
tionate share of costs to be borne by each participant might be required in such 
a case to ensure that the remaining arrangement is consistent with the ALS.291 
However, the complicated matter of how buy-in and buy-out premiums are to 
be treated, just like the question how contributed pre-existing intangibles are to 
be valued, is avoided completely.           
According to the EUJTPF, tax administrations should not challenge the business 
choice of entering into a CCA or require an analysis from taxpayers defending 
such choice.292 At the same time the terms and conditions of the CCA have to 
be at arm’s length, i.e. businesslike. Furthermore, the taxpayer has to be able 
288 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.28.
289 See Paragraph 4.4.
290 EUJTPF, “Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services Not Creating Intangible Property 
(IP)”,  Paragraph 37.
291 Idem, Paragraph 46.
292 Idem, Paragraph 16.
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to explain the CCA within the overall context of its business in order to under-
stand the rationale for entering into it.293 If these requirements are not met, 
the outcome of the CCA is not consistent with the ALS and a tax administra-
tion can under certain circumstances make adjustments to a taxpayer’s taxable 
income. If the actual benefits of participants differ from the expected benefits, 
the Report instructs tax auditors to first analyze the reasons for the difference 
before concluding whether the CCA is at arm’s length.294 To the extent that 
projections can be regarded reasonable or the difference is not material, tax 
administrations should refrain from making adjustments. When testing the 
projections a tax auditor should not make improper use of hindsight. Instead 
the economic and commercial circumstances prevailing or reasonably foresee-
able at the time of entering into the arrangement should be leading. The ques-
tion has to be answered whether third parties under similar conditions would 
have also entered into the arrangement, would have negotiated the possibility 
to amend the agreement based on results or would not have signed up for it at 
all. Neither the Report itself nor the EUJTPF’s earlier Guidelines on low value 
adding Intra-Group Services clearly indicates how in respect of the pricing of 
these services the burden of proof is split up between the taxpayer and the tax 
administration. This is left to the national law of the Member States. A further 
analysis of the division of the burden of proof in transfer pricing disputes as well 
as the documentation requirements in respect of CCAs will follow in Chapter 7.  
6.4. Relevance of the EUJTPF Report
In the second to last paragraph of the Report the EUJTPF concludes that: 
“following the recommendations [included in the Report] would facilitate evalua-
tion and acceptance that the arm’s length principle has been applied in the majority 
of the cases that fall within the scope of this Report”295. When adopting the Report, 
the European Commission was of the opinion that the Report addressed the 
EUJTPF’s key target of achieving a more uniform application of transfer pricing 
rules within the EU, while the European Council predicted that the Report would 
“contribute to reducing tax disputes related to intra-group services within the EU 
and help improve the functioning of the internal market”.296 However, by limiting 
the scope of the Report to CCAs on services not creating intangible property 
one of the most complex aspects of CCAs, the issue of appraising valuable 
development activities was circumvented and the matter of entry and exit fees 
293 Idem, Paragraph 25.
294 Idem, Paragraph 17.
295 Idem, Paragraph 55.
296 European Council, Press Release 17131/1/12 REV 1, 4 December 2012.
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did not get addressed in much detail. Instead only general wording was included 
on the valuation of work in progress as well as the rebalancing of cost shares in 
line with the ALS in case of changes in the group of participants. Although not 
having to tackle this issue might have speeded up the publication of the Report, 
it has also undeniably limited its added value.     
6.5. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 6 are as follows,
In respect of the intentions and results of the EUJTPF Report:
(i) With its 2012 Report the EUJTPF has attempted to make recommenda-
tions that contribute to a harmonization of the tax treatment of CCAs not 
creating intangible property within the EU. Useful, though not always inno-
vative guidance is provided on who can participate in a CCA, how expected 
benefits and contributions per participant are to be valued and what docu-
mentation requirements taxpayers have to be lived up to. Furthermore the 
Report elaborates on the conditions under which tax administrations can 
adjust a CCA’s outcome.
(ii) Most notably the Report allows for contributions under services CCAs to be 
valued at cost. By doing so it appears to have created the basis for the later 
guidance of a similar tenor included in Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines as part of the BEPS revisions.
In respect of the limitations of the EUJTPF Report:
(i) The overall level of detail of the Report is limited. The Report does not 
address the level of influence on decision making required from partici-
pants and the identification of costs to be shared under a CCA. Further-
more, by limiting the scope of the Report to CCAs on services not creating 
intangible property issues around the valuation of development activities 
and buy-in payments did not get to be exhaustively addressed. 
(ii) As the most pressing issues in respect of the transfer pricing treatment of 
CCAs are bypassed in the Report, its relevance for day-to-day fiscal prac-
tice is limited, most certainly when compared to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines or the US Cost Sharing Regulations.
6.4.  RELEVANCE OF THE EUJTPF REPORT
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7.1. Introduction
Regardless of whether an MNE’s tax strategy is to minimize its tax bill by all 
legal means, including aggressive tax planning, or just to manage its fiscal posi-
tion in a responsible manner and avoid uncertainty and risks where possible, the 
enterprise will be looking for an international cost reallocation mechanism that 
is practically enforceable and does not place a disproportionate administrative 
work load on its accounting and control departments. In this context it has to 
be kept in mind that management reporting does not necessarily require reallo-
cating costs to individual group companies. Instead it can also be acceptable to 
keep certain costs in a reporting unit maintained by a central legal entity. In that 
case it is only for fiscal and statutory reporting purposes that costs have to be 
accurately allocated and invoiced. An MNE focused on its business operations 
will then naturally seek the most pragmatic solution to such an administrative 
challenge. Taking that into consideration this Chapter 7 considers the admin-
istrative burden that transfer pricing in general and the operation of a CCA in 
specific may impose on an organization. It starts off to examine the division of 
the burden of proof between taxpayers and tax authorities in general (Para-
graph 7.2) and then discusses documentation requirements in respect of CCAs 
(Paragraph 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5). Finally, the obligation on tax administrations, to 
observe reasonableness and proportionality when imposing additional admin-
istrative obligations, is discussed and illustrated by an Italian court case from 
2005 (Paragraph 7.6).
7.2. Burden of Proof
7.2.1. Who Should Prove What in Tax and Transfer Pricing Cases?
Given their complexity and frequent use in tax planning structures, the tax and 
transfer pricing treatment of CCAs may relatively often become the subject 
of dispute between tax administrations and taxpayers.  It is then a principle 
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question who bears the burden of proof in respect of the facts and circum-
stances determining the taxpayer’s legal position. Many countries have in their 
domestic tax laws split the burden of proof so that tax administrations have to 
prove taxable income, while the taxpayers have to prove deductible expenses. 
Some did so because they consider that the burden of proof should rest on the 
party who can most easily obtain relevant information, others because they 
uphold that obligations to evidence claims in legal proceedings rest with the 
party that lays charges.  Following this principle other countries, including the 
United States, take a different approach. In the US taxpayers are considered to 
have better knowledge of both income and expenses and therefore they are 
required to evidence all relevant facts in respect of both elements.297  In a Euro-
pean context the division of the burden of proof between tax administration 
and taxpayer in a transfer pricing case has been the subject of litigation. The 
European Court of Justice considered that an anti-abuse measure that shifts 
the burden of proof to the taxpayers in transfer pricing cases can be justified in 
an EU context by the objective of providing tax avoidance in combination with 
the objective to preserve the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
between Member States.298
In an international context it can be particularly difficult for tax administrations 
to collect all relevant information determining the fiscal position of taxpayers. 
This is even more so, when cross-border transactions with companies in tax 
havens are involved and the local authorities are reluctant to exchange informa-
tion.  Many European countries have responded to this by increasing the burden 
of proof on taxpayers in those instances. The Netherlands for example reverses 
the burden of proof to the disadvantage of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer does 
not provide the tax administration with information that rests with a related 
company in a country with which the Netherlands has not concluded an agree-
ment on the exchange of information.299 
Furthermore, the division of the burden of proof takes a special position in 
transfer pricing cases. From my perspective there are two reasons for this. 
The first reason follows from the principle based approach (as opposed to a 
rule based approach) that is inherent to the ALS. The standard’s application is 
always circumstantial and, as also seen in the previous chapters, often requires 
calculations to be made on the basis of assumptions. Besides the fact that the 
reliability of these assumptions may be difficult to test, the ALS consistently 
leaves room for a certain amount of subjective interpretation. There can always 
297 B. Leidhammar in Meussen et al 2013, page 3.
298 ECJ C-311/08, “SGI”, 21 January 2010. Also see: G.T.K. Meussen, European Taxation 2010/6.
299 Article 47a Dutch General Tax Act (“Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen”).
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be different views about what is appropriate and what is fair. In fact multiple 
transfer pricing methods might lead to different, yet both acceptable outcomes. 
As a consequence, most of the time it is not possible and also not necessary 
to evidence indisputably that the one and only correct transfer price has been 
determined. Instead, it is sufficient to show that in good faith a pricing method 
was used that has led to an acceptable outcome.300 It is probably less compli-
cated to defend that this is the case than to prove the opposite. The second 
reason why the burden of proof requires extra attention in transfer pricing cases 
is that tax administrations, as mentioned several times before already, have a 
natural information disadvantage compared to taxpayers. The latter have more 
direct insight in their business and the market on which they operate. Taxpayers 
are in the best position to establish where, how and by whom functions are 
performed, assets are used and risks are assumed within their company and 
what is therefore an appropriate transfer pricing policy. Tax administrations 
on the other hand have a much harder job evidencing the negative, i.e. that 
transfer prices used are non-businesslike and would not have been agreed upon 
by third parties under similar conditions.  
The foregoing makes the division of the burden of proof between tax adminis-
trations and taxpayers a delicate matter deserving careful attention. The OECD 
has worded its concerns about that as follows:
“In practice neither countries nor taxpayers should misuse the burden of 
proof… Because of the difficulties with transfer pricing analysis, it would 
be appropriate for both taxpayers and tax administrations to take special 
care and to use restraint in relying on the burden of proof in the course of 
the examinations of a transfer pricing case. More particularly, as a matter of 
good practice, the burden of proof should not be misused by the tax adminis-
trations or taxpayers as a justification for making groundless or unverifiable 
assertions about transfer pricing. A tax administration should be prepared 
to make a good faith showing that its determination of transfer pricing is 
consistent with the arm’s length principle even where the burden of proof is 
on the taxpayer, and taxpayers similarly should be prepared to make a good 
faith showing that their transfer pricing is consistent with the arm’s length 
principle regardless of where the burden of proof lies.”301 
300 In line with this concept Paragraph 5.27 of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines requires 
taxpayers “to endeavor to determine transfer prices for tax purposes in accordance with the arm’s 
length principle”. 
301 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 4.16.
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If tax administrations want to adjust a taxpayer’s taxable income in a transfer 
pricing conflict, it is in most countries up to them to show that the outcome 
of intra-group transactions is not in line with the ALS. There are also some 
countries, including the United States, where the burden of proof is with the 
taxpayer from the start. However, corrections made by a tax administration in 
these countries should always be in accordance with transfer pricing standards 
as derived from tax law and in the US for example corrections cannot be upheld, 
if the taxpayer is able to show that a transfer price adjustment is arbitrary or 
capricious.302 Be this how it may, it is commonly accepted, also outside the US, 
that the information inequality places tax administrations at a serious disadvan-
tage. Legislators have tried to compensate for this by including an obligation 
for taxpayers in their tax laws to adhere to any reasonable information request 
from tax administrations. This is often supplemented by requirements for 
taxpayers to document both how transfer pricing methods were selected and 
how it is ensured that they have an arm’s length outcome. As Marino worded it 
in his contribution to the EATPL’s 2011 Report on the burden of proof in tax law:
“…due to the aforementioned globalization trend, tax administrations 
are becoming more and more unable to collect the necessary information 
in order to better ascertain the international tax allocation, and this is 
the reason why there is a parallel trend to somehow shift this burden to 
taxpayers by requiring the collection of a set of documents related to their 
international transfer pricing policy.”303
The “parallel trend” referenced by Marino received a further push, when the 
concern of the general public about tax avoidance resulted in a demand for 
increased transparency on the tax strategies of MNEs and the  OECD included in 
the BEPS Action Plan an action to re-examine transfer pricing documentation.304 
That resulted in a Final Report outlining a standard set of documentation that 
should provide tax administrations with all relevant information about global 
allocation of income, economic activity and tax paid, the contents of which is 
further discussed in Paragraph 7.3. 305
302 See for an analysis of the burden of proof in transfer pricing matters under US tax law: J. Witten-
dorff 2010, Paragraph 2.3.3.2.2. 
303 See G. Marino in Meussen et al 2013, page 40.
304 OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 19 July 2013, Action 13.
305 OECD/G20, “Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting”, 5 October 2015.
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7.2.2. Penalties
As explained above most countries use documentation requirements to shift 
the burden of proof on to the taxpayer. By consequence, the taxpayer is incen-
tivized to meet these requirements and to, by doing so, reverse that shift. 
However, many tax administrations did not solely want to rely on the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof to enforce documentation requirements. They have 
additionally imposed penalties in case of non-compliance. These penalties 
usually consist of one fixed amount or fixed amounts per missing document. 
In more exceptional cases they might also be defined as a percentage of the 
tax understatement, a percentage of the income adjustment or a percentage 
of the value of undocumented transactions.  Alternatively countries promote 
the fulfillment of documentation requirements by granting penalty protection 
to compliant taxpayers. These countries limit the penalty levied on tax adjust-
ments, provided the taxpayer completed the required documentation in good 
faith and submitted it timely to the proper authorities. 
7.3. OECD Documentation Guidance
7.3.1.  The Three-Tiered Approach
The purpose of transfer pricing documentation is generally threefold. It forces 
taxpayers to establish consistent transfer pricing policies, it enables tax admin-
istrations to perform transfer pricing risk assessments and it facilitates tax 
audits.306  In order to achieve these objectives the OECD, as part of the BEPS-
project, adopted a three-tiered approach based on the EU’s transfer pricing 
documentation concept, which is discussed in Paragraph 7.5. This approach 
requires MNEs to prepare a central master file supplemented by local files and 
a so called country-by-country report. The master file should provide a “blue-
print” of the MNE’s group, describing its organizational structure, its business 
activities, its use of intangibles, intercompany financial transactions as well 
as its financial and tax positions.307 As the master file can be used in different 
countries, it should allow MNEs an efficient way to meet their documentation 
requirements. It is acknowledged that the master file is intended to provide only 
a high-level overview of the MNE’s operations and policies. Not all elements 
have to be addressed in detail. Nevertheless, the master file should at least list 
important agreements, intangibles and transactions. As such reference to CCAs 
306 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 5.5.
307 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Chapter V, Section C.1.
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in place within the group are a first requirement. Furthermore, it should become 
clear from the master file what type of intangible property the company uses 
and what role it plays in its value chain. Together with the information on the 
company’s organizational set-up, the master file should then allow its reader to 
position the MNE’s CCA under the categorization chart of Paragraph 2.3.3.2. In 
fact, I would promote MNEs to proactively include specific wording explicating 
that position and how that impacted the terms and conditions of the CCA, 
including most notably the selection of participants and the valuation of contri-
butions. 
The local files should provide more detailed information about intercompany 
transactions in which the individual group companies are involved.308 This may 
concern relevant financial information, a comparability analysis and the selec-
tion of the most appropriate transfer pricing method. In respect of CCAs the 
local file could include the value of contributions made by individual group 
companies as well as the calculation of balancing payments made or received 
by these companies. Together with the master file and the other relevant docu-
mentation, such as intercompany agreement, intercompany invoices, bench-
mark studies, documentation prepared for management purposes etc.,  the 
local files should assist tax administrations to better understand the activities 
performed, the participants, the division of benefits, the value of contributions 
and the allocation of costs and risks.
The OECD’s three-tiered approach is completed by the so called country-by-
country report. In this report MNEs have to show on an aggregated basis per tax 
jurisdiction their income and profit, income tax paid, stated capital and accumu-
lated earnings, number of employees and book value of their tangible assets.309 
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines mention specifically that “the information in the 
country-by-country report should not be used as a substitute for a detailed transfer 
pricing analysis of individual transactions and prices based on a fully functional 
analysis and a full comparability analysis”. This information is intended to offer 
tax administrations a starting point for a transfer pricing risk assessment and tax 
audits. In respect of CCAs the stated capital and accumulated earnings, number 
of employees and book value of assets are relevant elements determining the 
level of substance and therefore the ability of MNE affiliates to exercise control 
over risk and thus be actively involved in cost shared activities. Furthermore, the 
reported income and profit per jurisdiction might be an indication of whether 
the anticipated benefits of participants, on the basis of which costs and risks 
were allocated, were determined in a reasonable manner. The OECD assumes 
308 Idem, Section C.2.
309 Idem, Section C.3.
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that the transfer pricing documentation package will be updated every year. 
It is preferred to require the update of the master file to be completed on the 
due date for filing the tax return of the group’s ultimate parent company. The 
update of local files is to be completed at the due date for filing the local tax 
return and the updated country-by-country report should be available no later 
than one year after the last day of the fiscal year of the ultimate parent.310 Since 
the OECD’s proposal many OECD Member States have implemented a Coun-
try-by-country reporting requirement into their national law, while the Euro-
pean Council  on 25 May 2016 adopted a directive for a mandatory country-by-
country reporting by all MNEs, headquartered in the EU or outside, that have 
business activities on the European market and have a global turnover of more 
than € 750 million.311
7.3.2. The CCA Contract
The extent in which information about an individual CCA is to be included in the 
master file or local files depends on its complexity and importance. However 
that may be, details should always be accessible to all participants and it can be 
expected that they are outlined in a CCA contract. Taxpayers should be prepared 
to provide this contract to tax administrations upon their reasonable request. 
It should be available and signed by all participants at the outset, i.e. before 
the joint activities commence. The most relevant information that this contract 
should include according to the OECD is listed in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
In respect of the initial terms of the CCA it concerns:    
• A list of participants;
• A list of any other associated enterprises that will be involved with the 
CCA activity or that are expected to exploit or use the results of the subject 
activity;
• The scope of the activities and specific projects covered by the CCA, and 
how the CCA activities are managed and controlled;
• The duration of the arrangement;
310 Idem, Paragraph 5.29 – 5.30.
311 European Council, Directive (EU) 2016/881 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, 25 May 2016, OJ L146/8.
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• The manner in which participant’s proportionate shares of expected bene-
fits are measured, and any projections used in this determination;
• The manner in which any future benefits (such as intangibles) are expected 
to be exploited;
• The form and value of each participant’s initial contributions, and a 
detailed description of how the value of initial and ongoing contributions 
is determined (including any budgeted versus actual adjustments) and how 
accounting principles are applied consistently to all participants in deter-
mining expenditures and the value of contributions;
• The anticipated allocation of responsibilities and tasks, and the mecha-
nisms for managing and controlling those responsibilities and tasks, in 
particular, those relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, 
protection or exploitation of intangibles or tangible assets used in the CCA 
activity;
• The procedures for and consequences of a participant entering or with-
drawing from the CCA and the termination of the CCA; and 
• Any provisions for balancing payments or for adjusting the terms of the 
arrangement to reflect changes in economic circumstances.312
When it comes to information that might be useful over the duration of the CCA 
the above is complemented by documentation outlining:
• Any change to the arrangement (e.g. in terms, participants, subject 
activity), and the consequences of such change;
• A comparison between projections used to determine expected benefits 
from the CCA activity with the actual share of benefits;
• The annual expenditure incurred in conducting the CCA activity;
• The form and value of each participant’s contribution made during the 
CCA’s term; and 
312 Idem, Paragraph 8.52.
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• A detailed description of how the value of contributions is determined.313
7.4. PATA Documentation Guidance
United in the Pacific Association of Tax Administrations (“PATA”) the tax author-
ities of Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States have published the so 
called PATA Documentation Package (“PDP”).314 Using the PDP eliminates the 
need to prepare separate documentation for each country. It is voluntary and 
does not increase the legal requirements imposed on taxpayers in local laws. If a 
taxpayer satisfies the PDP’s operative principles it is guaranteed to have fulfilled 
the transfer pricing documentation requirements in each PATA country. PATA 
tax authorities will then not impose transfer pricing penalties in respect of the 
documented transactions. On the other hand complying with the PDP does not 
guarantee that documented transactions are at arm’s length. Therefore it does 
not rule out transfer pricing adjustments or the assessment of interest on those 
adjustments.  
The PTP is based on three operative principles:
(i) The taxpayer needs to make reasonable efforts to establish that transfer 
prices are at arm’s length,
(ii) The taxpayer needs to maintain contemporaneous documentation of the 
efforts to comply with the ALS, and
(iii) Upon request the taxpayer needs to produce the documentation to the 
PATA tax authorities in a timely manner.
 What qualifies as reasonable efforts to establish at arm’s length transfer prices is 
left to the discretion of the individual PATA tax authorities. It generally includes 
the analysis of controlled transactions, an investigation into possible compara-
bles as well as the selection and application of an appropriate transfer pricing 
method.
The second operative principle requires contemporaneous documentation. 
Contemporaneous in the sense of the PDP means that it should exist on the 
due date for filing the income tax return for the period in which the controlled 
transactions took place. The further requirements for the documentation are 
outlined in a schedule added as an annex to the PDP. In respect of CCAs the 
313 Idem, Paragraph 8.53.
314 PATA Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, 12 March 2003, IR-2003-32.
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information to be available is quite similar to that identified by the OECD. The 
PATA lists the following:
• A copy of the CCA agreement that is contemporaneous with its formation 
(and any revision) and any other agreements relating to the application of 
the CCA between the participants;
• A list of participants and other associated enterprises that will benefit from 
the CCA;
• The extent of the use of CCA property by associated enterprises which 
are not CCA participants, including the amounts of consideration paid or 
payable by these non-participants for use of the CCA property;
• A description of the scope of the activities to be undertaken, including any 
intangible or class of intangibles in existence or intended to be developed;
• A description of each participant’s interest in the results of the CCA activi-
ties;
• The duration of the arrangement;
• Procedures for and consequences of a participant entering or withdrawing 
from the agreement (i.e., buy-in and buy-out payments) and for the modi-
fication or termination of the agreement;
• The total amount of contributions incurred pursuant to the arrangement;
• The contributions borne by each participant and the form and value of each 
participant’s initial contributions (including research) with a description of 
how the value of initial and ongoing contributions is determined and how 
accounting principles are applied;
• A description of the method used to determine each participant’s share 
of the contributions including projections used to estimate benefits, any 
rationale and assumptions underlying the projections, and an explanation 
of why that method was selected;
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• The consistent accounting method used to determine the contributions 
and benefits (including the method used to translate foreign currencies), 
and to the extent that the method materially differs from accounting prin-
ciples accepted in the relevant PATA member’s country, an explanation of 
the material differences;
• Identification of each participant’s expected benefits to be derived from 
the CCA, the extent of the benefits expected, and the formula and projec-
tions used for allocating or sharing the expected benefits, and the rationale 
and assumptions underlying the expected benefits;
• Where material differences arise between projected benefits and actual 
benefits realized, the assumptions made to project future benefits need to 
be amended for future years, and the revised assumptions documented;
• Procedures governing balancing payments, e.g. where payments are 
required to reflect differences between projected benefits and actual bene-
fits realized.
7.5. EU Documentation Guidance
The OECD’s multi-tiered approach discussed above is based on a concept for 
transfer pricing documentation that was first introduced by the European Union. 
It was presented as the “Code of Conduct on Transfer Pricing Documentation for 
Associated Enterprises in the European Union” (“EUTPD”), which was proposed by 
the European Commission on 10 November 2005 and adopted by the European 
Council on 27 June 2006.315  The EUTPD requires MNEs with business operations 
in the an EU Member State to prepare a master file and a file with country-spe-
cific information. The latter file is similar to the local file required under the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines since the BEPS-project. The EUTPD is “soft” 
law. As such it is not binding on the EU Member States, although it does pose 
political pressure on them to implement its provisions under their national law 
as much as possible. Generally Member States have done so in different ways 
and that has put some limitation on the harmonization actually achieved. At the 
same time it has to be recognized that Member States generally refrain from 
imposing penalties if transfer pricing documentation is prepared in line with 
the EUTPD, that they accept transfer pricing documentation to be prepared in 
315 European Council, Resolution on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associ-
ated enterprises in the EU, 28 July 2006, OJ C176/1 (“EUTPD”).
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English, provided it is translated upon request, and they allow for the use of 
pan-European comparables to evidence uncontrolled prices.316 
The Code of Conduct on EU Transfer Pricing Documentation did not cover any 
specific guidance on the documentation of CCAs. This blind spot was later 
filled in by the EUJTPF’s “Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services 
not Creating Intangible Property (IP)”.317 That Report provides a list of corrobo-
rative information on CCAs that a taxpayer should be able to make available 
to a tax auditor upon request. This lists covers information about the general 
set-up of the CCA, its participants, the valuation of their expected benefits as 
well as the measurement of their contributions. Furthermore, the list includes 
documentation on the monitoring of the CCA’s outcome and the relationship 
with non-participants, who might provide or receive CCA services.318 Taxpayers 
seem to be granted some flexibility when it concerns the format in which they 
may submit the information. The Report equally values information from for 
example written agreements, a narrative and data from computer systems.319 
However, all in all the paragraphs on documentation requirements are not 
groundbreaking. Nevertheless, they do supplement the EUJTPF’s earlier work 
and the pragmatic approach in respect of formats might indeed help to restrict 
the administrative burden on taxpayers.
7.6. Proportionality
An effective way to limit the administrative burden appears to be international 
harmonization of documentation requirements. 320 The initiatives by the EU, 
PATA and OECD show that both tax administrations and intergovernmental 
organizations recognize this. In fact, they commonly accept that transfer pricing 
documentation rules should strike a balance between having useful information 
provided to tax administrations and limiting the administrative burden placed 
on taxpayers. As such, I would argue that a proportionality principle applies. 
Confirmation of such principle can also be found in Paragraph 5.28 of Chapter V 
of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as revised under the BEPS project:
316 For a comparative analysis see Guðmundsson, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2009/1.
317 European Commission, Communication on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the 
period July 2010 to June 2012 and related proposals 1. Report on Small and Medium Enterprises 
and Transfer Pricing and 2. Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services not creating 
Intangible Property (IP), 19 September 2012, COM(2012)516.
318 EUJTPF, “Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services Not Creating Intangible Property 
(IP)”, Paragraph 25.
319 Idem, Paragraph 51.
320 Also compare Borkowski, International Tax Journal, 2003/2.
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“Taxpayers should not be expected to incur disproportionately high costs 
and burdens in producing documentation. Therefore tax administrations 
should balance requests for documentation against the expected cost and 
administrative burden to the taxpayer of creating it...”
The overall level of detail required in transfer pricing documentation should 
reflect this. It can, for example, be regarded unnecessary and overly cumber-
some to require MNEs to list all individual intra-group transactions, while it 
may be appropriate to require them to show transaction flows, invoice flows 
and amount of transaction flows on an aggregated basis. At the end of the day 
transfer pricing documentation should contain enough detail for a proper risk 
assessment and to serve as the basis for a possible tax audit. Tax administra-
tions can then by specific request or in the course of such audit ask for additional 
information or documents. The most effective way to limit the administrative 
burden is by international harmonization of documentation requirements. The 
initiatives by the EU, PATA and OECD evidence that tax administrations and 
intergovernmental organizations also recognize this.
The application of the proportionality principle in case of CCA related documen-
tation is well illustrated by an Italian court case from 2005.321 As reported by 
a correspondent of the IBFD’s International Transfer Pricing Journal this case 
concerned an MNE with subsidiaries in Germany, France, the United Kingdom 
and Switzerland that performed intra-group services322. Using a CCA the costs 
involved were recharged to other group members, among which an Italian 
subsidiary. This was documented by a CCA contract providing a general descrip-
tion of the cost shared activities and including the names of employees involved 
in the activities. The contract also outlined the related costs and how they were 
to be allocated among participants. This was supplemented by samples of 
invoices with a high-level description of services performed, accounting docu-
ments on the computation of total costs and a statement from an accounting 
firm confirming their computation and allocation in accordance with the 
contract.
Even though the tax burden in the jurisdictions of the service providers was 
similar to that in Italy and there was no reason to shift profits to these coun-
tries, the Italian tax authorities denied a deduction for charges under the CCA 
for a lack of proper documentation. They argued that the CCA contract and the 
sampled invoices did not include a detailed enough description of the specific 
services actually performed. As such the available documentation in their view 
321 Provincial Tax Court of Milan, Chamber VIII, Decision 158, 28 June 2005.
322 Saccardo, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2006/2.
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did not prove that there was a benefit from the activities for the Italian CCA 
participant nor did it properly rule out the possibility that the costs charged 
included shareholder costs. The taxpayer disagreed and appealed to the Provin-
cial Tax Court of Milan. In front of the Court the taxpayer pointed out that it 
conflicted with the guidance from the Italian Ministry of Finance for the tax 
authorities to automatically deny the deductions without a further analysis. Had 
such further analysis been performed, it would, in the view of the taxpayer, have 
shown that the services underlying the CCA charges did in fact have a benefit 
as they increased the efficiency of the taxpayer’s business. The Court started its 
ruling by considering that under Italian tax law in cases like these it is the obliga-
tion of the taxpayer to prove the existence of costs and their benefit. However, 
it then continued to acknowledge that it is a common market practice for MNEs 
to share the costs of centralized activities.  In the Court’s opinion the available 
documentation convincingly showed that the costs were actually incurred, 
while the description of activities included in the CCA contract in combination 
with the sampled invoices and the accountant’s statement were considered 
sufficient proof of a benefit transferred onto the Italian group company. There-
fore, the Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer and allowed for a deduction of the 
CCA charges.  
In my opinion the decision of the Italian court is in line with the OECD guidance 
on proportionality. As such it requires taxpayers to prepare a thorough set of 
documents, but at the same time it also limits the overall complexity of that 
documentation and the consequential administrative burden on the taxpayer. 
Complying with this obligation places the burden of proof back with the tax 
administration, which would then have to evidence that the intercompany 
charges under a CCA are not at arm’s length. Furthermore, the ruling of the 
Provincial Tax Court of Milan is specifically helpful for the Italian fiscal practice, 
because it identifies quite explicitly what documentation was considered deci-
sive to prove the existence of costs and their benefit.   
7.7. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 6 are as follows,
In respect of the burden of proof:
(i) The principle based approach of transfer pricing rules and the natural infor-
mation inequality between taxpayer and tax administrations have resulted 
in a trend for tax administrations to introduce documentation requirements 
shifting the burden of proof in transfer pricing matters on to taxpayers. This 
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also impacts the way in which the burden of proof is divided up in case of 
uncertainty about transactions taking place under a CCA. Those transac-
tions will therefore also have to be thoroughly documented.
In respect of the documentation requirements applicable to CCAs:
(ii) The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the PATA Documentation 
Package prescribe an extensive list of information that should be included 
in that contract (see Paragraph 7.3.2 and 7.4). The CCA contract is the 
anchor point of CCA related documentation. It is further supplemented by 
the background information on the arrangement provided in the compa-
ny’s transfer pricing master file, local files and country-by-country report. 
Quite relevantly that should provide the reader of those reports insight 
into the type of intangibles used, their role in the MNE’s value chain and 
its organizational set-up. Those elements should allow qualification of the 
CCA using the categorization model presented in paragraph 2.3.3.2, which 
subsequently should be taken into consideration when testing the arm’s 
length nature of the terms and conditions of such arrangement. Addition-
ally, taxpayers should maintain an accurate administration evidencing the 
costs, intercompany charges and income associated with the CCA activi-
ties. Furthermore, taxpayers should be able to substantiate the valuation 
of contributions under the arrangement, for example by preparing valua-
tion reports or benchmarking studies.
(iii) The foregoing can impose a significant constraint on taxpayers. Transfer 
pricing documentation requirements can be considered the logical answer 
to the information dissymmetry gap that exists between tax administra-
tions and taxpayers.  At the same time they should remain reasonable. 
International standardization can help to limit the administrative burden 
and in that respect progress has been made due to the initiatives of the 
OECD, PATA and EU. I strongly believe however that tax administrations 
should continue to observe the proportionality of the requirements in prac-
tice on a case by case basis. In that context the decision of the Provincial 
Tax Court of Milan offers an example of when they should be satisfied with 
how taxpayers document their CCAs.
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8.1. Introduction
The previous, second part of this study dealt with the transfer pricing aspects 
of CCAs and addressed the allocation of profits among participants. That deter-
mines in the hand of which group company those profits are taxed.  The next 
step is to consider in which state or states that taxation will be imposed. This will 
depend on the national law of the state or states with which the group company 
or the source of the income has a certain connection as well as on the tax trea-
ties concluded by those states. Generally states will regard themselves entitled 
to tax the income of the companies that they consider their residents. This is 
referred to as the residence principle. In addition most states also aim to tax 
transactions that take place within their territory or assets that reside within 
their territory. This is referred to as the source or situs principle. The applica-
tion of both the residence and situs principle in respect of the same profits can 
cause the tax claims of different countries to overlap and may result in the taxa-
tion of one legal entity’s income in two different jurisdictions. This is referred 
to as juridical double taxation.323 Juridical double taxation is distinguished from 
economic double taxation. The latter occurs when the same income is regarded 
taxable profit of two different legal entities (see Paragraph 3.1).
It is commonly accepted that any form of double taxation has negative effects 
on international commerce. By consequence it limits economic growth and 
global prosperity.  For that reason states try to prevent it through unilateral 
measures and through the tax treaties they conclude with other states. The 
first bilateral tax treaties date back to the nineteen twenties. Already in 1928 
the League of Nations developed a first model bilateral tax convention. After 
the Second World War the Organization for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC), the predecessor of today’s OECD, also recognized the importance of 
an extended international treaty network and published a model tax conven-
323 Vogel describes juridical double taxation as “the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) 
States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for the same identical periods” 
(See Vogel 2015, page 1).
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tion of its own. In addition several countries have since then drafted a national 
model tax convention. In today’s world the model tax conventions of the OECD, 
the United States and the United Nations can be considered most important. 
However, none of these explicitly address specific tax issues arising in relation 
to the use of CCAs.
This Chapter 8 further discusses the position of CCAs under international tax 
law in general as well as tax treaties in specific and considers the risk of juridical 
double taxation of CCA participants. It does so by investigating to what extent 
the conditions of a CCA can result in a tax liability of participants outside their 
country of residence.  Foreign tax can be imposed on the participant directly, if 
it would be considered to have a permanent establishment outside the state of 
which it is a resident. However, Paragraph 8.2 explains why the participation by 
itself should generally not result in a permanent establishment. Alternatively, 
foreign tax can be imposed indirectly via a source state withholding tax on 
balancing payments. Paragraph 8.3 analyzes under what conditions such with-
holding tax is payable.  Finally, Paragraph 8.4 discusses why it can be considered 
unlikely that a foreign tax liability is to result from the use of immovable prop-
erty in the course of a CCA.
8.2. Permanent Establishments
Under Article 7 of the OECD, UN and US model tax conventions business profits 
are as a main rule exclusively taxable in the taxpayer’s state of residence. 
However, an exception applies to the extent that the profits are attributable 
to a permanent establishment (“PE”) in another state. The definition of a PE is 
provided for by Article 5 of the model tax conventions. It is described as “a fixed 
place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly 
carried on”.  If such fixed place of business exists, the exclusive right to tax the 
profits attributable to the PE shifts to that other state and the residence state 
has to provide relief from double taxation, either by exempting the profits or 
granting a tax credit. This mechanism effectively places PEs at par with foreign 
subsidiaries in the sense that their profits are primarily taxable in the source 
state. 
Considering the above it is quite relevant whether a participation in a CCA can 
by itself cause a PE and, consequently, a foreign tax liability of the participants. 
For this to be the case the resources made available by one participant would 
have to constitute a fixed place of business for one or more other participants, 
through which they carry on all or part of their business. The analysis of whether 
these conditions are met can be facilitated by considering three variations 
(scenario 1, 2 and 3) of a single stylized example involving Company A, a resi-
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dent of country A, and Company B, a resident of country B. These companies 
both belong to the same multinational group. Among other activities the group 
engages in the manufacturing and sale of product X. Company A owns the 
existing know-how and technology required to manufacture product X, while 
Company B owns laboratory facilities in country B and employs an experienced 
R&D team. Driven by customer demand and a desire to preserve its competitive 
market position the group wants to develop the next generation of product X, 
product X-2.0.
In scenario 1 Company A solicits Company B as a contract researcher to perform 
the required R&D activities. Company A will be the owner of the outcome of the 
research, but also bears the risk of failure. Company B receives a market based 
hourly rate for time spent by the R&D employees irrespective of whether the 
research is a success or a failure, but it will not have any ownership rights on the 
know-how and technology related to product X-2.0. Although Company B’s R&D 
personnel will carry out the day-to-day research, Company A’s personnel will 
take the relevant decisions to control the risk associated with the R&D activities. 
That includes decisions to enter into or terminate the contract research agree-
ment, decisions about the type of research and decisions about the available 
budget. Furthermore, Company B’s personnel would report back to Company 
A’s personnel on a regular basis. However, Company A only has restricted access 
to the laboratory and cannot issue specific instructions to the R&D team about 
the day-to-day performance of activities. Under these circumstances the rela-
tionship between Company A and Company B is clearly that of a principle and 
a service provider. That should in most cases not cause the principle to have 
a permanent establishment in the country of the service provider. This is also 
explicitly confirmed in the Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention: 
“Whilst premises belonging to a company that is a member of a multina-
tional group can be put at the disposal of another company of the group and 
may, subject to the other conditions of Article 5, constitute a permanent 
establishment of that other company if the business of that other company 
is carried on through that place, it is important to distinguish that case from 
the frequent situation where a company that is a member of a multinational 
group provides services (e.g. management services) to another company of 
the group as part of its own business carried on in premises that are not 
those of that other company and using its own personnel. In that case, the 
place where those services are provided is not at the disposal of the latter 
company and it is not the business of that company that is carried on through 
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that place. That place cannot, therefore, be considered to be a permanent 
establishment of the company to which the services are provided. Indeed, 
the fact that a company’s own activities at a given location may provide an 
economic benefit to the business of another company does not mean that 
the latter company carries on its business through that location: clearly, 
a company that merely purchases parts produced or services supplied by 
another company in a different country would not have a permanent estab-
lishment because of that, even though it may benefit from the manufac-
turing of these parts or the supplying of these services.”324
There were no reservations made on this Paragraph 42 of the Commentary 
by any of the OECD Member States, while out of the non-member states that 
submitted their position India was the only country to express a deviating 
view.325. As such, it can be concluded that in scenario 1 Company A would gener-
ally not be considered to have a permanent establishment in country B.  
In scenario 2 Company A again intends to develop product X-2.0, only this time 
Company B rents out the laboratory facilities and assigns its R&D employees to 
Company A. Again Company A will become the exclusive owner the outcome 
of the research, while this time Company A pays a businesslike rent for the use 
of the laboratory and the salary of the R&D personnel plus associated costs. 
Just like in scenario 1 the risk controlling decisions are taken by Company A’s 
own employees in country A and the day-to-day research is performed by the 
R&D team in country B. However, Company A now has unlimited access to the 
laboratory and it can issue specific instructions to the R&D team in respect of 
its day-to day activities. Under these conditions it is more than likely that the 
rented laboratory is in fact regarded a fixed place of business at the disposal 
of Company A through which the assigned R&D team carries on a part of the 
business of Company A. By consequence, in this scenario 2 Company A would 
generally be regarded to have a permanent establishment in country B. Under 
treaties based on the OECD Model Tax Convention the attribution of profit to 
the PE would then be governed by the Commentary to Article 7. This prescribes 
that the attributed profit should be the same as when “the permanent establish-
ment had been a separate and distinct enterprise engaged in the same or similar 
activities under the same or similar conditions”.326 In this stylized example it is 
324 Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 42.
325 India is of the view that where a company resident of a state is a member of a multinational group 
and is engaged in manufacturing or providing services for and on behalf of another company of the 
same group which is resident of another state, then the first company may constitute a permanent 
establishment of the latter if the other requirements of Article 5 are satisfied.
326 Commentary to Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 2, under 17.
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reasonable to assume that the functional and factual analysis would show that 
such profit is equal to the difference between the arm’s length price for the 
time spent by the R&D team and their cost. In other words, the attributed profit 
would equal the profit from contract research activities that would have been 
reported as taxable profit of Company B in Country B under scenario 1.   
Having established the outcome in the foregoing more black and white 
scenarios, now let’s consider scenario 3, in which Company A and Company B 
decide to jointly develop product X -2.0 under a CCA. Company A contributes 
the knowledge and know-how on the development of the original product X 
and Company B makes the laboratory facilities and the R&D team available. 
Company A and Company B will jointly come to own the know-how and tech-
nology to manufacture product X-2.0, which they will each be exclusively 
allowed to exploit in their own region.  The profits from such exploitation are 
expected to be equal. The day-to-day research is performed by the R&D team, 
but the risk controlling decisions are proportionally split between Company A 
and Company B. Company B pays an arm’s length buy-in payment for the pre-ex-
isting know-how and technology to Company A, while Company A compensates 
Company B for making available the laboratory facilities and R&D team through 
balancing payments consisting of a market based hourly rate for time spent by 
the R&D employees.
Just like in scenarios 1 and 2 there is in scenario 3 no reason to doubt that the 
laboratory facilities and the R&D team constitute a fixed place of business. 
More relevantly it would have to be determined whether this is at the disposal 
of Company A and whether the business carried on there is that of Company 
A.  In my opinion this is in principle not the case. Crucial elements are that the 
legal right to freely access and use the laboratory facilities remains exclusively 
with Company B and that the R&D team remains fully employed with Company 
B. The R&D personnel is not obliged to take orders directly from Company A. 
As such, it cannot be said that the laboratory or the R&D team are placed at 
the disposal of Company A. That Company B applies these resources to make 
a contribution under the CCA does not change anything in this respect. To the 
contrary, Company B is rewarded for its contribution with the profit element 
included in the open market rent and the competitive hourly rate of R&D 
personnel used as the basis to value Company B’s contribution and to  calcu-
late Company A’s balancing payments. As such, the resources should be consid-
ered to be used to carry on the business of Company B and not the business 
of Company A. Furthermore, as the balancing payments are already part of 
Company B’s taxable income, there would be no profit left to attribute to the 
PE anyway.         
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The foregoing analysis is confirmed by the results of a survey performed by the 
IBFD’s International Transfer Pricing Journal in 2001. None of the respondents 
from 14 different countries considered it likely that participation in a CCA would 
result in recognition of a PE in their jurisdiction.327 Nevertheless there might 
still be some room for discussion, particularly when the contribution of R&D 
resources would not be valued at market price but at cost. In that case all the 
profits stemming from the undivided half of the work of the R&D team would 
end up with Company A. That the R&D team performs its activities in country B 
might inspire the tax authorities of country B to claim that there is a permanent 
establishment, to which at least some part of the profit should be attributed. 
They might consider that they are entitled to tax that profit and argue that the 
CCA is only a legal instrument to artificially avoid a permanent establishment. 
To promote clarity and avoid disputes I therefore propose adding the following 
new sub-paragraph to the guidance provided in Paragraph 42 of the Commen-
tary to Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention: 
“A company that is a member of multinational group cannot be considered 
to have a permanent establishment only because it participates in a cost 
contribution arrangement as defined in Chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and another company of the same multinational group 
performs activities or makes available resources under such arrangement 
that may provide the former company with an economic benefit. By defi-
nition all participants in a cost contribution arrangement have the expec-
tation that they will benefit from the objectives of that arrangement. 
However, that does not mean that the place of business where one partic-
ipant performs activities or where the resources made available by that 
participant are located is at the disposal of the other participant(s) nor does 
it mean that the business of the other participant(s) is carried on through 
that place of business.”      
Including this wording in the Commentary would clarify that a tax administration 
that is dissatisfied with its ability to tax profits from a CCA as defined in Chapter 
VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, cannot argue that an excessively bene-
fiting foreign participant has a permanent establishment and a corresponding 
tax liability in its jurisdiction. Alternatively, this tax administration would have 
327 The survey covered Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa and the UK (International 
Transfer Pricing Journal, 2001 (Volume 8) No. 2, IBFD), Belgium, Canada, France, Spain and the 
Unites States (International Transfer Pricing Journal, 2001 (Volume 8) No. 3, IBFD), Luxemburg and 
Hungary (International Transfer Pricing  Journal, 2001 (Volume 8) No. 4, IBFD) and Portugal and 
Denmark (IBFD, International Transfer Pricing Journal, 2001 (Volume 8) No. 6, IBFD).  
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to challenge the arm’s length nature of that CCA and pursue a transfer pricing 
adjustment. 
8.3. Withholding Tax on Balancing Payments
8.3.1. Introduction
As discussed extensively in Part 2 of this thesis, the outcome of a CCA will only 
be in line with the arm’s length principle, if each participant’s contribution is 
consistent with its expected benefit from cost shared activities.  If this is not the 
case, then the overall contribution of at least one participant will be inadequate, 
while the overall contributions of at least one other participant will be exces-
sive. To appropriately compensate for this, balancing payments should be made 
between the participants (also see Paragraph 5.6). These balancing payments 
will generally be included in the taxable income of the payee in its country of 
residence on the basis of the residence principle. However, the payer’s country 
of residence may also feel it has a right to tax the payments on the basis of the 
situs principle. It could collect such tax by requiring the payer of the balancing 
payment to withhold a certain amount from the balancing payment to the 
foreign CCA participant and remit that to the local tax authorities. If the resi-
dence state and source state have entered into a tax treaty, the qualification of 
the balancing payments under such treaty will determine the level of taxation 
the source state may impose and the way in which the residence state has to 
provide for avoidance of double taxation.  
8.3.2. Tax Sharing
To further understand the tax treatment of balancing payments under bilateral 
tax treaties, it has to be observed that these treaties generally seek to avoid 
double taxation in respect of certain types of, mostly passive, income through 
so called tax sharing. This income is then subject to full taxation in the residence 
state and a limited tax in the source state, for which the residence state provides 
relief from double taxation. Tax sharing, as Vogel puts it, “is a typical compro-
mise to settle a clash between the State of source and the State of residence in 
cases in which both believe that they have justified claims to tax jurisdiction that 
they do not want to forgo completely”.328  The compromise offered by tax sharing 
consists of dividing up the imposed amount of tax between the contracting 
states. To achieve this, the residence state is principally entitled to subject the 
328 Vogel 2015, page 708.
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income concerned to full taxation under its national rules, while the source state 
is allowed to impose a limited tax on that same income. The residence state 
then generally grants the taxpayer a proportionate exemption or a tax credit for 
this source state taxation. 
For practical reasons the source state taxation is in most cases withheld at the 
level of the payer. This is generally considered an efficient way for tax adminis-
trations to collect tax from non-residents earning income with a certain nexus 
to their jurisdictions.329 However, by nature these so called withholding taxes 
do imply a risk of over-taxation. This is because withholding taxes in most cases 
are levied on gross income. By consequence the effective tax rate can be unrea-
sonably high, if there are significant costs associated with the income. That 
not only imposes an unreasonable burden on the taxpayer, but in effect also 
shifts all taxation to the source state. The reason for this is that the tax credit 
granted to the taxpayer in the residence state will normally be limited to the 
tax paid on the same income in that state. If the residence state allows for a 
deduction of related expenses before taxing the net income, it could be that 
the tax payable in that state is actually less than the withholding tax levied in 
the source state and that the credit neutralizes all residence state taxation.330 In 
the context of CCAs, the foregoing is potentially most problematic in respect of 
balancing payments intended to compensate a participant for performing low 
value adding activities. For example, a company participating in a CCA aimed at 
developing relatively simple process technology may value the work of its R&D 
team at costs plus a profit mark-up of 10%. Assume this company incurs costs of 
100 for which it receives balancing payments of 110. If the statutory tax rate in 
its country of residence is 30%, it would principally pay local corporate income 
tax of 3 ((110 income -/- 100 costs) * 30%). If the balancing payment is subject to 
10% withholding tax in the source state, it would pay an additional 11 (110 gross 
receipt * 10%) in the source state. The country of residence will then generally 
grant a tax credit of 3, which implies a full refund of the corporate income tax 
that it levied. Nevertheless, the recipient of the balancing payment pays source 
state tax of 11 over a profit of 10, which still implies an effective rate of 110%.     
329 The OECD considered withholding systems “effective tax collection mechanisms due to their inherent 
ability to collect tax at the point that income is earned, promote voluntary compliance through third 
party reporting and ensure stable and timely cash flows to government”- OECD, Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration, “Compliance Risk Management: Managing and Improving Tax Compliance”, 
2004, page 53.
330 For a comprehensive analysis on the impact of withholding taxes see Camacho Palma, Intertax 
2010/12.
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The OECD Model Tax Convention applies tax sharing in respect of dividends 
and interest.331 The UN Model Tax Convention and many bilateral treaties, even 
those otherwise based on the OECD Model, do the same in respect of royal-
ties.332 Furthermore, there are also a number of bilateral tax treaties that apply 
tax sharing in respect of fees related to the transfer of technology or know-how 
and non-passive income from rendering (technical) services. For this purpose 
some countries have in their bilateral tax treaties incorporated technical services 
into the definition of royalties.333 Others have in their tax treaties introduced 
separate articles covering technical services income.334 In this context it also 
deserves mentioning that there is a proposal pending with the UN Committee 
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters to introduce a new 
article on technical services allowing for source state taxation in the UN Model 
Tax Convention.335 
It is of course quite unlikely that arm’s length balancing payments under a CCA 
can be qualified as dividends or interest. It may however be less evident whether 
they do or do not qualify as royalties or service fees. As such, there is a realistic 
chance that under certain tax treaties they could be subjected to source state 
withholding taxation. In order to assess if and when a withholding tax may be 
imposed on balancing payments a closer look at the general concepts of royal-
ties and service fees is helpful. 
8.3.3. The General Concepts of Royalties and Services 
Most bilateral treaties provide for a definition of royalties. In the OECD Model 
Tax Convention that definition is included in Article 12, Paragraph 2: 
“The term ‘royalties’ as used in this Article means payments of any kind 
received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright 
or literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any 
patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for 
information concerning industrial commercial or scientific experience.”
Many countries have also included definitions of royalties in their own national 
law. It follows from Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the OECD and UN Model Tax 
331 See Article 10 and 11 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
332 See Article 12 of the UN Model Tax Convention.
333 Examples are Brazil, India, Portugal and Spain. 
334 This approach was followed by a number of African countries.
335 B. Arnold, “Note from the Coordinator of the Subcommittee on Tax Treatments of Services: Draft 
Article and Commentary on Technical Services”, 30 September 2014, E/C.18/2014/CRP.8. For a 
further analysis of the proposal see Moreno, World Tax Journal 2015/3.
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Conventions that these are principally overruled by the treaty definitions. The 
definitions under national law may however still be used for treaty interpreta-
tion purposes.336 
In respect of a definition of services there is much less to go by. Both national 
law and tax treaties seldom provide a clear definition. That can be considered 
remarkable, because in many jurisdictions the tax treatment of payments 
depends on their possible qualification as a service. It also surprised the 
composers of the 2012 IFA Report. Left to their own devices the IFA branch 
reporters agreed that normally a broad range of activities could be labeled as a 
service. They concluded that “activities involving functions performed by one or 
more individuals at a particular location for the benefit of another person would 
generally be regarded as services”. 337 Wijnen, De Goede and Alessi used a simi-
larly broad definition for their research into the position of services under tax 
treaties. They assumed that “services comprise any work done for another person 
for remuneration”.338 A third definition can be found in the Commentary to 
the OECD Model Tax Convention that describes contracts for the provision of 
services as contracts, “in which one of the parties undertakes to use the customary 
skills of his calling to execute work himself for the other party”.339 In these and 
other definitions of services commonly available there is always a certain level of 
activity supposed on the side of the supplier. It therefore appears reasonable to 
conclude that a passive passing on of costs will by itself not qualify as a service. 
Further, it is worth noticing at this point that the Commentary to Article 12 of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention provides some guidance to the distinction 
between royalties and services:
“A payment cannot be said to be ‘for the use of or the right to use’ a design, 
model or plan if the payment is for the development of a design, model or 
plan that does not already exist. In such a case, the payment is made in 
consideration for the services that will result in the development of that 
design, model or plan and would thus fall under Article 7.This will be the case 
even if the designer of the design, model or plan (e.g. an architect) retains 
all rights, including the copyright, in that design, model or plan. Where, 
however, the owner of the copyright in previously-developed plans merely 
grants someone the right to modify or reproduce these plans without actu-
ally performing any additional work, the payment received by that owner in 
336 Also see Vogel 2015, page 206.
337 Pickering et al 2012, page 27. 
338 Wijnen, De Goede and Alessi, Bulletin for International Taxation 2012/1.
339 Commentary to Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 11.2.
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considerations for granting the right to such use of the plans would consti-
tute royalties.”340
Furthermore, payments for the supply of know-how, i.e. information concerning 
industrial, commercial or scientific experience, are explicitly considered a 
royalty. To distinguish the supply of know-how from the rendering of technical 
services, it should be taken into account that: 
(i) Know-how is pre-existing information; 
(ii) The supply of know-how would involve an actual transfer to the other party 
and that extends beyond know-how only being used by a supplier in the 
course of performing a service; and
(iii) Know-how can in most cases be supplied without additional activities being 
performed by the supplier.341 
All this makes it quite clear that a payment can only be regarded a royalty, 
if it is a consideration for the use or right to use a pre-existing intangible. By 
consequence, payments related to the development of new intangibles that 
will become the effective ownership of the payer do not qualify as a royalty. So 
called mixed contracts covering both the supply of know-how and the provision 
of services should according to the OECD Commentary be broken down into 
separate elements that then each should be given their own appropriate tax 
treatment, unless one element is clearly the dominant purpose of the contract:
“The appropriate course to take with a mixed contract is, in principle, to 
break down, on the basis of the information contained in the contract or by 
means of a reasonable apportionment, the whole amount of the stipulated 
consideration according to the various parts of what is being provided under 
the contract, and then to apply to each part of it so determined the taxation 
treatment proper thereto. If, however, one part of what is being provided 
constitutes by far the principal purpose of the contract and the other parts 
stipulated therein are only of an ancillary and largely unimportant char-
acter, then the treatment applicable to the principal part should generally 
be applied to the whole amount of the consideration.”342
340 Idem, Paragraph 10.2.
341 Idem, Paragraph 11.3.  
342 Idem, Paragraph 11.6.
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A more or less identical approach can be found in the Commentary to the UN 
Model Tax Convention.343 As will be discussed in Paragraph 8.3.4.2 below this 
guidance can be relevant, when pre-existing intangibles are made available 
under a CCA.    
8.3.4. Can Balancing Payments Qualify as Royalty Income?
8.3.4.1. General Rule: Balancing Payments Do Not Qualify as Royalty Income
As already acknowledged above many bilateral tax treaties, including those 
otherwise based on the OECD Model Tax Convention, allow for a source state 
taxation on royalties and would therefore allow for source state taxation on 
balancing payments, if those qualified as such. It is probably for that reason that 
the OECD provided some relevant guidance on the qualification of balancing 
payments as royalties in the 1997 version of Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines.  This guidance, which was no longer included in the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines after their revision as part of the BEPS project, explicated that: 
“…a balancing payment would not constitute a royalty for the use of intan-
gible property, except to the extent that the payment entitles the payer to 
obtain only a right to use intangible property belonging to a participant (or 
a third party) and the payer does not also obtain a beneficial interest in the 
intangible property itself”.344
The statement may be better understood, if it is acknowledged that the new 
intangible property developed under the CCA itself is not the subject of a trans-
action under that arrangement. The effective ownership of this intangible prop-
erty is in most cases shared proportionally among the participants community 
from the moment it comes into existence. Neither the ownership of the new 
intangibles nor a right to use the new intangibles is transferred between the 
payer and payee of a balancing payment. As such, CCAs should be distinguished 
from make-sell license agreements, which allow a licensee to use an intangible 
to manufacture a product and perform a service without that licensee becoming 
the owner of the intangible (also see Paragraph 5.5.2.3.1). By consequence, 
balancing payment can generally not be regarded a consideration for the use or 
a right to use the intangibles that are newly developed under the CCA. As such, 
343 Commentary to Article 12 of the UN Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 11.6.
344 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.25 (old).
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they should not be qualified as a royalty nor be subjected to withholding tax on 
that ground. However, there might be royalty withholding tax still. 
8.3.4.2. Exception: The Payer Obtains Only a Right to Use
8.3.4.2.1. A Lack of Beneficial Interest
According to the meanwhile revised text of Paragraph 8.25 of the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, balancing payments may in deviation from the general rule 
be qualified as a royalty and thus subjected to royalty withholding tax, if the 
payer receives a right to use intangible property but “does not obtain a beneficial 
interest in the intangible property itself”. For as far as I have been able to deter-
mine, this could be the case in either one of two situations:  
(i) The balancing payments relate to pre-existing intangibles being made 
under the CCA, which are not merely of an auxiliary and largely unimpor-
tant character;
(ii) The balancing payments relate to the development of new intangibles, 
but the effective ownership of these new intangibles is not proportionately 
shared among the participants.
In the first of these situations the CCA covers both the making available for use 
of pre-existing intangibles and the joint development of new intangibles. As 
such, it will be considered a mixed contract (see Paragraph 8.3.3). The Commen-
tary to both the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions then prescribe that the 
consideration should be broken down into parts according to what is provided 
under the arrangement. Living up to this guidance would require splitting up the 
balancing payments between the different contributions, after which the part 
that relates to making pre-existing intangibles available is treated as a royalty 
payment. 
In the second situations new intangibles are developed, but, contrary to the 
common purpose of a CCA, the effective ownership of those intangibles is not 
shared proportionally among the participants. This implies that certain more 
privileged participants hold a more absolute ownership over the intangibles, 
while others hold only a limited right. For example, the more privileged partici-
pants may be able to sell, license or lease the intangibles to third parties, whereas 
the less privileged participants are only allowed to make use of the intangibles. 
Under these circumstances the arrangement actually is more similar to a make-
sell license than to a CCA. In that case the more privileged participants should 
8.3.  WITHHOLDING TAX ON BALANCING PAYMENTS
238
8.  TAX TREATY QUALIFICATION
be considered to have developed or obtained the intangibles for themselves 
and to have subsequently licensed them out to the less privileged participants. 
Source states are specifically inclined to argue that a disproportionate alloca-
tion of the ownership of intangibles entitles them to tax balancing payments, 
if the applicable tax treaty includes a broad definition of royalties. Examples 
of such situations can apparently be found in Portuguese case law of the late 
nineteen eighties and early nineteen nineties. When the International Transfer 
Pricing Journal performed a comparative study of the tax treatment of CCAs in 
2001, the respondent for Portugal reported on an appeal by Dutch – British oil 
company Shell that had concluded a CCA, under which services were performed 
for the benefit of group companies worldwide including those in Portugal.345 
The arrangement was such that the costs incurred in relation to the services 
were recharged, but no profit mark-up was added. For certain services the 
subsidiaries’ turnover of oil products was used as a cost allocation key, while 
for others a direct allocation method was applied. Any patent or know-how 
developed through the services was made available for use to Shell Portugal 
without further charge. Under these circumstances the Portuguese Tax Courts 
considered the balancing payments were similar to a royalty and allowed for a 
withholding tax.  As is explained by the 2001 report in the International Transfer 
Pricing Journal, this was because “the Portuguese Tax Courts concluded that the 
taxpayer had not sufficiently proven that:
(i) payments merely corresponded to a specific refund of expenses previously 
incurred by Shell International;
(ii) there was a common fund of all the companies that entered in such agree-
ments; and
(iii) [pre-existing] know-how was not transmitted [i.e. made available] to Shell 
Portuguesa”.346 
The foregoing obviously raises questions about exactly when a disproportionate 
allocation of ownership of results justifies a qualification of balancing payments 
as a royalty. In my opinion two conditions would have to be met: 
345 Shell International Chemical Company Limited v. the tax authorities (Fazenda Pública), 21 February 
1990, Appeal 11.935.
346 De Sousa da Câmara, International Transfer Pricing Journal, 2001/6.
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(i) the payer effectively should receive nothing more than a right to use the 
newly developed intangibles; and 
(ii) the payee should hold a more absolute ownership.
I would advocate letting the economic substance prevail over the legal form of 
the arrangement when testing whether these conditions are met. This would 
have the important advantage that balancing payments are not qualified as a 
royalty, only because the payer does not hold the legal ownership of the newly 
developed intangibles. That leaves open the possibility to centralize the legal 
ownership of cost shared intangibles with one participant, which is considered 
to allow for better legal protection of intangible property. Under such substance 
over form approach it would be quite critical to assess not only how the payee 
may legally use the intangibles, but also what use the payer is economically 
expected to make of the intangibles. The relevance of this distinction is illus-
trated quite well by a contradicting public transfer pricing ruling and High Court 
decision in India.
8.3.4.2.2. The Indian ABB Ruling and CGI Case
On 15 March 2010 the Authority for Advance Rulings of New Delhi (“ARR”) 
published a ruling issued to ABB Ltd, an Indian subsidiary of a worldwide group 
specialized in power and automation technologies. This company was entering 
into a CCA covering the basic R&D activities.347 The corporate research and 
development program was coordinated by a Swiss group company, ABB Zurich. 
The latter company engaged several intragroup Corporate Research Centers 
to perform the R&D activities and it remunerated those on a cost plus basis. 
The various participants in the CCA shared in the overall costs on the basis 
of a pre-fixed allocation key in proportion to the “value added” achieved by 
each of them. Furthermore, they paid a coordination fee to ABB Zurich. The 
CCA contract provided for all participants to become joint effective owner of 
resulting intangibles with unlimited royalty-free access to those intangibles, 
while for administrative reasons only ABB Zurich was appointed legal ownership 
of intangibles. Any royalty income that ABB Zurich would earn from licensing 
out the intangibles to other parties was to reduce the R&D costs shared among 
the participants. In the ruling request ABB Ltd accepted that the coordination 
fee paid to ABB Zurich suffered an Indian withholding tax, but at the same time 
argued that the balancing payments for access to the newly developed intan-
347 The Authority for Advance Rulings of New Delhi (India),  A.A.R. No. 834 of 2009, 15 March 2010 
(ABB Ltd).
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gibles should not subject to such tax. The ARR went along with the taxpayer’s 
positioning. In reaching its decision the ARR explicitly took into account that 
the terms of the agreement allowed for each participant “to avail of the fruits 
of research in its own right”. It also referenced specifically how the proceeds 
from the further commercial exploitation of the intangibles by ABB Zurich were 
applied to reduce the R&D costs shared by participants. These considerations, 
together with the manner in which the funding was arranged and the cost basis 
was determined, led the ARR to conclude that the payments made by ABB Ltd 
did not qualify as royalty payments that could be subject to Indian withholding 
tax. The fact that the legal ownership of the intangibles was centralized with 
ABB Zurich did not affect the outcome. In the more recent CGI case however the 
High Court of Karnataka followed a marginally different reasoning, leading to a 
completely different outcome.348  
CGI is a Canadian headed group active in the IT-sector with a subsidiary in India. 
CGI Canada entered into a CCA with a number of its subsidiaries to develop an 
intranet facility for common use throughout the group.  CGI Canada initially paid 
for all development costs, including a substantial Microsoft license. The CCA 
participants were invoiced a proportionate share of these costs without any 
profit mark-up. In return they were permitted to make use of the intranet facility 
in their day-to-day business. At the same time however the absolute ownership 
of the facility remained with CGI Canada and the other participants could not 
sell, license or lease the facility. In fact the only right granted to the other partic-
ipants under the cost sharing agreement was a right of use. CGI India argued 
that payments under the CCA were intended to reimburse expenses, that they 
were not service fees or royalties and that there was no Indian withholding tax 
due on these payments. The Indian Commissioner of Income Tax disagreed. He 
qualified the payments as a royalty and imposed a corresponding withholding 
tax. The case was brought to court and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of 
Bangalore ruled in favor of the taxpayer. The Commissioner then appealed 
before the High Court of Karnataka. 
The High Court considered that it makes no difference in the eyes of the law 
that the invoices sent to CGI India did not include any profit or income element. 
It also added explicitly that it made no difference in this context that the Cana-
dian company acquired a substantial part of the intangible property by way 
of lease from Microsoft instead of independently developing the property by 
itself. The Court on the other hand did regard it to be “of utmost importance” 
that the underlying agreement explicitly stated that the absolute ownership of 
348 CIT v. CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Private Limited, 9 June 2014, ITA 
No.209/2008.
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the facility remained with CGI Canada. This led the High Court to conclude that 
it was not the intention of the CCA to equally vest the title of the facility among 
the participants. Taking this into account, the High Court concluded:
“If CGI group companies were to pay costs for using the said facility, then 
the title of the said facility i.e. intellectual property should equally vest 
proportionate to the cost share by [these] group companies. That is not 
the intention behind this agreement. Therefore, we have no hesitation to 
hold that this Cost Sharing Agreement is only a device to avoid payment 
of tax as contemplated under the aforesaid provision. It is nothing but 
a royalty. Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal is erroneous and 
requires to be set aside.”
In my opinion the decision of the High Court is quite formalistic and pays insuf-
ficient attention to the economic reality of the case, specifically the position 
of CGI Canada. It is unclear whether a clause in the CCA contract requiring CGI 
Canada to share any proceeds from licensing out the intangibles, similar to the 
provision that the ABB group used in its arrangement, would have led to another 
outcome. However that may be, the High Court disregards that an intranet 
facility is in most cases for internal use only and that CGI Canada’s right to sell, 
license or lease the facility may have little or no practical value. By consequence, 
it appears reasonable to argue that the effective ownership was in fact propor-
tionately shared among the participants. Instead the High Court regarded it 
decisive for the final tax treatment of the balancing payments that the abso-
lute ownership formally remained with CGI Canada and found reason in that 
to qualify the balancing payment as a royalty. With this ruling the Court takes 
a step back compared to the earlier ABB ruling. That appears to significantly 
increase the risk of an Indian withholding tax liability on balancing payments 
under any CCA contract that centralizes legal ownership of intangibles with one 
participant and does not explicitly grant sufficient effective ownership to other 
participants.
8.3.5. Can Balancing Payments Qualify as Services Income?
8.3.5.1. Introduction
If balancing payments are not qualified as royalty income, they may yet be 
subjected to withholding tax on services income. The OECD generally advocates 
exclusive residence taxation of services that are not attributable to a permanent 
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establishment.349 Various countries however have another opinion and impose 
a withholding tax on services income under their national laws. Some of these 
countries, including major economies like India and Brazil, have also reserved 
a right to tax fees paid for technical services in the royalty article of their tax 
treaties. However, in these countries it has not been undisputed when and how 
such withholding tax can be effectuated. In some situations it appears to be a 
critical aspect whether the payments are merely intended to share expenses or 
whether there is a profit element included and therefore they qualify as income 
in the hands of the recipient. 
8.3.5.2. The Indian Shell Ruling and M/s. C. U. Inspections Case
The Authority for Advanced Ruling of New Delhi was quite clear in the ABB 
ruling. In the case presented to the ARR there, the balancing payments were 
split up into two parts. There was a coordination fee paid and a compensation 
payment for access to the intangibles resulting from R&D activities performed 
by the corporate coordination centers. The coordination fee was subject to with-
holding tax, the payment for access to intangibles was not. It should be noted 
that the recipient of the latter payment, ABB Zurich, did not itself perform any 
development activity. It “outsourced” the work intragroup to dedicated corpo-
rate research centers. This led the ARR to hold:
“It cannot be said that ABB Zurich has rendered any service of technical or 
consultancy nature to the applicant when it makes available to the appli-
cant and other parties to the CCA the result of corporate research. From the 
statement of facts and the contents of the CCA, it is clear that rendering 
of any service of the nature of managerial, technical or consultancy is 
not involved and moreover, ABB Zurich does not deploy any personnel to 
perform any services in India.”
That decision was not changed by the fact that the corporate research centers 
were compensated at a cost plus basis, i.e. with a limited profit mark-up added 
to the amounts of costs shared by the CCA participants. Almost two years later, 
the ARR came to an exact opposite conclusion in respect of an application by oil 
company Shell.350
Shell had implemented a CCA, under which various of its operating companies, 
including Shell India, obtained general business support services from Shell 
349 Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 42.11 and further.    
350 The Authority for Advance Rulings of New Delhi (India), A.A.R. No. 833 of 2009, 17 January 2012 
(Shell India Markets Pvt Ltd).
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UK.  That included for example services in the fields of procurement, tax and 
legal. Research and development was explicitly not covered. There was no profit 
element included in charges to the group company under the arrangement 
and it was determined that all participating group companies would become 
the joint owner of any know-how generated through the services. In light of 
the latter element, the ARR agreed with the taxpayer that payments under the 
CCA could not be regarded a royalty. That left the ARR to determine whether 
under the given circumstances they could alternatively qualify as fees for tech-
nical services within the meaning of Article 13 of the India – UK tax treaty and, 
as such, be subject to Indian withholding tax. The ARR acknowledged that this 
would require the rendering of any technical or consultancy services that make 
available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes or that 
consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. 
Now the automatic shared ownership of the know-how came back to bite the 
taxpayer, as the ARR considered it to establish that the services were clearly 
made available to the applicant. It subsequently concluded that the payments 
made for availing the general business support services under the CCA qualified 
as fees for technical services and that the payment received by the UK service 
provider was therefore subject to Indian withholding tax.        
It is difficult to determine what the crucial elements are causing the difference 
between the ABB and Shell ruling.  Perhaps the ARR found it relevant that in the 
ABB case the group company receiving the payment from the Indian affiliate, 
ABB Zurich, did not itself perform any R&D services, while in the Shell case the 
group company receiving such payment, Shell UK, did in fact render the services 
under review. It would appear quite an arbitrary distinction however, whether 
or not another group company has been interposed as a CCA coordinator. This 
leaves plenty of room for uncertainty about the tax treatment of balancing 
payments. The decision of the Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”) 
in a cost sharing case on 6 March 2013 did not take that away, but does deserve 
further consideration when trying to better understand the Indian perspective 
on CCA transactions.351 
M/s. C. U. Inspections was engaged in “the business of certification of activities in 
respect of quantity quality, pre-shipment inspections, surveys etc.” The company 
was disallowed an income tax deduction in respect of two types of charges. 
Firstly, the group’s Dutch holding company incurred certain costs for and on 
behalf of the Indian company and various other subsidiaries. These costs were 
related to accounting services, legal and professional services, communication, 
351 C.U. Inspections (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, 6 March 2013, (ITA No. 577/Mum/2011).
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R&D and comparable other activities with a collective benefit. To appropriately 
reallocate the costs the companies concluded a CCA. Under this agreement 
the charges to the subsidiaries specifically did not include a profit mark-up. 
Secondly, the holding company had arranged for a training of the employees 
of the Indian company by a third party. Obviously the charges from such third 
party will have included a profit element. However, upon recharging the costs 
to the Indian subsidiary the holding company explicitly did not add any further 
mark-up.   
The Indian tax administration considered that the CCA charges and training 
related invoices would only be tax deductible to the Indian company, if a tax 
at source was withheld upon payment. When M/s. C. U. Inspections brought 
the case in front of the ITAT the Commissioner further challenged the inherent 
deductibility of the charges by pointing out that the taxpayer had not provided 
any details of the actual expenditures incurred. The ITAT concluded however 
that the absence of a tax withheld at source only justifies the disallowance of a 
tax deduction with the payer, if there was a withholding tax liability in the first 
place. Such withholding tax liability requires that the payments are taxable in 
the hands of the recipient. In respect of the charges under the CCA this was 
considered not to be the case, because the payments were nothing more than 
a reimbursement of expenses. Therefore, the ITAT ruled that there was no 
withholding tax due and that the payments were tax deductible nonetheless. 
Furthermore, the ITAT decided that the Commissioner could not improve the 
case of the Indian tax administration at this stage of the proceedings by ques-
tioning the inherent deductibility of the CCA charges. By consequence, this 
argument was rejected on formal grounds. 
For the training related invoices the ITAT reached a different conclusion. It 
established that these were routed via the holding company, but eventually 
ended up with a third party. The ITAT explained that in such a case the provisions 
for deduction of tax at source should apply, as if the Indian company made the 
payments to the third party directly. The mere fact that the holding company 
did not include an additional profit mark-up was insufficient for the payment 
to be termed as a reimbursement of expenses.  The ITAT further motivated its 
position as follows:
“…if the contention of the assessee is accepted and the payment to third 
party, routed through its related concern, is considered as reimbursement 
of expenses to the related party, then probably all the relevant provisions in 
this regard will become redundant. Such a route is impermissible to thwart 
the flow of law.”      
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In respect of the training related income the ITAT redirected the matter back 
to the assessing officer to assess both the inherent deductibility and the ques-
tion whether the amounts paid by the Indian company were taxable income in 
the hands of the third party. By doing so, it appears to deviate from the ARR’s 
decision in the ABB and Shell ruling, which did not consider it a critical aspect 
whether the costs recharged under the CCA by the coordinating group company 
included a profit mark-up. There may have been factual differences that caused 
this deviation. For example, the profit element added to the training charges 
by the third party may have substantially exceed the limited, cost based profit 
mark-up used by the corporate research centers of the ABB Group. However, the 
ITAT did not further comment on this, nor did it consider the earlier discussed 
ARR rulings at all. However, in light of the prescription under the post-BEPS 
OECD guidance for the valuation of contributions to generally include a profit 
element (see Paragraph 5.5.3), the ITAT’s decision may still result in more 
balancing payments becoming subject to Indian withholding tax.
8.3.5.3. The Brazilian Private Letter Rulings
In Brazil the tax treatment of CCAs has long been a controversial issue, in respect 
of which the Brazilian revenue service (Receita Federal do Brasil or “RFB”) has 
more than once changed its position. In 2012 it issued a private letter ruling, 
targeting payments under domestic cost sharing arrangements.352 The ruling 
explicated that it should be possible to centralize support activities and reallo-
cate the related costs to the benefiting group companies, provided that:
(i) the performance of the activities is necessary, normal and usual for the 
Brazilian company’s business;
(ii) the costs are actually invoiced to and paid by the Brazilian company;
(iii) the cost reallocation was calculated on the basis of reasonable and objec-
tive criteria, previously included in a formal agreement between the group 
companies involved;
(iv) the allocated costs correspond with the actual expenditure per company 
and the total price paid for goods and services; and
(v) all acts related to apportionment of costs are properly documented.
352 Receita Federal do Brasil, Resolution of divergence (Solução de Divergência) nr. 8/2012, 5 May 2012. 
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If these conditions were met and it did not concern a mere recharge of the 
costs for subcontracting services to a third party, then payments would be tax 
deductible for Brazilian corporate income tax purposes. In 2013 the RFB issued 
a second administrative decision, which also explicitly exempts the payments 
meeting the above conditions from liabilities under the federal social integra-
tion program and contribution for the financing of social security (Programa de 
Integração Social or “PIS” and Contribuição para Financiamento da Seguridade 
Social or “COFINS”).353 Furthermore, it has been argued by scholars that as long 
as there is no profit mark-up included, cross border balancing payments should 
be tax deductible and not subject to withholding tax.354 Be all that how it may, 
the RFB has more recently issued several rulings reversing most of the above.355 
These rulings considered the provision of general services under a CCA, in respect 
of which it is concluded that they are not tax deductible for corporate income 
tax purposes and that they are indeed subject to PIS, COFINS as well as with-
holding income tax and the contribution for the intervention on the economic 
domain (Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico or “CIDE”). Although 
the positioning by the RFB has not been tested by the Brazilian Supreme Court, 
this attitude of the tax administration and the notoriously long lead time of 
Brazilian legal procedures have in practice made it very unattractive for MNEs 
to enter into CCAs with their Brazilian subsidiaries.  
8.3.6. Author’s Analysis
Since the BEPS project the OECD requires most contributions to be valued at 
market price and therefore balancing payments are more likely to include a 
profit element. There is at least a theoretical basis for sharing the right to tax 
such profit under tax treaties. However, the risk that taxation of a gross amount 
leads to an excessively high tax rate is realistic and I am therefore generally 
not in favor of a tax sharing approach to balancing payments, especially when 
those relate to development activities or services provided under a CCA. When 
on the other hand the balancing payments are a compensation for access to 
pre-existing intangibles, this is more similar to a royalty payment and that 
might make a different tax treatment more reasonable. It should however in 
any case be understood that balancing payments are not to be treated as a 
royalty or subjected to withholding tax on that ground, if they are a consider-
353 Receita Federal do Brasil, Resolution of divergence (Solução de Divergência) nr. 23/2013, 23 
September 2013.
354 De Moraes e Castro, Bulletin for International Taxation 2015/8.
355 Receita Federal do Brasil, Resolution of divergence (Solução de Divergência) nr. 43/2015, 26 
February 2015, nr. 50/2016, 5 May 2016, and nr. 69/2017, 14 June 2017.
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ation for development activities aimed at creating new intangibles that will be 
jointly owned by the payer. By consequence, balancing payments should only 
be subject to a royalty withholding tax, if they are for the use of intangibles that 
are not effectively co-owned by the payer. This methodology was accurately 
worded in the old Paragraph 8.25 of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines (see 
Paragraph 8.3.4). Although there is no reason to assume that it has become 
less applicable, the OECD repealed Paragraph 8.25 (old) of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and replaced it by more ambiguous guidance that indicates: 
“Contributions including any balancing payments, by a participant to a 
CCA should be treated for tax purposes in the same manner as would apply 
under the general rules of the tax system(s) applicable to that participant if 
the contributions were made outside a CCA, to carry on the activity that is 
the subject of the CCA. The character of the contribution will depend on the 
nature of the activity being undertaken by the CCA, and will determine how 
it is recognized for tax purposes”.356
Unfortunately the above statement does not clarify how the balancing payment 
should have been qualified, if it had been made outside the CCA. That is there-
fore to be interpreted on the basis of domestic law and applicable tax treaties. 
Given that the wording from the old Paragraph 8.25 is then still very much 
appropriate, I would be in favor of re-introducing it. The OECD would then 
make crystal clear that it remains a critical distinguishing element whether or 
not the participant making the balancing payment obtains a beneficial interest 
in any intangible property, to which the payment may be associated. When 
testing whether such beneficial interest is obtained, I believe a substance over 
form approach should be used. Most notably the effective ownership should be 
considered and not the legal ownership. This avoids that the tax treatment of a 
balancing payment is affected, if the legal ownership is centralized with a single 
participant while the effective ownership is shared among the broader partici-
pants community. The latter can be a desire of MNEs, not for tax reasons but 
because it offers administrative advantages and allows for more effective legal 
protection of the group’s valuable intangible property. I would therefore further 
propose to add an additional comment, included in between brackets below, 
resulting in the following wording:
356 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 8.41.
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“…a balancing payment would not constitute a royalty for the use of intan-
gible property, except to the extent that the payment entitles the payer to 
obtain only a right to use intangible property belonging to a participant (or 
a third party) and the payer does not also obtain a beneficial interest in the 
intangible property itself[, whereby the existence of such beneficial interest 
is to be considered based primarily on the factual exploitation of the intan-
gible property instead of the legal entitlement to the intangible property].”
I would advocate including this there where it systematically belongs, i.e. in the 
Commentary to Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. However, even if 
my recommendations would be followed up, balancing payments not qualified 
as a royalty may still be subject to withholding tax on services income. In that 
case the source state should have provided for such taxation in its national law 
and needs to have negotiated a right to impose it under its bilateral tax treaties. 
Taking all the foregoing into account, the analysis to determine whether or not 
balancing payments are subject to source state withholding taxation can be 
schematically summarized in the following flowchart:
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Figure 8: “Flowchart Withholding Tax on Balancing Payments”
8.4. Immovable Property
The allocation under Article 6 of the OECD, UN and US model tax conventions of 
the right to tax income from immovable property to the state where such prop-
erty is located is a stereotype example of application of the situs principle. The 
rationale behind it is that there is always a close economic connection between 
the source of income, i.e. the immovable property, and the country where it is 
located. This connection is regarded so strong that the right to tax of the source 
state has priority over the right to tax of any other state, even if the income is 
only indirectly derived from immovable property.357 Exclusive source state taxa-
357 Commentary to Article 6 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 4.   
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tion of income from immovable property is undisputed and relatively straight 
forward to apply. It generally should not cause issues in respect of immovable 
property used for activities covered by a CCA. This would only be different in 
the exceptional situation that the terms and conditions of a CCA provide for 
profits from immovable property to effectively be shared among participants. 
This could for example be the case, if a cost shared laboratory is on a part time 
basis rented out to a third party and the rental income is taken into account as 
a negative cost when valuing the local participant’s contribution under the CCA. 
To avoid discussions with tax authorities it is recommendable for MNEs to struc-
ture their CCAs so that any foreseeable and unforeseeable income from immov-
able property used in the course of cost shared activities is exclusively allocated 
to the legal owner of such property. This can be achieved by not sharing income 
from immovable property, such as rental income and capital gains, with other 
participants. At the same time the CCA should foresee in a fixed arm’s length 
compensation for the owner for making the immovable property available to 
the participants community. That is materially different from simply sharing 
all costs associated with that property including its depreciation. The former 
approach should be defendable from a transfer pricing point of view, as third 
parties normally also include an appropriate amount for housing costs in their 
charges to customers while keeping risks and opportunities associated with 
immovable property separated from day-to-day business transactions.       
8.5. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 8 are as follows,
In respect of the possibility that participation in a CCA results in a foreign perma-
nent establishment:
(i) A participation in a CCA should by itself not cause a permanent establish-
ment abroad. The main reason for this is that the position of a CCA partic-
ipant making resources available or performing activities under a CCA is in 
respect of critical elements comparable to that of an intra-group service 
provider. Crucially the other participants do not have unrestricted access to 
the facilities of the first participant and the other participants can therefore 
not be considered to have a fixed place of business in the country of resi-
dence of that first participant. 
(ii) To avoid confusion, I have written a proposed text confirming this interpre-
tation to be included in the Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax 
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Convention. This would make it clear beyond a doubt that, if tax adminis-
trations feel the outcome of a CCA is such that they are not able to tax a 
fair share of results given the value created in their jurisdiction, they would 
have to seek a transfer pricing adjustment.
In respect of withholding tax on balancing payments: 
(i) A tax sharing approach allowing for source state taxation of gross payments 
under a CCA implies a risk of an excessively high tax rate being applied to the 
included net profit element and is therefore preferably avoided. However, 
there are a number of instances in which international tax law currently 
does provide for source state withholding tax on balancing payments.
(ii) To the extent that balancing payments are a compensation for access to 
pre-existing intangible property, while the effective ownership of such 
intangible property does not transfer, they should be labeled as royalty 
and can, as such, suffer source state withholding tax subject to the provi-
sion of the source state’s national law and any applicable tax treaty. The 
joint development of new intangibles however is materially different from 
making intangibles available for use. Balancing payments in respect of 
development activities should therefore not be qualified as royalties, unless 
the payer does not receive a proportionate share of the effective ownership 
in the new intangibles. If so, balancing payments may be qualified as royal-
ties and subjected to royalty withholding tax in accordance with domestic 
law of the source state and any applicable tax treaty.
(iii) Irrespective of the foregoing, balancing payments in respect of develop-
ment activities and services provided under a CCA can be subject to with-
holding tax, if the national law of the source state imposes such tax and 
that state has reserved a right to tax income from providing services to its 
residents in its tax treaties. As illustrated by the Indian M/s. C. U. Inspec-
tions case, a critical aspect to take into account can then be whether or not 
the balancing payment includes a profit element. Under the new Chapter 
VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines this will more generally be so. 
To the extent that the recipient is then located in a country with which the 
source state has concluded a tax treaty, such country should live up to its 
treaty obligation and allow for relief from double taxation.
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In respect of the potential foreign tax liability from the use of immovable property 
under a CCA: 
(i) There should be no foreign tax liability of participants from the use of 
immovable property, provided that the contribution of its use by the legal 
owner is valued at a fixed arm’s length amount and all other economic up- 
and downside risk associated with the property in fact remains with its 
legal owner exclusively.
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9.  CFC Rules
9.1. Introduction
As already acknowledged in the previous chapter, states will in principle only 
tax profits of their residents and (under certain circumstances) of non-residents, 
which are in some way connected to their territory.358 This system can offer the 
opportunity to MNEs to limit their total tax cost by allocating to controlled 
subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions highly mobile concepts like the ownership 
of certain income generating assets, for example intangibles, or the assump-
tion of risk, for example development risk under a CCA. To prevent the use of 
structures lacking economic rationale, some countries have introduces targeted 
anti-avoidance rules aimed at including the income of controlled foreign compa-
nies (“CFCs”) in the taxable income of their domestic parent. This Chapter 8 first 
looks at the background of such CFC rules (Paragraph 8.2). It then analyzes their 
relation to transfer pricing issues (Paragraph 8.3.1) and subsequently considers 
how they might help prevent the use of CCAs in base erosion and profit shifting 
structures (Paragraph 8.3.2).
9.2. Background of CFC Rules
9.2.1. Balancing Export Neutrality and Competitiveness
The United States was the first country to introduce CFC rules. Operating a 
worldwide tax system, the US traditionally uses the so called credit method to 
avoid double taxation. Under this system US companies are taxable on world-
wide income. They are then provided a tax credit for the foreign tax on that 
income. Since 1 January 2018 a major exception applies for foreign dividends. 
Those are now fully exempt at the level of the US parent, while the US continues 
358 They may for example tax business profits attributable to a local permanent establishment of a 
foreign company (see Paragraph 8.2) or passive income like dividends, interest or royalties orig-
inating from their jurisdiction (see Paragraph 8.3).  Unilateral measures or tax treaties will then 
generally foresee in relief from double taxation through an exemption or a tax credit in the resi-
dence state of the recipient of the income.
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to tax its residents’ other income on a worldwide basis.359 To the extent the 
foreign tax rate is lower than the US tax rate the total tax charge on the latter 
income is effectively “topped up” to the US rate. Hence, the taxpayer would pay 
tax at the highest of either the foreign tax rate or the US tax rate. By conse-
quence, from the perspective of a US taxpayer an investment opportunity in the 
US should ceteris paribus not be less attractive than an investment opportunity 
in a low tax jurisdiction. As such, the US tax system is considered to establish 
capital export neutrality.
At the same time the characteristics of these systems led to concerns about 
the competiveness of domestic companies investing abroad. As the US tax rate 
was relatively high, especially during fiscal years before 2018, US multinationals 
operating outside their home country would generally pay more tax than their 
local competitors and consequently they would be left with less profit to rein-
vest.  Before it introduced an exemption on foreign dividends the US compen-
sated for this by not taxing all foreign sourced business income immediately. 
Instead they generally allowed for a deferral of taxation until the income was 
actually repatriated to the US parent.  If income was reinvested abroad, the 
term of the deferral could be quite long. This of course resulted in taxpayers 
realizing a lower effective tax rate on foreign income than on domestic income. 
By consequence, the deferral allowance was in fact a limitation on the principle 
of export neutrality and opens up arbitrage opportunities. The introduction 
of CFC rules by the US in 1962 can be regarded an attempt to strike a balance 
between the principle of capital export neutrality and the concerns about the 
competiveness of US multinationals. For this purpose certain types of income, 
referred to as “Subpart F income”360 are excluded from the deferral mechanism 
and instead included in taxable income at the level of the parent company at the 
same time they arise with the subsidiary 
In later years many other countries followed the US example and also intro-
duced CFC rules in their national tax laws. Contrary to the US, most of these 
countries operate a territorial tax system. That means that they in principle only 
impose tax on their residents’ local income and allow for an exemption of their 
foreign income. Under a territorial system the tax on foreign business income is 
effectively limited to the tax imposed by the source state. This places taxpayers 
investing abroad at par with their local competitors. For that reason the exemp-
tion method is considered to result in capital import neutrality. Although this 
359 Public Law no. 115-97, “Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to tiles II and V of the current reso-
lution on the budget for fiscal year 2018” (“2017 US Tax Reform Act”).
360 These rules are laid down in the Internal Revenue Code, Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part III, Subpart 
F.
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can obviously be considered a stimulus for taxpayers with the ambition to invest 
abroad, it can at the same time offer an incentive for taxpayers to allocate mobile 
income to subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions.  To avoid tax avoidance the appli-
cation of the exemption method is therefore generally restricted to active busi-
ness income. A credit method is then used to provide relief from double taxa-
tion in respect of passive income. Such an approach is often supplemented by 
CFC rules, which under certain conditions directly include the passive income in 
the taxable profit of the parent company, so that the domestic taxation cannot 
be excessively deferred by retaining the income in a foreign subsidiary.  
9.2.2. Design and Compatibility with Tax Treaties
Traditionally there is considerable variation in how countries have structured 
their CFC rules. They use different definitions of “control”. They also distinguish 
in their own way between the types of income that are covered and at how low 
a rate that income should be taxed for the rules to apply. Furthermore, there 
are two fundamentally different approaches for including a CFC’s income in 
the taxable base at the level of the parent company. Under the “look-through 
approach” the CFC is regarded tax transparent and its income is considered the 
own income of the parent company.  Under the “deemed dividend approach” 
on the other hand the income is assumed to be paid by the CFC to the parent 
company as a dividend, regardless of whether such payment has actually taken 
place. The distinction between the look-through and deemed dividend approach 
can be relevant when establishing whether CFC rules are compatible with tax 
treaties. This has been the subject of dispute in several countries.361 Taxpayers 
argued that CFC rules following the look-through approach should under Article 
7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention not apply to business profits. Similarly CFC 
rules following the deemed-dividend approach would be considered a breach 
of Article 10, paragraph 5. Some tax courts ruled in favor of taxpayers, others 
in favor of tax administrations362. The OECD however included language in the 
Commentary to Article 1, 7 and 10 of the Model Tax Convention to clarify that it 
does not consider CFC rules to constitute a treaty override. Taking into account 
the purpose of CFC rules as an anti-abuse measure, I wholeheartedly agree with 
this position.
361 See Lang, Aigner, Scheuerle and Stefaner 2004, General Report, section III and M. Heidenreich in 
Simander, Titz et al 2013, Paragraph 3.3.
362 The Court of Appeals for England and Wales ruled in favor of the tax administration (Bricom Hold-
ings Ltd. v. Inland Revenue, 25 July 1997, 70 TC 272), while the French Conseil d’Etat ruled in favor 
of the taxpayer (Société Schneider Electric, 28 June 2002, No. 2322764).
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9.3. CFC Rules and CCAs
9.3.1. Introduction
Multinationals in search of a long term tax deferral or exemption can use 
different techniques in order to increase the amount of profits allocated to low 
taxed group companies. For a good understanding of how CCAs can play a role 
in this, it should be acknowledged that there is a conceptual difference between, 
on the one hand, shifting profits to low taxed group companies through transfer 
pricing manipulation (“the transfer pricing manipulation technique”) and, on the 
other hand, shifting profits to low taxed group companies by preemptively allo-
cating the ownership of the assets generating those profits (“the preemptive 
reallocation of ownership technique”). A more or less similar distinction is also 
made by Kane, who refers to the first technique as “milking” and the second 
technique as “parking”.363 The difference can be further clarified by considering 
the example of a company located in a high tax jurisdiction that is a member of a 
multinational group. Its domestic R&D team develops a high value technology, 
of which the company becomes the legal and effective owner. If it subsequently 
allows other foreign group companies located in low tax jurisdictions to exploit 
the intangible in exchange for a royalty that is below market price, this multi-
national group would be applying the transfer pricing manipulation technique. 
Alternatively the group could try to apply the preemptive reallocation of owner-
ship technique. In that case the group would look to allocate the ownership of 
the technology to a low taxed subsidiary that would then license it out to the 
various group companies making use of it for purposes of their business opera-
tions. The high taxed company could for example transfer the ownership of the 
technology to the low taxed affiliate in an early stage of its development, when 
it is not yet certain how successful that development will be and the transferee 
would be taking on a certain amount of development risk. Under such circum-
stances the transfer could take place at a relatively low value. CCAs can further 
facilitate and in fact enhance this technique, because they allow the joint devel-
opment of the intangible together with a low taxed affiliate. Provided that such 
affiliate has sufficient substance to argue that it controlled the risks associated 
with the cost shared activities, it would share in the full development risk, obtain 
the effective co-ownership of that intangible right from the very moment that 
it comes into existence and a transfer as well as the realization of a potentially 
taxable capital gain by the transferor would be avoided altogether. In other 
words the tax benefit would be fully optimized, as the maximum amount of 
363 Kane, Tax Law Review 2013, page 478 – 506.
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future returns would be shifted to the low taxed affiliates at the lowest possible 
price.  
It should be noted that transfer pricing manipulation is in breach of rules and 
regulations. As explained extensively in Chapter 3, transfer prices should cohere 
to the ALS. This is the common international standard and as such incorporated 
into most national tax systems. If the rules and regulations of those systems 
would be successful at achieving their objectives, there would be no shifting 
of profit through transfer pricing manipulation. However, the problem is that 
the principle based ALS is to some extent arbitrary and can in practice be diffi-
cult to apply, specifically for tax administrations lacking specialist insight in the 
business environment in which an intangible is developed and exploited. By 
consequence, there is a continued risk of intentional or unintentional “transfer 
mispricing” and a backstop to the rules can be useful. CFC legislation may play 
that part.364 The role of CFC legislation is somewhat different when it comes to tax 
avoidance using the preemptive reallocation of ownership technique. Contrary 
to transfer pricing manipulation a preemptive reallocation of ownership, either 
under a CCA, through a sale or via any other transaction, can very well be fully 
compliant with all applicable tax laws. The taxpayer would just be optimizing 
its benefit from the tax deferral or exemption of profits in foreign subsidiaries 
allowed by its state of residence to safeguard the competiveness of that state’s 
“own” multinationals abroad. Intended or not, such deferral or exemption has 
opened up a completely legal arbitrage opportunity. CFC legislation may limit 
this by including the profit from the re-allocated assets in the taxable income of 
the parent company. In that case CFC rules should in my opinion be considered 
as a tool to balance between capital import and export neutrality. In that role 
they are not a backstop, but instead a primary line of defense against undesir-
able tax avoidance. 
9.3.2. Including Intangible Returns in CFC Income
9.3.2.1. The Obama Administration’s Proposal
As explained in Paragraph 4.3 the US Treasury and IRS have been trying to 
counter the preemptive reallocation of ownership technique by requiring high 
buy-in payments for access to cost sharing arrangements. However, as experi-
enced by the IRS in the Veritas and Amazon case, this is significantly complicated 
364 Note that the OECD regards the qualification of CFC rules as a “backstop” misleading, because 
both transfer pricing rules and CFC rules target distinct categories of income. Although those may 
sometimes overlap, each set of rules has its own right of existence (see: OECD/G20, “Designing 
Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules”, 5 October 2015, page 14).   
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by the complex valuation exercises that then have to be performed. Preparing 
financial projections on which to base such valuation is difficult, specifically 
for tax administrations that will generally have less insider’s knowledge about 
intercompany transactions than taxpayers. Solving this with retroactive adjust-
ments to the buy-in payment after considering ex post results is under pres-
sure, as it could entail an undesirable use of hindsight (see Paragraph 4.3.3.3 
and 5.5.3.2). As an alternative, it may be considered to reverse the profit shift by 
means of the preemptive transfer of ownership technique not through a higher 
buy-in payment, but by instead including future profits in the taxable income of 
the parent at the time those profits materialize. 
The suggested alternative solution would involve including “excessive” income 
of cost shared intangibles in CFC income and tax such return at the level of 
the parent company. Revenue provisions along these lines were consistently 
suggested by the Obama administration in the US budget proposals for each 
fiscal year since 2011.365 If under the proposal a US taxpayer would transfer an 
intangible from the US to a CFC, then any income from transactions connected 
with or benefitting from that intangible exceeding the cost properly allocated 
and apportioned to this income increased by a percentage mark-up, i.e. the 
excessive income, would be included in the US parent’s taxable Subpart F 
income. The administrative draft further specified that income would be consid-
ered excessive, if it exceeds 150% of the costs attributable to that income. In 
other words, the percentage mark-up would be fixed at 50%. All of the excessive 
income subject to an effective tax rate of 10% or less would be regarded low 
taxed and become directly taxable with the US parent company. In addition a 
gradual phase out of the new rules would be allowed for income subject to an 
effective tax rate of 10 to 15%. Income taxed at a rate of 15% or higher would 
not be affected by the new rules. In other words, if a US parent transfers an 
intangible to its controlled foreign subsidiary, which in return makes a payment 
of 100 to the US parent, then any return of the foreign subsidiary exceeding 
150 would be considered excess profit. To the extent those profits are then not 
subject to at least 15% tax in the foreign subsidiary’s state of residence, the US 
would include a part or all of that excess profit in the taxable income of the US 
parent.
It is explicitly stated that the proposal also covers income from intangibles of 
which the ownership rights were allocated through “a shared risk or develop-
ment agreement (including any cost sharing arrangement)”. In my opinion this 
refers to pre-existing intangibles contributed as a platform contribution and not 
365 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011, Office of Management and Budget, 
www.budget.gov.
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to intangibles newly developed under a CCA.  That reading corresponds with 
the analysis of the proposal by the US Joint Committee on Taxation. This anal-
ysis establishes that “transfers made in conjunction with cost-sharing arrange-
ments present a unique issue” and continues to clarify that these transfers often 
concern platform intangibles, used for the development of a next generation 
of intangible assets.366 The Joint Committee on Taxation also explains that 
if the CCA allows the participants community to use the US owned technical 
know-how on the manufacturing of a certain product for further development, 
the income from exploitation of version 2.0 of that product will be part of 
income “connected with or benefitting from” the transfer of that know-how and 
thus be taken into account when determining whether returns can be consid-
ered excessive. It does however not become clear whether this mechanism 
continues, when later generations (version 3.0 and so forth) are developed and 
exploited. In my opinion this matter is very similar to the issue around useful 
lifespan encountered when valuing platform contributions. However, as it is not 
a transfer pricing rule but an anti-abuse rule that is proposed here, the matter 
could in this instance be settled by further explicating in the legislative provision 
itself or in its context that the proposal also covers income from next generation 
intangibles of which the development was facilitated by the transfer or contri-
bution of a platform intangible. In that case the measure would go one step 
further than just being a backstop to transfer pricing rules. It would in fact give 
the jurisdiction of the parent company the ability to include in its taxable base a 
part of the income of next generation intangibles developed under a CCA. 
9.3.2.2. The OECD Recommendations
The possibility to include excess profits in CFC income has also been considered 
by the OECD. This resulted in the inclusion of a separate section on the matter in 
the Report about the design of CFC rules, which was published as part of the 2015 
final BEPS deliverables.367  The report sanctions rules that characterize income 
in excess of a “normal return” earned in low tax jurisdictions as CFC income. The 
normal return is calculated as a percentage of eligible equity, which is defined 
as the equity invested in assets used in the active conduct of a trade or business, 
including intangible assets. According to the OECD Report economic studies 
have shown that a normal return on such equity would be 8% to 10%, although 
this varies by industry, leverage and jurisdiction. The report acknowledges that 
including excess profits in CFC income may be specifically useful in respect of 
366 US Joint Committee on Taxation, “Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s 
Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposal”, June 2012.
367 OECD/G20, “Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules”, 5 October 2015, page 49.
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income from intangibles. At the same time it also recognizes that an excess 
profits approach is fundamentally different from currently existing CFC legis-
lation, because it would include all income above the threshold without further 
classification. It will not be necessary to determine where, from whom or from 
which activities the income was earned. As such the working of this approach 
could be regarded quite mechanical, which raises concerns about suitability 
and accuracy. These concerns may be countered however by a substance-based 
exclusion. Such exclusion is not described extensively by the OECD, but may be 
understood to exclude returns that were caused by conditions that could not 
have reasonably been foreseen when the intangible was transferred or contrib-
uted. Furthermore, it should be remembered that an inclusion in CFC income 
does not result in double taxation. As long as the tax paid on the income abroad 
is creditable, it merely results in a top-up of the effective tax rate on the income 
to the tax rate of the parent company’s jurisdiction of residence. This of course 
significantly limits the negative effects of the presumed inaccuracy.
9.3.2.3. 2017 US Tax Reform
While the Obama administration’s proposal never made it into law, an alter-
native measure aimed at including intangible returns of CFCs in the taxable 
income of their US parent was adopted as part of the 2017 US Tax Reform Act.368 
This introduced the concept of so called Global Intangible Low Taxed Income 
(“GILTI”), which consists of any of the CFC’s earnings above a routine 10% on its 
tangible business assets. The US parent is allowed a fixed 50% deduction of such 
income, but the remainder is then subject to US corporate income tax at a rate of 
21%, thus resulting in an effective tax rate of 10.5% on the GILTI. Subsequently 
the taxpayer is granted a tax credit for 80% of the foreign income tax already 
paid on the income. On balance that means that there will be no additional US 
income tax due on the income, if it is subject to at least 13.125% abroad. This can 
be illustrated by the example of a US parent with a controlled foreign subsid-
iary that owns 400 of tangible business assets and 1,000 of intangible business 
assets. If its earnings in a year are 140, the CFC’s routine return is calculated at 
40 (10% of 400 tangible business assets), leaving a GILTI of 100. After the fixed 
deduction of 50%, an amount of 50 is regarded the US parent’s taxable income. 
At a rate of 21% the maximum US tax on this is 10.5, i.e. 10.5% of taxpayer’s 
total GILTI. However, if the income is already subject to foreign income tax in 
the hands of the CFC, then 80% of such tax is creditable. That implies that no 
additional US tax is payable, if the foreign income tax is equal to at least 13.125% 
368 HR 1 - An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on 
the budget for fiscal year 2018, Pub. L. 115-97.
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or more. It should be mentioned that the fixed deduction is envisaged to go 
down to 37.5% of the GILTI for fiscal years starting after 31 December 2025. This 
implies that from then on the foreign income needs to be equal to at least 16.4% 
for there to be no additional US taxation. Furthermore, it can be added that the 
2017 Tax Reform Act as a mirroring image to the GILTI taxation also introduced 
a new regime for foreign derived intangible income (“FDII”), which provides for 
excess returns of US companies from foreign sales, licenses and leases, to effec-
tively be taxable at a reduced rate of 13.125% as from 1 January 2018, increasing 
to 16.4% as from 2026.
9.3.3. Author’s Analysis
As already acknowledged in Paragraph 1.4 the mobile nature of intangible 
assets poses a difficult issue for tax administrations trying to prevent MNEs 
from eroding their domestic tax base. They can attempt to counter this by more 
strictly upholding transfer pricing rules and regulations. If they are successful 
at that, they will counter transfer pricing manipulation. However, that leaves 
open certain arbitration opportunities offered to MNEs by the possibility to 
preemptively reallocate the ownership of high value intangibles to low taxed 
subsidiaries, for example by jointly developing those assets under a CCA. As 
such, I understand the incentive to try to tax excessive returns of low taxed affil-
iates from intercompany transactions involving intangible assets. Again the US 
appears to be the pioneering country first to adopt a new specific anti-abuse 
measure. It can be argued that the formula based GILTI regime is somewhat 
rough around the edges. For one, there is no direct link to the US required in 
respect of the intangibles generating the taxpayer’s GILTI. This means that even 
income derived from assets that were developed and owned exclusively outside 
of the US are in scope and can thus be taxed in the US. However, when consid-
ered more carefully it can be looked upon as simply consistent with the US’ 
worldwide tax system. Second, the GILTI regime does not foresee in a substance-
based exclusion, as suggested by the OECD. Hence, the taxpayer cannot avoid 
the GILTI taxation by evidencing a certain level of substance in its CFCs. It can 
be argued that increased substance in the CFCs will generally cause the CFCs 
to own more business assets and thus to have a higher routine return, which in 
turn should reduce the GILTI. At the same time, that will not be the case if the 
substance consists of employees rather than tangible assets, while the former 
type of substance may still justify some relief. Third, an apparently fundamental 
flaw of the GILTI regime is that despite its broad scope and mechanical working 
it allows only an 80% credit for foreign income tax. This causes double taxa-
tion in respect of the non-creditable 20%, even in potentially bona fide situa-
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tions.  At the time of writing, the administrative regulations further specifying 
the GILTI regime still have to be published and its effectiveness in daily fiscal 
practice has not been proven yet. Nevertheless, the GILTI regime potentially 
makes a reallocation of intangible assets by a US parent to its low taxed CFC far 
less attractive, while the simultaneous lowering of the effective tax rate on FDII 
further removes the incentive to do so. If it turns out a successful disincentive 
for preemptive asset reallocations, the US approach can be expected to be repli-
cated by tax administrations across the globe.   
9.4. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 10 are as follows,
In respect of the traditional purpose and working of CFC rules:
(i) CFC rules are generally intended to strike a balance between offering 
domestic MNEs a good competitive position on the international stage by 
allowing a deferral or exemption of foreign sourced income and avoiding 
arbitrage.
(ii) CFC legislation, if properly drafted, is compatible with tax treaties based on 
the OECD Model Tax Convention and, as such, should not be considered to 
constitute a treaty override.
In respect of the effectiveness of CFC rules to prevent tax avoidance structures 
involving CCAs:
(i) Tax avoidance structures involving CCAs can be split in two categories: One 
is aimed at manipulating transfer prices, the other at preemptively reallo-
cating the ownership of valuable assets, most notably intangibles, to low 
tax jurisdiction.  
(ii) The solution for transfer pricing manipulation should in first instance come 
from enhanced transfer pricing rules. Only if those are unsuccessful, CFC 
rules can act as a backstop.
(iii) When it comes to a preemptive reallocation of ownership or in fact the 
preemptive sharing of ownership of valuable intangibles under a CCA, 
transfer pricing solutions involve complicated valuation exercises and 
will therefore always leave room for arbitrary decisions, discussions and 
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disputes. The inclusion of excess returns from intangibles in CFC income, 
like is the case under the US GILTI regime, could potentially keep taxpayers 
from initiating such reallocation. It might be specifically effective, if 
combined with a reduced domestic tax rate on intangible income, as under 
the US FDII or a European style patent box regime.
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10.1. Introduction
As the determination of the correct transfer pricing and tax treatment of CCAs 
can be a complex exercise, it may lead to uncertainty, disputes and, consequen-
tially, double taxation. International tax law offers different instruments to avoid 
or resolve issues. It provides for possibilities to obtain upfront certainty from tax 
administrations about the tax or transfer pricing treatment of a certain posi-
tion or transaction. It also enables procedures to effectively resolve disputes. 
However, neither of those instruments is always appropriately tailored to 
effectively tackle situations involving a CCA. This Chapter 10 first considers the 
possibility to obtain upfront certainty about transactions under a CCA from 
one or more tax administrations in a tax ruling or advance pricing agreement 
(Paragraph 10.2) and subsequently examines the available dispute resolution 
procedures under modern day tax treaties (Paragraph 10.3). In both instances a 
critical analysis of the existing mechanisms with a focus on their applicability in 
respect of CCAs is accompanied by recommendations for improvements.
10.2. Upfront Certainty
10.2.1.  Advance Pricing Agreements
With complex transactions as those under a CCA it can be in the interest of 
both taxpayers and tax authorities to operate a system under which taxpayers 
can obtain upfront certainty. For taxpayers this offers clarity about their fiscal 
position before they enter into transactions, while it mitigates the risk of 
adjustments, penalties and double taxation. For tax administrations it limits 
auditing costs, avoids future disputes with other countries and increases insight 
in business circumstances as well as common pricing policies. A decision on 
upfront certainty is generally formalized as a tax ruling or, when it concerns 
transfer pricing matters, as an advance pricing agreement (“APA”). A tax ruling 
addresses the interpretation and thus the application of tax law in a specific 
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case. Having taken into account the facts and circumstances presented to them, 
the tax authorities formalize their decision in the ruling, which is then provided 
to the taxpayer. An APA on the other hand has a slightly different nature. It is a 
contract between taxpayer and tax authorities on the acceptability of transfer 
pricing policies and application of the arm’s length principle to the case at hand. 
The OECD provides relevant guidance on APAs in section F of Chapter IV of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as well as in the Annex to that Chapter IV. That 
includes the following definition of an APA:
“An advance pricing agreement (‘APA’) is an arrangement that determines, 
in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed 
period of time.”369
An APA is not necessarily concluded by a taxpayer with a single tax administra-
tion. It can also be concluded with two administrations (a bilateral APA) or more 
than two administrations (a multilateral APA). According to the OECD “the bilat-
eral (or multilateral) approach is far more likely to ensure that the arrangements 
will reduce the risk of double taxation, will be equitable to all tax administra-
tions and taxpayers involved, and will provide greater certainty to the taxpayers 
concerned”.370 This is specifically applicable in respect of transactions under 
CCAs, because those might often involve participants from multiple countries. 
The terms and conditions of the contractual arrangement will then affect the 
taxable profit in each of those jurisdictions. The only way to rule out any risk of 
future disputes would be for all tax administrations involved to sign off on the 
APA. However, tax administrations are not in all countries allowed to enter into 
binding agreements with taxpayers directly. In that case, the mutual agreement 
procedure under an applicable tax treaty may offer the alternative solution of an 
agreement between the competent authorities of such country and the treaty 
partner. It should be noted that in that case the taxpayer is not a party to the 
agreement. However, under Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the 
taxpayer does play a crucial role, as he has to initiate the mutual agreement 
procedure through a formal request.
Specifically in the field of transfer pricing, the number of requests for upfront 
certainty has increased significantly over recent years.  A logical explanation for 
this is that the existing transfer pricing legislation leans strongly on the discre-
tionary norms of the ALS rather than that it provides a set of detailed prede-
369 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 4.132.
370 Idem, Paragraph 4.139.
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termined rules. As such, establishing the open market price for a transaction 
between related parties is by nature an arbitrary matter. It involves not only 
the identification, but also a subjective appraisal of facts and circumstances of 
the case at hand. The latter leaves a certain room for “negotiations” between 
tax administrations and taxpayers about what pricing is appropriate. Where it 
has so far simply not been possible to develop a more rule based way of deter-
mining transfer prices, APAs are an alternative way to provide taxpayers with 
legal security. They may also be regarded a pragmatic tool allowing for tailor-
made solutions to regulate transfer pricing issues on a case-by-case basis. This 
was also recognized in a 2011 study by Markham on the experience with APAs 
in particularly the US and Australia.371 Among others she interviewed transfer 
pricing experts from both jurisdictions about their experience with APAs. These 
experts pointed out the general push for increased transparency and the need 
to share information upfront with tax administrations anyway. They flagged 
the relevance of upfront certainty due to increased audit attention for transfer 
pricing matters as well as more stringent financial reporting standards. Further-
more, they considered that an APA application offers access to the best experts 
in the tax administration. The interviewees considered the expensive and 
time-consuming application process and its bureaucratization as the greatest 
disadvantage of using APAs. However, offset against the administrative burden 
of preparing transfer pricing documentation, handling audits and domestic 
dispute resolutions these disadvantages did not appear to outweigh the bene-
fits offered by APAs.372        
At the same time critics of the tax ruling and the APA system argue that the 
individualized approach of case-by-case agreements may cause this system not 
to comply with the principles of legality and equality.373 They point out that in a 
democratic society taxation should be based on duly established laws. If this is 
not the case, there is in their opinion a risk that larger, more influential MNEs 
will be able to negotiate better deals than smaller, less wealthy taxpayers. These 
concerns may be justified and will grow, as tax rulings and APAs are kept strictly 
confidential. If no or only very limited information on their contents is made 
available to the general public, there is a lack of transparency and a limited 
control of state actions. That this may have a competition distorting effect has 
also been acknowledged by the European Commission. Although the Commis-
sion does not oppose tax rulings and APAs in general, it has considered several 
371 Markham 2012.
372 See Markam 2012, Chapter 4 and also compare Kerschner and Stiastny, Intertax 2013/11.
373 M. Toribio Leao, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2014/4.
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tested examples to constitute state aid and therefore be in breach of European 
regulations in relation to APAs concluded by individual companies.374 
10.2.2.  Proposal for a Standard for APA Requests Concerning a CCA
There are valid concerns about the use of CCAs in base erosion and profit 
shifting structures. This is rightfully addressed in the BEPS project by adding 
control over risk as a precondition for group companies to participate in a CCA 
and by requiring that more contributions are valued at market price rather than 
at cost. However, while that may limit abuse of the arrangement for tax avoid-
ance purposes, it also makes structuring, operating and auditing CCAs signifi-
cantly more complex. Furthermore, it was established in Chapter 8 that there 
may be discussions about whether or not operating a CCA can lead to a foreign 
tax liability of participants. Therefore, I believe that an increased demand for 
upfront certainty in respect of transactions under a CCA is a logical develop-
ment. Facilitating such demand would avoid costly audits and, potentially, 
disputes between taxpayers and tax administrations as well as between tax 
administrations among each other. Concerns about a lack of transparency and a 
consequential illegality or inequality can be substantially mitigated by requiring 
the contents of tax rulings and APAs to be shared with other tax administra-
tions.  That would generally discourage overly beneficial arrangements, as 
those are more likely to be neutralized by increased taxation in other countries 
or, in an EU context, would trigger state aid allegations. For bilateral or multilat-
eral arrangements such backstops apply automatically, while for tax rulings and 
unilateral APAs this could be achieved by improved processes for international 
exchange of information. That political consensus on these matters is realistic 
has been proven among others by the agreement on the automatic exchange 
of information concerning cross-border tax rulings and APAs reached by EU 
Member States in 2015.375 
In light of the foregoing there is in my opinion a strong case to make for 
embracing APAs as a solution to problems posed by the principle based 
approach to transfer pricing under the ALS. When CCAs are concerned, the 
preferred scenario involves multilateral APAs to which the tax administrations 
from at least the most relevant countries involved are a party. The OECD also 
374 Examples are the APAs concluded between carmaker Fiat and the Luxemburg tax administration 
and between coffee retailer Starbucks and the Netherlands tax administration (press release of 
the European Commission of 21 October 2015) as well as the Belgium so called excess profit ruling 
regime (press release of the European Commission of 11 January 2016).
375 Council directive (EU) of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, Official Journal of the EU, L332, 18 
December 2015.
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recognizes this and mentions the use of APAs for transactions under a CCA 
specifically in Paragraph 4.140 of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines:
“Tax administrations may find APAs particularly useful in profit allocation 
or income attribution issues arising in the context of [… and also] handling 
multilateral cost contribution arrangements.”
Be that how it may, negotiations of APAs between more than two tax adminis-
trations or competent authorities can of course be a complex and cumbersome 
exercise. This makes it even more relevant that taxpayers include the right infor-
mation in the APA request or the request to start up a mutual agreement proce-
dure. The OECD words it as follows:
“The cooperation of the associated enterprises is vital to a successful APA 
negotiation. For example, the associated enterprises ordinarily would be 
expected to provide the tax administrations with the methodology that they 
consider most reasonable under the particular facts and circumstances. The 
associated enterprises also should submit documentation supporting the 
reasonableness of their proposal, which would include, for example, data 
relating to the industry, markets, and countries to be covered by the agree-
ment. In addition, the associated enterprises may identify uncontrolled 
businesses that are comparable or similar to the associated enterprises’ 
businesses in terms of the economic activities performed and the transfer 
pricing conditions, e.g. economic costs and risks incurred, and perform a 
functional analysis as described in Chapter 1 of these Guidelines.”376
The information included in the request should allow for an adequate assess-
ment of the financial and commercial relations between the participants in the 
CCA and an accurate delineation of the transactions between them under that 
arrangement. I would advocate that it should also allow the tax administrations 
or competent authorities to categorize the CCA under the categorization model 
of Paragraph 2.3.3.2. In my opinion the description of facts and circumstances 
to be included in the APA request could be quite adequately structured along 
the lines of the main transfer pricing focus areas identified in Paragraph 5.1:   
• General information – To set the scene for the analysis to follow, the request 
should include company specific details relevant to determine the group’s 
376 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Paragraph 4.133.
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overall financial and commercial position as well as background on the 
industry in which the group operates and the market positions that it has 
been able to assume. It would also appear logical that the introductory 
section of the request explains when and for what general purpose the CCA 
was concluded.
• Description of Activities (including functions performed, risks assumed and 
assets used) – The request should continue to provide a description of the 
nature of the activities performed under the CCA, indicating their rela-
tive importance and complexity. It should indicate which employees will 
perform those activities, elaborating on their job level and skill set. Further, 
it should identify the most relevant tangible or intangible pre-existing 
business assets used in the process, either to perform the activities or to 
serve as a platform asset for the development of a completely new asset, 
explaining the purpose of use and most unique characteristics of these 
assets. Furthermore, the request should describe and, if possible, quantify 
the risks associated with the activities performed under the CCA. It should 
also exhaustively list and describe the results that are anticipated to come 
from the activities performed under the CCA and the benefits those results 
are anticipated to offer. To the extent that the activities are expected to 
result in the creation of new tangible or intangible assets, the nature and 
use of those assets in the market on which the taxpayer operates should 
be described, allowing the tax administration or competent authorities to 
understand their role in the group’s value chain.     
• Identification of Participants – The request should further identify all partic-
ipants to the CCA and subsequently include information about the financial 
position of each of them. That should evidence that each participant has 
sufficient financial resources to bear their share of costs associated with 
the activities performed under the CCA as well as risks, were they to mate-
rialize. The request should also provide a clear outline of how the group is 
organizationally set up and, consequently, what each participant’s involve-
ment in the performance of the cost shared activities is. This should include 
a description of the substance of the participants, referencing which 
personnel they employ that is involved in the coordination or day-to-day 
performance of activities covered by the CCA and which assets they own 
that are used for the performance of those activities.  As a minimum, 
it should be made clear why each participant has sufficient capacity and 
authority to control the risks associated with the activities performed under 
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the CCA and how it regularly uses that capacity and authority to actually 
exercise such control. 
• Division of Benefits – The request should clearly and unambiguously lay out 
how the anticipated benefits from activities performed under the CCA as 
well as any additional unforeseen benefits from those activities are divided 
up among participants in a perpetual, non-overlapping and exclusive 
manner, for example on a territorial or field-of-use basis. Among others it 
should confirm how the effective ownership of newly developed assets is 
shared among participants and how each of them has unlimited access to 
its proportionate share of results free of any charges in addition to their 
contributions under the CCA.
• Valuation of Contributions – The request should build on the other informa-
tion provided to provide a comprehensive overview of all contributions in 
kind made under the CCA split per contributing participant. It should subse-
quently describe how these contributions are valued and why the selected 
valuation method is regarded to result in arm’s length pricing. It should 
identify the valuation method used per type of contribution and refer-
ence any back-up documentation available evidencing its appropriateness, 
including most notably any information that may be available in respect of 
comparable open market transactions. If any contributions are valued at 
cost, the request should elaborate on why that is the case and explain how 
the difference between market and cost price was either already included 
in the valuation of a pre-existing contribution or such difference is limited 
and cost is in fact a practical means to determine the relative value of the 
contributions. Furthermore, if the CCA contract includes a retroactive 
adjustment mechanism for when actual benefits deviate significantly from 
anticipated benefits, then such mechanism should be referenced here. If on 
the other hand the contract does not include an adjustment mechanism, 
it should be explicitly requested that the tax administration or compe-
tent authorities agree with and accept the risk assumption under the CCA 
contract. That would imply that no adjustments will be made for any devi-
ation of actual benefits from anticipated benefits unless there is a breach 
of any critical assumptions, upon which the APA is made conditional (see 
Paragraph 10.2.3).  
• Calculation of Balancing Payments – The request should then describe how 
the balancing payments are calculated, so that they arrange for the partici-
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pants’ proportionate share of overall contributions to be consistent to their 
proportionate share of overall expected benefits. This involves an explana-
tion of how the participants’ proportionate share of overall expected bene-
fits is determined. To the extent that this is done using a key, it should be 
explained which objectively verifiable measures serve as the basis for this 
key and why those are considered to appropriately reflect the participants’ 
relative share of the overall  expected benefits. Furthermore, if applicable, 
the request should include a description of the adjustment mechanism that 
allows for a prospective adjustment of the allocation method in case of 
changed economic, financial or operational circumstances.
• Conclusions in respect of tax and transfer pricing treatment – Finally 
the request should draw conclusions from all facts and circumstances 
presented about the tax and transfer pricing treatment of the transactions 
under the CCA and thereby summarize exactly what the tax administration 
or competent authorities are signing off on. First and foremost, it would be 
the intent to acknowledge that the terms and conditions of the transac-
tions under the CCA do not differ from what independent enterprises would 
have agreed under similar circumstances, that the CCA therefore complies 
with the arm’s length principle and that, by consequence, the arrangement 
leads to an appropriate allocation of income between these group compa-
nies for purpose of calculating their respective income tax liabilities in the 
countries of which the tax administrations or competent authorities are a 
party to the APA. Furthermore, there could be value in determining that 
there will be no foreign tax liability of group companies from their partic-
ipation in the CCA or in specifying which balancing payment qualifying as 
royalties or services can be subjected to source state withholding taxation 
and at what rate.
• Appendices – Obviously the request should be accompanied by any relevant 
back-up documentation that may be available. Most notably however the 
CCA contract and the group’s transfer pricing master file appear standard 
documents to be attached. 
In Paragraph 38 of the Annex to Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines the 
OECD points out that: 
“The content of the proposal and the extent of the necessary supporting 
information and documentation will depend on the facts and circumstance 
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of each case and the requirements of the individual participating tax admin-
istrations. It is therefore not considered practicable to list or define exactly 
what should be provided.”
The EUJTPF in its “Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements” concluded along 
the same lines, but nevertheless made an attempt to include some general 
instructions for composing an APA request in two appendixes to its Report. 
Although one may agree that it is not possible to prescribe the specific informa-
tion that is to be provided for every transaction, I still believe that standardiza-
tion of APA requests covering a specific type of transactions can accommodate 
fiscal practice and lead to more successful negotiations between taxpayers and 
tax administrations or between competent authorities.  In respect of transac-
tions under a CCA for example, the OECD could include guidance as an annex to 
Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and I would think the above could 
serve as a good starting point for drafting such annexure.  
10.2.3. Critical Assumptions
A major complexity of APAs is that they aim to qualify the pricing of transac-
tions that will only take place in the future. Whether the pricing methodology 
agreed upon is then still appropriate can depend on certain facts and circum-
stances as they stand at that point in time. This can require so called “critical 
assumptions” about those facts and circumstances to be included in the agree-
ment. The OECD also recognized the importance of such critical assumptions 
and pays special attention to them in section C.3.6 of the Annex to Chapter IV of 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Paragraph 43 of the Annex states:
“… The assumptions are defined as ‘critical’ if the actual conditions existing 
at the time the transactions occur could diverge from those that were 
assumed to exist, to the extent that the ability of the methodology reliably 
to reflect arm’s length pricing is undermined…”
Which critical assumptions are to be determined depends on the type of trans-
actions, the applied transfer pricing methodology, the individual circumstances 
of the taxpayer and the commercial environment in which the taxpayer oper-
ates. The OECD promotes basing them on observable, reliable and independent 
data. Examples are assumptions about domestic tax law and treaty provisions, 
assumptions about tariffs and other import or export regulations, assumptions 
about economic, commercial and financial conditions and assumptions about 
the taxpayer’s organization.
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As has also been recognized in fiscal literature, the instrument of critical assump-
tions can be applied extensively or restrictively. 377 An extensive application 
could entail the use of many different critical assumptions or broadly worded 
assumptions. A restrictive use would be more focused and would involve the use 
of only a limited number of critical assumptions, which have a narrowly defined 
scope of application. An extensive application of critical assumptions makes the 
agreement more specific, better acceptable to tax administrations and there-
fore easier to negotiate. However, it also makes the agreement less reliable, 
thus eroding its purpose of providing upfront certainty. In the US the IRS has 
provided guidelines to avoid problems with critical assumptions.378 First, these 
prescribe to make critical assumptions extreme outer limits, so that they would 
only lead to cancelation of the APA under extraordinary circumstances. Second, 
they recommend making the assumptions objective, in the meaning that they 
should be specific. If for example a decrease of sales numbers is considered a 
critical assumption, it should be included with what percentage sales should 
drop instead of only indicating that sales should drop “substantially”. Third and 
finally, the guidelines consider adjustment clauses in the legal contract under-
lying the transaction preferable to critical assumptions in the APA. As such, it can 
be argued that the IRS has adopted a relatively restrictive application approach.
When it comes to concluding an APA for transactions under a CCA, I would 
also be in favor of maintaining effectiveness of the agreement by only restric-
tively applying critical assumptions. For one, it would be preferable that the 
CCA contract provides for a retrospective adjustment clause in respect of the 
valuation of pre-existing intangibles, which can then be referenced in the APA, 
rather than that the binding nature of the APA is made depended on a critical 
assumption about the result from the exploitation of those intangibles by indi-
vidual participants. Similarly, it would offer more upfront certainty to all parties 
involved, if the participants to the CCA contractually agree a prospective adjust-
ment of the applied cost allocation key, instead of making the applicability of 
the APA subject to the key’s measure staying within a specified range. At the 
same time that does not mean that there is no room for critical assumptions 
at all or that those that are included would not be fundamentally important for 
the APA. The in my opinion most obvious critical assumption to include regards 
the organizational set-up of the taxpayer’s group. This is closely related to the 
categorization of the CCA for transfer pricing purposes under the categoriza-
tion model of Paragraph 2.3.3.2. A change in the level of centralization, which is 
377 Carolis, Intertax 2013/12.
378 US IRS, “APA Study Guide Lesson One: Major Elements”, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-apa/apa_study_guide_.pdf.
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not uncommon within large MNEs, can dramatically impact the relative value of 
each participant’s contribution under the CCA and thus require that the applied 
transfer pricing methodology is adjusted. Furthermore, it may be appropriate to 
include critical assumptions in respect of elements external of the transactions 
covered on a case-by-case basis. For example a change in relevant domestic tax 
law or applicable tax treaties and a dramatic change in market circumstances 
might still offer a valid reason for early termination of the agreement.
10.3. Dispute Resolution
10.3.1.  Introduction
The OECD, UN and US model tax conventions all include a procedure to resolve 
disputes, in case the actions of a contracting state result in taxation that is not 
in accordance with the provisions of the convention. This is intended to ensure 
that tax treaties are applied correctly and that they succeed in their aim of 
avoiding double taxation. In the OECD Model Tax Convention the procedure is 
provided for by Article 25 and consists of a two-step approach. The first step 
is laid down in Paragraph 1 to 4 of Article 25 and is referred to as the mutual 
agreement procedure (“MAP”). It allows taxpayers to present their case to the 
designated representatives (“competent authorities”) of their state of residence, 
if they are able to demonstrate that actions by one or both of the contracting 
states in breach of the treaty have led to economic and/or juridical double 
taxation. These competent authorities then have to endeavor to reach agree-
ment about a suitable solution, removing the double taxation, with the compe-
tent authorities of the other contracting state. It is important to note that the 
competent authorities have a so called best-efforts obligation only. That means 
they have to do their best to reach an agreement, which at least entails a duty to 
negotiate. It is however not mandatory that they actually reach such an agree-
ment.379 Under the OECD Model Tax Convention an MAP has to be initiated 
within three years of the first notification of the action by a contracting state 
that is not in accordance with the tax treaty. It can be positioned regardless of 
whether domestic remedies have been pursued up to the last resort. In practice 
however competent authorities have proven reluctant to enter into negotia-
tions with their counterparts in the other contracting state as long as domestic 
appeals are pending. If the competent authorities of the contracting states are 
unable to reach an agreement within two years, Paragraph 5 of Article 25 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention provides for the second step of the dispute resolu-
379 Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Paragraph 37.
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tion procedure. This makes it possible for taxpayers to request unresolved issues 
to be submitted for arbitration before a committee of experts. However, if the 
competent authorities have already reached a mutual agreement that suffi-
ciently eliminates double taxation, taxpayers cannot bring issues to arbitration 
only because they believe the outcome of such agreement is incorrect. In other 
words: Arbitration is not an alternative or additional resource for taxpayers that 
do not agree with the outcome of an MAP. 
It should be acknowledged that the two step dispute resolution procedure 
provided for by the model tax conventions is non-mandatory. That means that 
countries are not obliged to include it in their tax treaties and in practice many 
countries have not done so or included only the possibility of a MAP without 
the backstop of arbitration. In a positive development however, dispute reso-
lution received a push by its recognition under the BEPS-project as a necessary 
balancing measure next to anti-avoidance rules.380 Additionally, on 10 October 
2017 the European Council adopted a directive on tax dispute resolution mech-
anisms, which prescribes that all Member States should either on a unilateral 
basis or by means of an MAP resolve the dispute resulting in double taxation or 
alternatively enter into binding arbitration. The new directive has a more exten-
sive scope than the EU-Arbitration Convention, as it also covers non-transfer 
pricing disputes. Furthermore, a taxpayer can challenge non-compliance of 
Member States in respect of the directive with the European Court of Justice, 
while the ECJ in principle does not have jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the 
provisions of the Arbitration Convention.
10.3.2.  Disadvantages of Traditional Dispute Resolution Procedures
The non-binding and non-mandatory nature of the traditional dispute resolu-
tion procedures makes that tax treaties are not always successful at avoiding 
double taxation. Besides this, there is more criticism of these procedures. In his 
thesis published in 2005, Altman identifies various other fundamental disad-
vantages.381 He considers that current procedures inadequately address the 
inequality between negotiating tax administrations. Such inequality may lead 
to inappropriate outcomes and may for example occur when developing coun-
tries have to negotiate with developed countries, on which they depend for 
trade and capital investments. In addition Altman highlights that the outcome 
of MAPs and arbitration proceedings are in many countries not binding on the 
domestic courts. They also do not generate guidance to others nor establish a 
system of precedence, as long as the agreements are kept confidential. Further-
380 OECD/G20, “Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective”, 5 October 2015.
381 Altman 2006.
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more, tax administrations can apply stalling techniques, if in fact they do want 
to resolve a case in a timely manner. All this leads Altman to suggest alternative 
dispute resolution procedures with binding arbitration by an independent Inter-
national Tax Tribunal under supervision of a Global Tax Organization. Although 
there is a lot to say in favor of this proposal, there is unfortunately no sign of any 
political intention to move in that direction now or in the foreseeable future. 
By consequence it remains a theoretical alternative, mostly interesting from an 
academic perspective only.
A further issue with the traditional dispute resolution procedures that deserves 
specific attention is that they focus on bilateral solutions and, by consequence, 
are often times ineffective in situations involving more than two countries. This 
can become specifically apparent, if a transfer pricing adjustment is made in 
respect of transactions under a CCA.  If the CCA includes participants from more 
than two countries, such adjustment will impact the tax position of the group in 
the same number of jurisdictions. Consider for example a multinational group 
with a Dutch parent and several foreign subsidiaries that sets out to develop 
a new manufacturing technology under a CCA. Although all participants exer-
cise control over the risks associated with the cost shared activities, most of 
the day-to-day R&D work is provided in a limited number of locations, among 
which a laboratory in The Netherlands. For the purpose of calculating balancing 
payments under the CCA, the group may decide to value these activities on 
a cost plus basis. Now assume that upon audit the Dutch tax administration 
disagrees with this valuation.  It argues that in comparable uncontrolled trans-
actions the unique skill set and expertise of R&D personnel is better remuner-
ated and that the contribution made by the Dutch participant should be valued 
at a significantly higher amount. The Dutch tax administration then adjusts the 
taxable profit of the Dutch participant accordingly. In that case, to effectively 
avoid double taxation the group would have to seek a corresponding adjust-
ment in the countries of residence of all other CCA participants.
A similar, although not specifically CCA related issue recognized in fiscal liter-
ature concerns the problems posed by so called triangular cases.382  That issue 
is referenced here, because the solution for it may be the same as the solution 
for the problems with CCA related dispute resolution. Triangular cases involve a 
transfer pricing adjustment in one state that is neutralized by a corresponding 
adjustment in another state, but also inspires the tax administration of the 
other state to make a new transfer pricing adjustment in respect of a related 
yet different intercompany transaction with an associated enterprise in a third 
382 Van Herksen, Intertax 2008/8-9, Vollebregt, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2012/2 and R. 
Biçer, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2014/2.
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state. Vollebregt illustrates this by the example of a taxpayer that is a resident 
of a non-EU parent with a subsidiary in a first EU member state (“EU1”), which in 
turn holds subsidiaries in several other EU member states (“EU2”, “EU3” etc.). 383 
The non-EU parent sells to EU1, which is the sole European inventory company 
and sells to the bottom tier EU subsidiaries, which are distributors, shortly 
before they sell to customers.  As all the technology and brands are developed 
and owned by the non-EU parent, the applied transfer prices allows that parent 
to earn all residual profit, while the functions performed and risks assumed 
by the different EU companies are such that those companies earn only a 
fixed margin. If the resident state of a bottom tier EU company considers the 
profit of its resident to be insufficient, it may adjust its resident’s taxable profit 
by assuming a lower purchase price for products bought from EU1. A corre-
sponding adjustment would erode the margin earned by EU1 and therefore may 
trigger a second transfer price adjustment, this time in the resident state of EU1 
in respect of the purchase price paid to the non-EU parent. This would result, as 
Vollebregt puts it, in “a carousel of mutual agreement procedures”.
It should be noted that the EUJTP has also addressed triangular cases.384 It 
considers three different solutions. The first involves a prospective resolution 
through (multilateral) advance pricing agreements. Second, it suggests inter-
preting Paragraph 3 of Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention to provide 
for a multilateral approach to eliminating double taxation. Third, the EUJTPF 
considers that the working of the Arbitration Convention may be extended to 
third states based on Article 35 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties assuming acceptance of such rights or obligations by the third state.385 
However, none of the three solutions is investigated in much detail. Neverthe-
less the EUJTPF in its Report on Non-EU Triangular cases concludes that it “has 
taken the discussion as far as it is possible”.        
383 See Vollebregt, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2012/2.
384 EUJTPF, “Report on Non-EU Triangular Cases”, JTPF/007/REV2/2009/EN (January 2010).
385 Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “An obligation arises for a third 
State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of 
establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.” 
 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties subsequently states: “A right arises for 
a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that 
right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third 
State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the 
treaty otherwise provides. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with 
the conditions for this exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.”
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10.3.3.  Proposal for Simultaneous or Multilateral Mutual Agreement 
Procedures 
Over the years the OECD has made several attempts to improve the effective-
ness and accessibility of the dispute resolution procedure. Next to the exten-
sive commentary on Article 25 a Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Proce-
dures (“MEMAP”) was published.386  Furthermore, as part of the BEPS project a 
minimum standard with respect to the resolution of treaty-related disputes was 
developed and participating countries declared their commitment to provide 
for mandatory binding MAP arbitration in their bilateral tax treaties. However, 
none of these publications includes wording on multilateral dispute resolution 
or the specific issues that may arise in respect of CCAs and this can be consid-
ered a missed opportunity.
I believe that the existing dispute resolution procedures could be improved so 
that a consistent transfer pricing treatment of individual CCAs by all countries 
involved is better safeguarded. For this purpose I would advocate including the 
following paragraph to Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention:
“Where, under Paragraph 1, a person has presented a case to a compe-
tent authority that involves a Contracting State including in the profits 
of an enterprise of that State profits on which an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State as well as an enterprise of a Non-Contracting State 
have directly or indirectly been charged to tax in those States, then that 
competent authority will, in addition to any attempt of resolving the case by 
mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other Contracting 
State under Paragraph 2, endeavor to resolve the case by mutual agreement 
with the competent authority of the Non-Contracting State. The competent 
authority of the other Contracting State will make any reasonable effort 
possible to facilitate such mutual agreement is reached, which may include 
an endeavor to resolve the case through a multlateral agreement.”
The proposed wording would allow for both simultaneous mutual agreement 
procedures and multilateral procedures. Explicitly mentioning that profits may 
also be indirectly subject to tax in a third state is intended to expand the scope to 
transfer pricing disputes that may require a corresponding adjustment in more 
than one jurisdiction, including the triangular cases mentioned in Paragraph 
10.3.2. Obviously there is no obligation for the non-contracting state to coop-
386 The manual is available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/manualoneffectivemutualagreement-
procedures-index.htm.
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erate. Next to that, the contracting states may in fact regard profit adjustments 
in the relationship with such non-contracting states to be outside the scope of 
their tax treaty. For this reason the proposed additional paragraph should prob-
ably be non-mandatory. Furthermore, it would of course be strange to make the 
obligation to resolve double taxation in respect of non-contracting states more 
stringent than the obligation to do so in respect of the two contracting states 
themselves. Therefore, the proposed obligation under the additional paragraph 
is limited to the same best-efforts obligation to “endeavor” to resolve the case 
with the competent authorities of the non-contracting state. Still contracting 
states may be hesitant to expand the working of the treaty to third states. 
However, in my opinion it can then be emphasized that it is in the interest of each 
of the contracting states to ensure a reciprocal commitment on the consistent 
treatment of intercompany transactions in which their residents participate, 
including intercompany transactions under a CCA. After all, having to pursue 
a group wide solution requires the other contracting state to more carefully 
consider the validity of its position, which will force it to refrain from incautious 
adjustments. That already serves a purpose as such. At the same time it may also 
to some extent address Altman’s concern about potential inequality between 
states that are caught up in a mutual agreement procedure. Under the proposed 
amended Article 25 an economically powerful state could no longer “bully” a 
politically dependent state into an inappropriate adjustment without at least 
also having to defend the basis for such adjustment in front of other states that 
individually or together might be better positioned to oppose the first state. 
Finally, from the perspective of a state that wants to initiate an adjustment it 
can be helpful to be assured of the assistance of the other contracting state in 
mutual agreement procedures with third states. If that enables the first state to 
show that the proposed adjustment is accepted elsewhere, it would improve its 
position in negotiations with the competent authorities of such third states and, 
by consequence, allow it to better defend its own taxable base while protecting 
its residence against double taxation.
281
10.4. Conclusions
The key findings of this Chapter 10 are as follows,
In respect of procedures to obtain upfront certainty:
(i) Irrespective of how confident taxpayers may be about the arm’s length 
nature of their CCAs and the flawlessness of their documentation, the prin-
ciple based approach inherent to the ALS makes that there will be a subjec-
tive element to any transfer pricing assessment. That in turn leaves room 
for discussions, uncertainty and, ultimately, disputes. APAs offer a poten-
tial solution for these issues.
(ii) An APA request for transactions under a CCA should include a broad range 
of information in respect of each of the five transfer pricing focus areas as 
identified in Paragraph 10.2.2. Fiscal practice would benefit, if a standard 
confirming this would be included as an annex to Chapter VIII of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines.    
In respect of procedures for dispute resolution:
(i) Traditional dispute resolution procedures have so far proven ineffective 
in respect of disputes involving CCAs because of their non-binding and 
non-mandatory nature as well as their bilateral orientation. 
(ii) To promote a more consistent transfer pricing treatment of intercompany 
transactions, including those under a CCA, an obligation should be included 
in Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention for a contracting state that 
wishes to make a profit adjustment to, upon request from the taxpayer 
enter into a mutual agreement procedure not only with the competent 
authorities of the other contracting state, but also with the competent 
authorities of non-contracting state affected by such adjustment.
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11.  Conclusions and Recommendations
11.1. Introduction
This study set out to examine the tax aspects of CCAs. To structure the analysis 
Paragraph 1.5 determined 7 research objectives. Subsequently Chapters 2 to 9 
outlined a theoretical framework, first by considering the general concept of 
CCAs and the application of these arrangements in practice, then by investi-
gating the transfer pricing aspects and the international tax law treatment of 
CCAs. This Chapter 11 summarizes my conclusions and recommendations per 
research objective. Paragraph 11.2 looks at the history of rules and regulations 
and how the thinking about CCAs by legislators and policymakers developed 
over the years.  Paragraph 11.3 discusses the legitimate reasons for use of the 
arrangements and their role in tax avoidance structures.  The then following two 
paragraphs outline the most relevant transfer pricing aspects: Paragraph 11.4 
compares the US Cost Sharing Regulations with the relevant OECD guidance, 
while Paragraph 11.5 presents a 10-step plan to implement an arm’s length CCA. 
This is accompanied by a model legal contract. Further, Paragraph 11.6 considers 
the potential of a foreign tax liability as a consequence of participating in a CCA, 
after which Paragraph 11.7 and 11.8 include recommended improvements to 
CFC rules and procedures for advance certainty and dispute resolution. Finally, 
Paragraph 11.9 provides some closing remarks.   
11.2. Historical Background
Research objective (i): 
To examine the historical background and original purpose of CCAs and to establish 
how the conceptual thinking about these arrangements as a legitimate transfer 
pricing instrument and a tax avoidance tool evolved over the years.
The CCAs defined in Chapter 1 concern arrangements under which partici-
pants share costs and risk on the basis of their anticipated benefits and subse-
quently exploit results on an individual basis. This type of arrangement is mostly 
concluded between companies that belong to the same multinational group. 
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Its workings in terms of costs, risks and benefits allocation differ materially 
from the joint development agreements found between unrelated third parties, 
under which participants share costs and risk on a predetermined basis and then 
exploit results on a joint basis while allocating the benefits from the exploita-
tion in proportion to each other’s cost contributions. By consequence there is 
a general lack of comparable uncontrolled arrangements against which the 
arm’s length nature of controlled CCAs can be tested.  However, as discussed 
in Paragraph 2.2.1, that does not mean that CCAs cannot qualify as a legitimate 
transfer pricing instrument. The reason for this is that the difference between 
CCAs and uncontrolled joint development arrangements can be explained by 
the specific circumstances under which related parties operate, specifically the 
absence of the normal conflict of interest that would have existed between inde-
pendent parties. As such, CCAs have for more than half a century been recog-
nized as a legitimate method to arrange for the joint development, production 
or obtaining of tangible and intangible business assets as well as services. 
The original purpose for the introduction of the bona fide cost sharing arrange-
ments by the United States Treasury was to accommodate taxpayers. If the 
intangibles were developed under a qualifying cost sharing arrangement they 
would be co-owned by all participants and there would be no need to transfer or 
license out the intangibles to other group companies. This would avoid complex 
valuation issues. The OECD subsequently followed to adopt the concept of a 
CCA in its first transfer pricing reports. At that time it did not consider CCAs to 
be a tax avoidance tool. To the contrary, in Paragraph 109 of its 1979 Report the 
OECD chose to explicitly reference the US’ experience that “no greater danger of 
tax avoidance is seen through cost sharing arrangements than through any other 
type of intra-group transaction”.  Furthermore, it stands out that none of the early 
guidance explicitly required participants in the arrangements to have a minimal 
amount of substance. This was interpreted in practice to allow cash box entities 
in low tax jurisdictions access to the valuable group intangibles developed under 
the arrangement.  In respect of another crucial element, the valuation of contri-
butions, the US Treasury and the OECD expressed a difference of opinion. While 
the former allowed a valuation at cost, the latter was in favor of including a profit 
element and, in other words, advocated a valuation at market price. However, 
when the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines came out the OECD softened its posi-
tion and included ambiguous wording indicating only that further guidance on 
the valuation of contributions at cost or at market price might still be necessary. 
After that, during the more than 20 years it was considered defendable to value 
contributions at cost. This was then also argued to apply to high value adding 
contributions, such as the performance of development activities performed 
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by uniquely skilled and experienced R&D teams. It was only in the 2015 Final 
BEPS Report that the OECD finally published guidance to the contrary. By now a 
serious concern about the use of CCA in tax avoidance structures had developed 
and a full review of the dedicated Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
was initiated. Addressing both the substance of participants and the valuation 
of contributions the new guidance required participants to have the capacity 
to control risks associated with the cost shared activities and to value contribu-
tions at market price.
11.3. Legitimate Use and Tax Avoidance
Research objective (ii): 
To identify the legitimate business reasons for the use of CCAs, to determine the 
role of these arrangements in tax avoidance structures and to propose a catego-
rization model that can facilitate a tax and transfer pricing analysis of their appli-
cation in practice.
In Paragraph 2.3.1 four legitimate business benefits were identified to stemm 
from the operation of a CCA. The arrangement facilitates a free flow of exper-
tise and knowledge, allows for cross company risk sharing, brings contractual 
simplicity and offers upfront certainty and consistency in respect of the group’s 
transfer pricing approach. These non-tax driven benefits of use further justify 
that CCAs are recognized as a legitemate transfer pricing instrument. Neverthe-
less, it is commonly acknowledged that the arrangements are also used in tax 
avoidance structures. This is illustrated among others by the examples provided 
in the Report of the US Joint Committee on Taxation of 2010 and the OECD’s 
Base Analysis Report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting of 2013. These show 
that the two critical elements of CCAs that facilitate their use in tax avoidance 
structures are: 
(i) the participation of low substance group companies, specifically when cash 
box entities participate, and 
(ii) the undervaluation of contributions in kind, specifically when specialized 
development activities are valued at cost. 
Both these elements offer MNEs an opportunity to allocate taxable profits 
stemming from their most valuable intangible business assets to group compa-
nies located in low tax jurisdictions. This is not effectively neutralized by the 
current anti-abuse rules or by source state withholding taxation. It is therefore 
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logical that legislators and other policymakers are trying to better regulate the 
use of CCAs. However, it has to be recognized that the application in aggres-
sive tax planning structures is not per definition illegal. Distinguishing between 
legitimate use and tax avoidance is therefore an arbitrary exercise, without any 
legal consequence. At the same time assessing the appropriateness of the use 
of a CCA can help to identify those situations, in which there is an increased 
risk of tax avoidance and additional attention should be paid to the terms and 
conditions of the arrangement in order to determine its correct tax and transfer 
pricing treatment. In Paragraph 2.3.3.2 a categorization model was presented 
that in my opinion can facilitate such assessment. This model considers the 
taxpayer’s organizational set-up and the nature of the developed intangibles 
to then divide up CCAs into four quartiles. CCAs used to grant group companies 
access to centrally developed, innovative intangibles are assumed more likely 
to feature low substance participants or undervalued contributions and there-
fore end up in the high-risk quartile. Those are the arrangements that should 
be targeted by tax and transfer pricing rules and regulations and which on an 
individual basis should be most carefully monitored by tax practitioners.     
11.4. US Cost Sharing Regulations vs. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
Research objective (iii): 
To analyze the applicable transfer pricing rules and regulations governing CCAs as 
well as relevant case law, focusing primarily on the US Cost Sharing Regulations 
and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
The current US Cost Sharing Regulations and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
use distinct terminology and on occasion show differing opinions as to how a 
CCA can comply with the ALS. These differences are summarized per focus area 
in the following table:  
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US Cost Sharing Regulations (“CSR”) OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (“TPG”)
Terminology
General The CSR refer to cost sharing 
arrangements or “CSAs”.
The TPG refer to cost contribution 
arrangements or “CCAs”.
Contributions 
of pre-existing 
resources
Making pre-existing resources available 
under a CSA is referred to as a “platform 
contribution”. 
Making pre-existing resources available 
under a CCA is referred to as a “pre-existing 
contribution”.
Contributions 
to ongoing cost 
shared activities
Making a contributions to ongoing cost 
shared activities is referred to as a “cost 
contribution”.
Making contributions to ongoing cost 
shared activities is referred to as a “current 
contribution”.
Costs 
settlement
Cost settlements are referred to as 
“platform contribution transactions” and 
“cost contribution transactions”.
Cost settlements are referred to as 
“balancing payments”.
Activities
Development 
activities
Both the CSR and TPG regard development activities suitable for cost sharing.
Services Regarded suitable for cost sharing, 
although the CSR focus predominantly 
on development activities
Regarded suitable for cost sharing.
Participants
Mutual benefit Both the CSR and TPG require all participants to anticipate a benefit from their 
participation in the CSA/CCA that consists of more than just a cash compensation for 
their contributions.
Substance 
requirement
The CSR do not explicitly impose any 
material substance requirements for 
participants.
Participants should have the capacity to 
control the risk associated with the cost 
shared activities and regularly exercise 
such control.
Benefits
Territorial 
allocation
A territorial allocation of benefits 
is explicitly allowed, provided that 
participants receive the perpetual, 
non-overlapping and exclusive right to 
exploit the cost shared results through 
the use, consumption, or disposition of 
property or services in their appointed 
territories
No explicit guidance provided, but a 
territorial allocation of benefits is implicitly 
allowed.
Field of use 
allocation
A field of use based allocation of 
benefits is allowed, provided that 
participant should receive the perpetual, 
non-overlapping and exclusive rights to 
exploit the cost sharing results through 
their appointed field of use.
No explicit guidance provided, but a field 
of use based allocation of benefits is 
implicitly allowed.
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US Cost Sharing Regulations (“CSR”) OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (“TPG”)
Alternative 
allocation
Any alternative allocation is allowed, 
provided that the interest in cost shared 
results is clearly and unambiguously 
divided among participants, 
recordkeeping enables the checking of a 
consistent application, the participants’ 
exploitation rights are perpetual, 
non-overlapping and exclusive and it 
is possible to predict with a reasonable 
reliability the resulting benefits per 
participant.
No specific guidance provided, but any 
reasonable alternative allocation of 
benefits is implicitly allowed.
Contributions
Valuation of 
pre-existing 
resources
Platform contributions are valued 
at market price, which should in the 
opinion of the Treasury and IRS reflect 
the value of any ex ante commitment to 
make resources available at cost during 
the course of the CSA.
Pre-existing contributions are valued at 
market price.
Ex post 
adjustments
The CSR allow the commissioner to 
make retroactive adjustments on 
the basis of ex post results, unless 
those results are the consequence of 
extraordinary events that could not 
reasonably have been anticipated. The 
CSR provide a safe haven rule, under 
which no adjustment will be made, if 
the participants’ returns stay within a 
predefined range of return ratios.
The TPG allow tax authorities to make 
retroactive adjustments on the basis of 
ex post results, unless those results are 
the consequence of extraordinary events 
that could not reasonably have been 
anticipated. The TPG provide a safe haven 
rule, under which no adjustment will be 
made, if the adjustment is less than 20% of 
the total value of the transaction. 
Valuation of the 
performance of 
ongoing cost 
shared activities
Cost contributions are valued at cost. Current contributions are valued at 
market price, unless (a) the value of the 
ex-ante commitment to make resources 
available at cost during the course of the 
CCA is already reflected in the valuation 
of a pre-existing contribution or (b) the 
difference between cost and market price 
is minimal and cost can be regarded an 
appropriate means to determine the 
relative value of current contributions.
Balancing payments
Allocation of 
costs
Both the CSR and TPG allow for direct cost allocations based on projected results as 
well as indirect cost allocations based on an appropriate allocation key (e.g. number 
of employees, production volumes and sales).
Periodic 
Adjustments
Both the CSR and TPG require periodic reassessment of contributions vis-à-vis 
the revised share of benefits, potentially resulting in an appropriate prospective 
adjustment.
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What stands out is the discrepancy in the US and OECD approach regarding 
the participation of low substance group companies and the valuation of 
contributions, the two critical elements that potentially make CCAs an effec-
tive tax avoidance tool. The US tax administration allows access to CSAs for 
cash box entities and accepts a valuation of the performance of ongoing cost 
shared activities at cost. It relies on its ability to recoup future taxable profits 
by enforcing a high buy-in payment. For that purpose it attempts to qualify the 
ex-ante commitment to make high value resources available at cost during the 
course of a CSA as a platform contribution, which is to be appropriately compen-
sated at the outset of the arrangement. However, the IRS has so far not been 
successful in defending this position in court (see Paragraphs 4.3.4 to 4.3.6). The 
now available case law concerned fiscal years that were governed by old Cost 
Sharing Regulations and the IRS might be more successful, if next time it liti-
gates under the current regulations. The decisions in the Veritas and Amazon 
case however provide for some technical concerns about the IRS’s position. First 
of all, the applied broad definition of platform contributions assumes the exist-
ence of concepts that represent value and that are capable of being transferred 
between group companies, which have not been recognized as business assets 
before.  These items would include goodwill, going concern value and a work-
force in place, but such items are beyond the intangibles definition provided in 
the Internal Revenue Code. Secondly, the IRS advocates an aggregated valua-
tion of the pre-existing resources constituting a platform contribution. This can 
be regarded as extremely complex, if not impossible, given that the useful life 
of those resources can vary significantly. Thirdly, the IRS approach conflicts with 
the original reason of Congress to sanction the use of bona fide CSAs, which was 
to avoid valuation issues. 
The OECD favors different methods in respect of both critical elements. The 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines exclude those group companies from participation 
that do not have sufficient substance to control the risk associated with the cost 
shared activities (see Paragraph 5.3.2) and, at least as a main rule, value current 
contributions at market price instead of at cost, so that participants are gener-
ally compensated for the actual performance of functions during the course of a 
CCA instead of for an ex ante commitment to make available certain resources 
(see Paragraph 5.5.3). I am strongly in favor of the OECD’s approach compared 
to that of the US tax administration. First of all, it is in my opinion reasonable 
to consider the commercial and financial relations between related parties to 
differ from the legal contracts in place between them, if one of the parties does 
not have the capacity and resources to control the risk that it has contractu-
ally assumed. As such, a mere cash box entity cannot actually share risk under 
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a CCA. However, as the sharing of costs and risks is the shear essence of the 
arrangement, such cash box entity cannot participate in it at all. Secondly, while 
the US approach of requiring a high buy-in payment and then valuing further 
contributions at cost is overly complex, the OECD’s main rule of valuing all indi-
vidual contributions at market price at least has the benefit of segregating the 
valuation of pre-existing assets from that of the performance of cost shared 
activities. As such, the OECD’s main rule isolates separately transferred “hard” 
platform intangibles from not transferred “soft” intangibles impacting the value 
of functions performed under the CCA. As such, it allows for a better identifi-
cation of the subject of the valuation exercise and items such as a workforce in 
place are more accurately recognized as what they actually are: Not an intan-
gible transferred at the outset of the CCA, but a comparability factor impacting 
the value of the functions performed by an individual participant. That way the 
already quite complex valuation of pre-existing contributions is not further 
complicated, while the valuation of current contributions can be established 
using traditional transfer pricing methods - potentially an appropriate compa-
rable uncontrolled price can be found or, depending on facts and circumstances, 
a cost plus or profit split method could be applied.             
11.5. An Arm’s Length CCA
Research objective (iv): 
To develop a step plan and a model legal contract facilitating the implementation 
of an arm’s length CCA.
11.5.1.  Step Plan
The outcome of the recent initiatives to counter base erosion and profit shifting 
is expected to have a major impact on international tax law and the overall 
fiscal environment. With transfer pricing and specifically the tax treatment of 
intangibles at the center of the debate, these developments will also impact the 
rules and regulations governing CCAs. That will complicate the design of new 
arrangements and the testing of existing ones. To facilitate these processes it 
can be helpful to translate the guidance provided by the US Cost Sharing Regu-
lations and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines into the following comprehen-
sive 10-step plan for establishing an arm’s length CCA:
1. The activities that are the subject of the CCA are to be identified. Under 
a development CCA there should be actual new development activities 
performed. Merely granting access to pre-existing intangibles should be 
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structured as a transfer or license arrangement instead of a CCA. That also 
implies that the development activities have to be material. The mainte-
nance of existing intangibles or the making of only marginal improvements 
to existing intangibles seems insufficient. Furthermore, shareholders activ-
ities, duplicative activities and activities providing no or only an incidental 
benefit to other group companies should be excluded.
2. When selecting participants it is to be confirmed that each of them expects 
a benefit from their own individual exploitation of results. This benefit 
should therefore exceed a mere cash compensation for rendering services 
to the participants’ community and therefore low risk service providers are 
excluded. Only group companies that will exploit the cost shared results 
themselves are allowed access to the CCA.
3. It should be established that each participant has the capacity to control 
the risk associated with the cost shared activities and actually exercises 
such control. That means that each participant should have sufficiently 
skilled personnel to make decisions about entering into the CCA or termi-
nating its participation in the arrangement, about the direction and scope 
of the cost shared activities and about the available budget.
4. The effective and legal ownership of expected results has to be clearly and 
unambiguously assigned to individual participants, if possible on an exclu-
sive and non-overlapping basis.
5. The pre-existing contributions, most notably the contributed platform 
intangibles, have to be identified and a valuation method has to be speci-
fied taking into account the guidance from Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and, from a US perspective, the commensurate-with-in-
come standard of Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (see Paragraph 
4.2.1).
6. The current contributions have to be identified and an appropriate valua-
tion method has to be specified. 
7. A methodology for calculating balancing payments has to be agreed. This 
should result in the overall contribution of participants to be proportionate 
to their expected benefits, allowing for prospective adjustments to such 
methodology in case of changes in the scope of the cost shared activities, 
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the business operations of participants or economic, commercial and finan-
cial circumstances.
8. The taxpayer may consider including a clause allowing for retrospective 
adjustments to the valuation of pre-existing contributions. Although such 
a clause can be structured in any way that is compatible with the ALS, it 
would appear logical for it to be based on the model for periodic adjust-
ments under §1.482-7(i)(6) of the US Cost Sharing Regulations (see Para-
graph 4.3.3.3.1) or the model for the use of ex post results in respect of hard 
to value intangibles under Paragraph 6.193 of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (see Paragraph 5.5.3.2.4).
9. If it is intended to license out intangibles resulting from cost shared activ-
ities to controlled or non-controlled third parties, the legal owners should 
be granted the authority to do so under the condition that proceeds are 
shared with all participants in proportion to their share in the effective 
ownership of such intangibles. 
10. Finally, the admittance or departure of participants as well as the termi-
nation of the CCA should be addressed. It should be clearly stipulated that 
an appropriate arm’s length payment is made, if any such event leads to a 
transfer of ownership of cost shared results.         
Working through each of these steps, it is useful to carefully consider the posi-
tion of the transactions at hand under the categorization model of Paragraph 
2.3.3.2. Such consideration can also serve the purpose of an overall sanity check 
as to whether a CCA is the most appropriate legal arrangement for structuring 
those transactions. Most notably, if the taxpayer is a highly centralized group 
developing innovative and high value intangibles in a limited number of loca-
tions, i.e. the taxpayer is high up in the north-eastern quartile of the catego-
rization model, then it may be considered that the commercial position and 
bargaining power of the R&D and marketing centers is such that the economical 
outcome of the CCA should be identical to that under a licensing model. The 
latter could then be found the better alternative, for example if it is easier to 
benchmark an arm’s length royalty rate then to value CCA contributions.
To illustrate how this step plan can be applied in practice, the fictitious company 
X Electronics, introduced in Paragraph 1.3, can be used as a case study. It has 
three categories of activities in respect of which its group companies wish to 
enter into a CCA. These consist of the group’s strategic marketing effort, the 
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group’s research and development activities and the group’s executive manage-
ment and support services. These activities can be accurately identified and 
are collectively referred to as the global activities (Step 1 of the Step Plan). 
Before formalizing the CCA, it further has to be established whether each of 
the potential participants expects a benefit from those activities and whether 
the size of such benefit is in proportion to functions performed and assets used 
(Step 2 of the Step Plan). Strategic marketing and R&D will result in valuable 
intangible assets. This might for example involve brands, trade names, manu-
facturing technology and product know-how. As such, these two categories 
of global activities qualify as development activities. In respect of the stra-
tegic R&D and marketing it is apparent that they result in valuable intangible 
assets with relevance for the business operations of all participants performing 
the primary business activities manufacturing and sales. Under these circum-
stances it can be concluded that there is sufficient mutual benefit of participants 
to structure these activities in a CCA. The executive management and support 
services are centralized in X US and X UK. In respect of these activities there is 
also a reasonable expectation of benefit for all participants, including X US and 
X UK themselves. If the latter would not be true, it could still be defendable to 
include the services, if it could be ensured that the outcome of the arrangement 
is arm’s length by valuing the services with reasonable accuracy at market price. 
A further precondition for establishing an arm’s length CCA is that all potential 
participants should have the capacity to control the risks associated with the 
global activities (Step 3 of the Step Plan). As discussed in Paragraph 5.3.2.6 the 
net effect of this requirement is that cash box entities are excluded from partic-
ipation. The X group however does not include any cash box entities. While the 
global marketing strategy is coordinated by X UK and the fundamental R&D is 
centralized in X Singapore, local distribution and manufacturing companies also 
contribute to these activities.  Each of those companies houses active business 
operations and will employ sufficiently skilled personnel, which can and will take 
decisions about entering into or terminating its participation in the CCA, the 
direction and scope of global activities and the available budget. Each of them is 
therefore a legitimate CCA participant. By consequence the group can continue 
to draft a CCA contract.
11.5.2.  Model CCA Contract
Having clearly identified the activities performed and the qualifying partici-
pants to the arrangement, the X group can continue to draft a CCA contract 
as attached (see Annex - “Model CCA Contract”). The further elaboration on the 
steps 4 to 10 of the step plan should be read in close conjunction with this Model 
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CCA Contract and vice versa. In that contract it is assumed that the results of the 
global activities consist of marketing and R&D intangibles as well as services. 
Whereas services may by their nature provide specific benefits to individual 
participants, the allocation of the effective ownership of intangibles may require 
some additional specification (Step 4 of the Step Plan). This could be achieved 
by granting each of the participants the exclusive right to use marketing intan-
gibles for third party sales on their own domestic markets and wider geograph-
ical regions, while allowing them to use research and development intangibles 
for all manufacturing activities at their own production sites (Article 2 of the 
Model CCA Contract). 
Subsequently the different contributions of each of the participants are to be 
identified and assigned an appropriate valuation method (Step 5 and 6 of the 
Step Plan / Article 3 and 4 of the Model CCA Contract). Pre-existing contri-
butions can consist of tangible and intangible assets used to perform global 
activities. It may also concern platform intangibles, which are further developed 
under the CCA to create new, more advanced marketing or R&D intangibles. 
These contributions should be valued at market price. In respect of pre-existing 
intangibles the value might be determined by applying the relief-from-royalty 
method, which would involve calculating the net present value of a hypothetical 
royalty stream during the useful life of the intangibles (see Paragraph 5.5.3.2.3). 
For the support services a cost plus remuneration might be a reasonable solu-
tion. In practice an illustrative list of contributions, their value and valuation 
method can be added as an appendix to the contract, while in respect of more 
complex contributions the group will be expected to supplement its transfer 
pricing documentation by a detailed valuation report potentially supplemented 
by benchmark studies.
The identification and valuation of contributions is followed by their alloca-
tion to participants, which allocation is then effectuated through balancing 
payments (Step 7 of the Step Plan / Article 5 of the Model CCA Contract). In 
this case X Electronics has determined that third party sales are an appropriate 
allocation key for contributions related to strategic marketing and production 
costs for contributions related to research and development (Article 6 and 7 of 
the Model CCA Contract). The contributions related to executive management 
and support services on the other hand are allocated on the basis of time spent 
(Article 8 of the Model CCA Contract).
To ensure the arm’s length outcome of the arrangement on a continuous basis 
the X group has decided to include two adjustment clauses (Step 8 of the Step 
Plan). The first foresees in prospective adjustments to the methodology for 
calculating balancing payments in case of relevant changes in business opera-
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tions and economic circumstances (Article 9 of the Model CCA Contract). The 
second adjustment clause allows for retrospective adjustments to the valuation 
of pre-existing contributions under certain specific conditions (Article 10 of the 
Model CCA Contract). The latter clause is based on the OECD model for the use 
of ex post results in respect of hard to value intangibles. 
Furthermore, the X group’s CCA contract grants the legal owners the authority 
to license out cost shared results, provided that the licensing proceeds are 
shared proportionally among the participants (Step 9 of the Step Plan / Article 
11 of the Model CCA Contract). Finally it arranges for arm’s length buy-in and 
buy-out payments in case of newly admitted or departing participants and upon 
termination of the agreement, which would be similar to all but one or all partic-
ipants departing the agreement (Step 10 of the Step Plan / Article 12 of the 
Model CCA contract).
11.6. Foreign Tax Liabilities
Research objective (v): 
To examine the position of CCAs under international tax law and to determine 
when they may result in a foreign tax liability taking into account their qualifica-
tion under tax treaties.
The rules and regulations for the governance of CCAs that are currently in force 
primarily address the transfer pricing aspects of the arrangements. Most of the 
available literature also focusses on those aspects. The treatment of CCAs under 
international tax law and their qualification under tax treaties have been given far 
less attention. To determine such treatment and qualification tax practitioners 
therefore generally have to rely on the more general provisions of applicable 
national tax laws and tax treaties. In this context it should firstly be acknowl-
edged that as a commonly accepted principle a participation in a CCA by itself 
does not cause group companies to have a permanent establishment abroad 
or a corresponding foreign tax liability. While a CCA foresees in the sharing of 
costs and risks of certain business activities, it does not change the fact that 
the resources used in the process remain at the disposal of their legal owner, 
which applies them in the course of its own business. To avoid uncertainty about 
the existence of a permanent establishment in practice, I suggested wording in 
Paragraph 8.2 to be included in the Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention to clarify this issue. 
Secondly, it should be recognized that a CCA related foreign tax liability can 
result from the qualification of balancing payments as a category of income, 
in respect of which the source state has reserved a taxation right under its tax 
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treaties and effectuates such right under its national tax law. Such qualifica-
tion can then result in source state withholding tax on the balancing payments. 
However, that will only occur under specific circumstances. This is described in 
Paragraph 8.3, which in Paragraph 8.3.6 includes a flowchart summarizing the 
overall situation. Most notably balancing payments could be subjected to source 
state withholding taxation, if they are qualified as royalty income. That would 
be possible, if the payments are related to an intangible in which the payer does 
not obtain a proportionate part of the effective ownership under the CCA. This 
could be the case in two instances:
(i) The pre-existing intangibles are made available for use by the payee 
without a transfer of their ownership – An example would be the existing 
manufacturing technology for the production of a first generation product, 
which is further developed under the CCA into new technology for the 
production of a second generation product.
(ii) The new intangibles are developed under a CCA, in respect of which the 
ownership is not collectively shared among the participants but instead 
one participant obtains a dominant ownership – An example would be 
if a software application is developed as part of cost shared information 
management, which will be accessible to all participants during the course 
of the CCA, but which is legally owned by one of the participants that is 
contractually allowed to license and effectively will license out the appli-
cation without the consent of other participants and without sharing the 
royalty proceeds with them.   
Furthermore, withholding tax could also be payable, if the balancing payments 
are qualified as services income. That is significantly more likely to occur, if 
the payment includes a profit element.  This can be expected to become more 
common in the future, as a valuation of contributions at market price was 
included as a main rule in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as part of their revi-
sion under the OECD’s BEPS project.  Withholding tax on balancing payments 
will remain an exception nonetheless, because most countries consider services 
income to be exclusively taxable in the state of which the recipient is a resident. 
However, major developping economies have reserved a source state taxation 
right in their tax treaties and there could therefore be an increase of source state 
taxation on balancing payments originating from these countries.
Third and finally, it was established in Paragraph 8.4 that the use of immovable 
property under a CCA should generally not lead to a foreign tax liability of partic-
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ipants in the situs country. This does require that the CCA foresees in adequate 
terms and conditions for the use of the immovable property and the sharing of 
benefits related to it. Some doubt may still arise, if any capital gain upon sale 
of the property is shared. In that case tax authorities of the situs state can be 
expected to seek to tax such income in the hands of the foreign participants. 
This could quite simply be avoided by compensating the legal owner during 
the course of the CCA with a businesslike compensation for all its contributions 
including making the immovable property available, while leaving all indirect 
income from such property exclusively with that same legal owner.    
11.7. Potential Improvement of CFC Rules
Research objective (vi): 
To consider how anti-abuse rules aimed at including income of controlled foreign 
corporations in the taxable base of their domestic parent (“CFC rules”) can be 
improved so that they more effectively counter the use of CCAs in tax avoidance 
structures.
The examples considered in Paragraph 2.3.2 illustrate how MNEs can fairly 
easily bypass traditional CFC rules. This is primarily made possible by how 
those rules have so far calculated the CFC income to be included in the parent’s 
domestic taxable income and the many exceptions allowed in that respect. It 
goes beyond the scope of this research to discuss in detail the workings and 
flaws of the various present day CFC regimes, but the historical background and 
general purpose of CFC rules in general as well as their interaction with CCAs 
were briefly discussed in Chapter 9. It was also explained there how better 
drafted CFC legislation might help to prevent base erosion and profit shifting 
by supplementing transfer pricing rules and neutralizing the reallocation of 
income generating assets to tax havens, thus countering what I have referred 
to as transfer pricing manipulation and preemptive ownership reallocation (see 
Paragraph 9.3.1). Most notably, CFC rules can be expected to become more 
effective at keeping MNEs from granting affiliates in low tax jurisdiction cheap 
access to both pre-existing and newly developed intangibles under a CCA, 
if excess returns from intangibles are included in the CFC income. Where the 
US was first to introduce CFC rules in the nineteen sixties, by introducing the 
special regime for so called Global Intangible Low Taxed Income (“GILTI”) as part 
of its 2017 Tax Reform Act it is again a frontrunner. As explained in Paragraph 
9.3.2, the GILTI regime considers any return of CFCs above a routine 10% of its 
tangible business assets so called intangible income and, as such, qualifies it 
as taxable in the hands of the US parent. By allowing a fixed 50% deduction 
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the effective tax rate on GILTI is 10.5% and with an 80% tax credit for foreign 
income tax that limits additional US taxation to situations in which the income 
was subject to less than 13.125% taxation abroad. By simultaneously lowering 
the effective income tax on foreign derived intangible income, the US makes 
a thorough attempt to remove the incentive for allocating intangible property 
to low taxed subsidiaries. At the time of writing it is still to be seen how the 
GILTI regime is further specified in regulations and what avoidance measures 
taxpayers are able to think up for continued arbitration. However, at first sight 
the regime appears to present a firm answer to tax haven structures and, if this 
is sufficiently confirmed in practice, it is likely to be imitated by other tax admin-
istrations.       
11.8. Potential Improvement of Upfront Certainty and Dispute Resolution 
Procedures
Research objective (vii): 
To propose improvements to procedures for obtaining upfront certainty as well as 
for dispute resolution aimed at increasing their effectiveness in situations involving 
a CCA.
There is a long standing tradition among critics of the ALS to argue that its prin-
ciple based way of determining transfer prices facilitates transfer price manip-
ulation and tax avoidance. The frequently suggested alternative consists of so 
called formula based apportionment (see Paragraph 3.2.1.). This would be more 
rule based and therefore leave less room for arbitration. However, a system 
of formula based apportionment would only be possible without a distorting 
amount of double taxation, if it would be applied on a global scale in a consistent 
manner. As different economies will have different interests when it comes to 
setting the parameters of such a system, it is unlikely that political agreement 
can be reached about its implementation. Accepting this means that, instead 
of replacing the ALS, alternative solutions to its flaws should be considered. It 
is commonly understood that those could come from the further enhancement 
of procedures for obtaining upfront certainty or resolving disputes in respect 
of transfer pricing methods and the OECD addressed both in the BEPS Project 
Final Reports. Unfortunately these reports did not include any proposals aimed 
specifically at increasing the effectiveness of procedures in respect of cases that 
involve a CCA. I consider that a missed opportunity, because those cases can 
lead to specific issues that are difficult, if not impossible to resolve under the 
current procedures. These issues are primarily caused by the participation of 
group companies from more than just two countries in the CCA. That implies 
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that an advance pricing agreement will only have full coverage, if it is multilat-
erally signed off on by the tax administration of all jurisdictions involved. If more 
multilateral APAs were concluded, that would not only minimize instances of 
double taxation, it would also improve transparency, improve transfer pricing 
insights of both taxpayers and tax authorities, avoid harmful tax competition 
between jurisdictions and better guarantee an appropriate allocation of the tax 
base. For these reasons I feel that the OECD should step up efforts to accommo-
date the conclusion of multilateral APAs. As a start it could use the suggested 
outline of an APA request involving a CCA as presented in Paragraph 10.2.2 to 
draft a standard for such request and publish this as an annex to Chapter VIII of 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
When it comes to dispute resolution procedures their general non-binding and 
non-mandatory nature pose further obstacles next to their ineffectiveness in 
multilateral situations. Fortunately, there does appear to be a trend of more 
jurisdictions agreeing on binding and mandatory mutual agreement procedures, 
for example in an EU context. In addition it would in my opinion be helpful, if the 
article on dispute resolution in model tax conventions is extended with a para-
graph covering profit adjustments in respect of which corresponding adjust-
ments are needed in more than one jurisdiction in order to avoid economic 
double taxation. A text proposal for this purpose is included in Paragraph 10.3.3. 
Under that proposal a contracting state making such a profit adjustment would 
be required to endeavor to reach a mutual agreement not only with the compe-
tent authorities of the other contracting state, but also with the competent 
authorities of any non-contracting state in which affected affiliated taxpayers 
are located. That is intended to result in simultaneous or even multilateral 
procedures. Such backstop would require tax administrations making a profit 
adjustment to better substantiate and defend the adjustments. As such, it could 
ensure a more consistent tax and transfer pricing treatment of CCAs and offer 
better protection against double taxation.
11.9. The Future of CCAs after BEPS and US Tax Reform
This Chapter 11 completes my research on CCAs. These arrangements were 
introduced in the United States to offer taxpayers a practical instrument for the 
legal and fiscal structuring of group-wide intangible assets development. They 
were intended to reduce transfer pricing complexity, but were only partially 
successful at that. Although CCAs offer participants free access to cost shared 
assets and services, they defer transfer pricing issues to the valuation of contri-
butions. In addition to that, determining the correct tax treatment of trans-
actions under these arrangements has proven to be potentially cumbersome, 
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sometimes resulting in new uncertainty and disputes. Furthermore, their ability 
to allocate the effective ownership of valuable intangibles to foreign group 
companies in exchange for only a minimal consideration has made CCAs a 
popular tool for use in tax avoidance structures. The foregoing has caused CCAs 
to be a subject of frequent and lively fiscal debate. 
The findings from this study imply that there is a future for CCAs in a world after 
BEPS and US tax reform. It has been demonstrated that there are legitimate 
reasons for MNEs to implement a CCA (Paragraph 2.3.1) and that it would be 
inconsistent with the ALS to disallow the arrangements only because they are 
not commonly found between unrelated parties (Paragraph 3.4). An analysis of 
more opportunistic tax structures featuring a CCA in Paragraph 2.3.2 identified 
the two fundamental aspects of the traditional tax treatment that have undoubt-
edly helped to make them a useful tax avoidance tool: the participation of low 
substance participants and the valuation of contributions at cost. The IRS have 
tried to counter base erosion and profit shifting with the help of CCAs by trying 
to impose higher buy-in payments and by requiring stock-based compensation 
cost to be shared among participants. An analysis of the US case law in which 
this has resulted showed that the IRS tries to capture in the buy-in payment the 
value of the ex-ante commitment to provide ongoing activities under the CCA 
at cost instead of market price. This is not only overly complex, but it also results 
in a unjustified frontloading of income and it has proven a source of dispute 
between the Service and taxpayers (also see Paragraph 4.3.6). The OECD on the 
other hand addressed both aspects with more focus by requiring in the revised 
Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines that all participants should control 
the risks associated with their part of cost shared activities and by requiring that 
as a main rule all contributions are valued at market price (see Paragraph 5.3.2 
and 5.3.3). As clearly stated a number of times in this thesis, I prefer the OECD’s 
approach over that of the US Treasury and IRS. 
However, it is not so that with the revised Transfer Pricing Guidelines all CCA 
related issues are solved and the day to day tax and transfer pricing treatment 
of these arrangements becomes a straightforward matter from hereon. To the 
contrary, further complexities concern (i) the valuation of contributions, most 
notably the valuation at market price of pre-existing intangibles, (ii) the proper 
documentation of a CCA, (iii) the assessment of how balancing payments are 
to be qualified under tax treaties and (iv) the procedures to obtain upfront 
certainty from or to resolve disputes with tax authorities. In this thesis I have 
suggested improvements of the current fiscal practice in respect of each of 
these aspects. Firstly, the categorization model presented in Paragraph 2.3.3.2 
facilitates an accurate delineation of the commercial and financial relationship 
303
between group companies and, as such, can be a starting point to determining 
the relative value of contributions made under a CCA, both pre-existing intan-
gibles made available from the outset of the CCA and valuable development 
activities performed during the course of the arrangement. Secondly, the 
model CCA contract of Paragraph 11.5.2 is aligned with the most recent US Cost 
Sharing Regulations and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and can be the basis 
for meeting documentation requirements while simultaneously ensuring that 
critical preconditions are met. Thirdly, the flow chart of Paragraph 8.3.6 helps to 
identify if balancing payments are subject to withholding tax under applicable 
domestic law and tax treaties. Fourthly, the proposals for standardized advance 
pricing agreement requests and simultaneous or multilateral mutual agree-
ment procedures included in Paragraph 10.2.2 and 10.3.3 can make the formal 
processes more efficient in situations involving a CCA. Obviously, the situation 
could be further improved by supplementing the foregoing with an adequate 
anti-abuse rule. It just so happens that the new and rather innovative so called 
GILTI regime introduced in the United States as part of the 2017 tax reform is 
intended to serve exactly that purpose. The GILTI regime aims for any income 
from intangibles owned by a US group and defined as any income over and 
above a fixed 10% return on tangible assets to be taxed at a minimum tax rate 
of 13.125%. If effective, that would remove any arbitration incentive and should 
thus significantly relax the discussions between taxpayers and tax authorities. 
As such, a package of measures emerges consisting of enhanced practical guid-
ance combined with certain adjustments to existing rules and regulations, under 
which a legitimate use of CCAs can be continued while their application for tax 
avoidance purposes in effectively pared down. How that may work can be illus-
trated by reviewing the US case studies analyzed in Paragraph 2.3.2. The first 
and third example featured Bravo Company and Foxtrot Company respectively 
(see Paragraphs 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.4), which used a CSA to place ownership of 
intangibles with low taxed Swiss and Bermuda group companies that employed 
no personnel of their own. It is obvious that those companies did not have the 
capacity to control the risks associated with the cost shared development activi-
ties. As such, they do not meet a critical requirement to be allowed participation 
and therefore they should in today’s world be refused access to the CSA, while 
the tax authorities could proceed to disregard the arrangement otherwise. The 
second example concerned Echo Company, which also shifted significant profits 
to a low taxed group company through a CSA (see Paragraph 2.3.2.3). Contrary 
to the fact pattern of the Bravo case study, in this instance the benefiting Swiss 
subsidiary did house employees that (at least potentially) were capable to make 
an educated decision about taking on, laying off or declining risks associated 
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with the business opportunity presented by the company’s participation in the 
CSA. Hence, the control-over-risk requirement does not necessarily affect this 
structure. Alternatively however the profit shifting should now be mitigated by a 
review of the value of contributions made under the CSA. Most notably the R&D 
activities performed by Echo’s US group company should be valued at market 
price instead of at cost and that would result in significantly higher balancing 
payments by the Swiss subsidiary to its US parent returning a substantial part 
of profits to the US.
My overall conclusion from the foregoing is that there is a future for CCAs in 
the world after the BEPS project and US tax reform. That is one in which they 
continue to be an effective and efficient transfer pricing instrument for bona 
fide taxpayers, allowing them to allocate costs and risks associated with joint 
activities and the ownership of results from such activities appropriately and 
transparently among participating group companies. At the same time CCAs 
will be far less useful as a tax avoidance tool, as more adequately defined terms 
and conditions force on a businesslike outcome. However, this will require inter-
national coherent implementation of the rules and regulations governing CCAs 
as well as their consistent application by tax practitioners in every day fiscal 
practice. That requires a better understanding of CCAs and their application 
by taxpayers to result in a common consensus about the appropriate tax and 
transfer pricing treatment of these arrangements. I hope that this study is able 
to make a modest contribution to that process.
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Annex – Model CCA Contract
[Information specific to the X Electronics case study included in between brackets]
COST CONTIRBUTION ARRANGEMENT
This Agreement is made this day [date], by and between:
1. [X US], established at … [United States], and
2. [X Singapore], established at … [Singapore], and
3. [X United Kingdom], established at … [United Kingdom], and
4. [X …] , established at … …,
hereinafter jointly referred to as: Participants or individually referred to as: 
Participant. 
-  Whereas the Participants are part of the [X Group], a worldwide group 
of companies involved in [the manufacturing and sale of consumer elec-
tronics]; 
- Whereas the group has chosen to centralize certain ‘Global Activities’ (as 
hereinafter defined);
- Whereas the Global Activities make a valuable contribution to the business 
operations of the Participants, as described in more detail in the group’s 
transfer pricing master file and local files, and therefore each of the Partic-
ipants expects to benefit from their performance.
- Whereas all Participants employ sufficiently qualified personnel to take 
decisions about entering into or terminating this Agreement, the scope 
and content of Global Activities as well as the budget associated with the 
performance of Global Activities and regularly make these decisions. They 
therefore jointly control the risks associated with the Global Activities and 
regularly exercise such control;
-  Whereas Participants intend through this Agreement to formalize the 
arrangement to coordinate Global Activities and to share in the relevant 
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costs, risks and the ‘Results from Global Activities’ (as hereinafter defined) 
in a manner that is consistent with the arm’s length standard;
- Whereas all Participants have a reasonable expectation that each Partic-
ipant’s proportional share of the benefits derived from Global Activities 
undertaken pursuant to this Agreement will be consistent with the Partic-
ipant’s proportional share of the costs of those activities as computed 
pursuant to this Agreement;
- Whereas [X UK] wishes to perform the role as administrator, coordinator 
and facilitator of this Agreement;
[These considerations explicate that the most relevant preconditions for organ-
izing the activities at hand under a CCA are met. Quite relevantly they explicitly 
confirm that all participants exercise control over the risks associated with the cost 
shared activities and expect a mutual benefit from their participation in the CCA.]
Now therefore Participants agree as follows: 
Article 1: Definitions 
1. The term ‘Agreement’ shall mean this Agreement, as this may be updated 
from time to time;
2. The term ‘Global Activities’ shall mean all joint development, production or 
obtainment of tangible assets, intangible assets or services. These are split 
into the following [three] different categories:
• [‘Strategic Marketing’], 
• [‘Research and Development’],
• [‘Executive Management and Support Services’].
 It should be noted that shareholder activities and activities providing no 
or only an incidental benefit, such as activities that are merely a duplica-
tion of activities already performed by or for the Participants, are explicitly 
excluded from Global Activities. 
3.  The term ‘Results from Global Activities’ shall mean any and all tangible 
and intangible assets, including but not limited to brands, trademarks, 
technology,  process technology and know-how, as well as services which 
originate from Global Activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement. 
4. The term ‘Geographical Territory’ for a Participant shall mean its country of 
residence and those countries where [the X Group] is not represented by a 
local affiliate and which are appointed to that Participant by [the X Group’s 
executive management] as listed and specified in Appendix I.  
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5. The term ‘Pre-existing Contributions’ refers to the tangible or intangible 
assets of pre-existing value made available for purposes of use or further 
development under this Agreement as listed and specified in Appendix II.
6. The term ‘Current Contributions’ refers to the functions associated with 
Global Activities performed under this Agreement as listed and specified in 
Appendix III.  
7. The term ‘Balancing Payments’ means payments between Participants 
made to adjust their share in the overall Pre-existing Contributions and 
Current Contributions.
8. The term ‘Net Sales’ for a Participant for a given quarter of the calendar 
year during the term of this Agreement shall mean an amount equal to the 
sum of the Participant’s actual sales to third parties during the period as 
reported in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
9. The term ‘Production Costs’ for a Participant for a given quarter of the 
calendar year during the term of this Agreement shall mean an amount 
equal to the sum of the Participant’s actual direct and indirect costs of 
production activities during the period as reported in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
[This Article 1 provides definitions of terms used throughout the rest of the contract. 
Among others it defines the cost shared activities (‘Global Activities’), the measure 
to assign benefits (in this example: ‘Geographical Territory’) and the measure to 
allocate costs (in this example: ‘Net Sales’ and ‘Production Costs’). The Geograph-
ical Territories, the Pre-existing Contributions and the Current Contributions are 
still to be further specified in Appendix I – III.] 
Article 2: Effective and Legal Ownership of Results from Global Activities
1. Each Participant shall be the exclusive effective owner of all Results from 
Global Activities to the extent they pertain to its operations.
2. Each Participant shall have free access to, and be kept informed of all 
Results from Global Activities that pertain or could in future pertain to its 
operations.
3. For purposes of Paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article 2, intangible assets 
resulting from Strategic Marketing are considered to pertain to a Partic-
ipant’s operations to the extent that they are used in relation to sales to 
third parties in that Participant’s Geographical Territory.
4. For purposes of Paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article 2, intangible assets 
resulting from Research and Development are considered to pertain to a 
Participant’s operations to the extent they are used in relation to manufac-
turing at that Participant’s production sites. 
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5. In relation to their use of Results from Global Activities in accordance with 
this Article 2, Participants will not be charged any amount other than that 
which is payable by them as Balancing Payments under this Agreement. 
6. For convenience of administration and greater protection of intellectual 
property, legal title to, but not effective ownership of, all and any intel-
lectual property rights related to the Results from Global Activities may 
be held by [X US, X UK and X Singapore]. The Participants agree to under-
take or otherwise participate in all necessary and appropriate steps to vest 
legal title to, but not effective ownership of, all and any intellectual prop-
erty rights related to the Results from Global Activities in [X US, X UK and X 
Singapore].
[This Article 2 assigns the effective and legal ownership of cost shared results. It 
also clarifies in Paragraph 6 that, while effective ownership is shared among all 
participants, legal ownership is centralized.]
Article 3: Pre-existing Contributions
1. Participants agree that Participants making Pre-existing Contributions 
under this Agreement will receive an arm’s length compensation equal to 
the value of those contributions.
2. The valuation of Pre-existing Contributions for purposes of determining 
the compensation referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article 3 will observe 
the guidance provided in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as in force 
at the time of such valuation.
3. Appendix II to this Agreement contains a specification of all Pre-existing 
Contributions, their value and the valuation method applied to determine 
such value. 
[This Article 3 addresses the identification and valuation of Pre-existing Contri-
butions. Appendix II would include a description of all tangible and intangible 
assets contributed under the CCA, either as a platform asset or as an asset used 
to perform cost shared activities. It would further indicate per asset or asset class 
how its value was determined.  It should however be considered that this Appendix 
II will be very case specific. As such, including an example for the X Electronics case 
study was considered to defy purpose.]
Article 4: Current Contributions
1. Participants agree that Participants making Current Contributions under 
this Agreement will receive an arm’s length compensation equal to the 
value of those contributions. 
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2. Valuation of Current Contributions for purposes of determining the 
compensation referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article 4 will observe the 
guidance provided in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as in force at 
the time of such valuation.
3. Appendix III to this Agreement contains a specification of all Current Contri-
butions, their value and the valuation method applied to determine such 
value.
[This Article 4 addresses the identification and valuation of Current Contributions. 
Appendix III would include a description of the functions performed by each of the 
participants. It would further indicate per function how it was valued. Just like 
Appendix II, this will be unique to the CCA at hand and therefore it was decided not 
to include an example for the X Electronics case study.] 
Article 5: Balancing Payments
1. The compensation for Pre-existing Contributions and Current Contribu-
tions payable in accordance with Article 6 and 7 of this Agreement will be 
settled through Balancing Payments. 
2. [X UK] will make all calculations (denominated in US dollars) required 
for establishing all necessary Balancing Payments on a quarterly basis in 
accordance with the methodology outlined in this Agreement.
3. [X UK] will inform each Participant of the results of its calculations under 
this Agreement and issue a debit or credit note as appropriate to each 
Participant before the end of the [10th] working day after quarter-end. 
4. All invoices and credit notes are payable within [20] working days of the 
note date.  
[This Article 5 appoints a central administrator to the CCA and arranges practical-
ities around invoicing and settlement of Balancing Payments.]
Article 6: Strategic Marketing
1. The Participants have determined that each Participant’s Net Sales in any 
quarter of the calendar year during the term of this Agreement reasonably 
reflect that Participant’s anticipated benefits from the Strategic Marketing 
in that quarter. Therefore, the Participants agree that they will share costs 
related to Strategic Marketing in proportion to their Net Sales. 
2. For the purpose of the calculation of Balancing Payments under Article 5 
of this Agreement the aggregated value of Pre-existing Contributions and 
Current Contributions related to Strategic Marketing made in any quarter 
of the calendar year is divided by the aggregated amount of Net Sales in 
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the same quarter and multiplied by the Net Sales of the individual Partici-
pants in that quarter. 
[This Article 6 prescribes how balancing payments are to be calculated in respect of 
Strategic Marketing on the basis of Net Sales: If total Net Sales of a Participant in 
a quarter is 100 and the total Net Sales of all Participants in that quarter is 1,000, 
then this Participant is allocated 10% of the costs related to Strategic Marketing in 
that quarter. To the extent that the Participant’s own marketing related contribu-
tions are valued at a lower or higher lower amount, it will pay or receive a balancing 
payment under Article 5.]
Article 7: Research and Development
1. The Participants have determined that each Participant’s Production Costs 
in any quarter of the calendar year during the term of this Agreement 
reasonably reflect that Participant’s anticipated benefits from Research 
and Development in that quarter. Therefore, the Participants agree that 
they will share costs related to Research and Development in proportion to 
their Production Costs. 
2. For the purpose of the calculation of Balancing Payments in accordance 
with Article 5 of this Agreement, the aggregated value of Pre-existing 
Contributions and Current Contributions related to Research and Devel-
opment made in any quarter of the calendar year is divided by the aggre-
gated amount of Production Costs in the same quarter and multiplied by 
the Production Costs of the individual Participants in that quarter.
[This Article 7 prescribes how balancing payments in respect of Research and 
Development are to be calculated on the basis of Production Costs: If total Produc-
tion Costs of a Participant in a quarter is 100 and the total Production Costs of all 
Participants in that quarter is 1,000, then this Participant is allocated 10% of the 
costs related to Research and Development in that quarter. To the extent that the 
Participant’s own R&D related contributions are valued at a lower or higher lower 
amount, it will pay or receive a balancing payment under Article 5.]
Article 8: Executive Management and Support Services
1. [X US and X UK] will allocate their Current Contributions related to Execu-
tive Management and Support Services in any quarter of the calendar year 
among the Participants based on time spent by their respective personnel 
in that quarter and the Balancing Payments in respect of Executive Manage-
ment and Support Services will be calculated accordingly. 
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2. Upon request [X US and X UK] will present each Participant with a copy of 
its timekeeping administration to evidence the correctness of the alloca-
tions under Paragraph 1 of this Article 8.
[This Article 8 prescribes how balancing payments in respect of Executive Manage-
ment and Support Services are to be calculated on the basis of time spent.]
Article 9: Adjustments of the Method for the Calculation of Balancing 
Payments
1. The Participants will review on an annual basis the methodology used for 
the calculation of Balancing Payments under the Articles 6, 7 and 8 of this 
Agreement.
2. If found necessary to ensure that the calculation of Balancing Payments 
remains appropriate in light of the nature of the Global Activities under-
taken, the business operations of Participants and the general economic 
conditions effecting the financial position of [the X Group and its subsidi-
aries], the Participants will agree in writing on prospective adjustments to 
the methodology used for the calculation of balancing payments.
[This Article 9 allows for a periodic review of the cost allocation mechanism and a 
prospective adjustment in case of changes to relevant circumstances.]
Article 10: Adjustments of the Valuation of Pre-existing Contributions
1. The valuation of Pre-existing Contributions will be retroactively adjusted, 
if their initial valuation considered projected financial results, while consid-
ering actual financial results leads to an adjustment of more than 20% of 
such valuation.  
2. No adjustment will be made however, if (a) the difference between the 
projected financial results and the actual financial results is caused by 
circumstances that in reasonableness were not foreseeable at the time of 
the initial valuation or (b) the difference between projected financial results 
and the actual financial results during the first five years after the initial 
valuation were not so material that they led to an adjustment under Para-
graph 1 of this Article 10.
3. Any adjustments to the valuation of Pre-existing Contributions under this 
Article 10 will be reflected in the calculation of Balancing Payments under 
Article 5 of this Agreement in the current quarter. 
[This Article 10 allows for a review of the valuation of Pre-existing Contributions 
and a retrospective in case ex post financial results deviate materially from fore-
casted results. The adjustment clause, including the deviation percentage included 
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in Paragraph 1, is consistent with the OECD’s guidance on the treatment of hard 
to value intangibles, as provided in Paragraph 6.193 of the Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines.]
Article 11: Authorizations to X US, X UK and X Singapore
1. As effective owners of all intangible assets created or enhanced under this 
Agreement, the Participants hereby grant to [X US, X UK and X Singapore 
or its designee(s)] the authority to license out the Results of Global Activi-
ties to third parties on their behalf.  
2. The proceeds of the licensing out of the Results of Global Activities under 
Paragraph 1 of this Article 11 are allocated to Participants in proportion to 
their share in effective ownership of the Results of Global Activities and are 
reflected in the calculation of Balancing Payments under Article 5 of this 
Agreement. 
3. For purposes of the allocation of proceeds under Paragraph 2 of this Article 
11, the aggregated amount of proceeds from licensing out marketing 
intangibles received in any quarter of the calendar year is divided by the 
aggregated amount of Net Sales in the same quarter and multiplied by the 
Net Sales of the individual Participants in that quarter. 
4. For purposes of the allocation of proceeds under Paragraph 2 of this Article 
11, the aggregated amount of proceeds from licensing out technology and 
know-how received in any quarter of the calendar year is divided by the 
aggregated amount of Production Costs in the same quarter and multiplied 
by the Production Costs of the individual Participants in that quarter.
[This Article 11 authorizes the licensing out of the Results from Global Activities 
under the precondition that proceeds are shared proportionally among partici-
pants: If total Net Sales of a Participant in a quarter is 100 and the total Net Sales 
of all Participants in that quarter is 1,000, then this Participant is allocated 10% 
of the income from licensing out marketing intangibles in that quarter and its 
balancing payment is positively adjusted accordingly. If total Production Cost of 
a Participant in a quarter is 100 and the total Production Cost of all Participants 
in that quarter is 1,000, then this Participant is allocated 10% of the income from 
licensing out technology and know-how in that quarter and its balancing payment 
is also positively adjusted.] 
Article 12: Newly Admitted and Departing Participants 
1. If a new Participant is admitted as a Participant under this Agreement 
(hereinafter referred to as: “New Participant”), the existing Participants or 
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the New Participant, as the case may be, will make additional Balancing 
Payments to the other in an amount equal to the difference, if any, between 
the value of any Pre-existing Contributions made by the New Participant 
and the value of the tangible and intangible assets made available by the 
existing Participants to the New Participant upon its admittance. 
2. Any New Participant will agree to undertake or otherwise participate in all 
necessary and appropriate steps to vest legal title, but not effective owner-
ship, in [X US, X UK, X Singapore and/or its designee(s)] of all and any intel-
lectual property rights included in the intangible assets made available to 
the existing Participants under Paragraph 1 of this Article 12.
3. If a Participant (hereinafter referred to as: “Departing Participant”) termi-
nates its participation in this Agreement and relinquishes its beneficial 
interests in tangible and intangible assets, the remaining Participants will 
make additional Balancing Payments to the Departing Participant in an 
amount that accounts for the value to the remaining Participants of any 
tangible or intangible assets acquired from the Departing Participant upon 
its departure. 
4.  The valuation of tangible and intangible assets for purposes of determining 
the compensation referred to in Paragraph 1 and 3 of this Article 12 will 
observe the guidance provided in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as 
in force at the time of such valuation.
[This Article 12 sets out the conditions under which new participants can be 
admitted under the CCA or existing participants can depart. Most relevantly it 
arranges for buy-in and buy-out payments, in case either event causes the effective 
transfer of assets between the participants.]
Article 13: Withholding Tax, Indirect Tax and Other Levies
1.   All Balancing Payments under this Agreement will be made free and 
clear of, and without reduction for or on account of, any present or future 
income, stamp or other taxes, levies, imposts, duties, charges, fees, deduc-
tions or withholdings, now or hereafter imposed, levied, collected, with-
held or assessed by any governmental authority or any political subdivi-
sion or taxing authority thereof or therein (such taxes herein referred to as: 
Foreign Taxes). 
2.  If any Foreign Taxes are required to be withheld from any Balancing 
Payments under this Agreement for which the recipient nor any other 
member of [the X Group] is able to take a tax credit, the amount of the 
Balancing Payment shall be increased to the extent necessary to yield to 
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the recipient the amounts payable under this Agreement after payment of 
all those Foreign Taxes.
[This Article 13 arranges how withholding tax on balancing payments, if any, is to 
be handled. To the extent that such withholding tax is not creditable to the recip-
ient of the balancing payment, it is considered at arm’s length for the participant 
making the balancing payment to bear such tax cost.]
Article 14: Representation and Warranty
1. Participants make no express or implied representations, warranties or 
guarantees relating to the Results from Global Activities.
2. Participants shall use reasonable efforts to perform Global Activities in a 
professional and workmanlike manner consistent with industry standards.
3. No Participant shall be liable to any other Participant for the consequences 
of any failure or delay in performing any of its obligations under this Agree-
ment, other than for damages arising from such Participant’s gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct. 
4. In no event shall a Participant be liable to any other Participant hereto for 
special, exemplary, incidental, direct, indirect or consequential damages 
(including, without limitation, lost revenues profits, savings or business) or 
loss of records or data, whether or not the possibility of such damages has 
been disclosed to it or could have been reasonably foreseen by it and whether 
in an action based on contract, warranty, strict liability, tort (including, 
without limitation, negligence) or otherwise. Any Participant’s maximum 
liability for any claim, loss or other liability arising out of or connected with 
this agreement, shall in no case exceed the aggregate amounts paid to such 
Participant under this agreement during the preceding six months. Each 
Participant’s entire liability and the other Participants’ remedies under this 
Agreement shall be subject to the limitations contained in this Paragraph. 
[This Article 14 provides for representations and warranties between participants. 
They can be modified as considered appropriate in light of facts and circumstances 
of a specific case.]
Article 15: Term and Termination 
1. This Agreement shall be deemed to be effective as of [date] and shall 
remain in full force and effect until its termination in accordance with this 
Article 15. 
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2. Participants can terminate their participation in this Agreement at their 
own discretion by issuing a written request to [X UK] observing at least six 
months prior notice.
2. This Agreement shall be terminated automatically and with immediate 
effect with respect to a Participant in the event of that Participant’s liquida-
tion, bankruptcy or state of insolvency.
3. [X UK] shall have the right to terminate this Agreement with respect to a 
Participant with immediate effect in the event of any change of more the 
[25%] in the Participant’s shareholders or management.  
4.   [X UK] shall have the right to terminate this Agreement with respect to a 
Participant if such Participant does not remedy a material default within 
ninety (90) days of having received a written notice from [X UK].
[This Article 15 outlines how the CCA can be terminated. This example assumes an 
open ended agreement. However, parties could also agree a fixed term.]
Article 16: Miscellaneous Provisions
1. To the extent that any of the provisions contained in this Agreement shall 
be determined to be invalid or unenforceable, no such invalidity or unen-
forceability shall affect the validity or enforceability of the remaining 
provisions contained herein. The invalid or unenforceable provision shall 
be construed as an undertaking of the Participants to make all efforts to 
procure and effect any amendment or alteration as may be necessary to 
carry out the intention of the provision in question.
2. The failure of any intended Participant or Participants to execute this 
Agreement, or the cancellation, termination or invalidity (in whole or in 
part) of this Agreement with respect to any Participant or Participants, 
shall not affect the validity or continuation of this Agreement with respect 
to any Participant or Participants.
3. Modification, amendment or waiver of this Agreement or provision hereof 
shall only be binding upon any Participant, if made in writing or confirmed 
in writing by their duly authorized representatives.
4. The Participants agree to make any amendments to this Agreement as 
may be necessary to ensure compliance with any applicable existing or 
future tax laws as well as fiscal rules and regulations.  Whenever possible, 
the Participants agree to construe the terms of this Agreement to comply 
with any applicable legal requirements.
6. In case of termination of this Agreement, the Participants will fulfill all of 
their obligations due before the termination.
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7. The rights and obligations of the Participants under this Agreement are 
entirely personal and this Agreement shall not be assigned without the 
prior written consent of all Participants.
8. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to create a partnership 
among the Participants or to cause any activities undertaken pursuant to 
this Agreement to constitute a place of business or permanent establish-
ment in the meaning of Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
9. This Agreement contains no stipulations or provisions for the benefit of a 
third party or which could be invoked by a third party against a Participant 
to this Agreement.
10. This Agreement may be executed by the Participants in separate counter-
parts each of which, when so executed and delivered, shall be deemed to 
constitute an original but all of which together shall constitute one and the 
same agreement.
11. This agreement will be governed by the law of the [country] and is subject 
to adjudication by [name of appropriate Court] in case of any arguments or 
disagreements. 
[This Article 16 provides for some further general arrangements, which also can be 
tailored to accommodate the specific wishes of participants within the margins of 
what would be acceptable between third parties.] 
Agreed and accepted with effect from [date].
By and on behalf of:
[X US]  [X UK]
_____________________________ _____________________________
[X Singapore] [X …]
_____________________________ _____________________________
Appendix I: Specification of Geographical Territories per Participant
Appendix II: Specification of Pre-existing Contributions
Appendix III: Specification of Current Contributions
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Nederlandstalige Samenvatting
Introductie
Voor zover mij bekend bestaat er geen Nederlandse vertaling voor het Engelse 
woord cost contribution arrangement. Dit soort overeenkomsten, die meestal 
wordt gesloten door vennootschappen die onderdeel van de dezelfde multi-
nationale onderneming uitmaken, wordt hierna aangeduid met de afkorting 
“CCA”. Een CCA heeft tot doel bepaalde activiteiten uit te voeren voor geza-
menlijke rekening en risico van de deelnemende groepsmaatschappijen. Die 
activiteiten kunnen bestaan uit het verrichten van concerndiensten en het 
ontwikkelen van nieuwe bedrijfsmiddelen (materiële of immateriële activa). 
De deelnemers worden gezamenlijk economisch eigenaar van de resultaten, 
terwijl om niet-fiscale redenen vaak één groepsmaatschappij als juridisch eige-
naar wordt aangewezen. De kosten van de gezamenlijke activiteiten worden 
verhoudingsgewijs verdeeld al naargelang de deelnemers een voordeel uit hun 
individuele exploitatie van de resultaten verwachten. Daarmee onderscheidt 
een CCA zich van de meest gangbare samenwerkingsverbanden tussen onaf-
hankelijke derden, die doorgaans voorzien in een gezamenlijke exploitatie van 
de resultaten, waarbij deelnemers dan tot de winst zijn gerechtigd al naarge-
lang zij in de kosten hebben gedeeld. Een CCA werkt dus precies andersom en 
regelt tegelijk hoe de eigendom van de eventueel ontwikkelde bedrijfsmiddelen 
tussen de deelnemers wordt verdeeld. Dit laatste is uiteraard van groot belang, 
als aan die bedrijfsmiddelen een groot deel van de toekomstige bedrijfswinsten 
kan worden toegerekend, zoals het geval kan zijn wanneer het waardevolle 
immateriële activa betreft.
Onderzoeksdoelstellingen
Er zijn naar mijn mening twee ontwikkelingen te onderkennen, die een verder 
academisch onderzoek naar de fiscale behandeling van de CCA rechtvaardigen. 
De eerste bestaat uit het steeds verder toenemende belang van immateriële 
activa, vooral voor multinationale ondernemingen. De tweede betreft de zorg 
om belastingontwijking door diezelfde multinationals, onder anderen door 
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mobiele bronnen van inkomen zoals kapitaal, risico en immateriële activa naar 
laag belastende jurisdicties te verplaatsen. De cumulatie van deze twee ontwik-
kelingen heeft ertoe geleid dat de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwer-
king en Ontwikkeling (“OESO”) het versterken van de regels voor het vaststellen 
van verrekenprijzen, juist ook met betrekking tot transacties waar immateriële 
activa bij zijn betrokken, tot een speerpunt heeft gemaakt van haar recente 
project gericht op het tegengaan van grondslaguitholling en winstverschuiving. 
Ook het herschrijven van het hoofdstuk over CCA’s in de OESO-Verrekenprij-
zenrichtlijnen maakte hier onderdeel van uit. In dat kader en met het uitgangs-
punt dat het misbruik van CCA’s voor doeleinden van belastingontwijking dient 
te worden bestreden, maar dan wel zonder daarbij het bona fide gebruik van 
deze overeenkomsten in te perken, heb ik de volgende onderzoeksdoelstel-
lingen geformuleerd:
(i) de historische achtergrond en de initiële bedoeling van CCA’s te onder-
zoeken en de ontwikkeling vast te stellen van het conceptuele denken over 
deze overeenkomsten als een legitiem instrument voor het structureren 
van intra-groep transacties en als een middel om belasting te ontwijken;
(ii) de legitieme redenen voor het gebruik van een CCA te identificeren, de rol 
van dit soort overeenkomst in op belastingontwijking gerichte structuren 
te bepalen en een model voor te stellen om een analyse van het gebruik van 
een CCA in de praktijk te faciliteren;
(iii) de belangrijkste wet- en regelgeving, in het bijzonder de Amerikaanse 
regelgeving en de OESO-Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen, als ook jurisprudentie 
betrekking hebbend op CCA’s te analyseren en te vergelijken;
(iv) een stappenplan en een model contract voor de implementatie van een 
fiscaal acceptabele CCA te ontwikkelen;
(v) de positie van CCA’s onder internationaal belastingrecht en hun kwalifi-
catie onder belastingverdragen te onderzoeken en vast te stellen wanneer 
deze tot een buitenlandse belastingplicht van deelnemers kan leiden;
(vi) verbeteringen te beschouwen, die zogenoemd CFC-wetgeving beter in 
staat stellen om belastingontwijking met gebruik van CCA’s tegen te gaan; 
en
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(vii) voorstellen te doen tot verbetering van procedures voor het verkrijgen van 
zekerheid vooraf en het wegnemen van dubbele belastingheffing, die ertoe 
leiden dat deze procedures effectiever worden in situaties waarin een CCA 
is betrokken.
Historische Achtergrond van het CCA Concept (1ste Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
De eerste officiële regelgeving waarin CCA’s expliciet worden geadresseerd is 
de Amerikaanse verrekenprijzenregelgeving uit de jaren zestig van de vorige 
eeuw. Het daar geïntroduceerde begrip “bona fide cost sharing arrangement” of 
“CSA” ziet nog uitsluitend op overeenkomsten gericht op het ontwikkelen van 
immateriële activa. In de toelichtende publicaties is duidelijk aangegeven hoe 
de gezamenlijke ontwikkeling onder deze overeenkomsten het overdragen of 
het in licentie geven van de immateriële activa tussen verbonden partijen tot 
een minimum zou moeten beperken en daardoor lastige waarderingsproble-
matiek zou moeten voorkomen. In 1979 neemt de OESO het concept onder 
de naam CCA over in een voorloper van de huidige Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen. 
Daarbij stelt zij nog expliciet vast dat dergelijke overeenkomsten in de Ameri-
kaanse ervaring niet buitensporig vaak voor doeleinden van belastingont-
wijking worden gebruikt. In de jaren daarna verandert deze opvatting echter. 
In de Verenigde Staten wordt in 1995 specifiek op CSA’s gerichte regelgeving 
gepubliceerd, die in 2002 integraal wordt herzien vanwege een vermoeden 
dat de overeenkomsten worden gebruikt om immateriële activa tegen onza-
kelijke voorwaarden naar het buitenland weg te sluizen. In 2011 resulteert dit 
in nieuwe Amerikaanse regelgeving. De bezorgdheid over belastingontwijking 
door multinationals in het algemeen en misbruik van CCA’s in het bijzonder 
leeft echter veel breder. Dit is aanleiding voor de G20 om in 2012 de OESO te 
vragen een internationaal offensief tegen grondslaguitholling en winstverschui-
ving te coördineren. De OESO stelt vervolgens een Actieplan op, waarbij het 
versterken van de Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen, inclusief een herziening van het 
daarin opgenomen hoofdstuk over CCA’s, een prominente plaats inneemt. Het 
nieuwe Hoofdstuk 8 van de Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen wordt uiteindelijk op 5 
oktober 2015 gepubliceerd.
Legitiem Gebruik en Belastingontwijking (2e Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
CCA’s bieden multinationals de mogelijkheid om kennis en ervaring op effec-
tieve wijze beschikbaar te stellen aan de verschillende groepsmaatschappijen. 
Ze stellen de groep ook in staat de met onderzoek en ontwikkeling gepaard 
gaande risico’s te delen en zo grootschaliger projecten te ondernemen. Dit kan 
334
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING
in een enkele parapluovereenkomst worden geregeld, zodat het niet nodig is 
een complex web van individuele overeenkomsten tussen verschillende groeps-
maatschappijen te sluiten. Tegelijkertijd voorkomt het uitgangspunt dat deel-
nemende groepsmaatschappijen vanaf het ontstaan van nieuw ontwikkelde 
activa gezamenlijk effectief eigenaar worden, dat deze activa nog moeten 
worden overgedragen of in licentie worden gegeven, zodat het onnodig naar 
voren halen van fiscale winst wordt voorkomen en complexe waarderingsvraag-
stukken worden vermeden. Tot slot kunnen CCA’s duidelijkheid verschaffen over 
de kostenverdeling en bieden zij de mogelijkheid de fiscale acceptatie hiervan 
op een efficiënte wijze door belastingautoriteiten te laten toetsen. 
Tegenover deze legitieme voordelen van CCA’s staat dat de overeenkomsten 
ook zijn ingezet voor het verschuiven van belastbare winst van hoger naar 
lager belastende jurisdicties. Daarbij wordt met name gebruik gemaakt van 
twee controversiële elementen in de fiscale behandeling van CCA’s. Het eerste 
hier bedoelde element betreft de lange tijd geaccepteerde deelname aan een 
CCA van entiteiten met weinig reële economische capaciteit (“substance”). Het 
tweede element bestaat eruit dat CCA’s traditioneel voorzagen in een compen-
satie van onder deze overeenkomsten verrichte activiteiten tegen kostprijs. 
Samen maakten beide elementen het mogelijk dat een kasgeldvennootschap 
met minimale werknemers of activiteiten, gevestigd in een laag belastend land, 
door deelname in een CCA tegen een beperkte vergoeding mede-eigenaar kon 
worden van feitelijk in een hoog belastend land ontwikkelde nieuwe immate-
riële activa. Als deze vervolgens bijvoorbeeld aan andere groepsmaatschap-
pijen in licentie werden gegeven, was het effectieve resultaat dat door royalty-
betalingen een aanzienlijk deel van de groepswinst naar een fiscaalvriendelijker 
omgeving kon worden geleid. 
In Paragraaf 2.3.3.2 van mijn proefschrift wordt een categorisatiemodel voor-
gesteld dat fiscalisten kan helpen een bepaalde situatie te analyseren en vast te 
stellen of een CCA een legitiem instrument is om tot passende verrekenprijzen 
voor interne transacties te komen of juist een verhoogd risico op een onza-
kelijke uitkomst met zich brengt. Dit model gaat ervan uit dat bij het gebruik 
van een CCA voor de ontwikkeling van immateriële activa twee aspecten van 
bijzonder belang zijn: De rol van de betreffende activa in de waardeketen van 
de multinational en de wijze waarop die multinational zijn organisatiestructuur 
heeft ingericht. Wat betreft de rol van de immateriële activa in de waardeketen 
kan een onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen twee verschillende typen imma-
teriële activa. Het eerste type betreft waardevolle, innovatieve immateriële 
activa, die een geheel nieuw product of productieproces mogelijk maken of 
een bestaand product of productieproces ingrijpend verbeteren. Het tweede 
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type betreft minder waardevolle, meer marginale immateriële activa, die een 
bestaand product of productieproces slechts beperkt verbeteren. De innova-
tieve immateriële activa komt men stereotypisch tegen in hightech sectoren, 
zoals de farmaceutische en software industrie, de marginale immateriële activa 
vindt men in meer traditionele sectoren, zoals de bulkchemie. Het tweede als 
onderdeel van het categorisatiemodel te beschouwen aspect, de organisatie-
structuur van de belastingplichtige, maakt een onderscheid tussen centraal 
uitgeoefende en decentraal uitgeoefende ontwikkelingsactiviteiten. Bij een 
gecentraliseerde organisatie worden de activiteiten door een beperkt aantal 
groepsmaatschappijen uitgevoerd en bij een gedecentraliseerde organisatie 
juist door meerdere. Vanwege de ongelijke bijdragen van verschillende deelne-
mers lijkt het minder voor de hand te liggen om gecentraliseerde ontwikkelings-
activiteiten door middel van een CCA te structureren dan gedecentraliseerde 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten. Als de beide aspecten op verschillende assen tegen 
elkaar worden afgezet, resulteert dat in het volgende model:
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Bij CCA’s uit het noordoostelijke kwartiel ‘B’ is sprake van een verhoogd risico op 
een onzakelijke uitkomst en dus op oneigenlijk gebruik. Bij CCA’s uit het zuid-
westelijke kwartiel ‘C’ is de kans hierop aanzienlijk minder groot. 
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Amerikaanse CSA Regelgeving vs. OESO Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen  
(3de Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
Als het gaat om het tegengaan van grondslaguitholling en winstverschuiving 
kiezen de Amerikaanse belastingautoriteiten en de OESO een fundamenteel 
andere benadering. De Amerikaanse regelgeving stelt traditioneel geen eisen 
aan de reële economische capaciteit van deelnemers. Bovendien kunnen onder 
een Amerikaanse CSA verrichte werkzaamheden met een kostenvergoeding, 
dat wil zeggen zonder winstelement, worden gecompenseerd. Daarentegen 
gaat de Amerikaanse regelgeving ervan uit dat deelnemers een hoge inkoop-
vergoeding toekomt, indien zij zich bij het aangaan van de CSA committeren 
bepaalde activiteiten voor niet meer dan een kostenvergoeding te verrichten. 
Tot nu toe heeft deze benadering de rechterlijke toets echter niet succesvol 
kunnen doorstaan. In de zaken “Veritas” en “Amazon” oordeelde de rechter dat 
de wijze waarop de Amerikaanse IRS de inkoopvergoeding berekende niet in 
overeenstemming was met de geldende regels en de zakelijkheidsstandaard. 
Beide zaken zijn nog gewezen onder oude, inmiddels vervangen regelgeving. 
De technische onderbouwing van de uitspraken geven echter geen aanleiding 
voor hoop op een andere uitkomst onder de recentere, aangepaste regelgeving. 
Ten eerste wezen de rechters tot nu toe de veronderstelling van de hand dat 
“zachte” elementen, zoals de aanwezigheid van deskundig en ervaren perso-
neel of de ondernemingskans geboden door de mogelijkheid om deel te nemen 
aan de CSA, als een immaterieel activum kunnen worden aangemerkt dat zelf-
standig tegen een vergoeding kan worden overgedragen. Ten tweede gingen 
zij niet mee in de waardering op geaggregeerde basis van deze mengelmoes 
van veronderstelde immateriële activa. Dat is niet onlogisch, aangezien het 
onderling verband tussen deze activa beperkt is en zij doorgaans een zeer van 
elkaar verschillende levensduur hebben. Tot slot kan worden opgemerkt dat het 
vereiste om een inkoopvergoeding vast te stellen indruist tegen de bedoeling 
van het Amerikaans Congres bij de herbevestiging van de CSA als een legitiem 
instrument voor het structureren van groepstransacties, namelijk om complexe 
waarderingsvraagstukken te vermijden. 
In het licht van het voorgaande lijkt de alternatieve aanpak van de OESO niet 
alleen systematisch zuiverder, maar ook doelmatiger. Deze bestaat uit twee 
fundamentele wijzigingen in Hoofdstuk 8 van de Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen 
over CCA’s. Ten eerste wordt onder de aangepaste Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen als 
voorwaarde gesteld dat elke deelnemer aan een CCA de risico’s ten aanzien van 
zijn deelname dient te controleren. Wanneer een groepsmaatschappij daaren-
tegen de reële economische capaciteit ontbeert om een dergelijke controle uit te 
oefenen, dan kan deze groepsmaatschappij per definitie niet deelnemen en zijn 
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belastingautoriteiten zo nodig bevoegd de transacties onder de CCA fiscaal te 
herkwalificeren. Ten tweede vereisen de herziene Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen dat 
op enkele uitzonderingen na alle bijdragen onder een CCA op marktconforme 
basis, dat wil zeggen in de regel met inbegrip van een winstelement, worden 
gewaardeerd. Dit betekent dat in het bijzonder voor waardevolle ontwikke-
lingsactiviteiten een hogere compensatie zal moeten worden betaald, terwijl 
enkel het verstrekken van passieve financiering niet meer kan opleveren dan 
een risico-gecorrigeerde rente. Ook dit vraagt een zekere waarderingsinspan-
ning. Echter, deze wordt veel overzichtelijker en minder complex door de indi-
viduele bijdragen elk voor zich te beschouwen en de eerder vermelde “zachte” 
immateriële activa, zoals ervaren en deskundig personeel of een unieke onder-
nemingskans, in aanmerking te nemen als datgene wat ze daadwerkelijk zijn: 
Een vergelijkingsfactor die mee dient te worden gewogen bij het bepalen van 
de waarde van onder de CCA verrichte activiteiten.
Een Zakelijke CCA (4e Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
Met in acht name van het voorgestelde categorisatiemodel en de herziene OESO 
regels kan het volgende stappenplan worden opgesteld voor het opzetten van 
een zakelijke, fiscaal acceptabele CCA:
1. De onder de CCA te verrichten werkzaamheden dienen te worden geïden-
tificeerd. Aandeelhoudersactiviteiten en duplicatie van diensten dienen 
hiervan te worden uitgesloten en ook dienen geen werkzaamheden te 
worden inbegrepen die geen of slechts een incidenteel voordeel voor 
andere groepsmaatschappijen opleveren.
2. Het dient te worden zeker gesteld dat alle deelnemende groepsmaatschap-
pijen met hun deelname aan de CCA een voordeel verwachten te behalen 
dat uit meer bestaat dan een geldelijke vergoeding voor het verrichten van 
werkzaamheden.
3. Het dient te worden zeker gesteld dat alle deelnemende groepsmaatschap-
pijen de aan de CCA gerelateerde risico’s gezamenlijk controleren. Dat wil 
zeggen dat elke deelnemer voldoende deskundig personeel in dienst dient 
te hebben, dat afgewogen beslissingen neemt over het toetreden tot de 
CCA, het beëindigen van de deelname in de CCA, het doel en de strekking 
van de onder de CCA te verrichten werkzaamheden en het daarvoor beno-
digde budget.
338
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING
4. De economische en juridische eigendom van verwachte resultaten dient 
helder en eenduidig te worden verdeeld onder individuele deelnemers, bij 
voorkeur op een exclusieve wijze en zonder overlap.
5. Bijdragen in natura anders dan het verrichten van werkzaamheden, in het 
bijzonder ter beschikking gestelde immateriële platform activa, dienen te 
worden geïdentificeerd en op passende wijze te worden gewaardeerd.
6. Onder de CCA verrichte werkzaamheden dienen te worden geïdentificeerd 
en op passende wijze te worden gewaardeerd.
7. Een berekeningswijze voor compensatiebetalingen dient te worden over-
eengekomen. Deze dient erin te resulteren dat de totale bijdragen van alle 
deelnemers proportioneel zijn ten opzichte van hun verwachte voordeel 
uit hoofde van de CCA. Deze berekeningswijze dient prospectief te kunnen 
worden aangepast, indien de omvang van de te verrichten werkzaam-
heden of de aard van de ondernemingsactiviteiten van deelnemers veran-
dert dan wel de economische, commerciële of financiële omstandigheden 
waaronder zij opereren veranderen.
8. Optioneel kan een prijsaanpassingsclausule worden opgenomen ten 
aanzien van de hierboven onder punt 5 vermelde bijdragen. Een dergelijke 
clausule zou erin kunnen voorzien dat de waardering van deze bijdragen 
met terugwerkende kracht wordt aangepast, indien de resultaten uit de 
exploitatie van onder de CCA ontwikkelde nieuwe immateriële activa sterk 
afwijken van de oorspronkelijke verwachtingen.  
9. Indien het de bedoeling is dat onder de CCA ontwikkelde immateriële activa 
in licentie worden gegeven aan verbonden of niet-gelieerde niet-deel-
nemers worden gegeven, dient de juridische eigenaar hiertoe te worden 
gerechtigd onder de voorwaarde dat de opbrengst met andere deelnemers 
wordt gedeeld naar evenredigheid van de door hen uit de CCA verwachte 
voordelen. 
10. Tenslotte dient de toe- en uittreding van deelnemers als ook de beëindi-
ging van de CCA te worden geadresseerd. In het bijzonder dient te worden 
bepaald dat tussen deelnemers een zakelijke vergoeding zal worden 
betaald, indien een dergelijke gebeurtenis tot een overdracht van bedrijfs-
middelen leidt. 
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In Paragraaf 11.5 is dit stappenplan toegepast op een gestileerde casus, waar-
voor aldaar tevens een model contract is uitgewerkt.
Buitenlandse Belastingplicht als gevolg van Deelname aan een CCA  
(5e Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
Er bestaat weinig specifieke regelgeving ten aanzien van de positie van CCA’s 
onder internationaal belastingrecht of de kwalificatie van deze overeen-
komsten onder bilaterale belastingverdragen. De fiscale praktijk is daarom 
meestal aangewezen op meer algemene bepalingen in nationale wetgeving en 
verdragen. In dit kader kan ten eerste worden opgemerkt dat op zichzelf deel-
name in een CCA geen aanleiding zou moeten zijn om een vaste inrichting en 
een bijbehorende buitenlandse belastingplicht vast te stellen. Hoewel onder 
een CCA kosten en risico’s van bepaalde bedrijfsactiviteiten worden gedeeld, 
blijven de in dat kader gebruikte bedrijfsmiddelen ter beschikking van hun juri-
dische eigenaar, die ze aanwendt in het kader van de eigen bedrijfsuitoefening. 
Ten einde elke nog bestaande onduidelijkheid hierover weg te nemen, is in 
Paragraaf 8.2 een voorstel gedaan voor een aan het commentaar bij Artikel 5 
van het OESO-Modelverdrag toe te voegen tekst.
Verder dient te worden onderkend dat compensatiebetalingen kunnen zijn 
onderworpen aan bronstaatheffing. Dit doet zich voor als onder het natio-
nale recht van de bronstaat of een toepasselijk belastingverdrag een derge-
lijke belasting is verschuldigd, bijvoorbeeld indien de compensatiebetaling als 
een royalty wordt aangemerkt. Dat zou het geval zijn, wanneer de betaling 
is gerelateerd aan het gebruik van een immaterieel activum en de betalende 
groepsmaatschappij in ruil voor de betaling geen proportioneel aandeel in de 
effectieve eigendom van dat immateriële activum verkrijgt. Daarvan is sprake 
indien (i) het een vooraf bestaand, dus niet nieuw ontwikkeld activum betreft, 
dat onder de CCA ter beschikking wordt gesteld zonder dat de eigendom ervan 
wordt overgedragen of (ii) het een nieuw ontwikkeld activum betreft, waarvan 
de eigendom niet proportioneel wordt gedeeld, dat wil zeggen waarin ten 
minste één andere participant een meer absoluut eigendomsrecht verkrijgt 
(bijvoorbeeld wanneer deze overbedeelde participant het immateriële activum 
op eigen gelegenheid aan derden in licentie kan geven of vervreemden, zonder 
de opbrengst met andere CCA deelnemers te hoeven delen).Verder kunnen 
compensatiebetalingen ook aan bronbelasting zijn onderworpen, indien zij als 
inkomen uit dienstverlening worden gekwalificeerd. Het ligt meer voor de hand 
dat dit zal gebeuren, indien de betaling niet alleen uit een kostenvergoeding 
bestaat maar ook een winstelement bevat. Dat laatste zal in de toekomst vaker 
het geval zijn, nu de herziene OESO-Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen een waardering 
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van alle bijdragen op marktconforme basis voorschrijven. Dat neemt niet weg 
dat het een uitzonderingssituatie zal blijven, omdat de meeste landen inkomen 
uit dienstverlening aan het woon- in plaats van het bronland toewijzen. Dat geldt 
echter niet voor majeure, opkomende economieën, zoals India en Brazilië, die 
zich in hun bilaterale belastingverdragen doorgaans wel degelijk een heffings-
recht hebben voorbehouden voor een dergelijk inkomen. een stroomschema, 
dat de verschillende hier beschreven situaties van bronstaatheffing samenvat, 
is opgenomen in Paragraaf 8.3.
Potentiële Verbeteringen van CFC-Regels (6e Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
De huidige CFC-regelgeving is niet erg succesvol gebleken in het tegengaan 
van het gebruik van CCA’s om waardevolle immateriële activa aan dochter-
maatschappijen in laag of lager belastende jurisdicties te verplaatsen. Het is 
aannemelijk dat deze regelgeving effectiever zou zijn, indien zij het boven-
matig inkomen uit dergelijke immateriële activa in het belastbare inkomen van 
de moedermaatschappij zouden betrekken. Met de belastingherziening van 
2017 nemen de Verenigde Staten, die vaak zijn bekritiseerd om hun gebrekkige 
CFC-regelgeving en zogenoemde “check-the-box”-regime, hierin het voortouw. 
Het nieuwe regime is er op gericht al het inkomen van buitenlandse dochter-
maatschappijen, voor zover dit een forfaitair resultaat van 10% op hun mate-
riële activa overtreft, bij de Amerikaanse moeder te belasten tegen een effectief 
tarief van 10,5%. Daarbij kan de moedermaatschappij tot 80% van de eventuele 
buitenlandse belasting op dit inkomen verrekenen. Dit zorgt ervoor dat dubbele 
belastingheffing grotendeels wordt voorkomen en dat per saldo slechts een 
Amerikaanse bijheffing plaatsvindt, indien het buitenlandse belastingtarief 
lager is dan 13,125%. Door gelijktijdig een vergelijkbaar laag effectief tarief op 
met immateriële activa uit buitenlandse bron genoten inkomen in te voeren, zou 
het vanuit een Amerikaanse perspectief minder relevant moeten worden waar 
immateriële activa worden gehouden. Ten tijde van de afsluiting van dit manus-
cript is nog geen regelgeving gepubliceerd, waarin het nieuwe regime verder 
wordt uitgewerkt. Ook zal nog moeten blijken in welke mate de belastingad-
viespraktijk in staat blijkt ontgaan- en arbitragemogelijkheden te bedenken. Als 
de nieuwe regels echter effectief blijken, dan zou het de populariteit van CSA’s 
en CCA’s in agressieve structuren aanzienlijk kunnen verminderen. In dat geval 
is het niet onaannemelijk dat het nieuwe Amerikaanse regime ook in andere 
landen in min of meer vergelijkbare vorm zal worden overgenomen. 
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Potentiële Verbetering van Procedures voor het Verkrijgen van Zekerheid 
Vooraf en Regelingen van Onderling Overleg (7e Onderzoeksdoelstelling)
Criticasters van de zogenoemde “arm’s length standaard”, de internationale 
standard waaronder transacties tussen verbonden partijen tegen marktcon-
forme prijzen dienen te worden geprijsd, brengen vaker naar voren dat deze 
standaard te veel op principes en te weinig op regels is gebaseerd. Daardoor zou 
hij vatbaar zijn voor manipulatie en belastingontwijking mogelijk maken. Als 
alternatief wordt wel voorgesteld om bedrijfsresultaten formulematig tussen 
groepsmaatschappijen te verdelen, bijvoorbeeld op basis van omzet, vermogen, 
activa of werknemersaantallen. Dergelijke meer harde regels zouden minder 
ruimte bieden voor arbitrage. Een dergelijk stelsel zal echter alleen mogelijk 
zijn zonder een welvaartbeperkende hoeveelheid dubbele belastingheffing, 
wanneer het wereldwijd of regionaal op een consistente wijze wordt ingevoerd. 
Vanwege het tegengestelde belang tussen de verschillende grote economieën, 
is het echter onwaarschijnlijk dat over de parameters van het stelsel politieke 
overeenstemming kan worden bereikt. Dit accepterende is het beter om naar 
alternatieven te zoeken. Het versterken van procedures voor het verkrijgen 
van zekerheid vooraf of het verbeteren van regelingen voor onderling overleg 
tussen landen bij het oplossen van verrekenprijsconflicten zijn daar voorbeelden 
van. De OESO heeft aan beide aandacht besteed als onderdeel van haar recente 
BEPS project. Helaas werden in de finale rapporten geen voorstellen gedaan, die 
er specifiek op waren gericht om de effectieve tijd van beide processen te verbe-
teren in situaties waarbij een CCA is betrokken. Dat is een gemiste kans, omdat 
dergelijke situaties tot specifieke problemen kunnen leiden, die moeilijk, zo niet 
onmogelijk op te lossen zijn onder de bestaande procedures. De voornaamste 
reden daarvoor is dat een CCA meestal multilateraal is, dat willen zeggen deel-
nemers uit meer dan twee landen heeft. Bij gevolg heeft een afspraak over 
verrekenprijzen met overheden alleen sluitende dekking, indien alle betrokken 
autoriteiten hierop aftekenen. Indien meer multilaterale afspraken zouden 
worden gemaakt, zou dat niet alleen dubbele belastingheffing vermijden maar 
ook de transparantie vergroten, een beter inzicht in verrekenprijzenproble-
matiek geven, schadelijke belastingconcurrentie tussen landen tegengaan en 
een eerlijkere verdeling van de belastinggrondslag bewerkstelligen. Om deze 
redenen zou de OESO het bereiken van multilaterale afspraken verder moeten 
bespoedigen, bijvoorbeeld door een standaard te ontwikkelen voor het verzoek 
dat belastingplichtigen zouden moeten indienen wanneer zij een CCA willen 
voorleggen en deze te publiceren als een bijlage bij Hoofdstuk 8 van de Verre-
kenprijzenrichtlijnen. In Paragraaf 10.2 is een aanzet voor een dergelijke stan-
daard gegeven, door de minimale inhoud ervan verder uit te werken.
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De effectiviteit van regelingen voor onderling overleg opgenomen in modelbe-
lastingverdragen wordt beperkt door hun niet-bindende en niet-verplichtende 
karakter. Er lijkt echter wel een positieve trend te zijn om meer bindende en 
verplichtende regelingen overeen te komen, zoals bijvoorbeeld ook is afge-
sproken in een EU-context. Daarnaast zou het helpen om onenigheid over de 
uitkomst van CCA’s op te lossen, wanneer artikel 25 in het OESO modelverdrag 
zou worden uitgebreid met een regeling voor situaties waarin een aanpassing 
van verrekenprijzen in meer dan twee landen nodig is om economische dubbele 
belastingheffing te voorkomen. In Paragraaf 10.3 is hier een voorstel voor opge-
nomen, dat voorziet in een multilaterale of simultane bilaterale procedure. 
Overwegingen ter Afsluiting
CCA’s werden geïntroduceerd in de Verenigde Staten als een praktisch instru-
ment voor de juridische en fiscale structurering van interne ontwikkeling van 
immateriële activa door multinationale ondernemingen. Ze hadden tot doel 
verrekenprijzencomplexiteit te verminderen, maar zijn daar slechts deels 
succesvol in gebleken. Weliswaar maken ze het onder omstandigheden mogelijk 
een interne overdracht van immateriële activa uit de weg te gaan, maar tege-
lijkertijd leiden ze tot nieuwe waarderingsproblematiek wat betreft de verschil-
lende bijdragen aan de CCA van de deelnemers. Bovendien worden CCA’s in de 
praktijk vaak gebruikt in op belastingontwijking gerichte structuren. Dat laatste 
heeft de overeenkomsten tot het middelpunt van fiscaal debat gemaakt. Ik 
ben van mening dat bona fide CCA’s een bestaansrecht hebben als een legi-
tiem instrument voor de structurering van groepstransacties. In het bijzonder 
wanneer ze worden gebruikt in niet-artificiële juridische en economische struc-
turen. Daarbij is echter nadrukkelijk geen plaats voor deelname door brieven-
busmaatschappijen uit belastingparadijzen aan een CCA. Verder zouden alle 
bijdragen onder de CCA zoveel mogelijk op marktprijs moeten worden gewaar-
deerd, zowel wanneer het om de waardering van vooraf bestaande immate-
riële activa gaat als wanneer het de waardering van onder de CCA verrichte 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten betreft. De onder het BEPS project aangepaste 
Verrekenprijzenrichtlijnen van de OESO adresseren beide hiervoor vermelde 
punten. Als daarnaast CFC-regels worden aangepast, zodat laag belast exces-
sief rendement op immateriële activa bij de moedermaatschappij in de heffing 
wordt betrokken, dan ontstaat een beeld van een regime dat ruimte laat voor 
legitiem gebruik van CCA’s en tegelijkertijd oneigenlijke aanwending van deze 
overeenkomsten effectief tegengaat. Ik hoop dat mijn onderzoek op relevante 
deelgebieden een bijdrage kan leveren aan de verdere invulling van een derge-
lijk regime.
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Technological advancement and globalization have dramatically impacted the business 
models of multinational enterprises (“MNEs’’). This has complicated the taxation of these 
enterprises significantly. It becomes especially complex, when companies belonging to the 
same multinational group collectively develop (intangible) business assets or centralize 
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sets out to determine how effective those rules are at facilitating legitimate CCAs while 
countering their use in tax avoidance structures.
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